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Human rights orientation and the assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict¹

Abstract: Based on a concept of human rights commitment that includes both a cognitive (rejection of human rights restrictions) and an affective component (concern for the victims of human rights violations), the present paper uses Latent-Class Analysis in order to differentiate different forms of consistent and inconsistent human rights orientations, and relates them to participants' assessments of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The results of the study indicate that a consistent human rights commitment promotes pacifism, reduces moral disengagement and counteracts anti-Palestinian as well as anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic attitudes. At the same time, however, it exerts pressure to take a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it supports partisanship for the Palestinians, and it strengthens the tendency to dramatize foreign affairs and to call for action against Israeli policy. Nonetheless, it reduces the tendency to a one-sided attribution of guilt to Israel and decreases anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against Jews in general and/or that tend to restrict the rights of the Jews.

1. Introduction

As a reaction to the crimes of National Socialism elevated to international law (cf. Kopf-Beck, 2011; Schulze, 2012) the UN Declaration of Human Rights can be understood as a torch raised against war and discrimination against human beings which contains a catalogue of moral norms that, among other things, not only strongly rejects militarism, but also forms a counterweight to every form of racism.

The idea of human rights can only develop this potential if the abstract norms of human rights are transferred to concrete problem situations and are made constitutive of attitudes toward war and racism. That a human rights commitment furthers such a transfer is the overarching hypothesis of the present paper, which in the following we translate into a series of individual hypotheses and examine on the basis of the positions of German participants toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as their attitude toward anti-Semitic and Islamophobic stereotypes.

That and why this transfer is not self-evident is explained by Bandura's (1986, 1999) theory of *moral disengagement*, which describes the various different mechanisms by means of which moral principles can be deactivated in the concrete case. Bandura assumes that human beings usually orient their actions so that they harmonize with the moral standards acquired in the course of socialization. If these are violated, this is connected with a loss of self-esteem which can, however, be avoided if concrete action is disengaged from the moral standard. This occurs through suitable constructions of subjective reality concerning (1) the evaluation of the reprehensible behavior, (2) the evaluation of its harmful consequences, (3) the question of responsibility and/or (4) the devaluation of the person harmed.

In particular, Bandura distinguishes eight different mechanisms of moral disengagement, of which the first three concern the interpretation of the behavior itself and (1) justify it through higher moral aims (moral justification), (2) conceal its reprehensibility through the employment of euphemistic concepts (euphemistic labeling) and/or (3) trivialize it through comparisons with still worse alternatives (palliative comparison). A further three mechanisms concern (4) the interpretation of the consequences, whose harmfulness is hidden (minimizing, ignoring or misconstruing the consequences), as well as the responsibility for the consequences that (5) are shifted to other persons (displacement of responsibility) or (6) minimized by spreading them among many persons (diffusion of responsibility). The last two mechanisms relate to the person harmed, who (7) in the extreme case is no longer perceived as a human being, but rather as an enemy (dehumanization) and (8) is even accused of making the reprehensible behavior unavoidable (attribution of blame).

That these mechanisms are closely connected with the attitude toward war and peace is, among other things, shown in studies by Cohrs & Moscher (2002), as well as Eckstein-Jackson & Sparr (2005). Cohrs & Moscher showed using the case of the Kosovo conflict that there was a negative relationship between pacifism and ignoring the negative effects of the war (ignoring negative consequences), fending off responsibility (displacement of responsibility) and belief in the humanitarian motivation (moral justification). As Eckstein-Jackson & Sparr were able to show by means of a factor analysis, however, moral disengagement and militarism

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(as the polar opposite of pacifism) are only in part overlapping phenomena. Moral disengagement can be understood as a more strongly justice-related concept than militarism, which according to Cohrs (2004) consists of several dimensions, whereby the moral assessment of war represents only one of the constitutive attributes of militarism. Nevertheless, the authors assume that moral disengagement is a necessary precondition for the development and maintenance of militaristic attitudes, and to be sure particularly for those aspects of militarism that have a stronger relevance to questions of justice and ethics.

Our first hypotheses are then that a human rights commitment weakens the tendency toward moral disengagement and induces a negative attitude towards war and militarism:

- The more people are committed to human rights, the *less* they will tend toward moral disengagement (H1) and the *stronger* their pacifist attitudes will be (H2).

Already Zellman & Sears (1971) maintained that the approval of human rights principles cannot be equated with a commitment to realizing these principles. Since human rights principles are codified in the constitutions of most Western democracies, their approval may simply be due to social desirability and/or political correctness (Kopf-Beck, 2011). Furthermore, it is precisely the nature of moral disengagement that in the concrete case it deactivates norms internalized in the course of socialization. As human rights commitment we therefore understand not merely a consensual attitude toward human rights principles, but rather an attitude that rejects every limitation of human rights and stands up for the victims of human rights violations.

The assumption that a human rights commitment should also lead to a reduction of xenophobic attitudes of every sort is highly plausible because of the universality of human rights. Our further hypotheses are, thus, that a human rights commitment should go together with heightened sensitivity to the prejudicial character of not only anti-Semitic, but also anti-Zionist and anti-Palestinian stereotypes:

- The more people are committed to human rights, the *less* they will share anti-Semitic (H3), anti-Zionist (H4) and anti-Palestinian attitudes (H5);

With regard to anti-Semitism, drawing on Bergmann & Erb (1991a,b), Heyder et al. (2005) and Frindte (2006), we distinguish between various facets that Kempf (2013) has shown using modern item-response models to be in fact indicators for one and the same anti-Semitic attitude dimension.

Manifest or classical anti-Semitism refers to the open defamation of Jews via traditional prejudices and includes dislike of Jews, as well as the assumption of a Jewish world conspiracy and/or the demand to exclude Jews from political and economic processes.

Secondary anti-Semitism refers to the ways Germans deal with the Nazi past, the Holocaust and the question of guilt and responsibility. It includes defense mechanisms like perpetrator-victim reversal and/or the demand to close the books on the German-Jewish past.

Latent anti-Semitism, finally, refers to attempts to avoid publicly speaking about Jews. Whether there is a connection between these facets and the human rights orientation of the participants was recently studied by Kopf-Beck (2011) using a sample of school pupils ranging in age from 14 to 19. The results of his study showed in particular that there is a high negative correlation between the human rights orientation and the two facets of manifest and secondary anti-Semitism. To be sure, the human rights orientation likewise correlated negatively with the demand to close the books on the past, but the correlation was less strongly pronounced. Contrary to the author's assumption that the anti-Semitic valence of the demand to close the books was less pronounced in the third post-war generation, we assume that young people whose fathers and mothers did not personally experience the Holocaust experience the concept of collective guilt as discriminating. Thereby a process of moral disengagement is triggered that weakens the rejection of this aspect of secondary anti-Semitism.

As well, the negative correlation of human rights orientation with anti-Zionism was less strongly pronounced than that with manifest and latent anti-Semitism. How much this result explains is, however, questionable, because the anti-Zionism scale employed by Kopf-Beck has clear weaknesses. The scale consists of only two items² that, furthermore, cannot be subsumed (or at least not clearly subsumed) under the concept of *anti-Zionism* in the sense of prejudices against Israel's (alleged) Zionist state ideology.

According to Kempf (2013), at least two types of prejudice can be distinguished which can both serve as indicators for the same anti-Zionist attitude dimension: the blanket condemnation of Zionism as racist, etc., which Kempf refers to as *political-anti-Zionism*, and *generalizing criticism of Israel*, which quite simply makes the Jews responsible for Israel's policies.

As Kempf shows, a so-understood anti-Zionism, contrary to the earlier assumptions of other authors (e.g., Petzold, 2003; Frindte, 2006), does not represent a facet of anti-Semitism, but rather an independent attitude dimension that *can* admittedly be anti-Semitically motivated, but for which other motivational foundations can

² "Founding the state of Israel was a mistake," and "It would be preferable if the Jews left the Middle East."

also be constitutive – such as, e.g., a critical attitude with regard to the human rights situation in the occupied territories. Since they involve *blanket* prejudices, however, we assume that a human rights commitment should also unfold a moderating potential against anti-Zionist attitudes. Human rights are universally valid. Therefore, and regardless of his critique-deserving behavior, a human rights commitment should also exclude the defamation of the political opponent.

Human rights commitment should make no distinctions with regard to ethnic, religious and /or national membership, and therefore should sensitize people to not only the prejudicial content of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist stereotypes, but also likewise work against the prejudicial content of anti-Palestinian stereotypes and the devaluation of Palestinians, such as a blanket attribution of links between Palestinians (or Muslims) and terrorism and/or a demonization of Islam.

Empirical studies of the connection between human rights orientations and anti-Palestinian attitudes have not yet been made. There are, however, studies that point out that attitudes toward the Middle East conflict are strongly politically guided and not just a mere expression of sympathy or antipathy toward Jews and Palestinians (Bergmann, 2008, 493). Thus, among other things, a 1991 Emnid study shows that sympathy for the Palestinians correlates positively with sympathy for the Arab side, but has no influence on sympathy for the Jews in Israel. To the contrary: Anyone who lacks sympathy for the Jews in Israel has an above-average tendency to lack sympathy for the Palestinians, and anyone who sympathizes with the Israelis also tends to sympathize with the Palestinians.

Anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian attitudes appear to have a common foundation in a generally xenophobic attitude that should be negatively related to human rights commitment. If attitudes toward the Middle East conflict are strongly politically steered, however, it can be assumed that the formation of attitudes critical of Israel may also be affected by the perception and evaluation of the human rights situation in the occupied territories. Accordingly, we need to distinguish between two types of anti-Israeli attitudes: (1) attitudes directed against the Jews in general (like the insinuation that the way the Palestinians are treated shows the “true face” of the Jews) or that restrict the rights of the Jews (like the denial of the Jews’ right of residence), and (2) attitudes that involve partisanship for the rights of the Palestinians (such as the one-sided attribution of guilt and responsibility for the Middle East conflict to Israel and/or attitudes that dramatize the situation and call for action against Israeli policy.

This leads to our next hypotheses, which assume that human rights commitment has a negative effect on the first type of anti-Israeli attitudes but not on the second type, which it may even support:

- The more people are committed to human rights, the *less* they will share anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against Jews in general and/or restrict the rights of the Jews (H6), but the *more* they will share anti-Israeli attitudes that involve partisanship for the rights of the Palestinians (H7).

Moreover, we need to distinguish between (1) blanket anti-Israeli attitudes, on the one hand, and (2) the frames according to which participants make sense of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the other.

In order to reconstruct these frames, Kempf (2011) builds upon research by Deutsch (1973, 2000) which demonstrates that competitive conflicts are accompanied by specific misperceptions that become all the stronger the more escalated the conflict is. In addition, he draws on research by Bar-Tal (1998), who has shown that in long-lasting intractable conflicts these perceptual distortions harden into societal beliefs which become part of the psychic infrastructure that enables the members of a society to endure such conflicts. These beliefs include, among other things, belief in the justice of one’s own cause and one’s own victim status, delegitimizing the enemy, and belief in the maintenance of personal and national security through a policy of strength.

According to Kempf, such perceptual distortions are found on both sides of conflicts. Furthermore, virtually everyone who tries to make sense of a conflict will do so in one of two ways. He may either adopt a *war frame* that adopts one or the other party’s beliefs, or he may try to understand the conflict according to a *peace frame* that overcomes these perceptual distortions and accepts the justification (of at least some) of the demands of the opposing side, recognizes shared victim roles, refrains from delegitimizing the opponent and attempts to achieve personal and national security through a peace solution.

This leads to our last hypotheses, which assume that a human rights commitment exerts pressure to take a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that – due to the human rights situation in the occupied territories – is more pro-Palestinian than pro-Israeli and – due to increased pacifism, does not shift to a war frame.

- The more people are committed to human rights, the *less* they will avoid taking a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (H8), and the more they will tend to position themselves in a pro-Palestinian frame which is close to the edge of a war frame, but does not cross over (H9).

Due to an increase in pacifism and to increasing outrage over human rights violations committed by the respective opponent, finally, there should be a *curvilinear relation* between a human rights commitment and the tendency to interpret the conflict according to a war frame:

- Taking a position in accord with a *war frame* is most frequent among people whose human rights commitment is either *very weak* or *very strong* (H10).

2. Method

2.1 Scale construction

In order to classify participants with respect to their human rights orientation, we constructed an 8-items scale, focusing on four human rights principles that are particularly relevant for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: (1) right to life and physical integrity, (2) right to inviolability of dignity, (3) right to self-determination of peoples and (4) protection of minorities. For each of these rights we constructed one item that asked about the justifiability of human rights restrictions during crises and/or for purposes of (national) self-defense, and one item that inquired as to the imperative to defend the victims of human rights violations (cf. Table 1). Participants responded to the items on a five-point Likert-Scale ranging from complete disagreement to complete agreement.

Human rights principle	Justifiability of restricting human rights during crises and/or for purposes of (national) self-defence	Imperative to defend the victims of human rights violations (even at the risk of incurring disadvantages)
Right to life and physical integrity	<u>mere01</u> : Killing and torture can sometimes be necessary in order to prevent greater harm.	<u>mere05</u> : I find it intolerable that Europe sometimes accepts the deaths of refugees in order to protect itself from illegal immigrants
Right to inviolability of dignity	<u>mere02</u> : Some crimes are so bestial that the perpetrator forfeits his right to dignified treatment.	<u>mere06</u> : I do not want to have to take it lying down when the state violates the dignity of a human being
Right of self-determination of peoples	<u>mere03</u> : If a people lacks democratic maturity, it cannot be allowed to take its destiny in its own hands.	<u>mere07</u> : It depresses me that still today some peoples are denied their right of self-determination
Protection of minorities	<u>mere04</u> : If the general welfare is in danger, it can be necessary to limit the rights of minorities.	<u>mere08</u> : It makes me angry when I see how minorities are put at a disadvantage

Table 1, Construction principle and items of the human rights orientation scale.

2.2 Questionnaire

Besides the above-named *Human-Rights-Orientation Scale* (MERE), the questionnaire of the ASCI-survey on which this paper is based included amongst others the *Moral-Disengagement Scale* (MOR) by Eckstein-Jackson & Sparr (2005), the 6-item version of the *Pacifism Scale* (PAZ) by Cohrs et al. (2002), and a slightly modified version of the *Positioning Scale* (POS) by Kempf (2011), which classifies participants according to the way how they make sense of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into nine classes (cf. Kempf, 2013):

- Three of these classes are not sufficiently familiar with the conflict to be able to form an opinion. These classes consist of participants who neither agree nor disagree with the statements in the items (Class 9), who mainly respond in the "Don't know" category (Class 8), and/or who mainly do not respond to the items at all (Class 7).
- Three classes interpret the conflict according to a peace frame that is not completely neutral, but displays either sympathy for Israel (Class 6) or for the Palestinians (Class 2) and/or puts the blame on Israel (Class 4).
- Two classes interpret the conflict either according to a pro-Israeli (Class 5) or according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (Class 3), and another class interprets it according to a pro-Palestinian frame which is close to the edge of a war frame (Class 1).

With the exception of the pro-Israeli hard-liners, all these groups (even those who sympathize with Israel) share the view that the goal of Israeli policy is the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, they condemn Palestinian terror attacks (almost consistently) more harshly than Israeli military operations. The latter are condemned more harshly only by pro-Palestinian hard-liners, but nonetheless, they do *not* justify terror attacks (Kempf, 2013).

Moreover, the questionnaire included a number of ordinal homogeneous scales (cf. Kempf, 2013) for measuring anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, anti-Palestinian and anti-Israeli attitudes:

- three subscales for the measurement of manifest anti-Semitism – *Dislike of Jews* (MA1), *Conspiracy Theory* (MA2) and *Exclusion of Jews* (MA3);

- two subscales for the measurement of secondary anti-Semitism – *Closing the Books on the Past* (SA1) and *Perpetrator-victim Reversal* (SA3);
- a subscale for the measurement of latent anti-Semitism – *Avoiding Speaking about Jews* (LA).
- two subscales for the measurement of anti-Zionism – *Generalizing Criticism of Israel* (IA1) and *Political Anti-Zionism* (PA);
- three subscales for the measurement of anti-Palestinian attitudes – *Devaluation of Palestinians* (AP), *Connecting Palestinians and Muslims to Terrorism* (TK) and *Demonizing Islam* (IK); and
- three subscales for the measurement of anti-Israeli attitudes – *One-sided Attribution of Guilt* (PI01), *Dramatizing and Need for Action* (PI02) and *Denying the Jews' Right of Residence* (IA2).

Additionally, the questionnaire also included a single item that points to a direct connection between criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism:

"If you want to recognize the true face of the Jews, you only have to watch how they treat the Palestinians" (krit01p).

2.3 Samples

Survey-data were collected during the period between June and November 2010. The sample was a quota sample of $N = 998$ subjects, representative of Germany with respect to age, gender and school education. Half of the participants were chosen from an "old" state (Baden-Württemberg in Western Germany), and the other half from a "new" state (Thuringia in Eastern Germany). The ages of the participants ranged from 15 to 92 ($M = 47.86$; $SD = 18.78$); 51.3% of them were female, and 48.7% were male. 25.2% had an *Abitur*³ or comparable school-leaving diploma; 33.1% had a diploma from a *Realschule*⁴; 35.6% had a diploma from *Volksschule* (elementary school) or *Hauptschule* (junior high school); 3.9% were still in school, and 2.2% had no school leaving diploma. 94.9% were German citizens and 5.1% had another citizenship. 24.8% were Protestants, 24.1% Catholics and 6.0% belonged to another Christian religion; 2.9% were Muslims, 0.8% belonged to various other religions and 41.3% did not belong to any religion at all. 34.8% of the participants stated that they were religious and 61.4% that they were not.

For some analyses, this sample was expanded by three additional subsamples: (1) $N = 243$ over-sampled cases, among whom younger participants with a good secondary school education were over-represented; (2) $N = 461$ participants of an online survey with which we succeeded in locating more or less active critics of Israel (mainly older participants with a very good school education); and (3) $N = 394$ participants from an experimental study (Kempf & Thiel, 2012) on the interaction between media frames and individual frames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (younger participants with an above-average school education).

2.4 Data analysis

The data analysis proceeded in four steps. As a first step, we tested the homogeneity of the human rights-orientation scale by applying Latent-Class Analysis (LCA) to the item responses and inspecting the item profiles that display the expected item scores of the identified classes (cf. Rost, 1996; Kempf, 2012).

Since LCA requires rather large samples, these computations were not based on the representative quota sample only, but rather on the total sample of $N = 2096$ participants. Due to the large sample size, the model selection was based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, Bozdogan, 1987). The fit of the selected model was evaluated relative to the *a priori* distribution using the Proportional Reduction in Error Index (PRE; Goodman, 1972), and relative to the Pure-Random Model using the Explanatory Power Index (EP; Kempf, 2012).

As a second step, participants were assigned to the identified classes, and the reliability of the assignment was measured using mean membership probabilities (MEM). As a third step, the classes were compared with respect to the class members' subtest-scores on the various attitude scales by the application of Analysis of Variance with LSD and Bonferroni as post-hoc tests for the pair-wise group comparisons. As a fourth step, finally, Pearson Chi-Square was applied to compare the classes with respect to their positioning-class membership. In order to ensure the representativeness of the results, the computations in step 3 and step 4 were based on the quota-sample ($N = 998$). The level of significance was defined as $p < 1\%$.

³ Secondary-school leaving certificate (A levels) necessary for university admission in Germany.

⁴ Secondary modern school, whose diploma is *not* sufficient for admission to a German university.

3. Results

3.1 Patterns of human rights orientation

Latent Class Analysis of the human rights orientation scale identified six classes (cf. Appendix) with PRE = 56.10%, EP = 49.80% and MEM = 0.84. One of the identified classes (characteristic for 3.82% of the total sample) is dominated by missing data (cf. Figure 1) and was not considered in the further analyses. The other five classes represent different patterns of human rights orientation and reveal a curvilinear relation between the justification of human rights restrictions and the concern for the victims of human rights violations (cf. Figure 2).




Figure 1, Distribution of missing data within the latent classes.




Figure 2, Nonlinear relation between justification of human rights restrictions and concern for victims.




Figure 3, Consistently ordered classes.




Figure 4, Inconsistently ordered classes.

Three of the identified classes (K1: 21.07%; K2: 23.49% and K3: 25.78%) are consistently ordered (cf. Figure 3) and represent different degrees of human rights commitment (K3 > K2 > K1): The *more* they are concerned for the victims (K3 > K2 > K1), the *less* they will agree with human rights restrictions (K3 < K2 < K1).

However, the order of the remaining two classes (G1: 16.02% and G2: 9.83%) is inconsistent (cf. Figure 4): The *more* they are concerned for the victims (G2 > G1), the *more* they will agree with human rights restrictions (G2 > G1).

Participants in these classes are either indifferent (G1), or they respond with a knee-jerk reaction (G2): If confronted with matters of (national) self-defense, they call for human rights restrictions, and if confronted with the victims they are enraged over human rights violations.

3.2 Specification of hypotheses

Human rights commitment: Hypotheses 1-7 can be tested by a comparison of the consistent classes (cf. Table 2) which represent different degrees of human rights commitment and cover a spectrum from little concern for the victims and support for human rights restrictions (K1) via rejection and concern (K2) to strong rejection of human rights restrictions and strong concern for victims (K3) (cf. Figure 2).

Scales	Hypotheses					
MOR	H1	K1 > K2 > K3	H1a	G1 < K2	H1b	G2 > K2
PAZ	H2	K1 < K2 < K3	H2a		H2b	G2 < K2
MA1	H3	K1 > K2 > K3	H3a	G1 > K2	H3b	G2 > K2
MA2	H3		H3a		H3b	
MA3	H3		H3a		H3b	
SA1	H3		H3a		H3b	
SA3	H3		H3a		H3b	
LA	H3		H3a		H3b	
IA1	H4		H4a		H4b	
PA	H4	H4a	H4b			
AP	H5	H5a	H5b			
IK	H5	H5a	H5b			
TK	H5	H5a	H5b			
Krit01p	H6	H6a	H6b			
IA2	H6	H6a	H6b			
PI01	H7	K1 < K2 < K3	H7a	G1 < K2	H7b	G2 < K2
PI02	H7		H7a		H7b	

Table 2, Expected relations between group means.

Indifference: Although they show the same level of rejecting human rights restrictions as K2, participants in the indifferent class G1 tend not to be concerned for the victims (cf. Figure 2). Comparisons of these two classes can be used, therefore, to test the specific relevance that concern for the victims has for the various attitudes under study (cf. Table 2). In particular, we assume that concern for the victims supports pacifism and reduces xenophobic attitudes. Participants who are not concerned, on the other hand, have less need to cope with the contradiction between moral standards (human rights principles) and actual behavior (human rights violations) and, therefore, employ less moral disengagement, and – due to their indifference – also show less partisanship for the rights of the Palestinians.

- At a comparable level of rejecting human rights restriction (G1 & K2), participants who are *not concerned* about the victims of human rights violations (G1) engage in *less* moral disengagement (H1a) and are *less* pacifistic (H2a). They display *more* anti-Semitic (H3a), anti-Zionist (H4a) and anti-Palestinian attitudes (H5a), as well as *more* anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against the Jews in general and/or restrict the rights of the Jews (H6a), but *fewer* anti-Israeli attitudes that involve partisanship for the rights of the Palestinians (H7a).

Rejection of human rights restrictions: Although they show the same level of concern for the victims as K2, participants in class G2 do not reject human rights restrictions, but rather support them (cf. Figure 2). Comparisons of these two classes can be used, therefore, to test the specific relevance that the rejection of human rights restrictions has for the various attitudes under study (cf. Table 2). In particular, we assume that the rejection of human rights restrictions supports pacifism and reduces xenophobic attitudes. Participants who justify restrictions, on the other hand, need to cope with the contradiction between moral standards (human rights principles) and actual behavior (support of human rights restrictions). Therefore, they employ *more* moral disengagement, and – since they see no problem in restricting human rights during crises and/or for purposes of (national) self-defense – they also show less partisanship for the rights of Palestinians.

- At a comparable level of concern for the victims of human rights violations (G2 & K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions (G2) employ *more* moral disengagement (H1b) and are *less* pacifistic (H2b). They show *more* anti-Semitic (H3b), anti-Zionist (H4b) and anti-Palestinian attitudes (H5b), as well as *more* anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against the Jews in general and/or restrict the rights of the Jews (H6b), but *fewer* anti-Israeli attitudes that involve partisanship for the rights of the Palestinians (H7b).

Positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Assuming that pressure to take a position is exerted especially by participants' concern for the victims of human rights violations, hypotheses H8- H10 can be specified as follows:

- The "No position"-pattern is most frequent among those participants who are the least concerned for the victims of human rights restrictions (K1 and G1) (H8a).

Due to the human rights situation in the occupied territories, the majority of participants who are committed to human rights (K2 and K3) can be assumed to be more likely to take a pro-Palestinian than a pro-Israeli position. Due to increased pacifism, however, we assume that the majority of these participants do not switch to a war frame, but rather interpret the conflict according to a polarized pro-Palestinian frame that does not cross the border to a war frame.

- A pro-Palestinian frame "on the edge of a war frame" is most frequent among those participants who are most committed to human rights (K2 and K3) (H9a).

Due to outrage over the human rights violations of the respective opponent, it can be expected, however, that a relevant minority of those participants who are most concerned about human rights (K3) will tend to take a position in accord with a war frame. Since they hold less pacifistic attitudes, an increased tendency to do so can also be expected among those participants whose human rights orientation is inconsistent (G1 and G2).

- War frames are most frequent among participants with a very strong human rights commitment and/or with an inconsistent human rights orientation (K3, G1 and G2) (H10a).

3.3 Effects on moral disengagement and pacifism

The results in Table 3 and Table 4 indicate that most of our hypotheses concerning moral disengagement and pacifism are confirmed by the data.

- The more participants are committed to human rights (K3 > K2 > K1), the *less* they tend toward moral disengagement (K1 > K2 > K3) (H1), and the *stronger* their pacifist attitudes will be (K1 < K2 < K3) (H2).
- At a comparable level of rejecting human rights restrictions (G1 & K2), participants who are *not concerned* about the victims employ *less* moral disengagement (G1 < K2) (H1a).
- At a comparable level of concern for the victims (G2 & K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions employ *more* moral disengagement (G2 > K2) (H1b).

A specific effect of concern for victims (H2a) and justifications of restrictions (H2b) on pacifism could not be established, however, and the results with respect to H1a are significant according to LSD only.

Scales	Mean scores within groups					Analysis of Variance		
	K3	K2	G1	K1	G2	F	df	p
MOR	2.39	2.98	2.75	3.29	3.43	51.440	4. 967	< 0.001
PAZ	4.30	3.77	3.66	3.28	3.60	45.963	4. 918	< 0.001

Table 3, Pacifism and moral disengagement: Analysis of Variance.

Scales	Test	Significance of pairwise comparisons					
		K1 & K3	K1 & K2	K2 & K3	G1 & K2	G2 & K2	G2 & K1
MOR	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.009	< 0.001	0.039
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.090	< 0.001	0.389
PAZ	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.278	0.027	< 0.001
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	1.000	0.268	< 0.001

Table 4, Pacifism and moral disengagement: Post-hoc tests.

3.4 Effects on anti-Semitic attitudes

In addition, most of our hypotheses concerning anti-Semitic attitudes are confirmed by the data (cf. Table 5 and Table 6).

- The more participants are committed to human rights ($K3 > K2 > K1$), the *less* they hold anti-Semitic attitudes ($K1 > K2 > K3$) (H3).
- At a comparable level of rejecting human rights restrictions (G1 & K2), participants who are *not concerned* about the victims display *more* anti-Semitic attitudes (G1 > K2) (H3a).
- At a comparable level of concern for the victims (G2 & K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions display *more* anti-Semitic attitudes (G2 > K2) (H3b).

With regard to H3, only the differences between K1 and K3 and between K1 and K2 are consistently significant for all anti-Semitism scales, however. A further decrease in anti-Semitism from K2 to K3 was found only with respect to secondary anti-Semitism,⁵ but not with respect to manifest and latent anti-Semitism.⁶

Also, the specific effect of concern for the victims (H3a) on the subscales MA2 (Conspiracy theory) and SA1 (Closing the books on the past) was not significant at the 1%-level.

Scales	Mean scores within groups					Analysis of Variance		
	K3	K2	G1	K1	G2	F	df	p
MA1	1.33	1.44	2.03	2.06	2.01	31.350	4. 936	< 0.001
MA2	1.99	2.20	2.42	2.64	2.67	23.106	4. 923	< 0.001
MA3	1.54	1.74	2.12	2.17	2.12	23.226	4. 943	< 0.001
SA1	2.51	2.94	3.19	3.35	3.42	28.220	4. 933	< 0.001
SA3	1.70	2.01	2.49	2.54	2.45	35.144	4. 932	< 0.001
LA	1.77	1.90	2.35	2.41	2.26	33.798	4. 934	< 0.001

Table 5, Anti-Semitic attitudes: Analysis of Variance.

Scales	Test	Significance of pairwise comparisons					
		K1 & K3	K1 & K2	K2 & K3	G1 & K2	G2 & K2	G2 & K1
MA1	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.216	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.521
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	1.000	< 0.001	< 0.001	1.000
MA2	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.022	0.022	< 0.001	0.708
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.224	0.220	< 0.001	1.000
MA3	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.022	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.497
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.218	< 0.001	< 0.001	1.000
SA1	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.020	< 0.001	0.398
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.202	< 0.001	1.000
SA3	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.248
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.006	< 0.001	< 0.001	1.000
LA	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.080	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.013
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.799	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.132

Table 6, Anti-Semitic attitudes: Post-hoc tests.

3.5 Effects on anti-Zionist attitudes

With respect to anti-Zionism, only hypotheses H4 and H4b were confirmed by the data (cf. Table 7 and Table 8).

- The more participants are committed to human rights ($K3 > K2 > K1$), the *less* they share anti-Zionist attitudes ($K1 > K2 > K3$) (H4).
- At a comparable level of concern for the victims (G2 & K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions display *more* anti-Zionist attitudes (G2 > K2) (H4b).

With respect to subscale PA (Political anti-Zionism), this effect (H4b) is significant only according to LSD, however, and concerning H4, only the difference between K1 and K3 is consistently significant for both anti-Zionism scales. With respect to the subscale IA1 (Generalizing criticism of Israel), however, a significant decrease was only found from K1 to K2, and with respect to PA (Political anti-Zionism), only the decrease from K2 to K3 was significant.

⁵ Subscales SA1 (Closing the books on the past) and SA3 (Perpetrator-victim reversal).

⁶ Subscales MA1 (Dislike of Jews), MA2 (Conspiracy theory), MA3 (Exclusion of Jews) and LA (Avoiding talking about Jews).

The specific effect of concern for the victims on anti-Zionist attitudes (H4a) was not significant at the $p < 1\%$ -level.

Scales	Mean scores within groups					Analysis of Variance		
	K3	K2	G1	K1	G2	F	df	p
IA1	2.56	2.72	2.95	3.03	3.05	10.646	4.931	< 0.001
PA	2.45	2.75	2.77	2.86	3.01	9.431	4.910	< 0.001

Table 7, Anti-Zionist attitudes: Analysis of Variance.

Scales	Test	Significance of pairwise comparisons					
		K1 & K3	K1 & K2	K2 & K3	G1 & K2	G2 & K2	G2 & K1
IA1	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.076	0.028	< 0.001	0.815
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	0.001	0.762	0.279	0.002	1.000
PA	LSD	< 0.001	0.132	0.001	0.837	0.002	0.053
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	1.000	0.012	1.000	0.019	0.525

Table 8, Anti-Zionist attitudes: Post-hoc tests.

3.6 Effects on anti-Palestinian attitudes

As well with respect to anti-Palestinian attitudes, hypotheses H5 and H5b were confirmed by the data (cf. Table 9 and Table 10).

- The more participants are committed to human rights ($K3 > K2 > K1$), the *less* they share anti-Palestinian attitudes ($K1 > K2 > K3$) (H5).
- At a comparable level of concern for the victims (G2 & K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions show *more* anti-Palestinian attitudes ($G2 > K2$) (H5b).

Concerning H5, only the differences between K1 and K3 and between K1 and K2 are consistently significant for all anti-Palestinian attitude scales, however. A further decrease from K2 to K3 could only be found according to LSD and only on the subscales AP (Devaluation of Palestinians) and IK (Demonizing Islam), but not on the subscale TK (Connecting Palestinians to terrorism).

A specific effect of concern for the victims on anti-Palestinian attitudes (H5a) was found only for the subscale AP:

- At a comparable level of rejecting human rights restrictions (G1 & K2), participants who are *not concerned* about the victims devalue the Palestinians *more* strongly ($G1 > K2$).

However, there is no specific effect of participants' concern for the victims of human rights violations on participants' tendency to demonize Islam (IK) and/or connect the Palestinians to terrorism (TK).

Scales	Mean scores within groups					Analysis of Variance		
	K3	K2	G1	K1	G2	F	df	p
AP	1.55	1.76	2.02	2.20	2.14	34.250	4.949	< 0.001
IK	2.08	2.36	2.54	2.87	2.85	31.123	4.942	< 0.001
TK	2.69	2.82	2.75	2.99	3.01	14.433	4.942	< 0.001

Table 9, Anti-Palestinian attitudes: Analysis of Variance.

Scales	Test	Significance of pairwise comparisons					
		K1 & K3	K1 & K2	K2 & K3	G1 & K2	G2 & K2	G2 & K1
AP	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.003	0.001	< 0.001	0.316
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.030	0.006	< 0.001	1.000
IK	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.002	0.068	< 0.001	0.800
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.020	0.679	< 0.001	1.000
TK	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.019	0.227	< 0.001	0.629
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	0.001	0.187	1.000	< 0.001	1.000

Table 10, Anti-Palestinian attitudes: Post-hoc tests.

3.7 Effects on anti-Israeli attitudes

With respect to anti-Israeli attitudes, hypotheses H6 and H6b were consistently confirmed (cf. Table 11 and Table 12).

- The more participants are committed to human rights ($K3 > K2 > K1$), the *less* they share anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against Jews in general and/or restrict the rights of the Jews ($K1 > K2 > K3$) (H6).⁷
- At a comparable level of concern for the victims (G2 & K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions show *more* anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against Jews in general and/or restrict the rights of the Jews ($G2 > K2$) (H6b).⁸

A specific effect of concern for the victims (H6a) was only found for the subscale IA2 (Denial of the Jews' right of residence):

- At a comparable level of rejecting human rights restrictions (G1 & K2), participants who are *not concerned* about the victims *more* strongly deny the Jews' right of residence ($G1 > K2$).

On the other hand, there is no specific effect of participants' concern for the victims of human rights violations on participants' support of the item krit01p ("If you want to recognize the true face of the Jews...").

With respect to anti-Israeli attitudes that involve partisanship for the rights of the Palestinians, hypothesis H7 was only confirmed for subscale PI02 (Dramatizing and need for action) and only *cum grano salis*.

- The more participants are committed to human rights ($K3 > K2 > K1$), the *more* they tend to dramatize affairs and call for action against Israeli policy ($K1 \approx K2 < K3$).⁹

With respect to the subscale PI01 (One-sided attribution of guilt), however, there is a significant *decrease* from K1 to K2.¹⁰

- The more participants are committed to human rights ($K3 > K2 > K1$), the *less* they make one-sided attributions of guilt to Israel ($K1 > K2 \approx K3$) (H7*).

While a specific effect of participants' concern for the victims (H7a) could not be confirmed for any of the two subscales, the justification of human rights restrictions did have a significant effect on both of the subscales, which is contrary to our expectation, however, and hypothesis H7b must therefore be rejected:

- At a comparable level of concern for the victims (G2 & K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions show *more* anti-Israeli attitudes that involve partisanship for the rights of the Palestinians ($G2 > K2$) (H7b*).

Scales	Mean scores within groups					Analysis of Variance		
	K3	K2	G1	K1	G2	F	df	p
krit01p	1.53	1.99	2.33	2.69	2.78	27.446	4.975	< 0.001
IA2	1.77	1.98	2.28	2.36	2.19	22.084	4.957	< 0.001
PI01	3.01	2.96	3.19	3.15	3.31	7.047	4.960	< 0.001
PI02	3.05	2.92	3.00	2.91	3.09	9.314	4.961	< 0.001

Table 11, Anti-Israeli attitudes: Analysis of Variance.

Scales	Test	Significance of pairwise comparisons					
		K1 & K3	K1 & K2	K2 & K3	G1 & K2	G2 & K2	G2 & K1
krit01p	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.002	0.025	< 0.001	0.459
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.019	0.250	< 0.001	1.000
IA2	LSD	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.006	< 0.001	0.002	0.005
	Bonferroni	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.061	0.003	0.021	0.055
PI01	LSD	0.071	0.003	0.518	0.010	< 0.001	0.014
	Bonferroni	0.706	0.029	1.000	0.097	< 0.001	0.144
PI02	LSD	0.001	0.793	0.002	0.067	< 0.001	< 0.001
	Bonferroni	0.005	1.000	0.023	0.665	< 0.001	< 0.001

Table 12, Anti-Israeli attitudes: Post-hoc tests.

⁷ The differences between K2 and K3 are significant according to LSD only.

⁸ With respect to the subscale IA2, this effect is significant only according to LSD.

⁹ Only the difference between K1 and K3 is significant according to both post-hoc tests, LSD and Bonferroni. The difference between K2 and K3 is only significant according to LSD, and between K1 and K2, there is no significant difference at all.

¹⁰ However, it is only significant according to LSD.

3.8 Effects on participants' positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Concerning the effect of participants' human rights orientations on their positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chi-Square = 275.22; df = 24; $p < 0.001$) our hypotheses were consistently confirmed (cf. Table 13):

- The "No position"-pattern is most frequent among those participants who are the least concerned about the victims of human rights restrictions (K1 and G1) (H8a).
- A pro-Palestinian frame "on the edge of a war frame" is most frequent among those participants who are most committed to human rights (K2 and K3) (H9a).
- War frames are most frequent among participants with an inconsistent human rights orientation or with a strong consistent human rights commitment (G1, G2 and K3) (H10a).

	POSI-Class 7, 8 & 9: No Position	POSI-Class 5: Pro-Israeli war frame	POSI-Class 6: Ambivalent peace frame with sympathy for Israel	POSI-Class 2: Ambivalent peace frame with sympathy f. Palestinians	POSI-Class 4: Pro-Palestinian peace frame	POSI-Class 1: Pro-Palestinian frame "on the edge of a war frame"	POSI-Class 3: Pro-Palestinian war frame
K3	0.085	0.132	0.031	0.062	0.186	0.364	0.140
K2	0.059	0.073	0.123	0.292	0.041	0.365	0.046
G1	0.275	0.156	0.073	0.128	0.128	0.101	0.138
K1	0.199	0.070	0.193	0.346	0.049	0.101	0.043
G2	0.102	0.128	0.092	0.112	0.230	0.184	0.153

Table 13, Positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Relative frequencies of positioning patterns within groups.

4. Discussion

The results of our study indicate that a human rights commitment reduces the tendency to moral disengagement, and support Bandura's (1986, 1999) assumption, according to which moral disengagement serves as a defense mechanism with which participants cope with the contradiction between moral standards and actual behavior.

At a comparable level of concern for the victims (cf. comparison of G2 and K2), participants who *justify* human rights restrictions have a need to cope with the contradiction between human rights principles (moral standards) and support of their restriction (actual behavior). Therefore, they will employ *more* moral disengagement than those who reject the restriction of human rights.

At a comparable level of rejecting human rights restrictions (cf. comparison of G1 and K2), on the other hand, participants who are *not concerned* about the victims will have a lesser need to cope with the contradiction between moral standards (human rights principles) and actual behavior (human rights violations). Therefore, they will employ less moral disengagement than those who are more concerned about the victims.

At the same time, a *human rights commitment* (K2 and K3) also increases pacifistic attitudes and counteracts anti-Palestinian as well as anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Israeli attitudes that are directed against Jews in general and/or restrict the rights of the Jews.

While the *rejection of human rights restrictions* (cf. comparison of G2 and K2) is particularly relevant for reducing moral disengagement and counteracting the above-named xenophobic attitudes, a specific effect of *concern for the victims* (cf. comparison of G1 and K2) could only be established with respect to reducing xenophobic attitudes that include overt discrimination against certain groups like most (but not all) anti-Semitic attitudes, the devaluation of the Palestinians, and/or denying the Jews' right of residence in the Middle East. It was not found with respect to xenophobic attitudes that are disguised as political beliefs, e.g., the assumption of a Jewish world conspiracy, anti-Zionist attitudes, demonizing Islam and/or linking Palestinians to terrorism.

Furthermore, we found that a *human rights commitment* exerts pressure to take a position toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is a function of participants' pacifist attitudes, on the one hand, and their concern for the victims, on the other.

Avoiding taking a position is most frequent among those participants who are the least concerned about the victims (G1 and K1). Due to the human rights situation in the occupied territories, the majority of those who are committed to human rights are more likely to take a pro-Palestinian than a pro-Israeli position. Because of increased pacifism, the majority of these participants (K2 and K3) do not switch to a war frame, however. Instead, they interpret the conflict according to a pro-Palestinian frame that is clearly polarized but does not cross the boundary of a war frame.

Despite their pronounced pacifism and presumably due to outrage over the human rights violations of the respective opponent, however, a relevant minority of those participants who are most committed to human rights (K3) position themselves according to a war frame. Due to lower pacifism, participants with an inconsistent human rights orientation (G1 and G2) also have an increased tendency to do so.

Whether these participants position themselves according to a pro-Palestinian or according to a pro-Israeli war frame is, however, *not* a function of their human rights orientation *per se*.

Taking into account that the pro-Israeli war frame is the only one that does not claim that the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians is the aim of Israeli policy (Kempf, 2013), we may conclude that it is the interaction between this belief and participants' human rights orientation which determines the direction of partisanship.

This interaction also has a differentiating effect on the formation of anti-Israeli attitudes, which explains why previous studies (cf. Kopf-Beck, 2011) did not find a correlation between participants' human rights orientation and anti-Israeli attitudes.

The more participants are committed to human rights (K2 and K3), the more they will defend the Jews against the insinuation that "the way they treat the Palestinians" shows "the true face of the Jews." Also, with respect to the one-sided attribution of guilt to Israel, the concern not to demonize Israel has a stronger effect than concern for the Palestinians: The more participants are committed to human rights, the less they will tend to make one-sided attributions of guilt. Nonetheless, they show an increasing tendency to dramatize affairs and call for action against Israeli policy.

Altogether, these results draw a comprehensive picture of how participants' human rights orientations affect their attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its protagonists. With respect to anti-Israeli attitudes that involve partisanship for the Palestinians, our findings are ambivalent, however: There is no specific effect of concern for victims on these scales, and – contrary to our hypotheses – these attitudes are the strongest among those participants who most strongly justify human rights restrictions.

Since this is the group of participants (G2) who respond to the human rights orientation scale with a knee-jerk reaction, it is possible that this result is not so much due to their justification of human rights restrictions, but is rather due to low resilience in their concern for the victims of human rights restrictions.

The conjecture that their (alleged) concern for the victims is not resilient is also supported by the results summarized in Tables 3-12. Comparing G2 with K1, which rather supports human rights restrictions as well (though to a lesser degree) but shows *little* concern for the victims of human rights violations, there is no significant difference with respect to moral disengagement, nor with respect to any of the scales for measuring anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist and/or anti-Palestinian attitudes.

If this assumption holds, we must also question whether the other results that seem to speak for a specific effect of justifying human rights restrictions (cf. comparison of G2 with K2) could in fact be attributed to this aspect of the human rights orientation, or instead to the low resilience of the concern for victims in group G2.

In each case, however, the results support the idea that only a consistent human rights commitment which includes both a rejection of human rights restrictions *and* concern for the victims of human rights violations (K2 and K3) is able to form a counterweight to xenophobic attitudes.

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Appendix: Goodness of fit statistics of the Latent-Class Analysis.

Model	ln(L)	n(P)	df	L-Ratio	p	AIC	BIC
PR	-28154,52	5	1679610	26296,50	n < df	56319,05	56347,29
LC1	-24987,88	40	1679575	19963,22	n < df	50055,76	50281,67
LC2	-23547,97	81	1679534	17083,40	n < df	47257,94	47715,41
LC3	-22294,53	122	1679493	14576,52	n < df	44833,06	45522,09
LC4	-21994,99	163	1679452	13977,44	n < df	44315,98	45236,57
LC5	-21796,92	204	1679411	13581,30	n < df	44001,84	45153,99
LC6	-21607,27	245	1679370	13202,00	n < df	43704,54	45088,25
LC7	-21497,47	286	1679329	12982,40	n < df	43566,94	45182,21
LC8	-21417,33	327	1679288	12822,12	n < df	43488,66	45335,49
LC9	-21320,75	368	1679247	12628,96	n < df	43377,50	45455,89
Sat	-15006,27	1679615	--	--	--	3,39E+06	1,29E+07