Peace Journalism: The State of the Art

Friedens- und Demokratiepsychologie

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Peace Journalism: The State of the Art

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Preface

Bad news, more bad news, still more bad news! That seems to be the message of the dominant mass media. In the meantime, most of humanity goes about its business peacefully. If we go by the image given us by the dominant mass media, we must all carry a gun while traveling outside home, and sometimes when staying home. There is a lively controversy among media scholars on what effect the violence on the screen bears for the behavior of average citizen. It may make him more violent, less violent, or it may have no effect. We do not know. But whatever effect, it is better to err on the side of caution.

This volume is dedicated to that proposition. It calls for "peace journalism", an approach that may startle traditional media scholars. It calls upon reporters and journalists to become peace activists. Can they? Would they? Peace journalism can be treated as an ideal, a slogan, an illusion, or a project. Like the editors and the authors of this volume, I consider it a worthy project. I do share with them the premise that although the media are notoriously drawn to instantaneous and dramatic events, winners and losers, victories and defeats, individual journalists can be made keenly aware of the heavy costs of war. They can voice this awareness as part of their professional ethics, and their duty to the public. And they can play a critical role in building bridges of understanding and roads to peace.

The media today are an active part of any conflict. If they were allowed to truly access the front (as in the wars in Vietnam and Iraq), they could have a decisive influence in ending the carnage. If they were not (as in the wars during President Reagan's era), they would be kept out of the picture. It is noteworthy that politicians are aware of the role they play in inciting, subsiding, or ending a conflict. Peace journalism is therefore not an unreasonable demand. Journalists are often in touch with all sides of the conflict. They can, if they wish, carry messages across the hostility boundaries. They can, if they wish, know the most urgent demands. They can, if they wish, identify the common ground. They can, if they wish, bring the sides to the negotiating table. But they cannot dictate peace. They can, if they wish, pave the way.

In their enviable peaceful conditions, media scholars in this volume have recognized that potential. The importance of the theoretical approaches, the case studies, and the teaching modules presented in this volume lies in the clear formulation of these premises, in the practical recommendations for their implementation, and in the strong philosophical and conceptual bases used to develop them. I wish to mention in particular the opportunities journalists have to shy away from Manichean ways of defining conflict by providing context. Journalists who are aware of the cost of war cannot help but analyze conflicts in their historical contexts. Also responsible professionals will not limit themselves to official sources of information. They will try as best as they can to go to the root causes of violence. By doing so, they will have better ways to identify how the conflict can be resolved or transformed.

Such resolution or transformation depends on finding and implementing the mutual needs for peace on the part of the two or more sides of conflict.
Identifying and clarifying common needs is the surest road to peace. This is a task that can and should be performed by media professionals.
Another achievement of this volume is its emphasis on moral imperatives that show how peace journalism can help professionals resist the tendencies to reduce the parties in conflict to no more than two; to identify "the truth" rather than all truths involved; to become hostage to one single source of information; to underestimate the media ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human rights and dignity; and to surrender to personal ethnic, national, or ideological biases.

If journalists faithfully follow the above, these might become professional norms. This does not mean that journalism will cease to follow dictates of wealth and power. It will rather mean that we will have higher standards by which to judge the quality of journalism and its ability to influence our public sphere.

These standards could and should be fulfilled in different contexts. Ably edited by Dov Shinar of conflict-ridden Israel, and by Wilhelm Kempf of conflict-experienced Germany, we must heed their call.

Majid Tehranian
Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research

Newport Coast, CA; June 2007

Introduction

The relations between war, journalism and the media have always been problematic. Since the early days of the newspaper, governments, elites, and other social sectors interested in protecting and promoting their interests by any means, began to censor, pressure, and manipulate the press (and later other media). The ethos of critical journalism has always praised professionals who rejected and denounced censorship and manipulation, and fought on behalf of honest and impartial reporting. Journalists have always seen themselves as fighters on the propaganda front. Even under massive pressure, some have sacrificed their well-being and occasionally their lives to uphold the right to free speech in times of peace and war alike.

Propaganda and war coverage are of similar enduring interest in media and communication research. Since its emergence, every war and every peace process has produced a massive body of scholarly work. While some of it has served the cause of propaganda, an increasing amount of critical studies have disclosed unholy alliances of the military and media organizations, the mobilization of war coverage for governmental service, and the fuelling of conflict by the media.

Based on theoretical premises that first appeared in the 1970s, peace researchers, activists, and conscientious media professionals have begun at the end of the last millennium to systematically think about using the media not to fuel conflict, but to encourage peaceful settlement, conflict transformation and sometimes reconciliation. This initiative has rapidly developed into a movement that has been busy debating philosophical questions; developing conceptual formulations; analyzing empirical data gathered from in-depth case studies, monitoring of war, post-war, peacemaking, and peacekeeping coverage, and field research; and formulating models for conducting advanced training in peace journalism.

The present volume is a critical exploration of the "state of the art", with chapters written by prominent researchers and practitioners in the framework of the Peace Journalism Project of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, coordinated by Dov Shinar since 2004.

The purpose was to produce and disseminate meaningful information, ideas and methods on peace journalism, to be hopefully used by journalists as well as higher education instructors and students for teaching, learning, and reflection.

The theoretical and conceptual chapters in Part I tackle some of the most pressing and controversial issues in the epistemological and professional foundations of peace journalism. Their authors – Annabel McGoldrick, Samuel Peleg, Susan Dente Ross, and Robert Hackett – explore, analyze, and criticize possible avenues for peace journalism scholarly research, professional action, and disciplinary development.

McGoldrick introduces a professional approach to the concept of objectivity. Using her field experience and intellectual curiosity, she explores the professional paradox whereby the very fact that journalists do not take sides in most cases, leads them to be seen and to see themselves as 'objective'. Yet conventional conflict coverage shows a dominant bias in favor of a war-orientation over peace-seeking approaches. She suggests that this results from the current professional definition of 'objectivity' as coverage that is professionally, economically and politically "unobjectionable to the maximum number of potential customers". She goes on to explain how and why such conventions, when applied to conflict coverage, lead media organizations and journalists to over-value violent, reactive responses and under-value non-violent, developmental approaches. Contending that awareness of the influence these conventions exert on conflict coverage is now growing, McGoldrick concludes that more peace journalism would help to bring public service news back into line with legitimate public expectations rather than with particularistic interests.

Peleg's and Hackett's contributions take McGoldrick's conceptual framework to the theoretical arena. Both analyze "all-engulfing" models. Peleg presents conflict theory as a major analytical and normative basis for peace journalism. Stressing the leverage provided the newly achieved position of the media, particularly peace journalism, as third party, facilitator, mediator, and arbitrator, he suggests that it can effectively enhance the prospects of conflict transformation, resolution and reconciliation. This is illustrated in the Northern Ireland, the Basque country and the Israel-Palestine cases of protracted conflicts. Hackett's evaluation of three conceptual frameworks indicates that Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model usefully highlights some ways that state and capital influence journalism, but risks being reductionist and functionalist; the deconstructionist approach of Shoemaker and Reese's "hierarchy of influences" model helps to assess pressures for and against peace journalism, but like the propaganda model, its "anatomic" nature obscures the coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge-production. While pointing out the value of these models, he suggests that Bourdieu's view of journalism as a relatively autonomous institutional sphere, al-

lows conceptual space for both the structural influences of and on the news media, as well as the potential agency and creativity of journalists.

Susan Ross' chapter is an attempt to integrate these theoretical and professional frameworks. She analyzes the divide between peace journalism as advocacy media and its definition as a quality journalism that includes under-represented perspectives, and criticizes the long-standing imprecision and ideological focus of conflict studies, peace studies, and conflict resolution studies as a sole basis for the development of peace journalism. Like Hackett, she criticizes the fragmenting nature of some critical models, adding to their problematic nature the problems faced by quality journalism in the post-Cold War global realities; the inefficient and limited impact of local and independent media; and the present flawed, ineffectual, or co-opted nature of peace journalism. Unlike Peleg, however, Ross brings up the need to move the conceptual foundations of peace journalism from exclusive reliance on conflict-oriented models towards additional bases, such as professional training patterns; coping with structural, financial, and psychological constraints that encourage reactive, nationalistic reporting; encouraging approaches that transcend the bonds of identity and enmity toward symbolic rapprochement, and more.

Departing from the broad frameworks discussed in Part I, the empirical case studies offered by Lea Mandelzis, Rune Ottosen and Wilhelm Kempf in Part II, zoom onto particular dimensions and forms of peace journalism: discourse, image, and post-war de-escalation. All three make the case for techniques that might foster the impact of peace journalism: compatibility of media discourse with realities on the ground, the visual dimension, and de-escalation techniques in post-war coverage.

Mandelzis analyses a case in which a political and ideological discourse fostered unjustified optimism and hopes for peace in Israel. Identifying three types of discourse used by the Israeli press in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo Accords (war, peace, and harmony discourses), she depicts a dramatic change of attitude and terminology in the Israeli media that produced a sudden transformation of the traditional war discourse into disproportionate representations and images of "peace around the corner". Based on a content analysis of the Israeli press and on in-depth interviews with Oslo peace negotiators, her findings show the exaggerated emphasis the local media gave to a discourse of peace that did not correspond to the facts on the negotiation table, or to the ongoing violence; the adverse impact of this approach on actual peace perspectives and beliefs; and the return of war discourse, following the need of the media to cope with the cognitive dissonance elicited by the ongoing violence. Her study displays the role of context in representations of peace in the news discourse and the importance of compat-

ibility, and consequences of incompatibility between media discourse and political reality.

In a similar vein, Ottosen's more optimistic chapter focuses on the actual compatibility of media visual discourse with political realities. Based on data from the Norwegian press on the controversy around the Mohammed cartoons; on the coverage of Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council before the Iraq war in 2003; and on the attack on the Iraqi town of Fallujah by US and Iraqi forces in November 2004, Ottosen argues that visual aspects of journalism are underestimated, and suggests that a stronger emphasis on graphics and photographs might strengthen peace journalism and critical media in general. Contrasting the Fallujah coverage with the powerful and emphatic coverage of the Asian tsunami a month later, he further emphasizes that the digital media can be a powerful tool for the benefit of peace journalism.

Like Mandelzis, Kempf emphasizes psychological dimensions, and like McGoldrick, he departs from the premises that war coverage is strongly biased towards the promotion of conflict escalation. He also maintains that this bias often survives in post-war coverage; and that even after the end of war, only a minority of journalists frame conflict in a firmly de-escalation oriented way.

Seeking to answer questions derived from these contentions, Kempf broadens the conceptual scope into the empirical realm, and examines the impact and acceptance of de-escalation coverage on post-war former Yugoslavia, by readers of the nationwide German quality press and of provincial newspapers. His rigorous procedure shows results that support the peace journalism project: the acceptance level of de-escalation oriented articles by quality press readers was never lower than other texts. Also no difference was found with respect to the acceptance of various text versions by the provincial press readership.

Beverly Keever's and Jake Lynch's chapters in Part III lead the reader to the educational arena. Both offer blueprints for the study and practice of peace journalism in institutions of higher education. Based on theoretical and empirical foundations, some of which were discussed in the preceding chapters, their teaching/learning modules are viable applications experimented with students of conflict and peace studies; journalism; communications; media practice, and international relations, in the University of Hawaii; Sydney University and University of Queensland in Australia; Cardiff University in Wales; Oslo University College in Norway; Orebro University in Sweden; and the on-line TRANSCEND Peace University. Both chapters have companion resources in video format (Lynch's and McGoldrick's 'News from the Holy Land', Hawthorn Press and Films for the Humanities, 2004) and 'peace journalism in the Philippines' (2007); and Keever's web-based resource currently posted at the Toda Institute website (www.toda.org).

Keever presents the approach of University of Hawaii Professor Emeritus Glenn Paige, in his *Nonkilling: Global Political Science*, (http://www.globalnonviolence.org), in which he urges greater media awareness about the importance of avoiding the inappropriate use of the language of killing and, alternatively, avoiding the use of euphemisms to gloss over or cover up examples of violence. Following Paige's arguments, the article makes tangible recommendations for future action in academic classrooms.

Lynch's chapter is a systematic and inclusive module or short course aimed at final-year undergraduate or post-graduate groups in universities. The chapter is structured so as to help teachers shape their own syllabi.

Based on how conflict, peace, violence, and media criticism are represented in news reports, the module suggests how core concepts can be introduced, so as to enable students to form their own critical understanding of peace journalism. Also practical peace journalism notes are offered, showing how learning outcomes can be formulated to allow these issues to be tackled in the form of peacemaking and peacekeeping campaigns and other forms of media intervention.

Beyond their intrinsic value, both chapters are frames in which other parts of the book can be utilized for teaching and learning purposes.

Dov Shinar's epilogue, that bears the title of the book, integrates major topics of the book into a framework designed to orient the reader, without repeating the arguments presented in the chapters. The epilogue is aimed at encouraging instructors and students to use these materials; and at stimulating thinking on "where do we go now". Coherence is sought through looking at critical analyses of the conventional coverage of war and peace and at the promise and performance of peace journalism; analyzing epistemological and professional constraints; presenting ways to improve peace journalism concepts and practices; and offering an agenda and some development strategies.

Originally published electronically in *conflict & communication online* (www.cco.regener-online.de), the product of the project is now offered in book format, thanks to the cooperation between the irena regener berlin publishing house, and the Toda Institute. The chapters written by McGoldrick, Hackett, Peleg and Dente Ross, on theoretical foundations of peace journalism, appeared in a special issue of the journal (cco 5/2), in October 2006. The contributions by Keever, Lynch, Mandelzis and Ottosen, featuring case studies and teaching modules for peace journalism, appeared together with Shinar's Epilogue, in a second special issue (cco 6/1), in April 2007. Kempf's chapter on audience responses to de-escalation in conflict coverage first appeared in October 2005 (cco 4/2).

Majid Tehranian, the Director of the Toda Institute, who has accompanied the peace journalism project with warm encouragement, gracefully agreed to write a

preface to the book. All the other contributions are reprinted from the *conflict & communication online* special issues on peace journalism, unchanged and unabridged, as edited by Wilhelm Kempf. They went through a thorough peer review process whereby each article was evaluated anonymously by at least one peer scholar of the Toda Peace Journalism Group, and at least one external reviewer. We are indebted to all participants in the process, particularly the external reviewers Eitan Alimi, Daniel Bar-Tal, Burkhard Bläsi, Eytan Gilboa, Kai Hafez, Thomas Hanitzsch, Ankica Kosic, Helmut Lukesch, Heikki Luostarinen, Barbara Müller, Stig-Arne Nohrstedt and Gert Sommer for the infinite patience with which they evaluated the manuscripts, until the cco publication requirements were met.

The work of the contributors was conducted in three annual Toda Institute meetings convened in Budapest (July 2004), Madrid (May 2005), and Vancouver (2006); in regular correspondence and stimulating consultation among group members; and in arduous individual work on the production of the articles, in which some of the authors revised or rewrote their contributions several times. We are grateful to all of them for their tenacity and acceptance, as reviewers and reviewees, of the rigorous peer review procedure.

We offer this volume with the feeling that all authors have made valuable contributions, and we share the confidence that they represent significant philosophical, theoretical, and empirical additions to the scholarly and professional advancement of peace journalism.

Dov Shinar and Wilhelm Kempf

Jerusalem and Berlin, June 2007

Part I

Theoretical approaches

1

War journalism and 'objectivity'

Annabel McGoldrick

Introduction

This article explores some of the connections between the prevalent conventions of journalistic objectivity, and its pre-disposition towards patterns of reporting conflicts which deserve the name, war journalism – biased in favour of war. This was first defined by Johan Galtung (in Lynch 1998) as journalism about conflict that is:

- violence orientated
- propaganda orientated
- elite orientated
- victory orientated.

In this kind of journalism, violence seems to 'make sense' and often appears to be the only solution. But why would this be the case when journalists strive so hard to be 'neutral' and objective? Well therein lies the problem. What journalists think of as 'objective' reporting actually consists of a set of conventions which pre-dispose news about conflict in favour of war journalism.

Journalistic objectivity

Objectivity developed at the time of urbanisation, industrialisation and the advent of consumerism. Greater literacy and more efficient transport links enabled newspapers to grow larger in circulation. Between them, these developments led to an increasing dependency on selling advertising. So now they had to avoid putting off potential customers, of all political views and none:

"The popular commercial dailies developed the first version of journalistic objectivity; an independent, universalizing stance that looked at the world and the body politic from the viewpoint of the ideal citizen: a prudent, rational, fair-minded individual, committed to individual rights, political democracy, a market economy, and progress through science and education" (Hackett and Zhao 1998, p. 18).

Some latter-day definitions:

"It is the value of fairness, which is extremely important. It's the ethic of restraining your own biases, which is also important … It's the idea that journalism can't be the voice of any particular party or sect" (Rosen 1994).

"An effort to report the facts without developing – or at least without revealing – an opinion about them" (Kinsey 2001).

Journalism matching these criteria lent itself to being marketed in a consumer society (Bagdikian 2000), because it avoided putting off potential consumers among the educated classes.

But what to do about the subjective aspects of the job? The choices facing reporters and editors are endless. Why this story, and not another? Then, once you have decided that, why interview this person, or use that organisation as a source of information and not another? This issue was defused, as the methods of Objective Journalism hardened into industry conventions, by the habit of *indexing* – projecting such basic decisions onto an external frame of reference that was not, apparently, of the journalist's own making.

Indexing official sources

In practice, that often meant tracking the agenda set by official sources – governments, the police and courts, financial authorities and so on. Leading, say, the television evening news, or the front page of the *New York Times*, with a report of a speech by President Bush on Iraq, need not be taken to mean that the programme or the paper agrees with him. His comments can be presented as newsworthy – whatever he actually says – *because he's the President*, and the most powerful man in the land. Still a subjective interpretation, of what constitutes the most meaningful fact of that particular day – but one chosen on a seemingly 'neutral' basis, and one which is deeply embedded in the structures and practices of news:

"Journalism's criteria of newsworthiness and factuality, and its routines of newsgathering anchored in bureaucratic institutions with designated spokespeople and prescheduled routines, are mutually constitutive. Taken together, they tend to ensure routine and privileged access for bureaucrats and agency officials, who provide the "hard facts", credible claims and background information for Objective reporting" (Hackett and Zhao 1998, p. 78).

For these reasons, a bias in favour of official sources is probably still the single most widespread convention in global news. Go to any capital city in the world, pick up a copy of the main newspaper, and there's a good chance that the deeds and pronouncements of that country's political leaders will be on or near the front page.

Objectivity and war journalism

Lynch and McGoldrick argue that there are three ways in which news said to be Objective fuels further violence.

"Three conventions of Objective reporting, in particular, are *predisposed* towards War Journalism. Their 'natural drift', as it were, is to lead us – or leave us – to over-value violent, reactive responses to conflict, and under-value non-violent, developmental ones:

- A bias in favour of official sources
- A bias in favour of event over process
- A bias in favour of 'dualism' in reporting conflicts" (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p. 209).

The problem is that news is, by its very nature, preoccupied with change, yet it has a very fixed and one-dimensional understanding of how change comes about. Built into it is an orientation in favour of realism and ignores the insights of Peace and Conflict Studies, which argue that there are many ways to bring about change in a conflict, many 'levers' to pull. Later I will suggest that anyone working to intervene in the Cycle of Violence, for example, can be regarded as a 'change agent'.

But the Objectivity conventions mean we hear relatively little about them, compared with official sources – a category topped by leaders of national states. Max Weber provided a well-known definition: the state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 1946, p.78). Weber's argument was that a state could only be defined in terms of means rather than ends. States could not be said to be *for* anything, necessarily; they were better conceived in terms of their observable characteristics than assumptions about their purpose.

Weber's formulation has been seen as neutral, even normative – the word, 'legitimate' has seemed, to some, to suggest a benign hand, guaranteeing security for all citizens. But these are concepts later interrogated and revised by researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies. What if the effect of state action favours the interests of some citizens, and not others? In the words of veteran Australian peace researcher, John W Burton, the very notion of 'conflict resolution' is only admissible if conflict is understood as attributable not to "inherent human aggressiveness" but to "the emergence of inappropriate social institutions and norms that reasonably would seem to be well within human capacities to alter, to which the person has problems in adjustment" (Burton 1998).

Perhaps Burton's cardinal insight is that there is more to human relations than power – there are also human needs, including the basics of food, drinking water and shelter from the elements, certainly, but also intangibles such as identity, recognition and respect. If the institutions and norms of a state entrench power relations of a kind that deny these human needs to any or all of its citizens, 'the

person' will inevitably resist them. In those circumstances, what Burton calls the 'deterrent strategies' of the state take on an altogether more sinister aspect.

Once deterrent strategies – such as the $560bn Pentagon budget – are put in place, they inevitably alter the nature of power relations. Missiles have to be fired and replaced in order to maintain 'defence capacities' – rich and powerful interests are not served by allowing military hardware to gather dust. Prisons have to be filled to generate orders for correctional corporations to build more. So norms and institutions come to be influenced in favour of wars overseas and punitive criminal justice policies at home – variants on what President Dwight D Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex" (Eisenhower, 1960).

Then the number of levers under the control of the leaders of national states has diminished in recent times. Industry has globalised, public services have been marketised and/or privatised and economic policy-making has become increasingly contingent on events elsewhere. Hence there may be more emphasis on the levers they do control, including the ability to set the news agenda and also the deployment of armed forces.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair has pitched the UK into more armed conflicts than any other – Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan – and is said to admire the armed forces for their "professionalism" (Brogan 2003). Their stock-in-trade being, of course, to follow orders, in marked contrast to Blair's experience with other areas of the public sector where change has to be negotiated and efforts at reform had left him with "scars on his back" (Watt 1999).

It all means that a reliance on official sources may, of necessity, predispose the coverage of conflict towards war journalism. Military deployment always seems to move, as if by osmosis, on to the news agenda. Calls for collaborative effort to enforce international law, or building solidarity at the level of civil society – even, latterly, accepting as final the will of the UN – always seem to have to be justified afresh from first principles.

A bias in favour of event over process

A news story is supposed to answer six basic questions:

- Who?
- What?
- When?
- Where?
- Why?
- How?

Most stories only deal superficially – if at all – with the 'why'. Many journalists argue that that it would make the story too long. But people can only begin to think themselves out of a conflict if they understand the underlying issues. The important thing to note here is that without *some* exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the only response that 'makes sense'. Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right, as a contribution to ending or avoiding violence.

A bias in favour of dualism

One safe way to insulate oneself against allegations of bias is to 'hear both sides'. It means the journalist cannot be seen as 'the voice of any particular party or sect'. By tradition, classic BBC reporting, for instance, is said to adopt the formula:

"On the one hand … on the other … in the end, only time will tell" (Kampfner 2003).

But this inscribes a paradigm of dualism that frames out multiparty initiatives, complex causes and win-win situations. Dualism is a key part of Objectivity but also, for these reasons, a major contributory factor in the way in which it escalates a conflict, by turning it into a tug of war in which each party faces only two alternatives – victory or defeat. Their words and deeds must be unequivocally 'winning' if they are not to risk being reported as 'losing', 'backsliding' or 'going soft'.

Findings from researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies provide abundant evidence that this dualistic model of conflict is seldom, if ever, the whole picture; there are always third (or more) parties whose involvement may be hidden; and within the parties, there are fault lines and differentiations which open up the scope for more creative conceptualisations of the issues at stake (Francis, 2002).

The liberal theory of press freedom

Kempf puts his finger on a dilemma facing every journalist covering conflicts – "either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of a moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation" (Kempf 2003a p. 83). Failure to adopt a deliberate policy of constructive conflict coverage, he argues, is tantamount to escalating them, because of "the lack of differentiation between traditional conflict coverage and propaganda" (Kempf 2003a p. 83).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) give the following definitions:

"Peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict.

Peace journalism:

- Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting
- Provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention
- Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting" (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005 p. 5).

This contains a little more 'wiggle room' than Kempf's formula. Some journalists, in some places, will find themselves comfortable with the idea that they should decide, at the outset, to harness their journalism to the furtherance of socially desirable goals. In post-colonial societies, the traditions and assumptions journalists imbibe draw heavily on values of social solidarity, and the sense of obligation – on those fortunate enough to enter professional life – to use their education and position to improve the outlook for their society and the prospects for their fellow citizens. This certainly applies to responses to conflict. An exhaustive consultation with senior journalists from 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 1999, found:

"Whether employed by state-controlled broadcasting corporations or editing weekly or daily newspapers surviving on street-corner sales, most of the journalists involved said that they believe they have a vital role to play in the prevention (sic) and resolution of conflict. For many, the question was not whether they should be fulfilling that role, but rather how they could do so" (Onadipe and Lord 1999, p. 2).

Journalists in western countries sup from different sources, notably the liberal theory of press freedom, that media should be seen as a civic tool in democracy, flagging up problems and presenting 'the facts', without fear or favour. A UK study interviewed senior British editors, producers and reporters engaged in covering conflict, and recorded, as typical, this statement from an experienced frontline correspondent, Kim Willsher of the *Mail on Sunday*:

"I don't wish to sound pompous or arrogant about it, but you hope that by opening people's eyes to what is happening, that maybe something will be done to stop it from happening. If enough journalists are telling the story, the politicians will see what's happening and will actually do something to stop it continuing" (Tumber and Webster 2006, p. 67).

It's only a nuance away from the formulae for peace journalism and for constructive conflict coverage, quoted here, but, in this context, a nuance makes all the difference. Willsher cut his teeth covering the wars of succession in former Yugoslavia, Tumber and Webster record, and here, 'doing something', in the eyes of many UK-employed journalists, came to mean taking sides against the Serbs, up to and including military intervention.

"Journalists embarked on crusades and became partial. They empathised with the Bosnian government because of personal outrage at Serb aggression. *Prima facie*, this partiality distorted the reporting" (Gowing 1997, p. 12).

Inscribed in Lynch and McGoldrick's formula for peace journalism is a concept of redressing an imbalance. If war journalism predominates, then the media contribution to democratic debate is skewed, in favour of violent outcomes – reproducing war propaganda, as Kempf rightly points out. Instead, according to the liberal theory, they should project into the public sphere as many views, perspectives and versions of events as possible.

"The peculiar evil of silencing an expression of opinion is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error" (John Stuart Mill 1861).

A similar concept provides the underpinning for public service agreements common to many broadcast news organisations, both public and commercial. The BBC *Producer Guidelines (*2004), for example, stipulate that a "full range of significant views and perspectives" are heard and "There are usually more than two sides to any issue".

In Canada:

- "To achieve balance and fairness, the widest possible range of views should be expressed"
- "There must also be depth, the capturing of dimensions and nuances. Without these elements, the programming becomes too simplistic to permit adequate comprehension" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2004).

In Australia:

- "Balance" should be achieved by presenting "a wide range of perspectives"
- "In serving the public's right to know, editorial staff will be enterprising in perceiving, pursuing and presenting issues which affect society and the individual".
- "Pursuing impartiality should not mean endorsing the status quo. The Corporation is also required to be innovative… The ABC seeks to be a pace-setter in community discussion" (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2004).

Television in America is less overtly regulated, but the First Amendment to the US Constitution protects freedom of expression. A famous court ruling said that should mean:

"an uninhibited marketplace of ideas … It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, and other ideas which is crucial" (Supreme Court 1969).

These are all useful arguments for peace journalism. If there are generally more than two sides to any issue, then BBC reports, at least, should generally frame

conflicts as consisting of more than two parties; but most do not. The common denominator of these provisions – a responsibility to ensure public access to a "full range" of views – is generally trumped by the reporting conventions which award the agenda-setting role to official sources.

That means issues officialdom prefers to ignore tend to drop off the edge of the news agenda, even when it is in the public interest, as defined by these formulations, to discuss them. The conventions of Objectivity, in other words, are at odds with public service notions of balance and fairness; notions based, in turn, on the liberal theory of press freedom.

Sixty percent of journalists who responded to a global survey (Lynch & McGoldrick 2004) believed that the media in their own country industry today is not performing this essential public service. Most blamed "journalistic conventions", with "market conditions" a close second.

For journalists in the West, most of whom will likely feel uncomfortable at any suggestion of geared their reporting towards contributing to particular outcomes, this is a slightly different rationale for peace journalism – as a remedial strategy, necessary to redress the current, built-in, easily observable imbalance in favour of war journalism, to 'give peace a chance' in public debates about conflicts and how best to respond to them. In that, they are increasingly likely to have to find ways to take issue with, and look around the edges of, war propaganda.

The CNN effect

Inscribed in Willsher's comment about his role as a journalist is an assumption about media influence which has also come to be known as 'the CNN effect' – so called after the first Gulf War when the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said: "We say we have 16 members in the Security Council: the 15 members plus CNN." (Boutros-Ghali 1995). The proposition is that today's global media have grown so mighty as to be able to raise issues to the political agenda by their own efforts; issues which would otherwise hold little or no interest for the powers-that-be. But researchers who have examined the causality find the reality differs from the hype. To take two '*cause celebres*' of this argument:

- 'Operation Restore Hope' – the US intervention in Somalia, in 1992-3
- 'Operation Provide Comfort' – protecting Iraqi Kurds fleeing the vengeance of a defeated Saddam Hussein in the winter of 1991

In Somalia, well before images of starving children started appearing on television, there were already moves afoot in Washington to build a case for military deployment. Ultimately the decision was "based more on diplomatic and bureaucratic operations than press coverage" (Livingston and Eachus 1995).

Operation Provide Comfort has been called "TV news' finest hour" (Shaw 1996) – an argument that nightly coverage of Kurdish refugees, fleeing Iraqi helicopter gunships over the mountains into southern Turkey, prompted governments to decisive action they would never otherwise have considered.

This, too, gives way under closer scrutiny, however. Another account quotes Andrew Natsios, then Director of the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which is part of the US Government's Agency for International Development:

"Major geopolitical considerations drove policy at the time ... The first was concern for Turkey, one of Washington's closest Muslim allies ... Turkey, with its own Kurdish 'problem', had no desire to take in hundreds of thousands of destitute Kurdish refugees ... Even if the cameras had not been there, the Bush administration would have made the same decision" (Robinson 1999).

It underlines Kempf's observation, about the ease with which official propaganda frames can enter the news agenda – especially given the predisposition built in to the conventions of 'objective' reporting. Without peace journalism, the aspirations of the liberal theory of press freedom, and public service agreements for broadcasters, are likely to remain largely unfulfilled.

2

Peace journalism through the lense of conflict theory: Analysis and practice

Samuel Peleg

1. The rationale: Peace journalism as the third party

Conflict is a human interaction, which involves parties with incompatible interests. What renders such incongruity an overt and explicit strife is the awareness of the unsuitability and the ensuing choice of confrontation. Awareness is raised by communication, either with the environment or with the rivaling party. Communication produces information, which affects each side's decision whether to hash out the differences or shun them. Thus, communication becomes a crucial determinant in conflict and conflict resolution: it creates consciousness of, and attentiveness to, the other. Destructive and debilitating communication, which promotes noises, distortions, interruptions, deceptions, ploys, and false clues, promotes and expedites conflict. In contrast, constructive or beneficial communication relies on honesty, open channels and the effort to align the sent message with the received one. Such a pattern of interaction strives for accommodation and the relaxation of tensions and hostilities (Tillett, 1999; Lederach and Jenner, 2002; Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

Peace journalism (henceforth – PJ) has the characteristics and capabilities of encouraging constructive communication. This paper illustrates how the introduction of PJ into conflict theory can advance the theoretical understanding and actual practice of conflict transformation. Peace journalism, as a motivator of peace and as a promoter of depolarization and de-escalation (Galtung, in Hackett and Zhao, 2005), can accomplish a significant role by inspiring journalists to portray disputes in a different manner than that to which they usually ascribe. A successful conflict resolution process must be based on genuine and honest interaction between antagonists, whereby unmet human needs are frankly discussed and interests and motivations rather than positions are candidly aired. Interests such as the fulfillment of basic needs motivate parties to pursue conflicts in earnest. The continuing ignorance of such grievances turns conflicts into deep-rooted or protracted ones (Azar, 1985; Burton, 1987; Montville, 1990; Peleg, 1999). Peace journalism, with its keen eye for causes and stimuli and with its commitment to a broader and fair-

er depiction (Galtung, 1996; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a), can and should bring such unattended human needs to the fore and alleviate intractable conflicts.

Protracted social conflicts, or apparently irresolvable disputes (Fisher, 1997), usually require a third party to mediate between the rivaling parties, or at least, to facilitate their interaction. On-going conflicts generate hostility, animosity, and consequently mistrust to the extent that no direct communication is feasible. This predicament is further exacerbated when the issues in contention are intangible and cannot be compromised (Burton 1979; Mitchell, 1981; Peleg, 2002). The idea of a third party ameliorating dialogue between intransigent belligerents was enthusiastically pursued in various methods and approaches. Third party consultation (Walton, 1987) emphasized the facilitation of productive confrontations, in which rivals openly discuss their incompatibilities. The third party's role is to stimulate mutual positive motivation to reduce conflict. Similarly, techniques such as controlled communication workshops (Burton, 1969) and problem-solving interactions (Kelman, 1972; Doob, 1981) were tried in small group fashion and in interpersonal orientations. The strategic functions of the third party in these endeavors were described by a leading scholar in the field, as follows: "balancing the situational power of parties, synchronizing confrontation efforts, pacing the phases of the dialogue, promoting openness [and] enhancing communication" (Fisher, 1997:143). These are precisely the tasks that peace journalism attempts to pursue.

I suggest, therefore, that peace journalism will assume the role of the third party in its facilitation capacity: allowing for the rivaling sides to get to know one another, to uphold understanding and empathy, to focus on creativity and human ingenuity to resolve conflicts and to emphasize truth-oriented, people-oriented and solution-oriented journalism to expedite peace. The relationship between conflict theory and peace journalism is reciprocal and contributive in both directions. Therefore, the research question in the heart of this concept paper can be presented as "what insights does conflict theory offer into how the media can serve as a third party to conflicts". To answer this question and to elucidate the potential nexus between conflict theory and PJ, I will approach this issue from two complementary directions: the triangular construction of conflict and the spatial escalation model of conflict. These two perspectives in conjunction, a structural one and a dynamic one, will demonstrate the putative merit of PJ as a third party in conflict resolution processes.

2. The structural dimension: The triangle of conflict

Conflict, in many respects, can be perceived as a unitary phenomenon. It has a similar structure and the same dynamics of escalation and de-escalation in spite

of its numerous disparate spheres of occurrence. Thus, family feuds, office turf battles, intra-state clashes between vying factions or international war share common features. The structure that can best describe all types of conflict is the triangle of situation-attitude-behavior (Mitchell, 1981) or the ABC triangle of Attitude, Behavior and Contradiction (Galtung, 1969).

The situation of conflict is the initial state of incongruent interests, or the controversy. In other words, these are the circumstances that galvanized the parties to confrontation. The attitude connotes the psychological dimension: all the stigmata, prejudice, labeling, demonizing and de-legitimizing processes each side confers on the other. This mutual practice of disparagement and vilification is the crux of conflict and a major source of its worsening: stimuli for escalation are mostly psychological and subjective. Finally, behavior is how parties act and what they do with regard to the situation they are in and following the attitude they develop towards the other. PJ can mitigate tensions and exert favorable influence in all three dimensions:

1. *Situation*: Recounting the initial interests in contention in contextual manner, whereby all circumstances, environmental conditions, spectrum of availabilities and sequential background are disclosed. Such a description does not present the parties to the conflict as hungry contenders vying for ascendancy and eager for the other's defeat. Describing the complexity of the scene: not two rivals trapped in an ultimate zero-sum-game of winning or dying but a complex arena of multiple players and options (Tannen, 1999).
2. *Attitude*: Laying out the gamut of psychological feelings and outlooks that are involved. Concentrating not just on the denigrating and condescending aspects of the dialogue between the sides, but also emphasizing fears, concerns, insecurities, mistrust, miscommunication, and ignorance to make the repertoire of dehumanization more human. Abandoning false and excessive polarization (Mnookin and Ross, 1995; Bar-Tal and Teichmann, 2005) for a more reasonable and impartial study of mindsets under tension and duress.
3. *Behavior*: Calling attention to the fact that violence is not the only form of activity in conflict. Most conflict accounts are fighting or aggression-oriented. They are formulated in competition parlance and underscored by images of vanquish or subjugation. But violence is not the only performance in conflict, and certainly must not be the obvious one. Attempts to negotiate or create contacts can be depicted alongside with the more palpable belligerency descriptions.

This paper examines three cases of seemingly intractable, on-going conflicts – The Northern Ireland, the Basque, and the Palestinian-Israeli – to exhibit structure and escalation of conflict, and then, by introducing elements of PJ to each case,

it demonstrates the potential capacity of the peace journalism perspective and understanding to pacify contention and reverse its deadly course.

2.1 Three protracted conflicts

Protracted conflicts display enduring features such as multiple reinforcing cleavages, perpetuated grievances and intolerable inequality and injustice. Such conflicts are usually not discrete and hence, cannot be studied in isolation. A first step toward trying to understand them is to become familiarized with their background and the motivations that spawn them. This section, however, displays the complexities and sensitivities of PJ: admittedly, the contextualization of these conflicts will always seem to different readers value-laden and biased. The following descriptions will not be totally immune to such criticism but an effort has been made to minimize partiality.

a) Northern Ireland

The rift of the Irish Island is almost a century old and it is a corollary of a millennium of struggle between the indigenous population and the English who subdue them. The origins of the conflict go all the way back to the eleventh-century Norman takeover of England and the following subordination of the Irish by successive English kings. But it was only in the middle of the 16th century that English colonization really took root. It took shape in the relocation and resettlement of thousands of Englishmen and Scotsmen, mainly in Ulster, the nine northernmost counties in Ireland (Tilly, 2003). The national and ethnic schism matured and stabilized over the years into religious cleavage as well, when the two rivaling factions of Christianity consolidated as the Catholic Irish patriots versus the pro-English Protestants, the descendants of the English and Scottish settlers, in Ireland.

On the heels of WWI a civil war broke out, which brought about English military control. Within two years a partition agreement was signed between the King and the Irish leadership: an Irish Free State, the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland composed of six counties as an integral part of England. Hard-line Irish Republicans refused to accept the treaty and initiated the resurrection of 1922. Tensions were mainly concentrated in Ulster, or Northern Ireland with its Protestant majority and Catholic minority. An uneasy *modus vivendi* was kept, interrupted by occasional outbursts of violence. In 1969 hostilities erupted again and commenced a new cycle of conflict heightened by the *Bloody Sunday* of 1972, the massacre of civilians by British soldiers. This escalation triggered the British government to resume direct rule over the province, which lasted roughly 20 years. The last decade of the 20th century witnessed some attempts to resolve the situation with the bilateral cease-fire agreement of 1994 and the Good Friday agree-

ment of 1998. However, anxieties and animosities remain until this very day. The disagreements and misunderstandings between the two sides linger and the mistrust remains intact (Miller, 1994).

b) Israel/Palestine

The seeds of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or in its more concise and contemporary version, the Palestinian-Israeli strife, were planted in the last two decades of the 19th century, when Jews began immigrating to their perceived homeland to find the place already inhabited by indigenous Arabs. The birth of the Zionist movement in 1897 galvanized waves of newcomers from Europe and other corners of the world, who began settling and resettling Palestine. National institutions and organizations were founded as an infrastructure for a prospective Jewish sovereignty. Foundations were laid to establish a safe haven for persecuted Jews all over the world by creating the State of Israel in May 1948 in defiance of the British Mandate. The irony, and indeed, the tragedy of the ensuing conflict was that the Jewish national movement stimulated and inspired an Arab national movement, which protested and rebelled against the dispossession of the Palestinian Arabs by the overflow of Jewish immigration.

The two incompatible paths collided, at first in an unpremeditated way and in a form of riots, dispersed clashes and sporadic violence. The years 1920-1921 and 1929 in particular experienced occasional massacres and bloody assaults against Jews, which triggered retaliatory attacks and the establishment of Jewish defense forces. In 1936, the Arabs of Palestine demonstrated for the first time, signs of cohesion and organization. Their leadership launched what became to be known as the Great Arab Rebellion, which paralyzed the economy of the land and convinced the British rulers of Palestine to take heed of the Arab demands (Bickerton and Klausner, 2002). The escalating confrontation between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, with the British as the incompetent and reluctant third side, came to a head during the WWII years. Between 1939 and 1945, while the UK was preoccupied with fighting the Nazis, both claimants of the Holy Land were jockeying for possession for the day after. The UN declaration of November 1947 partitioning the land between the two sides did not ease the tension because it was rejected by the Arabs. Hostilities peaked and an atmosphere of an imminent war took over. This scenario was realized in 1948, when hours after the British evacuation, the Jewish leadership declared Israel an independent sovereign State. The next morning, invading Arab armies from the neighboring states of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon invaded and the Arab Israeli conflict entered its full-fledged military phase. The peak of this phase has been the 1967 war, in which Israel took control of the Gaza peninsula in the south, the Golan Heights In the North, and the West Bank of the Jordan River to its East. To this day, approximately 2 million Palestinians live under Israeli military rule. Five wars and two centuries after the point of

departure, the two sides are still at odds despite some high points along the way such as the Israel-Egypt peace treaty (1979), the (Israel-Jordan peace agreement (1994) and some brave attempts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.

c) The Basque country

Euskadi, or Basque is the name most commonly used to refer to the people located on the shores of the Bay of Biscay and on the two sides of the western Pyrenees that separate the Spain and France. The Basque people have maintained their own unique identity throughout the centuries, while at the same time keeping their association with Spain as part of the republic. Following the coup d'état that overthrew the Republican Government and the bloody civil war of 1936-9, General Franco established a dictatorship that was to last for forty years. The standardized idea of the State applied by Franco, together with the fact that Basque nationalist forces fought on the side of the Republic, meant that the Basque Country suffered strong repression and the total inhibition of systems of self-government (Shabad and Ramo, 1995).

The death of Franco in 1975 led to the monarchy of Juan Carlos I. The new king took upon himself to transform Spain into a thriving democracy. The Basque nationalists and some left-wing formations wanted a break with the previous regime, but in practice it was replaced by a transition process from dictatorship to democracy. The challenges faced by this process were to deal with claims for basic democratic freedoms, amnesty for political prisoners, and the claims for sovereignty of the nations that made up the State, especially Catalonia and the Basque Country, the vanguard of political struggle during Franco's regime. The new Spanish Constitution of 1978 acknowledged and guaranteed the right to autonomy of all its provinces. However, the Constitution did not satisfy the claims of the Basque nationalists for independence and self-determination (Kurlanski, 1999).

ETA, the Basque armed national liberation movement, emerged in December 1958, half-way through the period of Franco. The group was born of the dissatisfaction of certain nationalist sectors who considered the moderate nationalists too passive in their defense of Basque culture and against the dictatorship. Initially it was a political group that limited its operations to propaganda. The move to the armed struggle started with occasional bombs, hold-ups and sabotage that only caused material damage. During the first decade of activity, the police detained members of ETA but there were no human casualties as a result of its operations. The first fatalities occurred on 2nd August 1968, and from then until Franco's death the action that had the greatest impact was the attack on Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, President of the Spanish government and the designated successor of Franco. For the next two decades, ETA and the Spanish police would engage in a merciless struggle, which exacted hundreds of casualties.

In March 1992 the leadership of ETA was detained in a single military operation, which handed the organization its biggest setback ever. Until then, ETA's strategy was based on the demand for political negotiations with the Madrid government. Following the detentions in 1992, ETA's policy changed considerably. They adopted a two-phase path: one with the Spanish State and then an inner Basque venue. In the first stage, if the Spanish government would recognize the right to self-determination and the territorial unity of Euskal Herria, ETA would declare a ceasefire. That would allow a democratic process for the Basque citizens to decide their own future. This shift brought some tranquility to the area but differences between the rivaling sides persisted. The current phase of the conflict began in 1998 when ETA opened direct dialogue with the Basque nationalist parties without going through the government in Madrid. From that moment on, ETA stipulated ending violence by getting a nationalist agreement. Intermittent flare-ups of violence were justified by failure to sign an agreement on sovereignty in the terms proposed by this organization. That was the longest truce by ETA. In the last two years, out of frustration and dwindling supporters, violence against politicians, journalists, members of the judiciary and armed forces resumed. The incongruence of interests between ETA and the Spanish authorities were never dealt with.

The role of the media in sustaining the conflict and preserving the acrimonious atmosphere of suspicion and abhorrence has been substantial in all three cases. This was the routine and customary manner in which disputes were habitually covered. But such a routine is not a matter of course and should not be taken for granted. As Kempf points out:

> "[J]ournalists always have two options: either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation" (2003a, p. 83).

The following will be an attempt to demonstrate the use of the media as a third party in those conflicts. A third side, in the terms of conflict resolution theory, serves as a container of escalation. One of the field's leading theorists likens the role of the third side to "a social immune system preventing the spread of the virus of violence" (Ury, 2000). Since this clearly wasn't the way the media treatment of conflicts functioned so far, our emphasis here is on transforming the approach by which journalists depict their stories.

2.2 The peace journalism model and the conflict triangle

The peace journalism model (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a) originally formulated by Johan Galtung, posits some dichotomies to differentiate the concept of PJ from regular, or war-oriented journalism. These are only some of the model's features. Others are displayed later in section F:

Peace/Conflict Journalism	War/Violence Journalism
Peace-Orientated	*War-Orientated*
1. Explore conflict *formation*, x parties, y goals, z issues, 'win-win' orientation.	1. Focus on conflict *arena*, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war, zero-sum orientation.
2. Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture.	2. Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone.
3. Making conflicts transparent.	3. Making wars opaque/secret.
4. Giving voice to all parties, empathy, understanding.	4. 'Us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us'.
5. See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity.	5. See 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war.
6. Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapon.	6. Dehumanization of 'them'; more so the worse the weapon.
7. Proactive: prevention before any violence/ war occurs.	7. Reactive: waiting or violence before reporting.
8. Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma, damage to structure/culture).	8. Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage).



Figure 1: PJ and WJ attributes within conflict dimensions

These distinctions will help demonstrate the value of peace journalism to conflict resolution processes. If we associate the first three items with the *situation* dimension of conflict, the next three items with the *attitude* dimension and the last two items with the *behavior* dimension, we get criteria with which to assess the nature and orientation of media messages. Equipped with these analytical tools, the actual media discourse about the conflicts can be examined.

2.3 The conflict triangle in conventional journalism

The *situation* is the first dimension of conflict to tackle. It illuminates the dispute's historical foundations and the original discrepancies between the parties. The media, as the conveyer of stories, can deliver such an account in more than one fashion, with differing emphases and nuances. History as a concept can be tricky, for it is not what has actually happened in the past, but what certain observers saw, understood and recounted. Thus, several contending, even contradictory, versions of the same events might emerge. Here, the more attractive storyteller prevails. Describing roots of conflicts adheres to the same rule-of-thumb: subjectivity of the relaters rather than objectivity of "reality".

The media as storytellers, wishing to attract audience in an era of multi-channel, rating obsessed and commercial time-span mindsets, opt for a more dramatic, more emotional, more provocative and more sensational mode of telling. Their natural choice would be the war/violence perspective, which is strewn with the ample amounts of blood and guts, heroes and villains, righteousness and wickedness (Shinar, 2000). The next session analyzes *situation* press descriptions of the three conflicts. It detects the features of traditional journalism and then attempt to demonstrate the impression of the same accounts had they been painted in PJ colors. The media citations represent various sources, with disparate proximity to the conflict: some are directly involved (Loyalist and Republican press in Northern Ireland); others are less directly involved (Spanish press in the Basque conflict) and some are utterly extraneous to the conflict (CNN and TIME magazine). This is done to demonstrate the ubiquity of PJ, and on the other hand, the temptation of the WJ coverage regardless of how involved the reporter is.

2.3.1 The situation vertex:

(Arena, 2 parties 1 goal, Zero-sum, closed space/time, opaque/secret).

Northern Ireland:
The reports of the clashes in Northern Ireland usually focus on the *arena* of hostilities rather than on the origins of the strife. When the location of the conflict is described, each newspaper, the Catholic *Irish News* and the Protestant *News Letter*, tries to paint the scene with its own colors and substantiate its side of the

story as 'real'. For example, the *Irish News* constantly refers to Northern Ireland as The North to connote the irrefutable relationship between the two parts. The *News Letter*, on the other hand, routinely refers to Northern Ireland as Ulster to emphasize the historic nine-county province of England, and thus to perpetuate the linkage with the UK. The relevant parties to the conflict and their prospective national and religious affiliations are given special weight in the Irish war journalism. For years, the Catholic *Irish News* stubbornly bracketed under Home News all the events that occurred in both north and south Ireland. The World News section covered, among others, events in Britain. The rival *News Letter* used different titles, assuming the UK under local events and the Republic of Ireland as 'abroad' (Wilson, 1997).

The two newspapers unremittingly uphold, however, the rigid dichotomy between the belligerent communities. They assiduously align the Protestant with Unionist and Catholic with Nationalist. Thus, they contract the arena of discord into two participants, two main camps that are pitted one against the other. By lumping together all Catholics within the political position of Nationalists, i.e., Irish patriots advocating the unification of North and South into one nation, and identifying all Protestants as unequivocally Unionists who crave the kinship with Britain, the media distort the understanding of the conflict. The news reports flatten out the diversity within each religious community between moderates and extremists and nullify the existence of other groups in Northern Ireland, such as Chinese or Muslims. The polemic is unreasonably accentuated and heightened and the antagonists are solidified against each other to the point Giddens calls "the degenerate spirals of communication" (1994).

This crude and deliberate dichotomy spills over to the geographical parameters of the conflict. The BBC in its broadcasting routine refers to west Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland, as mainly a "nationalist area" i.e., Catholic, whereas other areas are distinctly stamped as "loyalist," or Protestant. While it is true that the warring communities dwell together and concentrate in particular areas, it is still not a clear-cut division. Characterizing the geographical divide in such simplistic dyadic way heightens the perception of territoriality and fuels the tension further. The immediate corollary of such a formulation is the so called "parades controversy," of Catholics defiantly marching in Protestant turfs and vice versa. Had this rigid physical partition not been repeatedly stressed in the media, the parades would not have become such a volatile instigator of violence. The BBC North Ireland controller, Pat Loughery, acknowledged the problem of portraying strictly two sides to the conflict by admitting that "… there are many traditions, many backgrounds, and many identities and to easily succumb to an analysis that is simple dichotomy … is to take the political polarization and to allow it to appropriate a far more diverse [situation]" (quoted in Wilson, 1997:17).

A lot of ambiguity is being kept in the media reports about the conflict. The vagueness has served to numb readers to the human tragedy involved and to implant the notion that nothing can be done. A keen observer noticed that describing the conflict as

"… a series of unconnected incidents helps promote in readers' minds the idea that the violence is mindless and has not grown out of specific economic, political and military causes" (Lundy, 1983).

Such a portrayal hardly encourages political activism or wide popular protest against the ongoing conflict due to its detached and isolated illustration of events. The consistently indistinct reporting affected the way people have viewed and understood the Northern Ireland situation. The regular lack of clarification and perspective and the omission of background created in the minds of readers a "procession of inexplicable events" (ibid.). The main theme became the illogical and unreasonable state of affairs, which was really a vacuous and inane umbrella expression to camouflage the complexities. As Elliott (1976) indicates: "the tendency of the media was to report violent events as simply irrational and horrid … Such events were irrational *because* they were horrid" (original emphasis). Referring to the Northern Ireland events in the patronizing and haughty term of 'troubles' does not help either and leads to cynical reactions such as "the 'troubles' are like the weather: they appear completely beyond anyone's control" (Greensdale, 1993).

Israel/Palestine:

The gist of the quarrel between Israelis and Palestinians is captured in the mere title of the first all-out war between them in 1948. While the Israelis proudly call it the war of Independence, the Palestinians remember it as the Al Naqba, or the catastrophe. The media on each side reiterate and perpetuate these vying descriptions to revive the mythology of each party. As far as the Israeli newspapers are concerned, the conflict is between the Israelis and "the Arabs", the "Muslim world", or "the Palestinians". It is always a two-sided controversy, in which the just side, the Israelis, battle the monolithic anti-Israeli side. Any internal Arab or Palestinian differences are shunned in favor of the neat, bi-lateral illustration. Another habit is the description of the setting or location of events. The entire conflict is limited to the Middle East, and more precisely, to the jurisdiction of Mandatory Palestine and its neighbors. The relevance of occurrences in Europe or in the rest of the Arab and Muslim world is played down. The sequential references of history are ignored in a closed space-time paradigm. The dispute is regularly introduced as purely and unequivocally zero-sum: two peoples struggling for one state. There is no compromise: either bigger Israel or bigger Palestine. One denies the basic rights of the other and vice versa.

In most accounts in the Israeli media there is no serious and profound discussion about the historical roots of the dispute with the Arabs. There is a comfortable ambiguity hanging over any descriptions which relate to past events, chronologies, or sequential turns of events. The impervious narrative of modern Zionism regarding "who we are", "what are we doing here and why" and "why we are right and just and they are not", is tightly kept. Any attempt to challenge the narrative is promptly and vigorously eschewed. The Israeli media has been very active in nurturing this storyline and backing up with "facts". Many unpleasant accounts or 'unfitting' details were ironed out. The Palestinian media did exactly the same and kept their exclusive narrative alive in a hapless mirror-image of their enemy's.

The Basque country:
A CNN report on the Basque conflict boasts the following title: "Basque question: Spain's pressing problem". Then, in the subtitle, the network chief correspondent in Madrid, Al Goodman adds: "For Spaniards, hardly a day goes by when they are not confronted with the issue of Basque separatist violence" (Goodman, 2002). This is how, wryly and matter-of-factly, the complicated and sensitive controversy is presented to the readers of CNN. First, the title declares, it is a pressing problem for Spain, not for the Basques, thereby assuming that all Basques perceive themselves as Spaniards, or ignoring the Basques all together. Second, the issue is not a matter of sovereignty, autonomy, authority or power, but violence. The outcome is again mixed with the cause because it sounds more attractive.

The article continues in quoting Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar as saying: "We are not going to allow them to impose terror on our country. We will fight them with all the moral and material force of the state of law." (ibid). There are no counter citations in the text, and it concludes with the statement: "From bombs to peace marches, the problem of Basque violence is ever-present in Spanish society" (ibid). It is a one-sided and attributive account. There is no mentioning of the Spanish Army's violence, the cruelty of the Madrid secret police or the government-linked death squads of GAL (Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups). Conspicuously missing are the background and origins of the dispute, and the divergence of actors partaking in it: the Spaniards and the Basque Extremists are depicted as two monolithic camps without any reference to Moderate Basques, Catalans, Andalusians, or other ethnic minorities, who might not see eye-to-eye with the Madrid line.

On the other hand, the Basque newspaper Euskal Herria Journal adopts a similar fomenting viewpoint. A report from August 23, 2002 reads:

"Thousands of people marched behind a Basque nationalist flag during a demonstration in support of the Basque nationalist party Batasuna in Bilbao on August 23, 2002. Spain´s public prosecutor approved on Friday the suspension of the party, backing a notorious Judge´s allegations that the group supports and funds the Basque national liberation organization

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). A sign at the demonstration read in Basque 'Basque Country Arise! Stop fascism'."

Similarly to the previous report, the story concentrates on the arena of conflict, which is current in space and time, and underlines two parties to the confrontation. The descriptions are very one-dimensional: ETA is never a terrorist but a national liberation organization, and the Spanish judge is notorious. Such provocative portrayals are certain to promote agitation and incitement.

2.3.2 The attitude vertex:

(Propaganda, "us"/"them", other as problem).

Northern Ireland:
The *News Letter* insists on naming the Republic of Ireland as Eire, thereby inculcating the impression of a foreign country in its unionists, or Protestant readers. This is done deliberately and consistently in order to underline the sense of anomaly and remoteness from the southern part of the island. Another point which is diligently stressed in the *News Letter* is referring to the IRA and its activists as terrorists. This catch-all term vilifies the Catholic organization regardless of their deeds and ignores the fact that only a minority of their actions in recent years have been purely of a terrorist nature. Such labeling "…decontextualizes the IRA from its conditions of existence in Northern Ireland and displaces it into the international arena of organizations deemed simply to be a threat" (Wilson, 1997). A mirror image is sustained for the same purpose of denigrating the enemy in the depiction of Protestant paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) or the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) in the pages of the *Irish News*.

The media are tempted to give voice to the extremists and to allow them easy access due to their vociferous prominence and stridency. Such characteristics are perceived as more alluring to readers and viewers. Consequently, communication channels are inundated with propaganda messages instead of a genuine discourse and exchange of views. Abandoning the media front to extremists might bear serious consequences, as a prominent analyst admonished with evidence from another conflict:

"… decent people and their activities are hardly ever news; nationalist demagogues are. There have been ten interviews with marginal fascists psychopaths in Serbia and Croatia for every interview with a human rights or peace activist. Thus the media have helped the bad guys" (Denitch, 1996).

In the same vein, media have a penchant toward elites as their source of information. Elites sense that weakness and exploit it to disseminate their own propaganda. This proclivity, again, does not propel dialogue or present a fair and balanced illustration but tends to reduce coverage to "routinist reportage of well-

rehearsed adversarial positions of political spokespeople" (Wilson, 1996) to the detriment of authentic and fresh ideas and actors.

Israel/Palestine:
It is difficult to find today a more psychologically charged and a more value-laden feud than the Israeli-Palestinian. Its protracted nature allowed the conflict to stockpile repertoires of negative images and prejudice on both sides. There is an abyss of mistrust between the belligerents, which feeds fears and hostilities. The media heat these emotions to a boiling point. In October 2000 the second Palestinian Intifadah (uprising) broke out against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Some Israeli-Palestinians (the Arab minority within the state of Israel) spontaneously joined the riots to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the way Israel treats its Arab citizens. Two weeks later, a poll was taken among the residents of the Jewish-Arab city of Jaffa to track any changes in the interfaith relations in the wake of the riots. To one of the questions, 40% of the Jewish residents answered that they believed that in times of war, their Arab neighbors might attack them. This datum was taken up by an Israeli local paper and published on the front page as: "In War Time the Jaffa Arabs will Attack Tel Aviv" in giant bold letters (Dor, 2001). This was a manipulative and scheming report intended to cause fear and disruption in its readers, or in other words, sheer propaganda that was fanned by panic and suspicion.

During the delicate negotiations to resume normalcy and reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis, the media on both sides consistently accredited "the other" with the burden of accountability. In the bloody October 2000, Israeli press headlines competed in pinpointing the Palestinians, and especially their leader, as a hindrance to pacifying the violence. They read: "Arafat's Test", "Arafat Has 48 Hours to Achieve Cease-Fire", and "Arafat is not in a Hurry" (ibid, 2001, 30). That "us versus them" depiction, with "us" being on the clear and "them" carrying all the blame and responsibility, is typical of war journalism and of biased coverage. The "blame-the-other" theme is very prominent as well. Even in the heydays of optimism, skepticism was looming as hope and doom were bitterly mixed. On the morning of the historic treaty with the PLO on September 13, 1993, another terrorist attack killed four Israelis. The headlines of the Israeli press read: "Peace in the Shadow of Terrorism", "Israel-PLO agreement will be signed today, a wave of attacks in the country" (Wolfsfeld, 1997b: 111). Linking the two frames, the peace one and the violence one, together implies that the process and our (the Israelis) goodwill and sacrifice hinge upon the deeds of the Palestinians. The clear message is that terrorism jeopardizes the peace and the Palestinians must do something about it lest it would all crumble. The most common and persistent thesis in that matter became the incompetence, or unwillingness, of Arafat to carry out his obligations, as specified in the Oslo Accords: "Arafat is not keeping his commitment to operate against extremists" was the headline of Haaretz after the Beit Lid

terrorist attack on Israeli soldiers and civilians in January 1995 (Wofsfeld, 2004: 69).

The Basque country:
The CNN 2002 special report on the "Basque question" rather than the Spanish question had other attributive features. The major theme is the distinction between the 'trouble makers' and the regular folk, who merely want normal life. This division is underlined in the article not only between Basques and others but among Basques themselves in order to accentuate even further the extremism and fanaticism of the activists. This citation is typical:

"The region has even attracted a famous museum, The Guggenheim in Bilbao, whose modern, dynamic image is precisely the image the Basque people want to project of themselves. None of this, however, is enough for ETA and the other Basque nationalist political parties, with the result that the region's streets continue to simmer with tension, fear and a lot of anger" (Goodman, 2002).

This is an expressly judgmental account, which under the disguise of an even-handed description, puts an indisputable blame on one party.

Another favorite technique to underscore the us/them attitude is comparison, which resembles dichotomies and labeling. An eye-catching comparison is usually an outrageous one. In the Basque context, it must involve Generalissimo Franco, as in this Time Magazine report:

"Since it aborted a 14-month cease-fire in November 1999, ETA has broadened its threats to include thousands of judges, journalists, politicians and businessmen, who are under constant guard. 'It's like the hardest days of the Franco dictatorship, when police informers were everywhere,' says [a resident]. 'But now we don't know who the informers are'" (Graff, 2003).

Some of the leading Basque newspapers conceal a great deal of nationalist propaganda in their reports. This camouflage comes to the fore especially when contrasted with the other party, the enemy. The *Euskal Herria Journal* demonstrates this trend in its August 2002 account of the outlawing of the Basque national political party Batasuna:

Tens of thousands of Basques marched on Sunday to protest against the Spanish government's moves to ban the Basque radical party Batasuna. Marchers shouted "Long live ETA military!" and "Independence!" Reporters estimated that thousands participated in the peaceful march. On Saturday, Spain's two leading parties agreed on plans to use a controversial new law to ban Batasuna, a party which shares the same Basque independence goal as ETA and denies links to the armed group. The ruling and main opposition parties called a session of parliament for later this month to mandate the government to ask the Supreme Court to ban the party under the law. The law holds that any party which supports, justifies or excuses terrorism can be banned. Batasuna's leader Arnaldo Otegi said last week Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was trying to turn the clock back to the days of military dictatorship under Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Cloaked as a neutral report, the journalist emphasizes the peaceful nature of the event and the goals of the marchers. On the other hand, the opponents' move is described as "controversial" and their methods are estimated by an interviewee as dictatorial.

2.3.3 The behavior vertex:

(Reactive, Visible effects of violence).

Northern Ireland:
The press on each side depicted "its" activists as merely reacting to the aggressiveness of the other. This partisan perspective created a 'tunnel vision', in which escalation was expedited in light of the intransigence of the enemy vis-a-vis the innocence of one's own side. The British media habitually praised its soldiers in Northern-Ireland as peace-keepers, claiming further, that their army is "… merely reacting stoically to the inflammatory Irish with a restraint no other force would show" (quoted in Wilson, 1997:37). The adulation for the British soldier picked in such accounts of poetic heroism as "a great defender of civilization against chaos, of order against the apostles of violence. He is the most patient, decent, military man in the world" (McCann, 1992).

The British army, in general, appeared "above the fray--brave, tormented, but largely inactive except as a rather superior kind of Boy Scout Troop" (Elliott, 1976:355). All newspapers established the axiom that the source of violence and evil is terrorism, which is destructive, asocial and inexplicable. Of course, each side had a different felon to put in the terrorist role; nevertheless, the press on both sides excels in savory and flavorful descriptions of that evil. The October 1974 Guilford pub bombing and the August 1998 Omagh market atrocity were given prominence in all the media channels. They were markedly covered and blatantly posits as the kernel of the Northern Irish "problem." Causes and consequences were muddled up and confounded, but by the profligacy and extravagance of their coverage, the reports set off an atmosphere of fury and vehemence.

Israel/Palestine:
When it comes to terrorism, especially in its most arbitrary and painful mode – suicide bombing – it is very hard not to concentrate on reaction to the atrocity and to underline its sheer brutality. The callousness of the act obscures the grievances which propel it. Thus, to return again to the Beit Lid massacre, in which 20 Israelis were killed, the captions under bloody pictures of the event in the Israeli newspapers contended with each other in their hysterical and uproarious tones: "The Children that won't Return", "With Tears of Rage" in huge letters and flaming red colors (Wolfsfeld, 2004:64). Again, the focus on the reactive depiction of the terrorist deed and its harsh consequences totally eclipse the despair that provoked

it in the first place. Those invisible sources of suffering are mute and inaccessible to media scrutiny. Such descriptions are rampant in Israeli media in every terrorist incident. The effect of indiscriminate violence is so mesmerizing that it silences every other aspect of the conflict. Analyzed from this perspective, Palestinian extremists are counter-productive to their cause.

A similar reactionary coverage is prevalent in other patterns of behavior between Israelis and Palestinians. Wars and other acts of violence naturally shoulder the major brunt of the conventional reporting but failure of diplomatic efforts or cessation of peace endeavors get a similar treatment. They are unceremoniously conveyed in an after-the-fact vein and seldom as forewarning or admonition in an effort to salvage resolution. When the first Intifadah broke out, the headline in *Yediot Aharonot* read: "The Uprising Began: A Dialogue through the Stone, the Sling and the Molotov Cocktail" (*Yediot Aharonot,* 9/12/1987). When the Oslo process began and the treaty between the PLO and Israel was signed, a series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic extremists shook the country. The headline in one of the leading Israeli newspaper was: "Hamas is Sabotaging the Peace Process" (Ma'ariv, 9/10/1994). This is just a tiny sample of the general attitude of the Israeli press toward Palestinian violence. The more obvious and conventional manner of reporting is not necessarily the most conscientious and accountable one. As far as encouraging conflict resolution, it was certainly not the optimal way. Relaying the horrors of terrorism, as appalling as they are, extract fury and ferocity which intensify conflicts.

The Basque country:
In their reports on the Basque conflict, most journalists opt for recounting observable violence--the highest attention-grabbing technique. By so doing, they often omit invisible consequences of aggression and brutality, which cause more damage and suffering than the visible ones. By concealing the more severe horrors of conflict, journalists actually condone the spirit of dispute. When finally the CNN reporter mentions cease-fire efforts, he immediately deserts them with this more typical kind of depiction:

"They were shattered more than a year later, however, by a car bomb in Madrid, with both the government and ETA blaming each other for wrecking the cease-fire. Now, hundreds of local officials who oppose ETA must go everywhere with bodyguards" (Goodman, 2002).

Many media accounts are passively and reactively describing rather than preemptively raising and discussing a point. A 2004 BBC Monitoring report depicts the critical issue of outlawing a Basque newspaper in a reticent, *post-facto* manner:

"[The] Madrid government of Prime Minister José María Aznar … regards the shuttering of *Egunkaria* — like last year's banning of the political party Batasuna for alleged close ties to ETA — a necessary step in its war on terrorism."

A Time Magazine reporter relates to a previous time the Basque newspaper was closed, in a similar reactive, though more vivid, fashion:

"First came the predawn trip, blindfolded in the back of a Spanish paramilitary van, from his home in Tolosa to a police cell in Madrid. It was there, claims Martxelo Otamendi — the last managing editor of the now banned Basque-language daily *Egunkaria* — that his ordeal began. While police interrogated him about his newspaper's alleged links to the Basque separatist terror organization ETA, he claims they had him stand naked in his cell for three days, with a chance to sit down only every five hours" (Graff, 2003).

No discussion follows this report and no profound deliberation of the implications and connotations of such a radical step by the government ensue. The same dry and unreflective manner is discerned in this *Euskal Herria Journal* description of a violent attack in the summer of 2002:

"A car-bomb blamed on Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ripped through a police barracks killing two, including a six-year old girl. The explosion in the tiny Spanish resort of Santa Pola on Sunday night also injured about 25 according to local media. It was the first lethal attack blamed on ETA since Socialist politician Juan Priede, 69, was shot dead in a bar in March. The force of the blast tore the facade off a four-story building in the barracks, exposing the staircase and the inside of the flats. The girl killed in the blast was the daughter of a paramilitary Civil Guard police officer. A 50-year-old man identified as Cecilio Gallego was also killed. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. ETA usually gives a warning about the bomb, but on this occasion it did not."

The details of this gruesome attack are calmly and painstakingly relayed in an almost ceremonial regularity, although the nuances of empathy are not relinquished: "a car-bomb *blamed on* ETA", instead of an ETA car-bomb, and the conspicuous absence of the word terrorism in this paragraph despite its content. The reactive, visible-violence oriented character of war journalism is aptly caught in this short summation of the CNN report on the Basque Question: "There is continued so-called low-level violence throughout the region, with pro-independence Basque youths attacking businesses, city buses, even homes on both sides of the border" (Goodman, 2002). What are the reasons and motivations of these youngsters to commit such violent deeds? What are the consequences and prospective implications of their delinquency? Who is going to face them and how? These essential questions remain unanswered.

One final note to conclude this section: there are more features to the distinction between war and peace journalism. They are surveyed here briefly. A very important difference is truth-oriented writing versus propaganda-oriented. The former is the exposure of cover-ups and schemes on all sides whereas the latter is selective disclosure, or 'cherry-picking' of the other's deceptions while concealing our secrets. Another disparity is the emphasis on elites in conventional news stories as opposed to PJ's people-centered stories. Finally, while regular conflict journalism is biased toward victory or defeat tales, peace journalism concentrates on resolution and peace initiatives. Whereas the former anticipates and predicts

reemergence of discord, the latter seeks reconciliation and prevention of future hostilities (Galtung, 1996). All the newspaper articles read for this paper stood up to conflict journalism standards. The Catholic, Protestant, Israeli, Spanish and Basque newspaper constantly blamed the 'other side' for being deceiving, unreliable and conniving. By contrast, their side was just and honest except for times when deception was required due to unexpected circumstances. In most descriptions, reports focus on leaders, political or military, their decisions, their actions, their comments. The plight of the common people was rarely mentioned in spite of its vast scope and rate of recurrence. Lastly, most reports in all three cases aimed at the ultimate "score": who wins, who loses, and by how much. Excruciating depictions of misery and failure always conquer over stories of resolution and settlement.

3. The dynamic dimension: Escalation of conflict

An additional way that conflict theory demonstrates the rigor and necessity of PJ is through escalation theory. There are several contending explanations for conflict dynamics but amongst them Schattschneider's contagion model, originally composed in 1960, still stands apart from all its successors. In his spatial model, the direct partners to the feud are less interested in one another. They are preoccupied with communicating to the environment and fortify their relative position by attracting other parties to join forces with them to outweigh the opponent. The media are the communication channels, and reporters carry the messages the rivaling sides transmit. The messages are molded and constructed by journalists and pertain to their reporting talent and style. If the tone they set is vehement and ardent, accentuating the zeal of combat and the spoils of war, other parties might be enthused and drawn into the cycle of violence, thus expanding it. If, on the other hand, the tone is reticent and composed, underlying the anguish of battle and the affliction of warfare, then other parties would refrain from intervening or would interfere to discontinue the conflict. PJ fits the second scenario. In the Irish case, if British public opinion is the observing crowd, bloody descriptions of the clashes between the IRA and British forces, laden with allegations and demonization, will encourage a hawkish mood and public support for an assertive policy in Ulster. In the Palestine/Israel conflict, if world public opinion is to be swayed, harsh depictions of violence devoid of background and circumstances will prop up hostility and anger to further the spiral of confrontation. If the Spanish populace is the critical mass, reports that accentuate cruelty and indiscriminate ETA violence without mentioning government reprisal or political restriction will foment resentment and readiness to sustain the struggle against Basque nationalism until submission. By contrast, fair and balanced reporting, which advances origins and not only symptoms of strife, multilateral relations and not inescapably dyadic

ones, dehumanizes and de-objectifies mutual images instead of de-humanizing and objectifying (Manoff, 2005), and supplies warnings as to the vagaries of war, will significantly alleviate the adversity of contention.

Schattschneider's metaphor of contagion emphasizes how more and more actors and issues join the conflict and exacerbate the escalation process whereby hostilities spread and infect others. The gist of his model, which suggests two direct protagonists who compete for the attention and support of the observing crowd, confers a lot of responsibility on the media. Each side hopes to lure the critical mass and gain sufficient muscle to outweigh the other. The expansion or contraction of conflict hinges, therefore, upon the success or failure to draw more parties into the fray. This endeavor, again, relies on communication. This time, the interaction is not between the two antagonists but between each of them and their environment. PJ as a conveyer of views and ideas, has the potential of favorably affecting the scope and direction of external involvement in the conflict. By presenting a balanced, well informed picture, and by supplying the onlookers with ample evidence and opportunity to intervene and deescalate the conflict, PJ utilizes the practices and patterns of conflict dynamics to advance peace.



Figure 2: Schattschneider's model of conflict escalation

The importance of the media role in the containment or contraction of conflict cannot be exaggerated. A major component of conflict is the environment that hosts it. Confrontation between sides at odds never occurs in a vacuum. There is always a context, a setting which confers the feud with perspective and circumstances. The parties to the conflict establish connections with the surroundings to sense the atmosphere and to detect sympathetic dispositions that might tip the balance

in their favor. The conflict milieu is not merely the physical or geographical location of the disagreement but also the psychological, cultural or sociopolitical background. By conversing with the environment, the actors really construct the meaning of the conflict. This spatial interaction is the incubator of terminology, images, labels, categorizations and stigmata. These, in turn, portray and piece together the discourse of conflict (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Inter-personal quarrel takes place in a small environment and the interaction between the actors is direct. Beyond that, the construction of reality through decoding the environment requires the mediation of the media. Thus, in larger conflicts, it is the media which supplies the images, the characterization, the classification and the direction of the conflict discourse. The media sets the agenda, pits the rivaling camps one against the other, and draws the fault-lines of the ensuing battles. This is how the observing crowd learns of the dispute and makes up its mind. Furthermore, this is how the involved parties themselves formulate and reformulate their positions and consequent moves. Thus the contribution of the media to the escalation or de-escalation of conflict is crucial and this is where the transformation from regular, sensational and contention-prone journalism to the accountable, evenhanded and rigorous peace journalism, is most desired.

4. Protracted conflicts in peace journalism

The perspective of peace journalism demands a major philosophical and ethical shift. It literally entails a fundamental conversion of professional etiquette and of work habits – not an easy task by any standard. Essential observations regarding conflicts are revised and discarded. Some convenient "truths" must be cast off to make room for innovative and daring thinking. For example, the vision of conflict as inevitably a zero-sum-game is replaced by the possibility of a win-win orientation. The excited anticipation for the thrill of victory or the drama of defeat is substituted by the eagerness for resolution, and the ambiguity of tension and suspense is exchanged for the clarity of relief and hope.

Accordingly, at its situation vertex, PJ's responsibility is to equally present all sides and to allow common people, not elites or leaders to express genuine thoughts and ambitions. Equal access must be permitted not only to fanatics, who bomb their way into the news but to other sides to the conflict as well. Conventional journalism highlights the militants and their conduct and thereby paints the entire conflict in belligerent colors. Consequently, the actual foundations of the controversy are disregarded. PJ would cover all involved to expose the sincerity of incompatible interests. Thus, in PJ reporting, the IRA, the Islamic Jihad, ETA or any other violent players, would not automatically gain central stage despite their added value of sensationalism. Moreover, PJ would grant more weight to the historical

circumstances of the Irish conflict. It would expand the scope of time and place to include not only the current arena but also Scotland, Wales and England and their relation to the Irish Isles in the 16th century. PJ would try to avoid volatile labeling such as Ulster on the one hand or the IRA terrorists on the other hand. It would use Northern Ireland to connote geography and the neutral term IRA radicals to indicate a non-compromising political views. A PJ coverage would introduce the multiplicity of actors on each side, and familiarize the readers with the nuances and sensitivities of everyone involved. The connection between the grievances and desires of all participants and their respective behavior would be clearly illustrated to prevent obscurity and confusion. Similarly, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute must be presented with lucidity and perspicuity. The Arab camp should be dissected into its various components as well as that of the Israelis. Both sides have hawks and doves and a variety of ideological and political stands regarding the conflict. There is more than one way, and not necessarily the zero-sum way, to get out of the Middle East predicament. PJ would shift the overemphasis on the arena of conflict by tracing down the sources of the strife to Europe and to other Arab countries in the region, stretching back to the 19th century and the beginning of Jewish and Arab national revival. Finally, the Basque question ought to be presented as a Spanish question, thereby moving the onus to the Spaniards at large. Thus the issue of terrorism is not attributed to Basques as such, but to disagreements within the Spanish sociopolitical system. Such an approach does not alienate anyone and hence, does not promote conflict. Here, as in the other cases, elucidating the historical origins of the struggle and the incompatible interests of each side would help disassociate readers from the harsh and immediate impression of terrorism and lead them more profoundly into the nature of the contention. PJ would persistently distinguish between militant and moderate Basques, independence and autonomy exponents.

In the attitude vertex, PJ reporting circumvents propaganda messages. Peace reporters serve nobody's cause but peace, and thus, won't avail themselves for anyone's particular agenda. Conflict journalism carries propaganda message occasionally if they are 'newsworthy' in their attractiveness. PJ exponents would not compromise their quest of representing a fare picture for the allure of the 'us versus them' spectacle. In the Irish case, PJ would not point a finger at the IRA as 'saboteurs' of reconciliation, nor to the Ulster paramilitary units as jeopardizing stability. They would describe the conflict as "a fly on the wall" (Fisher and Ury, 1981), bringing forth the claims and woes of all. In the Middle Eastern struggle, PJ exponents must work around the abyss of mistrust and hatred on both sides and not be carried away by the torrent of accusations. Instead of indicating who started the conflict or who has more justified claim on the Holy Land, emphasis should be put on the responsibility the two sides share for the future of that cherished area. As for terrorism, although it is spine-tingling, PJ would avoid the ex-

hibitionism usually associated with the publicizing of these atrocities. The customary labels and generalizations such as 'killers', 'Jihadists', 'Zionists' or 'occupiers' would be toned down, for they serve no purpose but fueling the discourse. In the Basque example, PJ could start by presenting the Basque nationalists and the Madrid government as two accessories to the conflict, who evenly share not the blame, but the responsibility to resolve the differences between them. Perceiving only the Basques as the 'trouble-makers' and holding them as liable for the quandary, is erroneous and counter-productive. All the analogies with the dictatorship of Franco on the one hand and with other terrorist movements around the globe are useless and self-defeating. PJ comparisons would be with positive historical examples, those who promoted peace and the good of the community. Lastly, neither the propaganda of the Madrid government nor the Basque nationalists' would be carried by PJ reports. No defamation of the other or misinformation would be allowed by peace journalism. Only an accurate account of each side's claims and interests would be described.

The behavior vertex in the PJ mode concentrates on the proactive: it endeavors to raise awareness of cores and hubs of potential violence in order to prevent them before they erupt. There is also a strong emphasis on invisible or 'silent' effects of violence such as trauma, damage to structure or culture, grievances, and various insecurities. Accordingly, peace journalists covering the Irish conflict ought not wait for another IRA assault or British troops' curbing of civil liberties, but rather, through an in-depth investigation and a prudent use of sources, discover impending focal points of intensification or nucleuses of discontent and call attention to them before they burst. Similarly with the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Suicide bombers can be detected in advance. They are recruited in the most wretched places and their zeal is stimulated by ignorance, poverty and religious fervor. PJ can surface these elements and bring them to the attentiveness and understanding of Westerners and Israelis. Once the roots of this intolerable behavior are explicated, it can be approached in a more sophisticated way, and ultimately, be worked out. The same quest into the motivations and stimuli of extremism can be launched in the case of the ETA activists. An exploration into 'what makes them tick' is a proactive move, which would bear more fruits for conflict de-escalation than the most vivid and flamboyant account of a terrorist act. Finally, bringing the outcomes of violence into the fore can be a double-edged sword. If the depiction focuses on killings and destruction, the tangible and observable impact of aggression, it might elicit counter-violence, reprisal and enhancement of the conflict. If, on the other hand, the indiscernible aspects, the psychological damages and waste of resources are elucidated, then the futility of war becomes evident and de-escalation might pursue. This assumption is valid in all three cases.

4.1 PJ in action: Search for common ground

Let us turn now to a concrete example of how peace journalism works. The Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is a non governmental organization, which attempts to transform the way the world deals with conflict since 1982. It has endeavored to shift away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative problem solving. Its activists engage in projects in various parts of the globe to understand the differences and to act upon the commonalities. Search for Common Ground relies in earnest on a "long-term process of incremental transformation, pursued on a realistic scale and with practical means" (http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_intro.html#1). In their credo, which is specified in their homepage website, they present a PJ approach to the media coverage of conflicts:

"The cost of dealing with conflict from an adversarial, win/lose mind set is apparent on the evening news every night. There are the obvious consequences where thousands of lives are lost to armed combat or neighborhood crime. Billions of dollars are spent on military expenditures and humanitarian aid after wars. Then there are the less obvious consequences, such as thousands of lives lost to hunger, poverty and preventable diseases, and the billions of dollars spent in legal battles. By transforming how people deal with conflict, we can make significant strides in addressing the major issues facing the world."

The following presents three articles from the Common Ground News Service (CGNews), which publishes balanced and solution-oriented articles by local and international experts in order to promote constructive perspectives and encourage dialogue. The insights from conflict theory will be highlighted as they were used in the CGNews authentic attempt at PJ coverage. The articles were randomly chosen with the common denominator of describing volatile and highly conflictual political issues, which are the stuff conventional media prosper on.

The first article is titled "Hamas' Victory" and it was written by Gwynne Dyer, a London-based independent journalist, for *The Jordan Times* on January 27, 2006. The reporter takes on the delicate issue of the extremist Hamas victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections and attempts to illustrate its implications in a more evenhanded manner. He posits the seemingly earth-shattering development within an evolutionary and gradual framework, which might have been obscured in most conventional reports lest sensationalism would be hampered:

"Hamas did not win its surprise victory because a majority of Palestinians are religious fanatics, nor because they believe that Israel must be destroyed. It won because the old mainstream liberation movement, Fatah, had squandered its credibility in ten years of corrupt and incompetent rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and because after 39 year of Israeli military occupation, there is still no sign of a genuinely independent Palestinian state…In fact, most Palestinians do want peace. They would quite like it if Israel were to vanish, of course, just as most Israelis would be happy if the Palestinians vanished. But as much the weaker party in the conflict, Palestinians have long been more realistic about what they would have to give up in a final peace settlement."

Such a description disarms the temptation for a rant-and-rave writing, which Hamas and its declarations so comfortably allow. This is a PJ style of reporting, which barters the gusto of confrontational accounts for the responsibility and conscientiousness of fairness. Such journalism evidently leads to hope and de-escalation of conflict. Owing to the way it is structured – the broad perspective it illustrates and the transparency of motivations and interests of all sides – the expectations from such an account is not for a clear winner or more bloodshed, but for a genuine resolution, as the summation of this piece demonstrates:

"So is the 'peace process' finally, legally dead? It certainly is for the moment. Hamas has reaffirmed that it has no intention of giving up the armed struggle against Israeli occupation. And yet there is always hope, because having genuine political power and responsibility for the results of exercising that power is a crash course in realism. Fatah made the journey from rejectionism to negotiation; it is not inconceivable that Hamas can do the same."

The second article is called "Targeting the innocent" and it was written by MJ Rosenberg, a Capitol Hill staffer, for the *Israel Policy Forum* on April 21, 2006. The author reacts to Prime Minister Tony Blair's remarks about Hamas terrorism and Islamic terror in general. His insights put such violence within broader and less simplistic context:

"As evidenced by Blair's remark, sometimes this whole issue of terrorism gets way too abstract. Take the phrase 'war on terrorism'. Instead of producing an image of actual civilians slaughtered by killers, we think about policy and battle fronts."

Then the author specifies names of Israeli victims who were murdered by a Hamas suicide bomber the day before. However, he follows through with an unexpected addition:

"Of course, we cannot continue to pretend that the only innocent people killed in this conflict are Israelis and Jews. In the last few weeks, six Palestinian children died as a result of Israeli shelling in Gaza and the West Bank."

A detailed list of the Palestinian victims follows. Outlining such a juxtaposition in the aftermath of a Hamas terrorist act is a rare and valiant writing, well worthy of the PJ endeavor. The concluding remarks go even farther:

"Some readers will, I am afraid, view these Palestinian kids as not in the same category as the Israelis. They will view them as collateral damage, just people who were in the wrong place at the wrong time. And, of course, the Israelis do not target innocent civilians nor do they invite attacks by intentionally placing armor in the midst of neighborhoods. Unlike the terrorists, the IDF regrets the innocent loss of life. Nevertheless, a dead child is a dead child: Innocent by definition."

The third article is titled "Meanwhile: An Eerie Lull in an Unfinished Conflict" and it is co-written for *The International Herald Tribune* by Jerrold Kessel and Pierre Klochendler, Jerusalem-based reporters on July 1, 2004. They open by pointing out that "an eerie normalcy has settled over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict" and

wonder whether that was an authentic state of affairs. When they describe the components of that normalcy, they supply a symmetric description:

"Anyone taking an Israeli bus these days from – say, from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv – is struck by the sense of normalcy. Not long ago, every hour, every half-hour, passengers would insist that the bus driver switch his radio on to catch the news headlines. Israelis made sure of being up to the second with the latest bombing, the latest political crisis, the latest proposals to tend the conflict ... Now constant cell phone conversations mixed with oriental pop on the radio swirl uninterrupted around the passengers. No one seems to feel a need for the news."

Eerier still, Ramallah, on the West Bank, seems more and more like a city that is less and less engaged in being the Ramallah of the Intifada. Take the wedding-gown store just off Manara Square where turnover is way down from pre-Intifada days and where the boutique owner can no longer provide custom-sewn gowns because his workshop, in a village outside Ramallah, lies on the other side of the Israeli wall. The store is bustling and the owner says that to circumvent the closures he now imports his extravagant party dresses from China – 'cheaper, too', he confides."

This piece vividly demonstrates the empathy toward both sides and the orientation of conflict, or in this case, violence and terrorism, as the problem and not one of the proponents. Such a balanced and composed account, devoid of the cut-throat anticipation for action does not serve the stimulation of readers toward supporting the escalation of conflict.

Furthermore, the reporters offer a bold analysis, which suggests future paths of action. Their concluding admonition fits the proactive philosophy of PJ by advocating a non-violent scenario before an escalation breaks out:

"On the one hand, the relative quiet does serve a salutary end – and not just because every moment of real quiet is a respite from death and mayhem. On the other hand, the apparent subsiding of tension could be lethal if it leads world leaders into accepting the lull as a prospect in itself, as a basis for resurrecting peace plans which have already proved illusory. The current quiet must not be allowed to become an end in itself. The world cannot afford to go on a summer holiday, to let the Israelis believe that their holiday can last even if they don't bring the occupation to an end. Sustaining the drive for disengagement requires constant international – and especially American – engagement."

5. Conclusion: The useful nexus of theory and practice

This article has probed how conflict theory can contribute to consolidate peace journalism as a valid and practical approach. Although PJ may sound promising and meritorious, it must be anchored to theoretical grounds. Such sustenance would credit PJ with sufficient explanatory power to become more pragmatic and programmatic in the face of structural, psychological, and professional hindrances. This is what Lynch and McGoldrick (2005a) mean by the term anchorage: drawing distinctions and assigning meanings to peace journalism by supplying a theoretical frame of reference. Conflict theory, with its focus on the structure and

dynamics of conflict and on the strategy of how disputes are captured and comprehended by their participants and their environment, is the ultimate candidate to "anchor" PJ to solid ground.

Conflict theory can assist peace journalism in more than one way. The brevity of this paper left room for only two, albeit of the more seminal and pertinent: 1) the three dimensions of conflict – situation, attitude and behavior – and 2) the contagious model of escalation. As for the former, the paper recommends the valuable PJ methodology in approaching each dimension, or each vertex of conflict, in the attempt to overcome the peril of destructive conflict. Only the PJ description, with all its elaborated features, would promote conflict de-escalation at the situation, attitude and behavior junctures. As for the latter, peace journalism is capable of influencing the wider population, represented in the readers' public, to dissuade the rivaling sides from escalating their feud rather than urging them on. A balanced account, an empathical approach to all parties and a broad contextual writing may reduce the penchant for "taking sides" and observing the conflict as a whole not as a match to be won but as a menace to be contained.

In that sense, as the communication channel between the warring sides and the attentive crowd, media have a heavy burden of responsibility to carry. The way they transmit the messages could decide the rate of acceleration or inhibition of hostilities. True to their mission as a third side to mitigate conflicts, peace journalists would meticulously choose their words and emphases to prevent the intensification and amplification of discord. Moreover, the nexus between peace journalism and conflict theory might be beneficial in both directions: while being strengthened theoretically, PJ could supply conflict theory with new evidence or refutation "from-the-field". As a novel empirical endeavor, PJ could enrich conflict theory with hitherto unfamiliar knowledge and experience. Since the traditional coverage of conflict and war has been strongly marred by a confrontational and belligerent bias, the innovation and freshness of PJ should bring in original insights and perspectives. Such a fruitful collaboration between scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution would surely help alleviate the hazardous and ambitious challenge of conflict reduction.

3

(De)Constructing conflict: A focused review of war and peace journalism

Susan Dente Ross

It would be simple to join the chorus of media critics who castigate contemporary journalism for overt bias, systematic pandering, and flagrant participation in various conspiracies. However, such simple answers are rarely correct, as the following will demonstrate. Rather, if there is a singular truth about contemporary journalism, it appears that it is both better than ever and less than it could be. There is much contemporary journalism that is not broken, that does not need to be fixed, and that is worthy of praise and emulation. There is also unequivocal evidence that systematic pressures (economic, structural, social, professional) on journalists exacerbate the human tendency to see only part of the truth and to transmit that truth in ways that reinforce previous perceptions and beliefs (Altheide, 1987; Donsbach, 2004; Gamson et. al, 1992; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1979; Hackett & Zhao, 2005; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tichenor et. al, 1980). The predictable rituals of journalists and their heavy dependence on official sources produce persistent patterns of inclusion and exclusion by the mainstream Westernized media (McLeod & Hertog, 1998; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1978).

The "narrative conventions of American journalism" also orient the media toward clashes rather than discussion of abstract political ideas (Hallin & Mancini, 1984, p. 845; Schudson, 1982). Among these, and of critical importance to the development of what many call the global civil society, is the pervasive pattern for media to exacerbate conflict and perpetuate wars through ethnocentric, nationalistic, and simplistic dualistic portrayals (Coe et al, 2004; Entman, 2004; Goldfarb, 2001; Hutcheson et al, 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Liebes, 1992; Nohrstedt et al, 2000; Ottosen, 1995; Ross, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 2001a, 2001b, 2004). Thus, for example, Dominikowski (2004) traced the historical symbiosis of war and media back to antiquity, while Price and Thompson (2002) identified the close link between media and violence during the last 15 years. Case studies by Metzl (1997a, 1997b), Thompson (1999), Naveh (1999), (2001), Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2002), Kondopoulou (2002), Stanley, Eriyanto, Sudibyo, Muhammad, (cited in Hanitzsch,

2004a) and others demonstrate the deep and ongoing interconnections between media coverage and military aggression in various conflicts around the globe.

This paper offers a summary overview of the literature on media and conflict to establish a context, theoretical framework, and source of cautious guidance for the growing field and study of peace journalism.

The war media

The media play a central role in international affairs and violence because citizens are dependent on media to provide timely, credible information of distant events. Lake and Rothchild (1996) cited "information failures" as a primary contributor to rising fear that increases the potential for violent conflict. Scholars (Beit Hallahmi, 1972; Ben-Dak, 1972; Hofman, 1972; Ibrahim, 1972) examining the significant role of communication flows in conflict resolution frequently focus on nation-states and highlight the role of media in the construction and reinforcement of simplistic and extremely negative images of the "other". Thus, for example, Steuter (1990) and others found that national media exhibit a strong tendency to cover terrorism, war, and international relations from an ethnocentric position in which news "bear[s] a remarkable resemblance to many sentiments common in [the government's] foreign policy and, indeed, [the nation's] political culture" (p. 274).

Nearly three decades ago, Schlesinger (1978) observed that the media's persistent and myopic focus on politics – as defined by the narrow range of publicly visible events in which self-defined politicians operate – systematically reinforced political power, obscured other influences upon political decisions – such as decisions to wage war – and de-legitimized attempts by non-government organizations to influence international policy decisions. Similarly, Angus and Cook (1984) concluded that the media allied with the nation-state to constrain the boundaries of public understanding and debate to "the very terms that [any oppositional] movement attempts to criticize" (p. 6).

Numerous scholars have documented more direct government pressures on journalists in conflict zones (Bennett, 2003; Carruthers, 2000; Knightley, 1975; Lynch, 2003a; Reese & Buckalew, 1995). In 1986, Hallin concluded that media coverage systematically excludes significant issues and distorts conflicts to conform to "the constraints of ideology and journalistic routines" closely aligned with the domestic government's power and perspectives (p. 214). In more concrete terms, Liebes (1992) observed that journalists tend to minimize the costs and accentuate the benefits of government-sanctioned violence when the domestic military is engaged in a conflict that is geographically distant from the domestic nation. Avraham (2003) found that media covering conflict zones report "different kinds of pain and different kinds of blood." Indeed, when the press looks on from a dis-

tance, it is more likely to ignore the pain and the blood to portray violent conflict as a natural and necessary part of political processes and social change. Such coverage often distinguishes worthy from unworthy victims (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Karnik, 1998; Kempf, 1994; Minear, Scott & Weiss, 1996).

Wolfsfeld (1997b) suggested that structural constraints – e.g., the need to condense and simplify voluminous material and the strong orientation toward crisis coverage – draw the press away from complex historical context or abstract frames of international violence (p. 153). Dependency on government sources gives government voice and privilege to construct key issues and events (Gans, 1979; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997b). Thus, both the quantity and the nature of news reporting vary with expressed government attitudes and actions (Daugherty & Warden, 1979). Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued that instead of an independent and critical press, media function as a propaganda tool for governmental elites, using binaries – such as us/them reporting – to echo and extend: 1. nationalistic political ideology, 2. media dependency on official government sources, and the influence of 3. corporate ownership, 4. advertising pressure, and 5. government and business spin. An analysis of U.S. and Canadian television coverage of Central American peace building by Adam (1991) found empirical support for the propaganda model, despite national differences and variations based on the language of coverage.

Others, particularly those closely examining variations in press coverage across nations or through time, have suggested that media are not an uncritical vehicle for government propaganda but rather an inefficient and limited mechanism for the distribution of minority and dissident ideas and information. Vincent (2000) found that coverage of war and peace is truncated so that "only the techniques of war may be debated, not the question of motives", the morality of bombings, or the opportunity for non-violent alternatives (p. 336). Ackerman's (1999) study of *The New York Times* concluded that the U.S. media virtually ignored any real possibility for peace and compromise in Rambouillet, France. He also found that, congruent with U.S. and NATO postures, the paper radicalized Milošević's stance in Rambouillet at a time when "the Yugoslav position had not changed at all." Similarly, Vincent's (2000) study of coverage of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo noted that occasional mentions of the Rambouillet peace talks were presented "almost exclusively from a US/NATO point of view" (p. 333, 331) and failed to use the talks as an opportunity "to go back and revisit events and to further examine them in historical context" (p. 333). Vincent argued that a primary cause of the media's continuing role "as an organ of political propaganda" is its continued fervent and "myopic belief that objectivity is possible" (p. 341).

Some scholars point to the new realities of the post-Cold War world, in which global conflict is dominated by volatile, interethnic clashes designed to assert identity

and protect security, as the source for imperfect media coverage (Terzis & Melone, 2001). Young and Jesser's (1997) study of the media and war postulated a series of linkages in this new global reality: Because multiple states had the power of mutual annihilation, conflicts in the post-Cold War era would be limited in scope; The limited scope of conflict relieved citizens of their historical duty to support wars as an essential element of their civic obligation; The release of citizens from their patriotic obligation to serve in war 1) increased the discretion of citizens to oppose wars, which placed 2) new emphasis on the importance of public opinion, and promoted 3) sophisticated and pervasive government manipulation of media coverage of war (p. 272).

Wolfsfeld (1997a) argued that media coverage could be understood primarily as part of a cycle of waxing and waning political influence that itself reflects varying external realities that mitigate the ability of political leaders to control relevant events. In a simplified vision of Wolfsfeld's (1997a, 2004) complex analysis that identifies several influential factors (e.g., media autonomy, political culture, etc.), peace coverage is in large part a factor of political power which, in turn, is driven by events. Lang and Lang (2004) also challenge the neat precision of the propaganda model for news and suggest that the process is more complex and disorderly. Other scholars assert national identity and political ideology, not governmental dictates, are the most significant and intractable factors directing media coverage. Lee and Maslog (2005) discredited government/media conspiracy theories and ideological reporting and concluded that "media outlets within the same cultural and political context do not frame the same event in the same way" (p. 323).

For decades, scholars have generally accepted Gitlin's (1979) finding that media serve as sites of strategic political contests in which struggles contain only two sides. Earlier, Allport (1954) identified the fundamental role of categorization in human cognition and posited that contact between members from opposing groups can reduce conflict under controlled and optimal conditions. Coe et al (2004) underscored the fundamental, inherently oppositional nature of Western thinking that constructs reality in terms of binaries that unify and direct public beliefs and attitudes.

Coles (2002) indicated the power of U.S. government elites to diminish this potential by deploying media disseminated binaries to generate patriotic unity and fervor and stifle dissent. He also asserted that rational government actors may use and multiply the instances of violent conflict because they recognize that "war and its words can be a means by which a society, including those who don't do the actual fighting, defines its national character and legitimates its existence" (p. 588). Coles argued that war is beneficial to national leaders for whom it provides "a teachable moment [in which to] socialize the nation's members …, defining who

they are …, and what their collective role is in the community of nations" (2002, p. 589).

One aspect of the political expediency of war is demonstrated by studies of business cycles and media coverage. Bloomberg and Hess (2002) found that domestic economic problems "create incentives for increased external and internal conflict" because war—and its jingoistic coverage by the "patriotic" media—serves as "a diversionary political instrument to signal [leaders'] competence to voters during recessions." War not only stimulates the economy but also provides ready scapegoats to the nation's ills. In a related study, Hess and Orphanides (2001) found the United States was twice as likely to engage in external conflict when the president was running for reelection and the economy had been in a recession.

Abundant public opinion polls and political commentary document that a sizeable majority of the U.S. public rallies behind the president at the onset of military conflict (see Lindsay, 2003). Powlick and Katz (1998) suggested that major media coverage of foreign policy events prompts public attention and activates opinion formation. Some scholars argue that increased public and media dependency on the president to set the national course during national crises and military conflict (Brody, 1994; Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Mueller, 1971) helps explain why media suggest, prompt, or magnify the impulse of the public to participate in a patriotic, pro-administration "rally" at such times (Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Hutcheson, 2003; Lee, 1997; Mackuen, 1983; Mueller, 1994). Indeed, Hutcheson (2003) found such rallies endure only during elite consensus, when the president effectively speaks for a unified nation. Pan and Kosicki (1994) found that increased homogeneity between government and media discourse generated greater rallying effects.

Arguing against a strong direct effects model, Connell (1982) observed that media texts are subject to multiple interpretations and do not simply exclude alternative voices but rather undermine their credibility with negative discursive cues that alert readers to the lack of authority of such perspectives. Embedded in communication disorders, such as two-sided messages and double-bind communication, these cues finally immunize the dominant interpretation of reality against criticism (Reimann, 2002). Bratić (2006a) reasons that the increasingly homogeneous media content and increasing media consumption, impact, dependence and susceptibility in communities experiencing violence heighten media effects. Bratić, like Hanitzsch (2004a), starts from a weak effects model of media influence but concludes that within the context of violent conflict "the role of media in building peace is simultaneously both substantial and limited … by the uncertainty that [its] positive impact [on awareness and beliefs] will be translated into behavior" (p. 9).

Decades of study of the role of the media in ongoing conflict suggests that media rarely report conflict neutrally (Gamson et al, 1992; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002; Ross,

2003; Wolfsfeld, 1997b, 2001a, 2001b). Taleb's (2004) overarching work on media coverage of conflicts asserted that media frame conflicts in one of five ways: as win/lose conflicts, as human interest stories, as economic forces, as morality tales, and as indicators of blame. Some scholars have argued that press and researchers' excessive focus on media coverage of conflicts, rather than more "normal" situations, provides limited potential for discovering paths to peace (Ben-Dak, 1970; Kent; 1971). Ben-Dak (1970), for example, concluded that much research on media and peace served primarily to establish the intractability and irreconcilability of parties engaged in conflict.

Carroll (1972) suggested that research focused on power relations at national and supranational levels served to increase the powerlessness, helplessness, impotence, and apathy of those whose mobilization would best serve peace efforts. She (1972; also see Hoffman, 1963) argued that too much research fails to "consider seriously the possibility that war is inherent not in human nature but in the power system of dominance in human relations" articulated through the nation-state.

In a recent study of political propaganda discourse and media content across four European nations, however, Nohrstedt et al (2000) found that media coverage of war is part of "propaganda flows and activities" that naturalize the fundamental paradox of "peace by bombs" and morality through immoral use of violence (p. 384). Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2002) suggested that three interconnected discourses constitute the global discursive order on war and peace: news discourse, propaganda, and a discourse of global compassion that embodies collective choices and effects change (Fairclough, 1995). They found post-Cold War politicians mobilized for war with the "designer language" of rights and compassion, not the discourse of dominance and power (Hoijer et al., 2002, p. 5; see also Terzis & Melone, 2001).

Nohrstedt et al's (2002) study of reporting on violence in Kosovo found that transnational media engaged in nationalized propaganda discourse that uncritically incorporated the government's concept of "military humanism" (p. 391) to the extent that military violence as a rational solution to the Kosovo conflict aligned with the domestic nation's international policy. The authors identified personalization of threats, exaggerated demonization of the enemy, acceptance of the "regrettable inevitability" of "accidental" casualties, and the consistent neglect of the existence or content of peace initiatives as components of media's war propaganda discourse that polarizes and suppresses shared or neutral positions. They also observed a continuum of media empathy with victims that paralleled national political policy.

Hackett (1991) argued that the need for public credibility, the journalistic ethos of public service, and the demands for professional integrity countervailed a singular, government-dictated discourse in the media. Decades earlier, Boulding (1972)

contested focus on "'the man' or capitalist imperialism as the source of oppression and violence, … [arguing that it offers] simplistic, monocausal explanations of war" and that "powerful tools for understanding the dynamics of community formation are being left to one side in the peace research movement."

Peace journalism

At the start of the 21st century, Galtung (1998, 2002a), Kempf (1996, 2002), Shinar (2003b) and others (see, e.g., Kempf, 2003a; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) advocated creative models and training programs to respond to this reality and to transform the role of media. Young and Jesser (1997) proposed that international media consolidate and concentrate their coverage to establish a single press consortium with the economic and tactical independence of governments to provide a truly autonomous alternative voice. Botes (1995) contended that media could play a critical positive role in conflict prevention. Gorsevski (1999) suggested that the media could advance "propaganda of peacemaking" by re-humanizing individuals engaged in conflict through a non-violent rhetoric (Chilton, 1987). Rather than use media as a tool for pro-peace advocacy (see e.g., Bell, 1997; Galtung, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002a), however, Terzis and Melone (2001) asserted that media should pursue balance and neutrality, but they "cannot be neutral toward peace" (p. 19).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) similarly defined peace journalism as quality journalism that uses a creative set of tools to include routinely or habitually underrepresented perspectives to provide deeper and broader coverage of news (pp. 5, 224). In place of advocacy journalism that envisions or portrays a conflict-free society, they argued for a peace journalism that helps produce a society" good at handling [] conflicts non-violently" (p. 48). Kempf (2002) also rejected attempts to understand peace journalism as a form of advocacy and favors peace journalism as "good journalism" that goes well beyond simplistic dualisms of good and bad. Kempf (2003b) suggested a two-stage strategy to reduce the escalation orientation of mainstream conflict coverage: His first stage of "de-escalation oriented coverage" is characterized by neutrality and critical distance from all parties to the conflict and coincides broadly with what is generally considered quality journalism. It goes beyond the professional norms of journalism only to the extent that the journalists' competence in conflict theory produces coverage in which the conflict is kept open to a peaceful settlement. His second stage requires the abandonment of dualism and the reframing of conflict as a cooperative process through "solution-oriented coverage", which, he concluded, is likely to garner majority support only when an armistice or a peace treaty is already in place.

Possibly in response to critiques against peace journalism, Bauman and Siebert (2000) found nothing inherently unique or objectionable in its postulates and posited that media are inevitably engaged in conflict mediation. At the same time that media inherently educate, contextualize, provide an outlet for strong emotions, offer solutions, and build consensus, "journalists [also] mediate conflict whether they intend to or not" (Bauman & Siebert, 2000; see also Merrill, 1989, pp. 10-11). Astorino-Courtois (1996) suggested that media can play a pro-active role in marketing peace by identifying publicly salient attributes of peace and encouraging opposing groups to seek accord in areas of low-risk gain with little or no loss to their information role to society. Gilboa (2003) documented a positive, though ethically and professionally ambiguous, media role in helping peace negotiators build external support and test strategies and terms of agreement. Howard (2003) asserted that peace journalism does not require a departure from fundamental news values and professional practices but rather arises when the press attends carefully "to its own professional strictures … [of] accuracy, impartiality, and independence" (p. 1). Lee and Maslog (2005) found that peace journalism relies less on overt advocacy than on "extensions of the objectivity credo… avoidance of good-bad labels, a non-partisan approach, a multiparty orientation, and an avoidance of demonizing language" (p. 324). Their empirical study of Asian newspaper coverage of conflicts found "little in terms of a solution-seeking approach [or] … people orientation" (p. 324).

Clearly, however, peace journalism is not without its critics. Hammond (2002) has castigated the false morality of peace journalism as a form of "advocacy" journalism, evoking memories and fears of "yellow" journalism and abdication of social responsibility. Hammond argued that only a truly "dispassionate", neutral, objective press serves the needs of an open society and concluded that the agenda-driven coverage of the "journalism of attachment" increases, rather than reduces, the errors of distorted consensual reporting, moral certainty, lack of balance, selectivity, over simplification, dichotomization, polarization, dismissal of contrary or dissenting evidence, refusal to critically evaluate claims, and insufficiency of context. Hanitzsch (2004a) complained of severe theoretical, ethical, and practical limits to the engagement of peace journalism and argued that some underlying assumptions of peace journalism are both naïve and simplistic. In what may be viewed as praise or condemnation, Winoto (2002) said, "The concept of peace journalism looks quite suitable, especially …where the *purpose* of communication is to *generate social harmony* and freedom" (emphasis added). Fawcett (2002) suggested shortcomings of the narrative assumptions of peace journalism reporting. Howard (2003) argued "that the media may well be the most effective means of conflict resolution and preventing new wars" (p. 2), but competitive Westernized media will not quickly or easily abandon their "obsession with commercialized conflict" (p. 8).

Despite growing interest and controversy related to peace journalism, too little systematic empirical research has been conducted in the field. Wolfsfeld (2001c) and Howard (2003) decried the scarcity of academic analysis of the role of the media in peace building. Some three decades earlier, Ben-Dak (1970) encouraged the field to engage in systematic translation of the literature and to adopt "exact and reproducible methodologies" of consistent quantitative analyses from varied perspectives and experimental designs to counterbalance the dominance of "impressionistic" studies. Scholars including Fabris and Varis (1986), Hackett (1991), and Kempf (2003b) have asserted that more systematic scientific analysis and empirical data on media coverage of war *and peace* are vital to understand the roles of the media and to mitigate social harms of media coverage. Daugherty and Warden (1979) argued that far-flung attacks on U.S. media coverage of the Middle East had been made "without substantial empirical data" about their content or their effects. Their analysis of 11 years of editorials in four elite newspapers found the press provided overwhelmingly more favorable coverage of Israel than Palestine but the skew in coverage was event driven, and press support for Israel was "neither monolithic nor invariable."

Political scientists repeatedly have reviewed and analyzed the literature in peace studies and conflict resolution (Arendt, 1969; Ben-Dak, 1970; Ben-Dak, 1972; Boulding, 1968; Boulding, 1972; Carroll, 1972; Converse, 1968; Kent, 1971; Parenti, 1970; Rapoport, 1970) in search of innovative directions and reasonable expectations for the field. These scholars simultaneously accused the field of experiencing a drought, lacking substance, being overly pragmatic and excessively "technical", preoccupied with institutionalized power rather than people, polemical, illusory, fashionable, narrow, amorphous, homogeneous, conflicted, reactive, ideological, ineffectual, biased, misdirected, speculative, trivial, marginal, reductionist, and meaningless. Anderson's (1963) overview of the status and weaknesses of peace research focused predominately on the United States and limited discussion of the role of the media (segregated under the effects of communication on attitude formation) to their function "as inventors of images and ideas" (p. 34)

Carroll (1972) suggested that peace was best advanced through the empowerment of small, self-focused, non-status-competitive, austere, isolated, independently competent, non-state actors. What was needed, Carroll (1972) asserted, was a reinvigoration of the sense of individual and autonomous competence and capability among the "underdogs." Peace studies, therefore, should refocus outside the nation-state, and away from the normative practices of superpowers and toward deviators and the potentialities of individual agents by defining "power as ability, energy and strength." Carroll (1972) barely acknowledged the pervasive influence of media and other social control institutions and claimed that the "integrative" power to build community and identity lies with the people.

Davison (1974) suggested a constructive media role and argued vaguely that the press could become an agent of "peace-keeping" because of its ability to direct public attention toward negotiations and enhance the exchange of information among parties. Boulding (1969) noted the "integrative power" and the ability of the media to define the central concepts of community and identity upon which peace could be founded. Beit Hallahmi (1972), Ben-Dak (1972), Hofman, (1972), and Ibrahim (1972), who explicitly examined the significant role of improved communication and information flows in conflict resolution, tended to highlight the role of the media in the construction and reinforcement of simplistic and extremely negative images of the "other." Ben-Dak (1970), for example, observed that the media could serve either as a mechanism of "socialization for hostility or for coexistence." Much of this work implicitly centered on and presaged subsequent research on the role of media in identity formation rather than peace-building.

Arno (1984) argued that media can and do "operate as effective third parties" in conflict resolution (p. 233). Based primarily on case studies, O'Heffernan (1991) and Loshitsky (1991), and indeed Wolfsfeld (1997b), suggested media – especially television public affairs programs – function as public forums in which disputants engage and conflict is resolved. Spencer (2004) concluded that because the media attract public attention and generate public pressure to "facilitate diplomacy and force movement", they inherently play a role in peace by pressuring politicians to engage actively and effectively in peace negotiations (p. 604). Kelman (1996) argued that the media support conflict resolution by encouraging and facilitating positive commitment to negotiations and peace building, and Burton (1969) indicated that this media role is tied to its ability to control the pace and content of communication.

Botes (2003) and Becker et al. (1995) cautioned that the peace-making function of media is not automatic and hinges on the degree to which dialogues are respectful and reasoned exchanges rather than attacks and insults. Hopman and Druckman (1991) observed that media forums sometimes simply provided a highly visible opportunity for competitive posturing. Botes (2003) argued that media deal with disputants "relatively unconsciously and invariably without taking any responsibility for bringing the parties closer to any form of resolution" (p. 16). While reconciliation may arise through mediated exchanges, then, such an outcome is a largely unintentional effect of programming that is actually "a form of media voyeurism that does not take any responsibility for its social intervention" (p. 16). Indeed, journalists understand that parties in conflict use the media to advance their own self-interests. Yet Vayrynen (1991) noted significantly that the media can bring "out-parties" into the dialogue, thereby transforming the power dynamics and redefining the conflict. This function is most likely to occur, according to Botes (2003), when communication among the parties is limited, strained or otherwise "impoverished."

While one author flatly denied any independent media power and asserted that media in conflict zones are "the most manipulated and powerless players" (Three Kings, No Journalists, mediachannel.org, Dec. 20, 1999), more analytical attempts to grapple with the issue of the power of the media remain inconclusive, conflicted, or so complex as to evade rigorous empirical testing. Howard (2003), for example, distinguished among the "undeniably deadly side" of media as instruments of totalitarian regimes, the "partisan … and destructive role" of completely free media in the most open democracies, and the challenging and problematic development of autonomous media in states moving from totalitarianism to democracy (p. 2; see also Bennett & Paletz, 1994; Strobel, 1997). Stone (1989) and Bruck (1989) argued that media discourse is highly contextual and far from determinative or closed. Thus, for example, Bruck (1989) said research into the role of media in peace must consider "historical and social embeddedness" as well as "ongoing [social] struggles" (p. 109).

Tehranian (2002) is an exemplar of those peace journalism scholars who assert that peace building requires "a media system that promotes peace rather than war, understanding rather than obfuscation, tolerance rather than hatred, celebration of diversity rather than xenophobia" (p. 74) (Galtung, 2000, 2000b). He (2002) advocated greater structural pluralism to free independent media outlets to embrace discrete agendas and selected components of peace journalism. Tehranian argued that pluralistic ownership and governance of media are necessary but not sufficient for the praxis of peace journalism because media "objectives are ultimately hostage to the institutional, *national and international regimes* under which they are being pursued" (p. 71) (emphasis added).

Chomsky (1999) and Thussu (2000) have examined the ideological content of peace reporting by the U.S. media and assert that U.S. evocations of peace are strategically employed not to support peace but to cast a "saintly glow" over American aggression (Chomsky, 1999, p. 14). Thussu (2000) suggested that media representations of peace are defensive – presenting peace as the military protection of "our" borders against evil incursions (p. 358). Solomon (1992) similarly concluded that U.S. news media portray U.S. militarism as "establishing democracy and … peace" (p. 57). Stone (1989) argued that Canadian newspapers use the language of "peace" as a surrogate for "our" values, beliefs and ideals in opposition to those of the "other" (pp. 57-8).

Illustrative problems and concerns: A case study

Foreign press coverage of Middle East peace initiatives offers insight into some of the key concerns of Tehranian, Lynch, a, and others, and reflects this author's interest in non-local, especially international media coverage of regional conflicts.

While Shinar (2003b) demonstrated the problematic role local media may play in building excessively high expectations for peace processes and conflict transformation, the global U.S. hegemon relies on long-distance wire reportage and U.S. summaries of the foreign press for much of its Middle East news. Here a purposive sample of European press summaries in *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* is used to highlight some problems and concerns with media coverage of distant conflicts that implicate U.S. interests or cultural values. While some would challenge the objectivity or selective coverage of this publication, *The Washington Report* presents itself as a magazine "that focuses on news and analysis from and about the Middle East and U.S. policy in that region, … published by … a non-profit foundation [created by] by retired U.S. foreign service officers to provide the American public with balanced and accurate information concerning U.S. relations with Middle Eastern states." The publication proclaims itself to be the most exhaustive and significant U.S. periodical covering these issues that reaches more than 100,000 of "the nation's most sophisticated populace", who are decision makers and opinion leaders in government, business, and the media. As such, *The Washington Report* is positioned to influence U.S. public policy, public opinion, and media content (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1993; Shah & Thornton, 2004).

A review of *The Washington Report* with particular attention to its summaries of press coverage of peace initiatives between Israel and the Palestinian territories suggests five trends in press orientations: 1. Peace initiatives are represented as political maneuvering and strategic posturing, 2. Peace initiatives are rhetorical games that hide fundamental and intractable differences and hatreds, 3. Peace initiatives are a game among players who have little commitment to or belief in their success, 4. Peace initiatives are fragile and will evaporate given any provocation, and 5. The language of peacemaking is doublespeak and distortion.

The following purposive sample from stories in *The Washington Report* illustrates these trends.

1. Peace: Politics by another name

The tendency to represent peace efforts as political games is pervasive and overt. General summaries of news coverage (Marshall, 1991) as well as references to specific newspaper stories (Jones, 2000, 2001a, 2001c) suggest that peace initiatives are a farce and a "meaningless" "charade" played out by politicians who seek the spotlight rather than substantive agreements. Jones (2000) cited newspapers that represent peace negotiators as "playing for time" in a "game of exploiting the unrest." Marshall's (1991) summary suggested that the political game is fixed; he called U.S.-brokered peace initiatives "a contest [in] which the other side had drawn up the rules, could choose the players, and had determined the outcome in advance." In this game, newspapers in Frankfurt, Germany, and London represented weak political players as patsies or "stooges" in the talks (Jones,

2000). Intervention by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 2001 was justified because the "unfolding tragedy … could have a decisive effect on America's other interests in the region" (Jones, 2001a). However, the political involvement of the United States was portrayed as an "11th hour grasp" to "allow [… Clinton] to ride off in glory into the sunset as credits roll" rather than to advance or achieve lasting peace in the Middle East (Jones, 2001a).

Such representations of peace negotiations as a political game render the violence invisible, consistently minimize the real costs of conflict, and marginalize human suffering. Both violent conflict and its cessation are seen as political maneuvers in which human lives are a reasonable cost. Jones highlighted this inhumane perspective by citing an *Economist* story on peace negotiations that concluded that "stopping the slaughter is worth doing for its own sake. The killing is leading to nothing good. It's a tragedy in itself" (Jones, 2001c).

2. Conflict: Evidence of essentialist hatreds

While the political game perspective suggests that the costs of violence are immaterial, the essentialist perspective suggests that violent conflict is natural, inherent, and inevitable. Jones (2000) documented this type of reporting in German, Italian, Polish, and Russian media that portrayed the collapse of peace talks as evidence of the fundamental insolubility of violence in the Middle East. Such reporting called the violent conflict evidence of "a holy war" and the embodiment of the "people's anger" and a "growing wave of hatred on both sides." Media adopting this view saw peace treaties as efforts to "paper over the irresolvable contradictions" between peoples convinced violence was the only path to pursue (Jones, 2000).

3. Peace efforts: Charades, futilities and foolishness

A closely related media frame begins with a fundamental disbelief in the potential for true peace, perhaps due to an assumption of the inherent evil of human nature. Such media coverage of political actors' peace initiatives tended to suggest that the participants themselves lacked faith in the process (Jones, 2001c). Marshall (1991), for example, summarized stories in which both the possibility of conducting talks and their potential for effectiveness is seen as a sham. In this light, peace talks in fact do more harm than good; they produce "only empty promises" that "can only arouse a sense of betrayal and intensify existing grievances" (Marshall, 1991). British, German, French, Swedish, Italian, and Austrian media stories are cited to demonstrate coverage in which negotiations are presented as "worthless" and "likely to fail" from the start (Jones, 2000, 2001a, 2001c, 2001d). For example, Jones (2000) noted a story in the French *Liberation* that said a summit was "better than military escalation" although no one should harbor "any illusions

about the outcome." The *Berliner Zeitung*, according to Jones (2001a), said the peace process would "lurch from crisis to crisis for many years", and the Italian *La Republica* paradoxically called the *peace* plan "a burial shroud."

Coverage of citizens protesting U.S. military action in Afghanistan was more than merely skeptical of its efficacy. Reporting challenged the "sincerity" of the protesters, and it overtly dismissed their rationale, their logic, and their understanding of international issues (Jones, 2001d).

4. Events: Portents of doom

Coverage of potentially conflict-laden events and actions did not receive this same skeptical or dismissive treatment in the news media routinely reviewed by *The Washington Report.* Instead, media tended to accept the potency of events that challenged, rather than supported, peace talks. Examples from German, Dutch, and British newspapers represented Ariel Sharon's 2000 visit to the Temple Mount, for example, as a powerful, intentional, and unmitigated act of agitation that presaged future violence that might explode "into full-scale war" (Jones, 2000). Here even the 2001 Israeli elections are presented as a harbinger of a new "wave of violence" (Jones, 2001a, 2001b). Here, the future potential for violence is made concrete and present, overshadowing the possibility of peace.

5. Officialspeak: Truth and other constructions

Press summaries also indicate that journalists sometimes exaggerate positions and polarize participants in peace negotiations, perhaps to overcome the inherent absence of drama in ongoing talks. Thus, for example, selected media labeled U.S. pressure on Palestinians to participate in talks an "ultimatum" (Marshall, 1991).

In its selection and representation of mainstream media coverage of peace initiatives in the Middle East, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* highlights five mechanisms through which news media undermine and marginalize the credibility and effectiveness of peace processes while simultaneously underscoring the potency of actions that threaten peace. To the degree that *The Washington Report* contributes to the U.S. public and policy agenda in the Middle East, it portrays peace as uncertain, remote, and untenable. Through both news coverage and commentary, the selected newspapers recurrently dismiss the potential for peace and denigrate diplomatic solutions. Peace initiatives are alternately a political charade or a vital component of imperialist ambitions. Public protests against war are condescendingly represented as sincere but misguided. Violence is inherent, logical, and imbedded in the very nature of the peoples and the extremism of the region; it is an intractable cultural phenomenon among those "other" people, who often are represented as irrational, full of essentialist hatred, and increasingly committed to violence as a solution.

Media, conflict and identity

Understanding of the complex intersections of media, conflict, and identity is foundational to the practice of peace journalism. Tomlinson (1991) observed that newspapers both naturalize and "promote identification within the nation as *the* dominant form of cultural identity" (p. 83) (emphasis added). While the media occasionally evoke "images and representations of explicit nationalism", they more frequently call upon and reinforce national identity "through the construction of an abstract nation at risk through constant evocation of the 'natural' boundaries of the national community" (Brookes, 1999, p. 261). Some scholars (see, e.g., Shinar, 2003b) have argued that nationalist media have emphasized and magnified popular sensitivity to essentialist differences, fueling conflicts between cultures, and, in the words of Tehranian (2002), promoting "envy and hatred [that] … outpaced mutual understanding, respect, and tolerance" (p. 59; also see Hackett, 1991). Challenging the naturalness of nationalism as the master identity requires a more complex vision in which identity is understood as an ongoing process of boundary construction, maintenance, and destruction (Brookes, 1999; Schlesinger, 1991, 1991b).

Majstorovic (1997) noted that each of the two prevailing interpretations of the nature of conflict is profoundly flawed. Portraits of two sides, divided by essentialist differences and primordial hatreds (Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1957, 1995; Smith, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1995; Hunter, 1991; Moscovici, 1981) misunderstand the malleable multiplicity of identity (Swidler, 1986), misrepresent history (Mermin, 1999), dichotomize complex problems, and ignore the interconnections among various groups (Majstorovic, 1997). In contrast, insights into the constructed nature of ethno-nationalism (Anderson, 1991; Hall, 1992; Ignatieff, 1993; Shils, 1957) colored by critical perspectives of power and of nation-state manipulation of the masses to their own ends (Haas, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1990) fail to recognize the contingent, fluid nature of identity; dismiss the varied constraints of myth, history, and tradition; and underestimate the agency of the people (Barthes, 1972; Brookes, 1999; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Majstorovic, 1997).

Majstorovic (1997) suggested that prevailing perspectives on national identity may result from the "shared perspectives" of scholars, the product of ideology, perhaps, rather than deep insight into the nature of intergroup dynamics. While vital questions remain unanswered, it seems evident that Huntington's (1998) thesis that global conflicts arise from irreconcilable fundamental cultural differences is profoundly flawed. To overlook the varied, distinct, or potentially overlapping ways in which parties to a conflict may self-identify, and to ignore the highly subjective and contextual nature of identities is to fall into the trap of reductionism. Neither the "peoples" nor the causes of conflict are fixed or unitary. Thus, reporting practices that essentialize and reify difference are not only simplistic, they are

simply inaccurate. Moreover, analyses that focus on elite representations and portraits of reality (e.g., media content analyses) suffer from the same exclusivity of focus for which researchers castigate the media.

Contested directions

While much current energy is directed toward practical training initiatives to address the perceived inadequacies of contemporary media practice, systematic research on media coverage of peace is insufficient to direct these efforts. One point of contention is the locus (or loci) of the problem. External events and shifting realities are a primary source of existing coverage patterns, according to Young and Jesser (1997), and Ross and Bantimaroudis (2005). Hess and Orphanides (2001) and Bloomberg and Hess (2002) suggest that strategic political economic gamesmanship drives world events that, in turn, drive media coverage (Mosco, 1996). More generally, Bruck (1989), Stone (1989), and others, point to the highly contextual nature of media coverage and assert that a significant impetus toward war reporting lies within the world itself and within the nature of catastrophic events. Such perspectives suggest limits to the transformative power of journalism training.

A stronger argument, effectively articulating the impotence of peace journalism initiatives, posits that the media are a propaganda mouthpiece for the government, and journalistic norms and standards are little more than a ruse (Chomsky, 1999; Herman & Chomsky, 1980). Several scholars explicitly reject this vision of journalists as patsy to government (Lang & Lang, 2004; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Wolfsfeld, 1997a), but a large and well-established body of work emphasizes the significant influence of political propaganda upon reporting (Nohrstedt et al, 2002; Solomon, 1992; Stone, 1989; Thussu, 2000). Hallin (1986) and Avrahim (2003), for example, hold that the political culture in which media operate holds enormous sway over coverage patterns.

Rejecting portraits of relatively powerless media, many scholars assert that both internal industry norms and pressures and external ideology and politics drive the tendency for media to participate in rallies around government elites (Coles, 2002; Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Hutcheson, 2003; Lee, 1997; Lindsay, 2003; Mackuen, 1983; Mueller, 1994, Powlick & Katz, 1998). Gans (1979), Paletz and Entman (1981), and Shoemaker and Reese (1996) articulate a reciprocal influence between government elites and media in which a pivotal component is media dependency on government spokespeople. Bennett (2003), Body (1994), Lynch (2003a), and Mueller (1971) point toward media reliance on government sources as the crux of the matter. Here, then, government exerts its power to set the media (dis)course indirectly by articulating coverage narratives and establishing sa-

lient binaries (Coe et al, 2004; Coles, 2002; Gitlin, 1979). Tuchman (1978), Schudson (1982), and Hallin and Mancini (1984) acknowledge the linguistic power of sources but suggest that the narrative conventions of journalism themselves are also at fault for media's proclivity to emphasize and exacerbate conflict. Professional norms and practices contribute to this formula (Hackett, 1991), making it particularly useful to consider new reporting and editing practices.

Wolfsfeld (1997b), Hackett (1991), Tehranian (2002), and Howard (2003) direct attention to the organizational structure, the increasing lack of pluralism, and the political economy of the media to argue that increased pluralism in ownership, structures, and revenue streams is a key concern. In their view, a considerable portion of the problem lies within the power and prerogatives of media ownership and must be addressed at that level.

The complexity of the issues underlying peace journalism may elude scholarly consensus; a sufficient body of theory and evidence exists to support divergent positions. Thus, portents of gloom for the future of peace journalism see the field as flawed, certain to be ineffectual, or – worse – certain to be co-opted and manipulated to serve the "man" rather than the "people". Others see opportunities for change and empowerment through retraining, restructuring, and re-envisioning the field. It is the reconciliation of these positions that is required.

Those who envision media as a public forum for open and productive debate (Arno, 1984; Loshitsky, 1991; O'Heffernan, 1991) must contend with abundant evidence that these industries are driven by the profit motive and the competitive lure of conflict (Howard, 2003) and often function as purveyors of fear and essentialist hatred at the behest of the powerful (e.g., Brookes, 1999). Those who advocate using the media to market salient, low-risk steps toward peace (Astorino-Courtois, 1983) or as a mechanism for advancing mutual respect and redefining community (Becker et al, 1995; Botes, 2003; Boulding, 1986) must address others who condemn the journalism of engagement as an abandonment of its vital role as an objective source of information (Fawcett, 2002; Hammond, 2002; Holquin, 1998). Those who suggest that citizens exert significant influence on media content because of their power to confer, or deny, media credibility (Tehranian, 2002) must recognize their diminished influence in the arena of international coverage. Those who believe in transcendent populist media standing outside existing power dynamics and transforming public dialogue to embrace new voices (Vayrynen, 1991) must grapple with the realities of competition in a lucrative global market and the expanding influence of media conglomerates and cross-national political initiatives (Burton, 1969; Kelman, 1996). And each of these must incorporate rich understanding of the variety of individuals and organizations that comprise the field of journalism as well as the dramatically different economic, cultural, and political environments in which they operate.

The middle road

Today both peace and war are caricatured in media coverage that seeks drama, political congruence, and clarity in 150 words or less. Such reporting obscures reality and confounds human initiatives toward global peace. Yet this practice is the result of a profound human tendency; journalists evoke oppositional dualities more readily during coverage of violent conflict, when their increased fear and mortality salience prompt heightened desire to cling to one's own world view (Jonas & Greenberg, 2004). Inchoate fear also increases nationalism, defensiveness, and the willingness to censor the flow of information and to forego other fundamental liberties (Blanchard, 1992). Siebert (1952) and Blanchard (1992) are among a much broader group of scholars (see, e.g., Smith, 1999) who have argued that this "urge toward conformity", in Blanchard's (1992) terms, undermines the ability of the press to function as a check on government abuse of power during times of fear (pp. viii-ix).

Peace journalism, therefore, faces a daunting challenge to address deeply trained professional patterns, structural and financial pressures within the industry, and profound psychological responses that encourage reactive, and at times reactionary, nationalistic reporting. Calls to simply "do better" will, therefore, likely fall short if they fail to help journalists negotiate the terrors of war and transcend the human desire to distance and to blame. The challenge is not only for journalists to listen well and to hear "the other" better but to understand and incorporate that new understanding into an expanded revision of self that transcends national, religious, ethnic, and other profound aspects of identity and enmity. This shift demands abandonment of the moral certainty in one's own beliefs to adopt a broader and more fundamental set of values grounded in clarity that peace is always better than violence, health is better than epidemic disease and starvation, and economic sufficiency is better than ravaging poverty.

To move toward media that serve global peace not war, we must avoid the alluring yet insubstantial path of reductionism. Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1969) observed that people employ categorizations to economize and simplify their assessments of others and to direct their intergroup behavior. The human urge to simplify complexity and divide continua into discrete categories upon which we base future choices and actions is a fundamental precept of contemporary understanding of social cognition and intergroup psychology (Miller & Hoffman, 1999). Kempf's (2003b) observations on human psychology are particularly useful here. He noted that humans tend to focus on their own intentions but on the actual effects of other's actions. This tendency systematically underestimates the harm of personal actions as it overestimates the harm caused by others. The influence of such categorizations upon stereotyping, outcasting, and symbolic representations of culture is well documented (e.g., Hazlam et al., 1995, Hunter, 1991).

Yet the varied categories to which individuals belong do not coalesce into hostile opposing camps unless the groups are "*clearly defined in a public forum*. That is, people are not likely to see themselves as belonging to a broad social category until some event, popular group, or charismatic leader defines the category" (Miller & Hoffman, 1999, emphasis added). Decades of agenda setting and framing research confirm the role of the media as this forum and support the conclusion that people employ the categorizations with the greatest salience (Hogg & Turner, 1997; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Thus, people aggregate around dominant categories, forming groups that will adopt increasingly extreme positions and exaggerate inter-group differences as the media portray conflict between the groups as rising (Brown & Williams, 1984).

An effective praxis of peace journalism must recognize first that journalists are human beings, citizens, social beings, and products of the same social, political, religious, ethnocentric, and nationalistic pressures and predilections as the people about whom they report. It is paradoxical, but nonetheless true, that many journalists attracted to the profession by a desire to "change the world" systematically engage in practices that entrench the status quo. Wilhoit and Weaver (Weaver, 1998; Weaver et al, 2002; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996, 1991) repeatedly have documented the solid membership of U.S. journalists in the elite caste that benefits from the very conflicts peace journalism would ask them to work toward eliminating. Given human nature, peace journalism seems unlikely to take hold until proposals provide mechanisms to assist journalists in transcending their own individual and collective identities.

Journalists themselves, however, recurrently cite training as the greatest influence on their news values (Weaver et al, 2002). Modern journalism education in the United States is essentially an outgrowth of the U.S. government's extensive and effective use of communications media in World War II (Rogers, 1994). Here history suggests attention to retraining is well placed, at least in the United States and in countries where independent, autonomous media have not been the norm (Howard, 2003). James Carey (1978) and others (Edge, 2003) long have argued that the contemporary training of professional journalists stifles original and critical thinking. Improved practice, they say, requires journalists to be more self-reflexive and to better understand their role in society and in conflict (Edge, 2003).

Based in knowledge of the powerful role of war coverage to divert public attention away from enormous transfers of wealth, Galtung (1970, 2000, 2007) and Tehranian (2002), like Kaldor (2003), nonetheless argues that strong, diverse, independent media are essential to civil society and "to counter the powers of the state and the market" to dominate and, hence, diminish civil discourse ((Tehranian, p. 79, 77). It is clear peace journalists and activists promoting peace must abandon the tactics of conflict and the reactive rhetoric of negativity, blame, and criticism

(Coles, 2002; Gorsevski, 1999; Harvey, 1991; Ivie, 1987) to engage in a positive discourse of principled, compassionate humanism, and provide positive alternatives to the status quo. Proponents of peace must not engage in the game of shaming, demonizing, and othering mastered by the mongers of war (see, e.g., Lazar & Lazar, 2004) but should rally the people with invitations to act upon their essential "peace and justice sentiments" (Coles, 2002, p. 599) and conceptualize a transnational identity of universal humanity (Coles, 2002, p. 602).

What is needed is a journalism of symbolic rapprochement. My views adopt some of the principles of "conflict transformation" identified by Shinar (2003b), who suggests that a transformation of "the images of the self and the other", rather than reconciliation, is necessary to end intractable, essentialist, cultural conflicts. I strongly support the focus on image transformation as vital to resolution of all conflicts regardless of whether essentialist or not. The key, as Shinar (2003b) notes, is for "groups engaged in conflict [to] achieve a fairly accurate understanding of each other."

The role of the media in such transformations is critical, yet extremely difficult. Journalism structures of conglomerated ownership politically aligned or interwoven with government actors exerting transnational or even global influence and peddling government rhetoric present significant sources of resistance particularly when legal structures limit their autonomy. Yet assertions that media have expanded their influence on and their intervention in international policy processes (Fowler, 1991; Gilboa, 1998; Hall, 1980a; Larson, 1986; Tuchman, 1978) may be unduly pessimistic. It is likely media consistently have partnered, throughout time and to varying degrees, with governments in international affairs.

The challenge to create new constructions of reality is, at its base, a human challenge. Fisher (1989a, 1989b) first suggested that narrative conventions have enormous societal impact because humans are story-telling animals, what he called *homo narrans*, who experience and understand life as a series of narratives with beginnings, middles, and ends (Niles, 1999). Humans naturally craft stories with dramatic coherence that transform individuals into archetypes and connect events into a logical series. Familiar story lines that place good and evil in dramatic combat, link hard work to resource acquisition, and create a world of finite resources and zero-sum contests resonate with the human psyche and drive the journalist who crafts the story as well as the reader.

Here restructuring and retraining that insulate independent journalism organizations and journalists themselves from the economic, socio-political, and nationalistic pressures exerted by corporate and government elites are critical. Independent organizations and individuals can provide coverage responsive to events (manipulated by these elites) but redefined by a new array of credible and authoritative sources who offer resources of the imagination from which citizens

can craft alternatives to elite constructions. The challenge to create more open and varied news outlets that embrace a range of views rather than parrot dominant political ideologies is in large part one of capital. Internet-based independent media centers (IndyMedia) today are expanding news narratives and increasing the rhetorical space for open exchange of information while evading many of the obstacles of capital. Independently funded through multiple private supporters, "Indymedia is a democratic media outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth" (http://www.indymedia.org/en/index.shtml). A non-hierarchical collective of independent media organizations and hundreds of journalists, Indymedia advances the objectives of peace journalism through grassroots, non-corporate coverage with access for alternate voices.

As voices rise and independent, self-critical media grow, training also can provide journalists with strategies to inoculate themselves against knee-jerk responses to evocations of fear and the realities of violence. As in most attempts at self-change, moving beyond denial is a critical first step. Thus it is encouraging that journalists are aware of government control and spin of war coverage and have become somewhat self-critical about press participation in propaganda efforts (Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2002, p. 7). The dominance of the discourse of compassion among audience members is a potential resource for those seeking to transform media coverage toward praxis of peace.

Peace praxis also requires the deconstruction of national identities and movement toward representation of humans as individual people not as exemplars of a national, religious, ethnic, or other group. This is a particularized practice. According to Juanita Leon, editor of *El Tiempo*'s (Colombia) Peace Unit, what is needed is a journalism that "create[s] the idea that peace is possible in the collective imagination" (Pratt, n.d.). Journalism that displays the society's efforts toward peace is essential because "government and media attention [to] the peace process, and the specific benefits to be gained from a peace accord, would be directly associated with public attitudes concerning the *vitalness* of that process" (Astorino-Courtois, 1996, p. 1039, emphasis in original). Actions to disempower the primacy of national identity and coalesce new communities can be built through coverage that places transnational linkages, regional alliances, and global concerns at its center.

The goal of peace journalism should not be to achieve rational mutual understanding at all times for all peoples around the globe. Such a goal would ignore the importance of what Kaplan (2003) eloquently called "the beauty of intolerable truths": irrational, destructive, cruel, and violent "explosions of passion … are central to the human spirit." Numerous psychologists, similarly, have recognized the role of violence in fulfilling both individual and collective needs that include relief

from boredom and stimulation of an increased sense of creativity, confidence, empowerment, and agency (Grundy & Weinstein, 1974).

A more realistic objective for peace journalism, and one that conforms to the norms of professional ethics and objectivity, is to include a rich array of "symbols of security" and peace as resources for the collective imagination, particularly in nations or regions where long-term violence has rendered peace an unknown and unimaginable concept (Ghazy, 2003; Kashua, 2004; Shinar, 2003b). The primary task of peace journalism, then, is to render the unknown thinkable; the alien, recognizable; the different, compatible. For, "in the absence of positive depictions …, it is extremely unlikely that [others'] interests will resonate" (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 649).

The war on war

Some will continue to argue that the practices outlined above as central to peace journalism praxis abandon the essential and central role of objective reporting. Poppycock! U.S. media long have embraced the government's "war on crime", its "war on drugs", its war on drinking and driving and an array of other public policy initiatives designed to alter the practices of residents. No one suggests the media should be an objective and neutral platform to exchange ideas on the pros and cons of rape or genocide. Why, then, is it more acceptable for media to promote anti-drug and anti-crime messages than to advocate for the end of violence? Clearly Lynch (1998) is correct: No substantial professional/ethical obstacle exists to the inclusion of pro-peace narratives by the media, and peace journalism does not involve any radical departure from contemporary journalism practice. Rather peace journalism requires numerous subtle and cumulative shifts in seeing, thinking, sourcing, narrating, and financing the news: shifts toward citizens and away from elite spokespeople, toward the value of peace rather than the adrenalin rush of conflict, toward mutual benefits rather than unilateral victory.

Caution is advised in pursuing a "peace frame" that encourages continued reliance on elites, media events, etc (Dayan & Katz, 1992) or a practice reliant upon overly concentrated media power (Young & Jesser, 1997). History demonstrates how quickly power corrupts and the agility with which governments co-opt external elites and effectively silence expression of truly original visions. Symbolic representations of equality, humanity, and harmony grow best in the rich soil of diverse experience and freedom (Shinar, 2004).

4

Is peace journalism possible? Three frameworks for assessing structure and agency in news media[1]

Robert A. Hackett

Amongst practitioners and scholars of journalism, a movement towards "peace journalism" is gaining momentum, and attracting controversy.[2] Its proponents see it as an expression of, and/or improvement upon, the best practices of actually-existing journalism, as well as a means of ameliorating conflicts and opening up new opportunities for their peaceful resolution (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). Peace journalists regard conventional international news coverage – its typical emphasis on violence, conflict as a two-sided win/lose struggle, government and military sources, and "our" suffering versus "their" villainy – as comprising war journalism.

By contrast, the opponents of peace journalism (henceforth, PJ), raise a number of objections: PJ is an unwelcome departure from objectivity and towards a journalism of attachment; it mistakenly assumes powerful and linear media effects; it is a normative model, rooted in the discipline of peace research, that fails sufficiently to take into account the constraints imposed by the actual dynamics of news production (including professional values and organizational imperatives),

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2 I am assuming that most readers of this journal are already familiar with the basic concepts of peace journalism. Briefly, as outlined by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), PJ draws upon the insights of Conflict Analysis to look beyond the overt violence which is the stuff of news (especially television) and calls attention to the context, of Attitudes, Behaviour and Contradictions, and the need to identify a range of stakeholders broader than the "two sides" engaged in violent confrontation. If war journalism presents conflict as a tug-of-war between two parties in which one side's gain is the other's loss, PJ invites journalists to re-frame conflict as a cat's cradle of relationships between various stakeholders. It also calls on journalists to distinguish between stated demands, and underlying needs and objectives; to identify and attend to voices working for creative and non-violent solutions; to keep eyes open for ways of transforming and transcending the hardened lines of conflict. And it calls attention to expanding our understanding of conflict beyond the direct physical violence which is the focus of war journalism, to include the structural and cultural violence that may underlie conflict situations (Hackett 2006a).

and hence, may have little to offer journalists in practice (Hanitzsch 2004a; 2004b).

In this paper, I want to take up the last of these criticisms. I start from the assumption that PJ is, or would be, a Good Thing, and thus, I largely bypass debates about its desirability. I also take for granted that journalism does matter to the prospects for war and peace, even if not in a unilinear or deterministic way. Rather than address the debates about media ethics and effects that PJ has provoked, this paper addresses another aspect. I want to argue that to succeed, PJ must translate its normative concerns, rooted in the discipline of peace research, into a strategy based on a theoretically-informed analysis of the governing logics of news production. PJ supporters need to conduct a purposeful review of what media scholarship tells us about the determinants of news production. Such a review could help us to identify blockages and opportunities for the practice of PJ (and conversely, war journalism). Do media organizations have sufficient autonomy vis-a-vis other institutions, or journalists vis-a-vis media organizations, to put PJ into practice? Or is structural reform a prerequisite for the successful implementation of PJ?

This paper does not attempt a full literature survey, particularly since other scholars are also engaging in that task from a PJ perspective (e.g. Spencer 2005). Here, I want briefly to review three conceptual frameworks which could help shed light on the scope for agency in existing media institutions – Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model of the media, Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model of influences on media content, and Pierre Bourdieu's notion of journalism as a field. I conclude that a precondition of PJ's success is structural reform in that field, raising the strategic issue of how to build coalitions for media change.

It is not that PJ proponents have altogether ignored the question of how to transform journalism's practices, in the context of news media structures. In a landmark text that admirably combines theory and practice, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: xix) enquire into how deeply embedded war journalism is, in the political economy of media industries:

> "If there's to be a journalistic revolution, does it entail taking over the commanding heights of the media economy? Not necessarily. In one sense, both government and commercial media have their own interests in creating images of 'self' and 'other' – to command allegiance, and to sell products and services, respectively. 'The two systems thus tend to exacerbate international tensions by dichotomizing, dramatizing, and demonizing "them" against 'us'." [citing Tehranian 2002].

The authors argue that even though war journalism "has powerful political and economic imperatives at its back", there is still scope for PJ, through the agency of journalists. In a chapter devoted to explaining "why is news the way it is", they give particular attention to Herman and Chomsky's (1988) "propaganda model".

More generally, amongst civil society activists concerned with media change, especially in the US, the propaganda model is probably the best-known critical theory of the media. It thus makes a useful starting point for this review.

The propaganda model

Herman and Chomsky (1988: 2) regard the dominant American media as comprising a single propaganda system in which "money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public". In their extensive studies of American media treatment of human rights and US foreign policy during the period of the Cold War, the authors found example after example of politically-charged double standards (Hackett 1991: 35-36). Human rights abuses committed by pro-US regimes were ignored, minimized or excused, while those perpetrated by pro-Soviet or other enemy states were more likely to receive extensive and strongly negative treatment. The US press implicitly treated repressive US client states in Latin America and elsewhere as if they were autonomous allies of the US, whereas the responsibility for human rights violations in pro-Soviet regimes (in eastern Europe and elsewhere) was laid at the feet of the Soviet Union. People abused in enemy states were defined implicitly as "worthy victims", their suffering treated in detail and sympathetically, while those in US client states were portrayed as "unworthy victims" (Chomsky and Herman 1979: 12, 37-41). The term "terrorism" was typically applied to the "retail terror" of left-wing insurgent groups, and not to the "wholesale" official or clandestine violence of states – except sometimes, those hostile to the US. Staged, coercive elections held in militarized US client states in Latin America were portrayed as legitimate expressions of the popular will, while an election held under conditions of greater real freedom by Nicaragua's left-wing regime in 1984, was framed as deficient and illegitimate (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 87-142; Hackett 1991: 36).

While Chomsky and Herman do not use the term, their findings correspond to the characteristics of war journalism: double standards consonant with elite perspectives, that portray "our" side as moral and righteous, and "them" as evil and aggressive. While the Soviet bloc has disintegrated and the Cold War ended, Chomsky and Herman continue to find similar media subservience to warlike elite perspectives in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the "war on terror" (e.g. Chomsky 2001: 30).

Why do these patterns persist? The propaganda "model" is actually more than that – it is not just an heuristic device for organizing data, but an actual theory, a set of related propositions about the media's governing logics, intended to "help explain the nature of media coverage of important political topics" (Herman 1996:

116). In its original version, Herman and Chomsky (1988: 3-31) identified five institutionalized pressures or "filters" that bind the media to elite interests: first, the corporate and commercial of media, including the wealth, size and concentrated nature of media ownership; second, media dependence on corporate advertising revenue; third, media reliance on information from government, business and associated "expert" sources; fourth, right-wing "flak" in the form of sustained criticism and pressure from conservative media monitoring and policy institutes; and fifth, the ideological environment of anti-communism as a "national religion". In the post-Cold War era, Herman (1996: 125) has supplemented anti-Communism with free market fundamentalism as an ideological filters. (In a later modification of the propaganda model, Herman dispenses with the ideological filter altogether, perhaps because it too directly implies a critique of popular consciousness that is difficult to reconcile with a populist stance. Conversely, he divides the information/source filter into two components: news shapers (experts, disproportionately conservative); and news makers – politicians and institutions capable of generating what Boorstin (1980 [1961]) christened "pseudo-events", such as press conferences, created for the purpose of being reported and to serve a political agenda (Media Education Foundation 1997).

The propaganda model emphasizes the major media's structured subordination to (or imbrication with) the interests of political and economic elites. A similar analysis, concerned more specifically with media's role in representing and reproducing violence and peace, was earlier offered by Becker (1982). If Chomsky and Herman empirically critiqued American mass media, Becker theoretically critiqued transnational (but western-dominated) media (Hackett 1991: 36). Drawing inspiration from the then-current New World Information and Communication Order movement, which called *inter alia* for more equal information flows between the global North and South, Becker attacked the liberal notion that the extension of transnational information flows necessarily promotes peace. Deriding the typical research focus on the effects of media (representations of) violence on their audiences, Becker reframes the issue: media are part of a system of structural violence, which Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 59-60; emphasis in original) define as "a structure, usually understood as a *system* of political, social or economic relations, [that] creates barriers that people cannot remove ... an *invisible form* of violence, *built into* ways of doing and ways of thinking", a form that "includes economic exploitation, political repression and cultural alienation". For Becker, media are embedded in, and help to reproduce, relations of inequality within and between nations. Accordingly:

"If mass-media reception as well as production are at once expression and motor of structural violence; if communications technology can be understood, historically, only as an integral part of the emerging military industrial complex; if the access to and the power over the mass media are unequal and unbalanced...then the mass media can fulfill their original

hoped for function as 'peace-bringers' [only] under rare and exceptional circumstances. The representation of violence in the mass media, then, is part and parcel of the universal violence of the media themselves" (Becker 1982: 227).

Such structural critiques, particularly the propaganda model, have important advantages for PJ educators and practitioners. The model's moral and empirical clarity has helped it gain a hearing amongst youth and social movements, probably more so than any other critical or left-wing perspective on media, at least in North America. It is an antidote to naive liberal notions of the free press, and still more so to the conservative concept of the "left-liberal media", heavily promoted in the US. It calls attention to the inherent articulation of media with power, and identifies specific structural links which can help explain the persistence of war journalism. In testing its explanatory capacity, Chomsky and Herman have used a "paired example" approach (e.g. "worthy" versus "unworthy" victims) which can readily be adopted as criteria for monitoring and evaluating conflict coverage.

Nevertheless, the model has significant limitations, particularly when it is misconstrued as a complete explanation of the news agenda, contrary to its authors' stated intentions (Herman 1996: 118; see also Herman 2000). To be sure, there are some "silly" criticisms (such as the claim that it is a "conspiracy theory") that can readily be dismissed. But over the years, more serious criticisms have emerged:

It tends towards *reductionism*, oversimplifying the complexity of the news system, treating it as an epiphenomenon of other institutions (state and capital). In particular, it has little to say about journalists, or the ways in which they may exercise agency within newsrooms; instead, Chomsky has sometimes argued, the news is a predictable product of institutional priorities, much like cars on an assembly line (Media Education Foundation 1997). Similarly, it has little to say about how audiences interpret the news. Although Herman (1996: 118) stresses that it is a model of media performance and behaviour, not effects, the very phrase "manufacturing consent" implies that audiences accept elite frameworks relatively passively. (Yet at the same time, it has been argued, the model seems to imply a naive faith in the possibility of unrestrained "free" communication, and in the rationality and ideological independence of audiences-as-citizens, once the shackles of media-induced false consciousness are removed (Hackett 1991: 39)).

Similarly, the model has been criticized as *functionalist*, emphasizing the smooth reproduction of the system, scanting contradictions and tensions within it, and thus failing adequately to explore the openings for oppositional interventions within and against the propaganda system. When taken as a complete analysis, such functionalism can be disempowering to peace movements and other agents of social change. It also does little to identify the scope and conditions under which newsworkers could exercise the kind of choices called for by PJ.

To be sure, Herman (1996: 124) points to certain conditions which permit the expression of dissent within the dominant media, notably division within elites, and mobilization by oppositional groups. But other contradictions are relatively overlooked, such as the tension between media corporations' need to attract audience trust, and their reliance upon official sources whose credibility may be in question in some contexts (such as the non-discovery of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction). In the context of the British government's support for the invasion of Iraq, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 199-200) argue that neither British business in general, nor media corporations specifically, had a vested interest in promoting the war. To the contrary, the war brought "depressed stock market performance", meagre pickings in reconstruction contracts, and mushrooming public deficits to industry; and an advertising recession, declining newspaper sales, and "plummeting ad revenues" to the media. Yet the patterns of war journalism persisted, for reasons (notably, the objectivity ethos) not well addressed in the propaganda model.

In short, and particularly in some of its more doctrinaire interpretations, the propaganda model risks:

> "... reducing the news media to tired ideological machines confined to performing endlessly, and unfailingly, the overarching function of reproducing the prerogatives of an economic and political elite through processes of mystification. Journalists would then become little more than well-intentioned puppets whose strings are being pulled by forces they cannot fully understand" (Allan 2004a: 55).

The hierarchy of influences model

Compared to the propaganda model, the "hierarchy of influences" model calls attention to a broader range of pressures on news content (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). This model is hierarchical in that the five layers of influences identified range successively from the micro level to the macro. The authors use this model to organize the substantial literature on media determinants.

As I have summarized elsewhere (Hackett and Uzelman 2003), the first level comprises media workers themselves. Their professionally-related roles and ethics appear to have a direct influence on content, whereas their socio-demographic backgrounds and their personal and political beliefs shape news indirectly, especially when individuals are in a position to override institutional pressures or organizational routines (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 65). The second layer of influence consists of daily work routines within the newsroom, routines that structure journalists' output independently of their personal backgrounds and values. Converting raw materials (information) garnered from suppliers (sources) and delivering it to customers (audiences and advertisers) results in standardized and recurring patterns of content (p. 109). The third layer of influence references the

broader organizational imperatives of media institutions. Here, the profit orientation shared by private media companies, combined with their hierarchical structure, in general shape content in accordance with ownership's interests. The fourth layer comprises extra-media influences, including sources, advertisers, the political power of governments, market structures, and technology. Finally, and most broadly, is the influence of ideology – a system of values and beliefs that governs what audiences, journalists and other players in the news system see as 'natural' or 'obvious' and that furthermore serves in part to maintain prevailing relations of power (pp. 221-24). Ideology not only shapes news, it is extended, renewed and reproduced through media content.

This model is an heuristic device, not a theory *per se*. It should be evaluated on the basis of its utility in raising questions and organizing research data, rather than its explanatory power as such. I have found it useful in organizing the media sociology literature with a view to identifying the extent of corporate influence, and the offsetting "progressive" and "conservatizing" forces operating at different levels of the press system (Hackett and Uzelman 2003; Hackett and Carroll 2006: Chapter 2). It should be possible to do likewise with respect to the forces which reinforce war journalism, and the openings for the practice of PJ. The following is offered speculatively, as a basis for further research.

At the microlevel of journalists' influence on news production, at least in the North American context, some of the personal values of journalists (social liberalism, respect for human rights, "post-materialist" attitudes (Miljan and Cooper 2003: 59)) may incline them towards suspicion of militarism, sympathy for moderate dissenters, and/or personal voting support for liberal politicians or parties (Lichter, Lichter and Rothman 1986). Aspects of their social background would lead in the same direction; journalists tend to be more secular, urban and educated compared to the national population (e.g. Miljan and Cooper 2003: 68-72).

On the other hand, most journalists are citizens of particular states and members of national cultures, and they are not immune to the biases of nationalism in covering international conflict, particularly when their news organizations and audiences are also nationally based. Moreover, journalistic professionalism privileges the ethos of objectivity, albeit more strongly in some countries and news organizations than others; as we argue below, it is an ethos that correlates all too readily with key characteristics of war journalism.

At the second and third levels of influences on the news, daily news routines and organizational imperatives may provide some scope for diversity and for contextual news broader than that typical of war journalism. The convention of covering "both sides" of legitimate controversies (Hallin 1986: 116-17) provides openings for anti-war voices, in historical situations (such as the later years of the Vietnam war) when a war policy has produced dissension amongst elites, and when dissent

is not equated with deviance. (On the other hand, the same convention of "two sides" to a controversy reduces its complexity and the diversity of viewpoints, at odds with the PJ proposal to identify multiple stakeholders in conflicts.) The sociologist Herbert Gans (1979) identified a number of factors that news producers take into account in framing the news, including "audience considerations"; some of these, such as the audience-building potential of "human interest" stories about peacemaking and reconciliation, are consistent with PJ. The fact that some media, like BBC World or CNN International, are aimed at audiences in different countries, as well as the stake these organizations have in their reputation for independence and trustworthiness, could help to temper tendencies towards national chauvinism in conflict reporting.

On the other side of the ledger, many organizational routines and imperatives lend themselves all too easily to war journalism. In selecting and framing news, journalists employ professional "news values" that, in part, link news judgement to audience considerations. In an update of pioneering peace/media research by Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1965), Harcup and O'Neill (2001) suggest ten such criteria: the power elite (reference to powerful people or organizations); celebrity; entertainment (including drama and human interest); surprise; bad news; good news (e.g. rescues and cures); magnitude; relevance to the audience; follow-up; and the news organization's own agenda. Roughly speaking, one can infer from this list that war and governments are typically more newsworthy than peace processes and activists. In addition to audience considerations, the pressures of meeting deadlines encourage newsmakers to stick to simple storylines and familiar stereotypes, and to favour immediate events (like battles) over long-term processes (like peacebuilding) – all key features of war journalism.

Such pressures undoubtedly reinforce "rhetorical and narrative structures" that "shape and constrain the way in which newspapers report conflict" (Fawcett 2002: 213). Even when they were editorially committed to a "win-win" compromise, two newspapers on opposite sides of the Northern Ireland conflict failed to escape the conflict-exacerbating frames of their respective political communities in their actual reporting – until a particularly tragic (and newsworthy) event, and a consequent shift in elite opinion, altered the narrative (ibid.).

At the fourth level, of extra-media institutions and processes, the factors identified by Shoemaker and Reese also cut in both directions. Consider audiences as an influence on news frames. Depending perhaps on the political context, audiences may sometimes reject wartime news (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005: 200); but they also enjoy drama and ethnocentric, manichean narratives. They may also share a patriotic and/or morbid fascination with the spectacle of violence and the display of military prowess, particularly on television.

When translated into the terms of the Shoemaker/Reese model, many of the "filters" identified in the propaganda model (state/government financial and legal influence, conservative "flak", elite experts, government information control, etc.) can be considered "extra-media" influences. Many of these do on balance tend to favour war journalism. However, we should not automatically assume that these influences always work against conflict resolution; elites may sometimes initiate and promote peace processes.

Technology is another cross-cutting influence. The influence of the Internet on the practices and agendas of journalism, and of communication in conflict situations, is a topic too vast for exploration here; suffice to note that it has facilitated the expansion of voices, and new forms of online journalism – including the weblogs of Iraqi civilians as witnesses to the 2003 invasion -- that are often consistent with PJ (Allan 2004a: 188-90; Allan 2004b). On the other hand, some writers regard the still-powerful media of television (and film) as technologically biased in favour of the aestheticization of war (Mander 1978; Nelson 1987).

As an especially important extra-media influence, the pressures of commercialism on the globally dominant western media deserve particular consideration. As noted above, many advertisers and media organizations have a structural interest in directing societal resources to consumer spending rather than military production; on the other hand, some advertisers and media conglomerates (like the General Electric-owned NBC network) are significantly involved in the latter. More significant, advertising subtly but decidedly contributes to the corporate media's "democratic deficit", partly by disproportionately serving, informing and empowering affluent urban consumers, who are the prime target markets for advertisers, at the relative expense of the rural and the poor (Hackett and Carroll 2006, chap. 1). In a country like India, such a disparity can have devastating consequences for the (lack of) access to the dominant public sphere on the part of the poor and their issues, including the social roots and consequences of drought and famine (Thomas 2005).

Moreover, advertising-based media are structurally linked to the "ceaseless promotion of consumerism", with its destructive consequences for the physical and cultural environment (Hackett and Carroll 2006: 8). As American environmentalist Bill McKibben (1999: 45-6) has put it,

> "the thing to fear from television is less the sight of [people] mowing each other down with machine guns than the sight of people having to have every desire that enters their mind gratified immediately...[T]hat kind of culture is going to be a violent one, no matter what images one shows. Television hasn't done this by itself, ... but it's the anchor and central ideol of this system of values that dominates us."

The broadest layer of influence, ideology and cultural narratives, also cuts in both directions. For instance, Canada's myth of peacekeeping, or concepts of democ-

racy and human rights embedded in the culture, are resources for peace advocates. But conversely, dominant cultural narratives can emphasize national self-glorification, hostility to particular Others, and the connection of national self-esteem and self-defence to military power, as in America's "master narrative" of war (Hackett and Zhao 1994).

Like the propaganda model, the hierarchy of influences framework was developed in the American national context. Any contemporary analysis of journalism and conflict must now also take into account the context of cultural and economic globalization (growing interdependence and the near-universalization of capitalist social relations) as well as more specifically, media globalization, by which I mean not only the emergence of transnational media organizations, but also "the articulation of nationally based media systems with global markets and processes" (Zhao and Hackett 2005: 1). Like other influences identified by Shoemaker and Reese, globalization has contradictory implications for the prospects for PJ. Economic "globalization from above" has created growing economic interdependence (Friedman 2000) and arguably a capitalist class which is increasingly integrated across national boundaries (Sklair 2001). As broad contexts for the media, these features can be read positively: they raise the economic costs and political barriers for regimes contemplating war as an option (Friedman 2000), and thus may act as brakes upon war-mongering within nationally-based media.

But capitalist globalization can also be read negatively: it arguably intensifies the structural violence of marginalization, inequality, exploitation and ecological degradation, compounded by the media's "global fishbowl" effect (Tehranian 2002: 59), whereby the world's poor majority is increasingly aware of the North's (media-exaggerated?) affluence. Whether "globalization from below", the mobilization of an emergent global civil society, is sufficient to challenge the dark side of capitalist globalization from above, remains to be seen; at the very least, it may create a social basis for PJ, as global justice struggles challenge and transform dominant news narratives.

Journalism as a field[3]

The hierarchy of influences model is useful to researchers seeking to identify specific influences on the news, and to explore relationships between them. Compared to the propaganda model, it calls attention to a broader range of factors, and to their often contradictory nature. If the propaganda model overemphasizes structural determination, however, the hierarchy model may overplay the multi-

3 With grateful acknowledgement to the publisher, this section is a revised version of Robert A. Hackett and William K. Carroll, *Remaking Media: The struggle to democratize public communication* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006b), pp. 32-35.

plicity and contingency of influences; and both models risk obscuring the specificity and coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge-production.

Not just those two models, but much of the anglo-American literature on media determinants and media power, is informed by empiricist notions of linear causality; where scholars differ concerns the direction in which the causal arrow runs – – from economic and political power to the media, or vice versa. A somewhat different way of conceptualizing journalism's political functioning can be obtained by selectively drawing from French social theory about social structure. The work of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu implies an analysis of media as a relatively autonomous institutional sphere, one which articulates with relations of power, knowledge and production more broadly, but which also has a certain logic of its own. Foucault spoke of "discursive regimes" – of how power is imbricated with knowledge, not by directly imposing censorship or coercion from outside, but indirectly and internally, through the criteria and practices that "govern" the production of statements (Foucault 1984: 54-5; Hackett and Zhao 1998: 6). Thus, power relations may be manifested or even constituted, within the everyday routines and ethos of workaday journalism – a conception which implies the productivity and power of journalism, and the potential agency of journalists as social actors, without seeing it as entirely free-floating or self-determining.

Bourdieu's concept of "field" may be more useful still, since it pays more fulsome attention to the potentially asymmetrical relationship *between* as well as within institutional spheres. In his view:

> "... any social formation is structured by way of a hierarchically organized series of fields (the economic field, the educational field, the political field, the cultural field, etc.), each defined as a structured space with its own laws of functioning and its own relations of force independent of those of politics and the economy ... Each field is relatively autonomous but structurally homologous with the others. Its structure, at any given moment, is determined by the relations between the positions agents occupy in the field" (Johnson, in Bourdieu 1993: 6).

Each field is "a social universe with its own laws of functioning" (ibid., p. 14), a "microcosm with its own laws, defined both by its position in the world at large and by the attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms" (Bourdieu 1998: 39). Typically, each field is characterized by its own ethos, its own formal and informal rules and logics, its own set of status and power positions for individual agents (such as journalists) to occupy, its own forms of interests or resources – capital – for which agents compete. In the economic sphere, agents presumably compete for economic capital through investment strategies; in the political sphere, they compete for governmental power. If we regard cultural production in general, and mass media or journalism specifically, as distinct fields, two forms of capital are particularly relevant: symbolic capital,

the accumulation of prestige or celebrity; and cultural capital, forms of cultural knowledge or dispositions (Johnson 1993: 7). Indeed, this insight suggests that journalism and related forms of large-scale cultural production (the "media"), have the distinct feature of combining economic power (the production of profit) and symbolic power, which is ultimately the capacity to define social reality. The "media" are influential in so far as they comprise a concentration of society's symbolic power (Couldry 2003: 39), with a consequent "reality effect" (Bourdieu 1998: 21-22). That is, media generate categorizations of the world that acquire a reality of their own and influence the course of social struggles and the perceptions of peace movements, other social movements, and broader publics.

Put differently, Bourdieu suggests that the journalistic field is considerably influenced by commercial or economic constraints, particularly as embodied in the audience ratings system, but in turn (especially due to the mass reach of television as a medium), journalism imposes structural constraints upon other fields (notably on politics, and on other spheres of cultural production) (Marliere 1998: 220; Bourdieu 1998: 56).

Thus, this approach invites us to consider journalism and mass media as relatively autonomous fields within a broader field of power, which itself is structured in dominance: some fields may well be more dominant, or may exert a greater gravitational force, over the whole social formation. This metaphor takes us beyond linear, billiard-ball causality, to suggest a new way of conceptualizing how journalism interacts with economic forces, the political system, science, or other institutional spheres, and also with capitalism, patriarchy, racism, militarism, or other axes of domination. While recognizing, indeed insisting, that individuals are active and creative agents pursuing strategies with the resources available to them, this model turns our attention to structured roles and relationships – including interactions between institutional fields. Thus:

"External determinants can have an effect only through transformations in the structure of the field itself. In other words, the field's structure *refracts*, much like a prism, external determinants in terms of its own logic, and it is only through such refraction that external factors can have an effect on the field. The degree of autonomy of a particular field is measured precisely by its ability to refract external demands into its own logic" (Johnson 1993: 14; emphasis in original).

This very rich passage suggests that the most important form of external influence upon journalism is not explicit and occasional interventions (like an advertiser trying to kill a story, or a source pressing for favourable spin), but rather the long-term re-structuring of the ground rules and routines which shape (relatively autonomous) journalism on a workaday basis.

What does this conceptual framework look like "on the ground", when it is applied to actual journalism practices? And how is it relevant to peace journalism? In his

controversial critique of television journalism, written for a French readership in the 1990s (Bourdieu 1998), Bourdieu himself was not centrally concerned with war and peace, but with the impact of the journalism field on democracy and on the quality of cultural production. However, his analysis clearly has implications for peace discourse in and through the news.

For Bourdieu, TV journalism has developed a number of destructive characteristics. It privileges entertainment over real information, confrontations over reasoned arguments, political tactics over substance, individuals, anecdotes and scandals over the analysis of structures or processes. TV news has created a new category of journalist/intellectuals, fast-food thinkers who promote cynicism and simplification (ibid: 3, 29). Worse, it stimulates xenophobic fears, excessive concerns about crime and safety, and the "primal passions" of nationalism (ibid: 11), and it overaccesses ethnocentric and racist demagogues (ibid: 8). In offering fragmented, decontextualized images of events, and in portraying politics as a game for professionals, TV disempowers audiences as citizens, giving them nothing to stimulate cohesive or oppositional interpretations. TV breaks the ties between politicians and publics (ibid: 5), undermining intermediary institutions like unions and parties which have a mandate as guardians of collective values, to elaborate "considered solutions to social questions" (ibid: 77). All these factors bear ominously against the kind of discourse that PJ asks news media to generate. At their root, Bourdieu points to the subordination of journalism to market logic through the mechanism of audience ratings, although he acknowledges other factors, such as journalists' training and their long-standing tradition of competing for "scoops" and exclusives.

There is much to criticize in the specifics of Bourdieu's particular analysis. In the US, the country where "hyper-commercialism" has arguably taken its greatest toll on the quality of journalism (McChesney 2004), his observations may well seem commonplace. More important, his normative standpoint seems less concerned with peaceful humane governance (though he repeatedly stresses his commitment to democracy) than with insulating other fields of cultural production (juridical, literary, art, science) from degradation by market-driven journalism. Though he disavows "nostalgia" for paternalistic television (Bourdieu 1998: 48), there is arguably an element of cultural elitism in the analysis.

Nevertheless, his framework is very rich, and can be applied to news characteristics more directly relevant to PJ. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) see journalism's ethos of objectivity as a primary mainstay of war journalism, particularly the dualistic presentation of conflict (Us versus Them), dependence on official sources, and the preference for events (e.g. battles) over processes (e.g. the build-up to, or resolution of, conflicts). It may thus be useful to consider the analysis by Hackett and Zhao (1998) of the "regime of objectivity" that has characterized North

American journalism for most of the twentieth century. While they do not explicitly use Bourdieu's framework, their analysis illustrates his emphasis on the relative autonomy of the journalism field, and the way its relatonship with other fields is refracted through its own governing logics.

By "regime of objectivity", Hackett and Zhao (ibid: 86) mean an interrelated complex of ideas and practices that provide "a general model for conceiving, defining, arranging, and evaluating news texts, news practices, and news institutions". The regime comprises five dimensions. Objectivity is a normative ideal, a set of desiderata (factualness, accuracy, completeness, as well as a stance of detachment, neutrality or independence). Second, it entails an epistemology, assumptions about knowledge and reality, like the possibility of separating values from facts and observers from observed. Third, objectivity also crucially involves newsgathering and presentation practices, like the use of appropriate sources and the separation of news from opinion in the pages of the daily paper. Fourth, the objectivity regime is institutionalized in social structures, a framework which journalism has actively helped to construct, not merely reflect, and comprises "complex, specialized news organizations, with compartmentalized roles and departments (the marketing and advertising departments over there, the newsroom pristinely overe here), staffed by professionals with appropriate skills and ethical commitments, and enjoying autonomy from the state ..." (ibid: 86). And finally, as an active ingredient in public discourse, objectivity and related concepts, like bias, fairness and balance, provide the language for everyday talk about news.

While journalism's regime of objectivity is no mere expression of external forces, however, neither is it free-floating. It has social, political, historical conditions of existence. One might say that journalism's objectivity regime, and the institutional environment of other fields, were mutually constituting. The invention of the telegraph and the related emergence of wire services encouraged a shift from partisan commentary to non-partisan facticity in the nineteenth-century press. So too did the economic interest of reaching large, multi-partisan readerships, on the part of the emerging commercial daily press. The state has used the objectivity/balance ethos in regulating broadcasting and in guiding its relationships to media outlets; compared to media seen as "mainstream" or "objective", those defined as "alternative" or advocacy media are more vulnerable to legal harassment or informal discrimination (such as exclusion from high-level political meetings, or wartime reporter "pools"). Other factors that have shaped and solidified the objectivity regime included the rising status of science and empirical research in the nineteenth century, the increasing educational level and professional-status claims of journalists, and the political legitimation needs of monopoly newspaper owners in the twentieth century (ibid: 36-81).

Historically, the characteristics of the objectivity regime have not been fixed in stone. Both journalism, and its articulation with other institutional fields, have evolved over time. Thus, while the notion of objectivity as truth-telling in the public interest has been a remarkably persistent touchstone of North American journalism, both its practices and conceptualization have shifted. The "naive realism" of late-nineteenth century faith in the ability of facts to speak for themselves gave way after World War I to a narrower definition of objectivity as "a method designed for a world in which even facts could not be trusted" (Schudson 1978: 122). The carnage of war, the apparent success of wartime propaganda, Freudian psychology, the rise of totalitarian regimes, and the Great Depression all undermined the culture's confidence in the reliability of facts, the rationality of citizens, and the permanence of democratic capitalism (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 40). The same historical moment of confusion and complexity also gave rise to interpretive reporting, intended to provide context and perspective without undermining objectivity. Later, the upheavals in 1960s popular culture, and the "credibility gap" between American government and public resulting from the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal, paved the way for a more critical mode of journalism, albeit one more prone to adversarial style than to counterhegemonic substance.

So, an interacting set of fields have generated journalism's regime of objectivity, and in turn, the routine practices of journalism objectivity have political or ideological consequences – largely unintended, but in a generally conservative direction. Consider one of the hallmarks of "objective" reporting – the use of "appropriate sources" to provide credible, relevant and authoritative "facts". It just so happens that the sources who are most "appropriate" – available, articulate, convenient and appparently authoritative – as frequently representatives of powerful institutions (ibid: 142). While it may provide openings for change and the expression of opposition, journalism's objectivity regime on the whole:

"... provides a legitimation for established ideological optics and power relations. It systematically produces partial representations of the world, skewed towards dominant institutions and values, whie at the same time it disguises that ideological role from its audiences. It thereby wins consent for 'preferred readings'...embedded in the news. In contemporary North American society, these preferred readigs ratify and reproduce the ideological framework of liberal-democratic capitalism. More specifically, over the last two decades or so, objective journalism has been complicit in naturalizing a move towards a right-wing market-liberalism" (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 161).

Such "conservatizing" consequences of objectivity are not necessarily intended, but, given the position of journalism within a structured field of power, neither are they purely accidental. Journalism (and media) may be a relatively autonomous field, but it is not a level one on which to play. The insistent attention to the (re)production and contestation of hierarchies, and to the structural embedded-

ness of inequality, differentiates this position from the liberal-pluralism arguably implicit in the Hierarchies of Influence model.

Moreover, as the three conceptual frameworks we have reviewed above suggest, if indeed journalism can be considered a field, it is a relatively "weak" one, in two related senses. First, its boundaries are permeable, its autonomy limited. Compared to fields like "high" culture (art, literature, poetry), science and technology, or (though now in retreat) academia, the logics and resources of journalism/mass media are less self-determining.

Second, while journalism/mass media is a field vastly more influential than high culture and academia, and while its concentration of symbolic power can constrain other fields, it does not perch atop the social formation. Arguably, in the era of market liberal hegemony and state- and corporate-driven globalization, all fields have become more subject to direct determination by the economic, and more specifically the untrammelled logic of capital accumulation. But journalism/mass media are especially vulnerable, because they are so heavily integrated into processes of generating political and economic capital. (Speculatively, in an era of corporate and political "branding" (Klein 2000), the very distinctions between symbolic, economic and political capital are themselves eroding.)

Journalism's weakness as a distinct field is evident in the significant erosion of the regime of objectivity, the emblem of autonomy and professionalism, during the past two decades. The Reagan government's abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine, one which had mandated broadcasters to provide opportunity for counterbalancing commentary on controversial issues, narrowed the range of views and paved the way for partisan (mostly right-wing) networks, notably Fox. The 1996 Telecommunications Act enabled massive growth in media concentration, and further encouraged the ethos of broadcasting as a property right rather than a public service. In 2001, the 9/11 terror attacks led US journalism to a largescale disavowal of "objectivity" as even an appropriate stance to take in reporting the Bush administration's "war on terror" (Navasky 2002). Shifts in the economic field (such as the rise of conglomerates driven by shareholders seeking short-term profits) have contributed to the prevalence of "infotainment" over public affairs programming. The depoliticization of the culture, and the concomitant decline of party identification amongst media audiences, has undermined the economic necessity for careful nonpartisanship amongst commercial media organizations.

The erosion of objectivity finds its pinnacle in Rupert Murdoch's Fox News Channel. This development can hardly give comfort to peace journalists. The fusion of news and commentary, the close political ties of its decision-makers with the Republican Party, the daily memos to set editorial agendas on blatantly political grounds, the political screening of its pundits, the musical and graphical tributes to American nationalism during news programs, are all clear violations of even the

cautious, conservatizing versions of objectivity that had marked US journalism in earlier decades. Fox's only vestiges of objectivity are window-dressing: point-counterpoint talks shows setting right-wing pitbulls against *faux* liberal poodles (notably the talk-show *Hannity and Colmes*), and the network's marketing slogan "fair and balanced" (Franken 2003). The respected correspondent and author Philip Knightley (2002: 171) notes that Fox:

"... has significantly increased its ratings by its all-out support for the war, encouraging its correspondents and presenters to express anger and a thirst for revenge, and to present the conflict as a biblical battle of good versus evil."

What is most revealing is not only that Fox has encountered little organized opposition within the ranks of journalism, but that its jingoistic and ultra-nationalist style and stance may be influencing other networks. To the extent that such is the case, Knightly concludes that "Dark days lie ahead".

Conclusion

The three models of news determinants discussed in this paper have rather different emphases. The propaganda model highlights several repressive "filters" that allegedly subordinate the news media to elite interests. The hierarchy model identifies a broader range of influences in a more open-ended way. The journalistic field model moves away from linear causality to emphasize the relative autonomy and coherence of journalism as an institutitionalized sphere, functioning in relationship with other homologously structured fields.

All three models, however, have limitations which much be acknowledged, and taken as a challenge for further research. All three were developed in the context of powerful western nation-states (respectively, the US and France). Each of them assumes that journalism operates within entrenched institutional settings, with well-established and relatively stable relationships with mass audiences, and with economic and political institutions. Needless to say, these conditions do not obtain throughout the planet, and the three models may have less to offer as a "map" for peace journalism in countries struggling to emerge from a neo-colonial and/or authoritarian past.

In addition to the models' own national biases, the global mediascape is changing in ways that these models cannot fully handle, premised as they are on relatively stable national media systems. Oppositional and grassroots Internet-based outlets are challenging the dominance of mass media, introducing new voices and expanding the definition of journalism. On the other hand, the dominant media corporations are extending their influence transnationally, through a multi-faceted process of media globalization, marked by the emergence of transnational media firms and markets; the spread of commercialized media as the general organiza-

tional form; the continued dominance of transnational media flows by western-based TNCs, with some reverse flow from regional production centres in the global South; emerging neo-liberal regimes of global media governance; and more ambiguously, the globalization of media effects (Zhao and Hackett 2005: 6-8). Particularly at the level of English-speaking urban elites, media globalization is transforming the terrain for peace journalism. Interestingly, Reese (2001) has begun an effort to adapt the hierarchy model to the analysis of global journalism.

Within the dominant western countries, social and economic changes are also shifting the nature of journalism, as it increasingly dissolves within profit-driven media and entertainment and information conglomerates; its economic basis threatened by audience fragmentation; its governing ethos shifting from public service and "objectivity" (however conservatively defined), to one of consumerism and commercialism. The regime of objectivity is in decline, but no clear replacement has emerged. The whole field of journalism may be fragmenting, its social bases eroding. This presents opportunities for PJ – there are more niches in the system to practice and find a constituency for different and experimental forms of journalism. But it is also a challenge – it may be more difficult to locate, let alone transform, the "commanding heights" of the agenda-setting national and global media.

That said, the three models do suggest the range of tasks and challenges confronting PJ. These cannot be reduced to a single variable or point of intervention. The barriers to PJ include the difficulties of constructing 'peace' as a compelling narrative, the national basis (and biases) of much of the world's news media and their audiences, the ideological and structural links between media corporations and states, and the embeddedness of dominant media and states in relations of inequality (as the NWICO movement had argued). In western media, the regime of objectivity may be a particularly important impediment to PJ, as Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) suggest; but our analysis above suggests that journalism objectivity is itself a multi-faceted regime that is related to institutional structures and imperatives.

In light of these challenges, I conclude by briefly addressing two questions. First, what kind of media system could best facilitate PJ? Second, through what strategic routes might it be implemented?

Tehranian (2002: 80) rightly notes that media ethical codes for PJ are "necessary but not sufficient", since ethical codes without sanctions are largely "pious wishes"; rather, "the structure is the message". While this formulation may be overly deterministic, all three models point to the intrinsic relationship between media structure, and journalism practices and content. Tehranian identifies the need for more "structural pluralism in media ownership and control" as a precondition for more democratic checks and balances, and for more content pluralism, including

the diversity of voices in conflict situations that is called for by PJ. Support for public and community media systems is also required, to help offset the biases of corporate and government media towards commercial and political propaganda respectively. Moreover, echoing the NWICO movement's concerns, Tehranian calls for a World Media Development Bank, to help reduce the inequalities of media production and access within and between nations of the global North and South.

To these structural changes, one could add the development of genuinely multinational and internationalist media, able to address and engage audiences in different countries with programming that challenges ethnocentric narratives and provides multiple perspectives on conflict. Finally, PJ would be strengthened by national and global regimes of media governance that reinforced popular communication rights -- not only freedom of expression, but also access to the means of public communication.

What about vectors or strategies for change? From Bourdieu's analysis of fields, we can extrapolate three broad approaches (Hackett and Carroll 2006: 52).

One broad strategy is to reform the journalism field from within. The hierarchy and field models both suggest some degree of agency for newsworkers. There is indeed a necessary role for dedicated journalists to take the lead; as teachers, practitioners, writers and advocates, Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick are themselves exemplars. Unfortunately, it seems probable that in the Western corporate media, at least, journalists have neither sufficient incentives, nor autonomy vis-a-vis their employers, to transform the way news is done, without support from powerful external allies. It may be that PJ is most likely to take root in societies (Rwanda? Indonesia? the former Yugoslavia?) that have experienced the ravages of violent conflict, and where the media have played a blatant role in fuelling the destructive fires of enmity. Moreover, I speculate, much of the impetus (or constituency) for PJ is likely to derive from the victims of war, from activists committed to peacebuilding processes, and/or from social justice movements marginalized by current patterns of national or global communication.

A second approach is to build a new field, parallel to currently-existing journalism. This is the option of creating alternative media organizations, supported by civil society, insulated from corporate or state power, and capable of putting into practice the ethos of PJ. The current Canadian-based initiative to create an Independent World Television news network, and to offer "real news" about peace and development to an international viewership, is a very encouraging step in this direction.

Finally, a third approach entails intervening in adjacent fields (such as those of politics, or social movements) to change the environment of journalism, the grav-

itational pulls to which it is subject. One key aspect of journalism's environment are state policies regarding culture and communication. Here, there are encouraging signs. Citizens' movements have emerged in a number of countries, demanding democratic reform of state communication policies, to help bring about more accountable, diverse and better quality media (see e.g. McChesney 2004; Hackett and Carroll 2006). In recent years, similar efforts have been directed towards democratizing global media governance, such as CRIS, the Campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society (O Siochru 2005). More broadly, social justice movements struggling to project their voice in the public arena could help shift the environment of journalism. So too could mobilized audiences, demanding "real news" as a condition of their own empowerment. Or indeed, survival.

Part II

Case studies and audience research

5

Representations of peace in news discourse: Viewpoint and opportunity for peace journalism

Lea Mandelzis

1. Introduction

The mass media play a critical role in the reproduction of socio-political and ideological discourse by framing different issues, especially the news, with a strong bias in favor of conflict and violence. The complex and sensitive nature of conflict and reconciliation situations exposes journalists to difficulties when reporting on wars in objective and value-free terms. Galtung (2002b) claims that journalists are unable to think outside the dualism of "we are good, the other side is evil", and when covering a conflict they take sides with one of the parties and justify its violence and condemn that of the other. He suggests 'peace journalism' as an alternative coverage method that focuses on the actual interests in conflict, including those of *all* parties, not merely those of any two, and preferably discussing possible alternative solutions.

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005a) maintain that the 'peace journalism' approach offers a roadmap for journalists' awareness of non-violent discourse in everyday reporting. Their theory is that media discourse is integral to shaping the images and representations of events in war and peace. 'peace journalism' may direct journalists and editors toward an alternative discourse which could help to build responsible peace communication and more accurate media coverage. As Shinar (2004, 2006) describes it, "peace and war critical media coverage".

Under some circumstances, the implementation of such alternative media discourse can play a significant role in changing the attitudes of both journalists and audiences, especially during transitions from war to reconciliation or to a peace climate. This was evident in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo accords (1993), the case on which I focus this news discourse analysis of media 'peace' presentations.

This study compares three types of discourse used by Israeli print news media in the context of 'peace' and 'war'. In essence, the aim was to identify the negative social consequences of the incompatibility of discourse types with actual political

conditions at a given time. Weaving together inter-textual representations of 'war' and 'peace' led to a discourse type that imposed unwanted meanings upon itself. Inappropriate discourse in a given time period may reduce the chances of building trust between peoples and nations.

In searching for scholarly studies of 'peace discourse', I found that most actually deal only with 'war discourse' framed in a 'conflict-escalation oriented way' (Kempf, 2003b). Kempf discusses the various meanings of peace: (1) as the absence of war, (2) as a specific (constructive) mode of dealing with conflict, and (3) as a state of harmony. The latter, he states, is unrealistic in the immediate aftermath of war, but may show how peace is understood in everyday discourse. He suggests a two-step model for deconstructing war discourse. First, there must be "de-escalation-oriented conflict reporting" which deconstructs antagonisms and the polarization of the parties to the conflict by remaining neutral, distanced from all parties, open to a peaceful settlement, searching for information on war and questioning military values. Second, there must be "solution-oriented conflict reporting" which is people-oriented, focuses on common rights and peace initiatives, humanizes all sides and redirects anger against war instead of against the enemy. Both steps have a win-win orientation that is mainly functional when an armistice or peace treaty is already in place.

The linkage between peace and war

Studies of media peace discourse *per se* are exceedingly rare, and peace itself is not strongly emphasized in the media or elsewhere. Consequently, since the beginning of the 21st century, much attention has been paid by academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 'peace' studies, 'peace' theories, 'peace' discourse, 'peace' research and to the development of 'peace' culture. Groff and Smoker (2002) explain that in the last few years the term 'culture of peace' has become increasingly popular among the leadership of UNESCO – but at present no clear consensus exists as to how the terms 'peace' or 'peace culture' should be interpreted. Although the word 'peace' is much used, peace is never fully achieved, but can only be approached (Barash, 2000). In his great historical novel *War and Peace*, Tolstoy writes of 'war' and 'peace' as the two most timeless and moving themes in the history of mankind. Perhaps it is the lack of perspectives on 'peace', among other things, that also explains the scarcity of literature on the relationships among the mass media, communication and the culture of 'peace'. When they reviewed papers published in 1991 in *Peace Research Journal*, Bruck and Roach (1993) found that not even one article dealt with the media and peace research. Following their lead, I examined several volumes of the same journal for the years 2000 and 2001 and found that the word 'peace' was used only in the context of war, conflict and/or conflict resolution. Indeed, my own search through

numerous dictionaries, encyclopedias, book titles and Internet websites yielded the same results (Mandelzis, 2002).

War, disarmament and peace are always linked, even though they are separate fields in which different discourses compete. Sreberny-Mohammadi (1997) proposes as the best example of this the fact that the antagonistic East and West blocs were superseded in the last decade of the 20th century by the emergence of international markets, technologies and the development of the media, while at the same time nationalistic, tribal, and ethnic struggles broke out globally. The world has witnessed the re-emergence of ethnic, nationalistic and territorial competitions that often culminate in violent conflicts.

Of the 120 violent conflicts waged worldwide in 1993, 72% were ethnic wars (Tehranian, 1993). Shinar (2003b) explains that contemporary violent conflicts involving political forces and social stress take place on the foundation of cultural, religious and ideological differences. Unfortunately, this results in a contradictory view of the world in which people are unable to co-exist without war, despite mankind's expressed desire for peace. When people encounter a range of incompatible cultural perspectives differing from their own personal perceptions and beliefs, they often turn to the media for guidance. They rely on media information and media discourse as the most effective channels for acquiring information to use in making decisions about political goals. However, Shinar (2003b, 2004) claims that the mass media have not yet provided audiences with symbols of security and peace. In the end, 'peace' continues to seem an unachievable goal. Given this situation, Tehranian (1993) suggests that new cultural forces, including responsible mass media, peace discourse and peace journalism, are essential for achieving a transition to a peace culture.

2. Conceptualizing peace & news discourse

The notion of 'peace' has still not been adequately conceptualized. The traditional concept that dominated Western political and media discourses for centuries was, and still is, that peace is the absence of war. Consequently, this notion of peace discourse can only be understood in relation to conflicts and violence linked to a 'zero-sum' orientation. Not surprisingly, through this approach media peace discourse may sometimes even contribute to the distortion of peace perspectives.

Our 'reality' is structured by language and experienced through various types of discourse used in everyday interactions in social, economic and political relations. According to the common conception, Galtung (1968) states, peace entails a 'fatal connection' with war, since it can only be perceived negatively as the 'absence of war', or as a 'negative peace', a process of violence reduction, in contrast to 'positive peace', which is a process of life enhancement. Galtung believes that

these definitions could be used in research on the political, military, economic and cultural dimensions of peace. These 'negative' and 'positive' peace classifications suggest options for other peace discourse possibilities that can transmit a better understanding of 'peace' messages. Ultimately, peace processes and perspectives require an effective public communication strategy that may be supported by developing the 'peace journalism' approach. Shinar (2006) thinks that developing a new approach requires changes in mental attitudes towards war and peace. Historically, and especially in war-torn societies, attitude change has not been achieved just by signing peace treaties (Azar et al., 1978). Attitude change can only be brought about by social actors working with tools such as education, language, socio-political practice and the media (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992). Indeed, Blumer and Gurevitch (1997) argue that post-modern writers tend to see linkages between media change and social change. Moreover, it has become almost an article of faith that the mass media play a crucial role in the construction, articulation and reflection of reality, especially under conditions of uncertainty, where public opinion tends to become more media dependent (De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1989). In other words, dependence on media messages and discourse increases when the social environment is ambiguous, threatening, and/or rapidly changing, as evidenced in periods of war and/or transition to a peace process. This supports the idea that journalists' reporting and media discourse have a strong impact on framing stories and shaping images and representations of nations, actors and events through war and peace reporting which interprets the world for journalists and media audiences alike.

It is not easy for journalists to cover conflict in a neutral manner without expressing their own personal opinions. Wolfsfeld (1997b) maintains that all news media employ a particular cultural and political perspective that has a major impact on the tone of news coverage. Hanitzsch (2004b: 187) offers a good example of this: Neil Cavuto, a Fox News correspondent, was accused of not being as impartial in reporting on the Iraq war in 2003 as a journalist should be. His reply was that he considered himself to be an "American first, a journalist second". Amnon Dankner, editor of the popular Israeli daily *Maariv*, was once criticized by *Keshev*, The Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel, for not giving front page coverage to a story about how the Israeli military killed seven members of a Palestinian family on a beach at Beit Lahia in the Gaza Strip (11 June 2006). Dankner's defense (12 June 2006) was that for his readers a story about death threats against a kidnapped Jewish student was more interesting and important as a front-page story than one about the deaths of Palestinians in Gaza. In his letter to *Keshev*, he argued that, "'we', our 'own' people, take precedence over 'others'". These examples reflect the debate on the differences among advocacy or partisan journalism, nationalistic journalism, and what Martin Bell (1997) defines as the "journalism of attachment": journalism that "cares as well as knows, will not stand neutrally be-

tween good and evil, right or wrong, the victim and the oppressor". Peace journalism could develop theories and strategies to help create an awareness of higher news values and responsibilities, in both the local and the global spheres.

Discourse and ideology

Discourse can be defined as the "institutionalized use of language and as a social practice" (Fairclough, 1995: 7). Bruck (1989) argues that discourse shapes and structures language, beliefs and social practice. It functions as a context for text production (Fiske, 1992) and has the power of transmitting to the public an interpretation of events that makes sense of them. In this context, Van Dijk (1988b) suggests that the cognitive processing of news discourse by audiences (and representatives of the media) essentially depends upon news structure – the emphasis given to a story. News discourse is socially shaped and provides a frame for public debate. In short, media representations reflect the policies of political institutions, contribute to the creation of public opinion and reinforce the ideologies that form the basis for public opinion and understanding. Ideologies reflect the basic components of social identity and define the interests of groups, in the form of an organized set of attitudes in which meaning is expressed through news discourse (Fairclough, 1989; Van Dijk, 1988b). News discourse frames legitimate or illegitimate ideas and opinions by means of information selection and dissemination to mass audiences. It offers a broad picture of social reality as a structured ideology and promotes social solidarity by reinforcing national identity and shared beliefs through language use.

3. Context and purpose of the case study

This study analyzes the news discourse that appeared in print immediately following the Oslo Accords signed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat under the auspices of President Bill Clinton on the White House lawn in Washington on September 13, 1993. By this time, the media had already demonstrated a dramatic change in attitudes and terminology regarding the historic 'ultimate enemies': Arafat and the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). The familiar media war discourse was immediately replaced by peace representations and peace images.

The definition and significance of Oslo as a peace process was articulated by the government and adopted in media news discourse, thereby creating a new public agenda that conformed to both governmental and journalists' expectations. News 'selection' and 'transformation' by both journalists and editors were guided both by references to cultural ideas and personal beliefs (Fowler, 1991: 2) and by euphoric wishful thinking regarding Yasser Arafat, the "new partner for peace". They

believed that the new image of Arafat could replace the old one of the "ultimate enemy". The speed with which this took place is an example of what Van Dijk (1988a) referred to as a "press panic" accompanied by unrealistic peace images in media news discourse. News discourse loaded with the term 'peace' in various contexts made up a large share of all news in the post-Oslo era. This study presents a news discourse analysis in which the dominant political and ideological discourse of war and militarism gave way to optimism and expectations of peace in Israel. The purpose of the study was to uncover the contextual representational system that developed to communicate specific topics relating to 'peace' representations and their negative socio-political consequences. The research method used was to analyze the contents of news texts published on the front pages of two of the best-known and most highly regarded Israeli newspapers, *Yedioth Aharonot* and *Ha'aretz*.

Method

This study compares three types of news discourse used by two Israeli newspapers in the context of 'peace' and 'war' reporting. The research questions analyzed the key inter-textual representations of 'war' and 'peace' discourse types. I hypothesized that overuse of the term 'peace' in news discourse at the time of a revolutionary upheaval in Israeli socio-political practice not only negatively influenced Israeli peace perspectives and beliefs, but also caused the news discourse to deteriorate into war discourse. The aim was to combine the 'who' with the 'what' and the 'how' in order to interpret the meaning of the peace messages disseminated to the public by the media in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo Treaty.

To achieve the aims of the study, two methods were employed: During the first phase of the study a news discourse analysis was performed on 455 front-page articles in both newspapers: 180 articles in *Yedioth Aharonot*, the most popular newspaper in Israel, and 275 articles in *Ha'aretz*, a high-quality newspaper "for thinking people". Both newspapers devoted the largest proportion of their news articles to peace during the 14 months beginning with the letters of recognition exchanged by the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority in late August 1993 and ending with the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan on 26 October 1994. The newspapers were randomly sampled on one day of every week throughout the entire period.

The second phase of the study included in-depth personal interviews conducted individually with three political policymakers who were actually involved in the Oslo process from the beginning of the secret talks: Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister (1992-1996), who was awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize together with Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat; Yossi Beilin, Israeli Labour Party Member of Parliament and deputy Foreign Minister, who advocated dialogue with the PLO

and initiated the secret Oslo channels which led to the Oslo Accords; and Ron Pundak, one of two left-wing intellectuals who went to Oslo and secretly carried on talks with the PLO through which mutual barriers were broken down and confidence was established.

The interviews used the convergent interview method proposed by Dick (1998). This method involves asking a single broad 'content free' question and only later adding specific questions/clarifications based on the findings of a news discourse analysis of the 455 articles in both newspapers. Dick (1998) believes that this method combines some key advantages of both unstructured and structured interviews and achieves its results by leaving much of the content to be determined by the interviewee. The interview process is, however, structured, as it allows for systematic analysis of information.

Micro-analysis of the discourse of peace

To interpret the meaning of the news discourse, in this study I adopted Kempf's (2003b) distinction between two different types of discourse, which he defines in terms of the main questions dealt with by the discourse: While *war discourse* asks, "Who is the aggressor?" and "How can he be stopped?", *peace discourse* asks, "What is the problem?" and "How can it be solved?" A third type might be called *reconciliation discourse* and can be defined by the questions "Who is the other?" and "How can we come together?"

A fourth type of discourse was defined by Shinar (2003b, 2004), who explains that the use of inappropriate types of discourse can have negative consequences. He holds that the very form of discourse used immediately after the Oslo agreements implied that peace and reconciliation were already present. Using this type of discourse, which we might call a *discourse of harmony*, the media promoted unrealistic hopes and expectations, which ultimately produced a sense of frustration when they were not realized.

In the discourse of harmony the question "Who is the other?" was neglected, and ironically the question "How can we come together?" seemed irrelevant, because although there was still no peace treaty, the media acted as if peace and reconciliation were already established facts. Expressions such as 'peace has begun', 'for peace', 'with friendship', 'warm peace', etc. completely ignored problems that had still not been solved, were based emotionally on wishful thinking and were completely unrealistic. Consequently, instead of asking: "How can we come together?" the claim was made: "We have become friends".

Next, the findings show that when Peace Discourse was employed by the media, it was reduced to answering only one question: "How can peace be secured?" The answers were: 'being ready to withdraw in return for peace', 'land for peace',

'territories for peace', 'there is a need to learn to live together and to defeat the opponents of peace', 'only a strong and secure Israel can make peace', 'peace reinforces peace', 'every step towards democracy is a step towards peace', etc. The conflict was not defined in news discourse as the main problem at this point in the political process. Moreover, peace was represented as though it were no longer in doubt, despite widespread unrealistic hopes and expectations. As a result, what seemed to be a peace discourse was already biased towards a War Discourse asking: "How can peace be secured?"

When unrealistic hopes and expectations were frustrated, the War Discourse returned to traditional war images by asking: "Who is the aggressor?" and identifying a new enemy: 'Hamas wants to kill peace', 'Hamas and the right wing extremists have become partners … [they] celebrate the blood of terror victims', 'The burning fire of Islam is a threat to peace', etc.

The three different forms of discourse relating to peace, i.e., Peace Discourse, War Discourse and the Discourse of Harmony, are illustrated in Table 1, which shows the use of peace notions in Israeli media discourse after the conclusion of the Oslo Agreement. Surprisingly, during the entire period analyzed the quotations published by both Israeli newspapers had similar texts with similar phrasing (Mandelzis, 2002).

Analyzing newspaper articles after Oslo revealed that the notion of peace replaced the former discourse of war and security for only a very short period. Wolfsfeld (1997b) states that when the Oslo story broke in August 1993, the power of the Israeli government press office over media news could be compared to that exercised by public officials during wartime. The news discourse after Oslo emphasized and dramatized, positively and negatively, the peace symbols, narratives, and cultural codes of Israeli society. Every topic in the news was linked to the notion of peace. However, in contrast to 'solution-oriented conflict reporting' (Kempf, 2003b), the news discourse gradually developed confusing and conflicting messages which soon deteriorated into 'escalation-oriented conflict reporting' (Kempf, 2003b). The findings show that post-Oslo news coverage began with a deceptive discourse of harmony, which two months after Oslo changed into a misleading and limited peace discourse and, four months later, sharply deteriorated into a war discourse (Kempf, 2003b and Shinar, 2003b). This three-stage process of deterioration is shown in Table 1, as follows:

All quotations were taken from front-page news items that appeared in *Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth Achronot* between 9 September 1993 and 26 October 1994.
Table 1: Reconciliation discourse, peace discourse and war discourse

1. Discourse of Harmony	2. Reduced Peace Discourse	3. War Discourse
Peace has broken out! We have become friends!	Peace is the problem How can it be secured?	Who is the aggressor? How can he be stopped?
• *peace* has begun and it is irreversible… • *Peace* and friendship… • mandate for *peace* • *peace* for *peace*… • The *peace* era began and the war era ended… • this *peace agreement* will bring happiness to millions of Israelis and Palestinians… • this is the *peace* of the brave for our children and future generations… • breakthrough in the *peace process*… • *peace* is worthwhile… • real *peace*… • *peace* of the brave… • warm *peace*… • the young trust *peace*... • valley of *peace*… • *peace* for the mothers and babies – peace for the next generation… • hello to you, Jewish mother, the *peace* that was born today brings hope that your son will not know war… • the *peace* dove… • Normal *peace* relations… • sustainable *peace*… • *peace* of honor… • a new era of *peace*…	• only a strong Israel, secure and protected, can make *peace*… • comprehensive *peace* will reinforce *peace*… • Sweeping victory for *peace* supporters… • every step towards democracy is a step towards *peace*… • in *peace*, as in war, there is a need to understand the other side's mentality… • there is a need to learn to live together and to overpower the extremists who are the opponents of *peace…* • land for *peace*… • ready to withdraw in return for *peace* • territories for *peace*... • just *peace* and full *peace* should be followed by security arrangements… • to strive for *peace* and fight terror… • he who wants *peace* should be prepared for war… • the soldier of *peace*…	• murder instead of *peace*... • Hamas wants to kill *peace*… • *peace* refusals… • *peace* opponents…We will fight the enemies of *peace*... • the blow was the gift of Hamas to the false *peace*… • The murdered Bedouin pursued *peace* and was murdered by enemies of *peace* … on the way to *peace* there are victims… • terror aims to kill Jews and to kill the chances of *peace*… • losing hope in *peace*… • tried to kill *peace*… • the burning fire in Islam is a threat to *peace*… • victim on the altar of *peace*… • We do not want victims of *peace*, but healthy soldiers for a healthy *peace*... • goodbye to the *peace* process… • the window of opportunity for *peace* is closing… • no bullet, no Molotov cocktail and no stone will change our obligation to *peace* • the *peace* murderer … the plot of *peace*… • Hamas and the right-wing extremists have become partners: they lie and celebrate the blood of terror victims… • Israel is well aware of the enemies of *peace*… • Hamas wants to kill *peace*… • a severe blow to the *peace process*…

The mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO created a new phase in the relationship between the Palestinians and the Israeli media. Whereas before Oslo the news media ignored or demonized the Palestinian leadership, suddenly this leadership was legitimized, and the media related to its members as political leaders and, most importantly, not only as partners for peace but also as true friends (Mandelzis, 2003). Consequently, the 'peace' notion began to dominate media and political discourse.

Before the Oslo era, the Israeli media were totally captive to the idea of antagonism. Every attempt to talk with Arafat and/or the PLO was rejected by the Israeli government. Therefore, peace was on neither the public agenda nor the news agenda. After Oslo, the Israeli media were totally captive to the government's policy for peace. Peace seemed to be there, dominating the public and the media agendas (Mandelzis, 2002).

The findings of this study show that two months after Oslo, the misleading discourse of harmony began its march toward a likewise misleading reduced peace discourse. This was followed by messages that began to question the peace, but suggested solutions like, "There is a need to understand the other side's mentality"; "There is a need to learn to live together and to overcome the extremists who are the opponents of peace"; "A just peace and full peace should be followed by security arrangements", etc. Four months later, following Hamas's terror attacks in Israel, peace and war became paired nouns, and the semantics of peace were conditioned by the semantics of violence and war, which led to the third phase, that of war discourse.

We can follow the journalistic regression from peace in which, although using the word peace, the news discourse gradually developed towards an emphasis on violence and war. This discourse framed Israeli victims as "victims of peace", followed by expressions of demoralization and despair, which Kempf (2003b) views as war discourse. Some examples are: "Hamas wants to kill peace", "peace refusals", "peace opponents", "the blow was the gift of Hamas to the false peace", "the murdered Bedouin pursued peace and was murdered by the enemies of peace". This finally deteriorated into disillusionment and a conflict emphasis: "we will fight the enemies of peace", "on the way to peace there are victims", "losing confidence in peace", etc.

The image of peace was transformed from a discourse of harmony using phrases like "real peace", "warm peace" and "peace for peace" into phrases associated with peace discourse, but making use of war-related and military semantics, including "peace of the brave", "the victory of peace", "soldier of peace" and "peace combatants". In the third phase, reporters moved on to a war discourse, expressed in phrases like "killers of peace", "victims of peace", "enemies of peace", "the plot of peace", "a severe blow to the peace process", etc.

From then on, the notion of 'peace' was consistently associated with terror, violence, fear and security concerns. Hope and despair were inseparable and conveyed not peace messages, but rather militant ones. In the end, the axiom that in Israeli reality there is never any hope of peace was reconfirmed by PM Ehud Barak on his return from the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David in July 2000. Barak explained that his attempt to negotiate a "final status settlement" of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was unsuccessful, because "we do not have a partner for peace" (*Ha'aretz*, 27 July 2000).

The three phases of news discourse in the media began with the transformation from a pre-Oslo war discourse into an illusory discourse of harmony at the end of August 1993, went through a brief period of limited peace discourse, and rapidly reverted to war discourse after early 1994, when Hamas threats to Israel began.

Thus, the initial transformation from conflict and violence to a peace process between Israelis and Palestinians aroused unrealistic hopes and expectations for peace. It ended with a second cycle of conflict transformation and returned to antagonism and violence, which finally ended in frustration.

Having obtained empirical evidence on post-Oslo news discourse, I began the second stage of my study by interviewing three policymakers who were actually involved in the Oslo process, with questions based on my study findings.

The first interview was held with Ron Pundak on 12 May 2002. Pundak expressed the view that in the first few months after Oslo the news media were blinded by a "euphoria syndrome". He explained that the use in news discourse of phrases like "peace process" and "peace agreements" created an unrealistic discourse, because:

> "We did not sign any peace agreement. The DOP [Declaration of Principles] was no more than the threshold into which the political negotiations were channeled. The Israeli public discourse was full of 'peace with the Palestinians' because of the media discourse. It could not be peace when the occupation did not end and siege and oppression continued. The subsequent dissonance was due to the gap between the high expectations created by the media. Although the media alone cannot be blamed, because the government created these euphoric hopes and expectations, the media inflamed these emotions and exaggerated without analyzing the procedures themselves. The media created euphoria, on one hand, and misunderstanding of a security horizon in a political agreement, on the other hand."

A minor example of this euphoria was the report in *Yedioth Aharonot* (15 October 1993) that "at least 150 Jewish babies born during the month since the signing of the peace agreement were named 'Shalom'" (the Hebrew word for peace).

It should be stressed that, in fact, no peace agreement was signed; Oslo only produced a *Declaration of Principles*. However, the Israeli government and the media embraced the DOP and rationalized it through ideological beliefs that were pre-

sented in the news via popular and emotionally charged rhetoric as if it actually were a peace agreement.

Goren (1995) wrote that the cumulative impact of such reporting was expressed by audience attitudes toward peace *prospects*, not toward the process itself. The reporters' overuse of the notion of 'peace' gave a deceptive impression of peace as already present and thereby encouraged unrealistic expectations. Furthermore, the unrealistic expectations encouraged by the flood of peace messages ultimately turned hopes for peace into outrage at the enemy.

One of the political reporters interviewed by Wolfsfeld (1997d: 22) in 1995 stated:

"One thing is true about the coverage of the peace process. It's not objective. The peace process is not some anonymous process that you leave up to the reader to decide whether it's optimistic or pessimistic. In principle, when the media relates to the peace process it is primarily relating to the word 'peace' … the attitude then, is optimistic or even celebratory … just like it is completely clear that if there is a terrorist attack the attitude is negative. When the media comes to cover the ceremony, or the historic handshake at Oslo, they relate to the word peace, and if there are complaints about that [the biased coverage], then maybe they are justified."

The media clearly embarked on an interventionist mode of advocacy journalism that actively promoted peace as a typical characteristic of government public relations discourse (Hanitzsch, 2004b) and accepted the information disseminated to reporters without questioning or investigating the political establishment and the accord signed. This was supported by the second interviewee, Yossi Beilin, on 15 May 2002. Beilin was of the opinion that:

"After the Oslo Accord was signed, the media … completely ignored the fact that it was not a peace agreement and presented it as such. Admittedly, government policy legitimization was one of its advantages. On the other hand, it was perceived as a peace treaty that raised unrealistically high expectations and led to misunderstanding and despair when the terror continued. The public asked what kind of peace is this? Why are they [the Palestinians] violating the peace agreement?"

Pundak accused reporters of being superficial and characterized them as "ethnoeuphoric". He also felt that the media had not changed its 'diskette' [stored information] from the conflict era to the process of building a peace era.

Each of the policymakers interviewed for this study emphasized that the media had missed an opportunity to contribute to peace: Peres argued that "the media neither contributed to peace nor to an understanding of the peace process" (Shimon Peres, 3 May 2002). Beilin noted that, "by focusing on peace agreements, the media misled the public" (Yossi Beilin, 15 May 2002). As Pundak explained, "The media did not try to counter Israeli misperceptions of the Palestinians" (Ron Pundak, 12 May 2002).

My interpretation is that the media provided excellent examples of advocacy journalism that violates the basic professional ethical principles of journalism, such as

objectivity, neutrality and impartiality. It can even be defined as 'involvement journalism', similar to that engaged in after 9/11 (Thumber and Prentoulis, 2003: 28), when reporters shifted from objectivity to subjectivity. We should note here that journalism is a professional field whose aim is to facilitate a shared, socially binding viewpoint by providing information unbiased by personal attitudes and beliefs.

4. Conclusions

My findings in regard to the three categories of discourse shown in Table 1 indicate that the media reproduced the dominant policy of the political elite by using the discursive practice of peace semantics, phrases, frames, inconsistencies and contradictions. This provides a way of understanding how power is structured in media discourse. The dramatic political change that occurred in relations between Israelis and Palestinians was followed by extensive use of the term 'peace' in news discourse and accompanied by semantic confusion about terms relating to 'war' in post-Oslo media news discourse.

The similarities among the terms used by the two newspapers may not be surprising, because the most important filter through which news is constructed is "the cultural air we breathe and the whole ideological atmosphere of our society" (Hoggart, cited in Schudson, 1997: 154). Schudson proposes that elite institutions create a "cultural air" in relation to the ideology of a given society.

In my view, peace is not uninteresting, as Shinar, 2003b and Wolfsfeld, 1997b imagine. Although peace does not provide the same kinds of images and actions as conflict and war, it still makes a valuable contribution and even offers interesting news events for reporters and audiences. Indeed, global media peace events (Dayan and Katz, 1992), such as the historic Oslo handshake on the White House lawn in September 1993, are often fascinating ceremonies. Other examples are the Oslo ceremony of 13 September 1993, the ceremony marking the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan (27 October 1994), Elton John's peace concert in Belfast (May 1998) celebrating the peace agreement in Northern Ireland, and the Nobel peace prizes which were extensively reported on in the frame of reconciliation discourse. These events increased media interest and raised hopes for peace, but they were covered by the media only for short periods, during which the media presented unrealistic images.

Beyond the ceremonies, however, in Israel the word 'peace' was always associated with unrealistic and euphoric wishful thinking, for example, expecting the 'end of all wars'. After Oslo, this led to severe public disappointment, followed by a devastating wave of frustration. The political and ideological setback also encouraged blaming the media, expressed in public by denunciations of "hostile journalism".

This study might lead us to the understanding that all three kinds of news discourse, harmony, reduced peace and war reporting, may be important in establishing proper relations among discourse, language, media and the meaning of peace because of the essential role that the mass media play, not only in war coverage, but, no less important, also in peace reporting.

Scholars have found a casual relationship between semantic structure and cognition. It is clear that language influences thought in the sense that it structures and channels the psychological experience of the world. By definition, 'peace journalism' is related to alternative patterns of covering news events. Differences in expression convey ideological distinctions, and thus differences in representation (Fowler, 1991). "Violence of any kind breeds violence of any kind"; "Peace of any kind breeds peace of any kind" (Galtung, 1998a: 32). Unfortunately, the dramatic 'peace' upheaval that occurred between the Israelis and Palestinians in September 1993 reinforced Azar and Cohen's (1979) definition of peace in the Middle East: "Peace as crisis and war as status quo".

6

Emphasising images in peace journalism: Theory and practice in the case of Norway's biggest newspaper

Rune Ottosen

1. Introduction

Authors like Johan Galtung (2002), Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick (2005) have suggested peace journalism as an alternative strategy for critical journalists covering wars and conflicts . In this article, I contribute to the concept by suggesting that, in promoting a peace journalism strategy, more emphasis should be placed on visual elements. I will analyse the coverage of Colin Powell's presentation to UN Security Council before the Iraqi war, and the coverage of the attacks on Fallujah in November 2004, in Norway's largest newspaper *Verdens Gang* (*VG*), as an empirical case study. In my analyses I will pay attention to the textual as well as the visual elements of the news coverage, to provide an overall impression of the news coverage in relation to Galtung's theory. In particular, I will look at the role played by photographs and other visual elements in the journalistic process at the time. At the end of my article I will contrast the lack of attention to the suffering of civilian casualties during the attack on Fallujah in November 2004 with the massive attention, through visual and textual representation, on the tsunami a few weeks later. My ambition is to show what potential peace journalism might have if the digital technology is made available and there is a willingness to use it on behalf of victims of wars.

2. Theoretical approach

As theoretical point of departure I will build upon theories of peace journalism and visual persuasion, and after the theoretical review I will offer some examples, from events other than my own case studies, to underline the power, on a global scale, of photographs and other visual elements in the news agenda. Here, the attention given to the drawings of Mohammed in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, and restrictions on photographs of coffins returning from Iraq with US soldiers, are the most powerful examples. The idea is to show what potential visuals

and digital technology can have for peace journalism – if the technology is available in war zones and there is a willingness to use it.

2.1 Peace journalism

Peace journalism as suggested by Johan Galtung defines war as a problem in itself and promotes non-violence as a mean of conflict resolution (Galtung: 2002). Galtung's model builds on the dichotomy and contrast between what he calls 'war journalism' and a 'peace journalism' approach.

The model includes four main points where he contrasts the two approaches: war journalism is violence-oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented and victory-oriented. This approach is often linked to a zero-sum game where the winner (as in sports journalism) takes all. This is a prototype of what one could call traditional mainstream war coverage, without the journalists reflecting the fact that media itself is playing a role in the conflict, often escalating conflicts by reproducing propaganda developed as part of media strategies and PR campaigns by the parties involved (Ottosen: 1994).

"Thus, the peace journalism approach assumes a moral and ethical point of departure, acknowledging the fact that media themselves play a role in the propaganda war, intentially or unintentially. The peace journalism approach may make the conscious choice to identify alternative options for the readers/viewers by offering a solution-oriented, people-oriented and truth-oriented approach. It means focusing on possibilities for peace that the conflicting parties might have an interest in hiding. Peace journalism is people-oriented in the sense that it focuses on the victims (often civilian casualties) and thus give a voice to the voiceless. It is also truth-oriented in the sense that it reveals untruth on all sides and focuses on propaganda as a mean of continuing the war" (Galtung: 2002: 261-270).

In their book *Peace Journalism* (2005), Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick have further developed Galtung's model and turned it into a practical tool for journalists. They offer an analytical model in the form of techniques of how to practise peace journalism, demonstrated with examples from their own journalistic practice. They argue that the peace journalism option accepts that every war takes places in an atmosphere of propaganda in which the parties often offer confrontation as the only path. By pointing in the direction of a peaceful solution, journalists can offer the audience a broader perspective in a given conflict by using "insights of conflict analyses and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting" (Lynch & McGoldrick: 2005: 5). They see the potential of peace journalism as the provision of a road map "tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the story they cover and the consequences of their journalism" into what they call the "ethics of journalistic intervention" (ibid.). In summary, their ambition is to raise "awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting" (ibid.).

2.2 Theories of visual persuasion

The analyses of Galtung and Lynch, and McGoldrick, deal mainly with written texts. (A video is also published by Lynch and McGoldrick as a tool in education, putting more emphasis on the visual.) To my mind, there are several reasons for putting more emphasis on the visual elements in the approach to peace journalism. One reason is simply that we remember visual impressions better than verbal (Magnussen and Greenlee: 1998). If we look back at history, visual impressions of war coverage are more present in our memories than written texts. The little girl running screaming along the road after having been hit by a napalm bomb during the Vietnam War is a good example of how such iconic images stick in our memories. We combine such images in our memories with experience and knowledge from other sources upon which we draw our conclusions and judgements (Eide: 2005). We see pictures in the same way that we view the world in general, and tend to accept what we see as the truth (Klaren: 1996 in Eide: 2005). Daniel Gilbert concludes that "people believe the ideas they comprehend as quickly and automatically as they believe the objects they see" (Gilbert: 1991 quoted by Eide: 2005). Research on the decoding of pictures in the brain also shows that it matters how the pictures are organised on the pages. We remember better, and put more weight on, pictures that are placed on the left side of a page. Rudolf Arnheim puts it like this: "The left side is endowed with special weight; it assumes the function of a strong centre with which the viewer tends to identify" (Arnheim: 1988).

Susan Sontag suggests that press photographs even have a "deeper bite" than movies or television since they "freeze-frame" events in a single image: "in an area of information overload, the photograph provides a quick way of apprehending something and a compact form of memorising it" (Sontag: 2003, quoted by Artz: 2004: 81).

Sontag also underlines the role of photography in our collective memories:

> "The problem is not that people remember through photographs, but that they remember only through photographs. This remembering through photographs eclipses other forms of understanding and remembering. To remember is, more and more, not to recall a story but to be able to call up a picture" (Sontag: 2003:89).

It's also timely to quote Susan Sontag in developing the concept of peace journalism, since in the book *Regarding the pain of others* (2003) she already raises the issue of how visual element can mobilise broader perspectives for peace. Referring to Virginia Woolf's book *Three Guineas,* which deals with the civil war in Spain, she introduces the discussion of how all of us can mobilise sympathy for suppressed people and small nations under attack from super-powers. Referring to Virginia Woolf, Sontag mentions the Second World War as a breakthrough for photojournalism, with Robert Capa as one of the founding fathers. Capa and some of his colleagues founded the photo cooperative, Magnum, that actually devel-

oped an ethical platform relevant for peace journalism: the members should commit themselves to documenting their contemporary conflicts, free from chauvinist prejudices (Sontag: 2003:34).

Pictures, cartoons and other visual elements play an important role in creating enemy images, which is an important part of propaganda in war journalism (Ottosen: 1995). Since visual persuasion takes a short cut to our emotions (Eide: 2005), the presence of visual elements should play a more important role in the debate about peace journalism. Sometimes, *absence* of pictures is also a problem, since modern journalism, especially television, depends on pictures to tell a story. First of all, therefore, we have to acknowledge that without pictures or other visual elements most stories will never surface in the news. For example, the lack of visual representation has kept important conflicts outside the news agenda in the mainstream Western press in East Timor, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and Zaire (Zelizer: 2004:116).

In an essay comparing the use of photographs in news magazines' coverage of wars like the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Michael Griffin underlines the importance of visual images in the framing of stories (Griffin: 2004). His conclusion, after analysing the magazines *Time*, *Newsweek* and *US News & World Report*, underlines the ethnocentric and militaristic approach:

"Photo coverage in the US news-magazines routinely supported Washington's 'official' version of events. The American president was prominent in the pictorial coverage, appearing in pictures as a strong and confident leader. US troops, weapons, and military hardware dominated the deceptions, providing an image of a powerful and determined nation ready and able to vanquish its enemies. The enemy itself was reduced to stereotypical emblems. And the subtleties and complications of global economics and foreign affairs remained invisible. Finally, the human and economic costs of war were largely absent from news portrayals" (Griffin 2004:399).

Thus Griffin underlines that the photographic image in itself will not draw attention to human sufferings and create sympathy with the victims of war. Representational legitimacy remains tied to power, and visual images in the mainstream are more likely to produce enduring symbols of that discourse than to give us alternative perspectives (Ibid.: 400).

A final argument for putting more emphasis on visual elements in peace journalism is to take seriously the approach by young people in the analytical framework. The fact that young people, to large extent, are not adopting the everyday use of news media from their parents' generation and are paying more attention to visual culture, must be taken seriously by both journalists and media researchers (Sparrman: 2006).

2.3 The power of images

Before diving into the analysis of my own empirical case, I will provide some other examples of the importance of pictures and other visual elements in the news agenda.We were reminded of the power of visual images during the controversy over the cartoons published in Denmark by the right-wing newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* on September 30, 2005. In Norway, the cartoons were published by *Magazinet,* a small Christian weekly. In fact, some of the cartoons had already been published by more influential newspapers like *Aftenposten* and *Stavanger Aftenblad* as illustrations, without causing any debate. When *Magazinet* published the drawings this was seen as a conscious move to support *Jyllands-Posten*, and the magazine received much attention despite its limited influence in Norwegian public debates. In the Muslim tradition, visual representations of the Prophet are forbidden, so it is not surprising that the cartoons offended Muslims across Europe as well as rest of the world. In many countries it also triggered a debate about the border between freedom of expression and respect for religious belief.

The most provocative cartoon showed Muhammad's turban as a bomb; in another, a turbaned figure in heaven implores a group of suicide bombers to stop because "we ran out of virgins!" Muslim clerics denounced the cartoons in their sermons; in many countries, demonstrations were organised to demand an apology. The political crisis in Denmark was evident when ambassadors from Muslim countries requested meetings with officials. Denmark's prime minister defended the paper's right to publish the cartoons on grounds of free speech, and refused to meet with Muslim ambassadors. The media in Europe were divided on this issue. Some supported the Danish prime minister who reduced it to primarily an issue of freedom of expression, but most had a balanced view and saw the dilemmas involved.

By late January 2006, Danish, and in some cases Norwegian, embassies in the Middle East and Asia were approached by angry crowds. What had begun as a local affair had developed into an apparent showdown between Europe (portrayed as either liberal and tolerant or anti-Muslim and neo-colonialist) and Islam (portrayed as either victimised and proud or backward and repressive) – a cardboard 'clash of civilisations' deeply gratifying to both right-wing Europeans and radical Islamists. Much leftist and mainstream publication refused to reduce this to an issue of freedom of expression. *The Nation* (February 6, 2006) stated that the cartoon scandal was about much more than freedom of speech and focused on the power of images in global mediated environment:

"At its heart the controversy is about power – the power of images; the power that divides Muslim and non-Muslim Europeans, the West and the Middle East; the power of radical Islamists to silence more moderate voices – and the responsibility that comes with power. In today's volatile political climate – charged by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, by Israel's

construction of the 'separation wall' in Palestine, by the controversy over the hijab and the revolt in the French *banlieues*, by the growth of anti-immigration politics and radical Islam in 'liberal' Europe and by the velocity with which news and rumour travel on the Internet – the point is not *Jyllands-Posten*'s right to publish but its editorial wisdom, its sense of civic responsibility."

This case is too complicated to be dealt with in detail in this article and my point in drawing attention to it is not to discuss the cartoons and/or the issue of Islam, but, rather, to draw attention to the power of visual images. In a globalised world such a provocative act will not remain local. Through the Internet, the images can be spread within seconds. It was evident that both *Jyllands-Posten*, which wanted to provoke by publishing the cartoons, and extremist Islamite groups, which wanted to escalate the conflict, used the Internet to mobilise support for their causes. Why should not those in favour of dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution use this tool more consciously? In order to do that more efficiently, more emphasis should be placed on visual representation in the peace journalism model itself.

2.4 The power of the narrative?

Pictures of the dead, of bodies and of coffins can mobilise sympathy and public support for the dead and their families, but they can also be regarded as a threat. I will argue that in many cases it is not primarily the content of the image itself, but the context in which it is presented and its symbolic value, that make the difference. To make my point, I will show how dead bodies in coffins can have both the symbolic effect of empathy with the dead and their relatives, in the case of Swedish tsunami victims and as a threat to government policy in the case of US soldiers returning from Iraq.

2.5 Tsunami victims versus victims of the war in Iraq

When the first coffins of tsunami victims arrived in Sweden on January 5, 2005, draped in Swedish flags, people were moved to sympathy with families of the victims in Sweden and other countries. These were not controversial images. The return of the coffins was covered by the media, and images of the coffins draped in flags were presented as live footage on television and as press photographs in the newspapers.

By contrast, coffins bearing dead US soldiers arrive at American bases almost daily. Their images are banned by the Pentagon. The issue caused public attention when, in the winter of 2004, Tami Silicio published a private photo of a coffin taken at an airbase on the way from Iraq to the US She was dismissed by her employer, Maytag Aircraft, for allegedly violating company and government regulations.

Silicio explained to the media why she took the picture and made it available to the press. The *Seattle Times*, which published the photograph, reported that Silicio received no compensation from them. She said she had not sought to put herself in the public spotlight, and pointed out that she hoped the publication of the photograph would help families of fallen soldiers understand the care and devotion that civilians and military crews dedicate to the task of returning the soldiers home. "It wasn't my intent to lose my job or become famous or anything", Silicio said (*The Village Gate* 22 April 22, 2004).

No television cameras are allowed at Dover, the base where the coffins arrive. Americans rarely see media reports about bodies returning from Iraq. In order to continue to sell an increasingly unpopular Iraqi invasion to the American people, President George W. Bush's administration tries to hide the unpopular aspects of the war – the grieving families, the flag-draped coffins, the soldiers who have lost limbs.

President Bush does not attend the funerals of soldiers who gave their lives in his war on terrorism. If stories of wounded soldiers are told, they are mostly told by hometown papers, but no national attention is given to the funerals. Christopher Simpson, a professor of communications at Washington's American University put it like this: "You can call it news control or information control or flat-out propaganda".

It has not always been so. Photographs of dead soldiers returning to American soil have historically been part of the ceremony, part of the picture of conflict and part of the public closure for families. Lynn Cutler, a Democratic strategist and former official in Bill Clinton's White House, says this is the first time in history that bodies have been brought home under cover of secrecy: "It feels like Vietnam when Lyndon Johnson was accused of hiding the body bags ..." (quotes from Harper: 2004).

And here we are at the core of the matter. Potentially, images of coffins have the power to stimulate the so-called Vietnam syndrome. The military blamed the press for losing the Vietnam War by demoralising the public with images of body bags and civilian casualties. Subsequently, the word 'body bag' has been taboo in military circles. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Pentagon began calling them 'human remains pouches' and it now refers to them as 'transfer tubes'. According to Pentagon officials, the policy of banning cameras at Dover dates back to the 1991 Gulf War, under Bush's father (Hoskins: 2004:149). But the policy has been unevenly applied, and at Ramstein airbase in Germany we have seen photographs of soldiers' bodies returning in coffins from Afghanistan (ibid.).

Pictures of incoming coffins were allowed after the terrorist attack on the USS. Cole in 2000, and President George W. Bush received coffins when they returned

from Panama and Lebanon with television coverage. In one incident, several media used a split screen showing President Bush, smiling and chatting at Dover Air Force base when coffins arrived after the Panamanian invasion. He was criticised for lack of sympathy and subseqently warned the media against using the split screen in the future (Luostarinen and Ottosen: 2002:125). The ban against showing images of coffins was reintroduced during the invasion in March 2003. The White House ban is, to a large extent, respected. According to Harper (2004), if there are no pictures of coffins being delivered to US air bases, citizens don't think of them. I shall stress the visual aspects of these images. The human mind tends to rely on memory, transforming the past by keeping alive certain images and versions of events, and suppressing or altering others (Hoskins: 2004:149). This is why the Pentagon and other power structures wish to focus on certain images and suppress others. Images of the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein after the fall of Baghdad, and President Bush's appearance on board the battle ship *Abraham Lincoln* on May 1, 2003, claiming "mission accomplished", were media events constructed to fit into a visual presentation, mainly through television, the latter an interesting propaganda event with powerful visual images of Bush arriving in a masculine manner wearing a pilot's uniform, after allegedly flying part of the distance in the fighter plane himself (Lippe: 2006).

2.6 The visual component in peace journalism

Three years after the Iraqi war started, it is evident that all the claimed reasons to start the war have been proved wrong. Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction – which means that Saddam didn't even pose a regional threat, let alone a global one. There was no al-Qaeda connection or link to the September 11 terrorist attacks, but *because* of the war al-Qaeda has access to a chaotic Iraq. US troops were not greeted as liberators and are now being fiercely opposed by violent resistant groups. By contrast to the powerful images of the Saddam statue falling and the proud arrival of Bush on the *Abraham Lincoln*, the alleged weapons of mass destruction have been invisible. It is an almost abstract threat, but a very powerful one, to build up an enemy image (Gonsalves: 2006). You can't see it but you can create fear by claiming its existence. Later in this article, I will show how the Pentagon compensated for the absence of real pictures of the alleged weapons of mass destruction through digital and graphical presentations by Colin Powell during his presentation at the UN. By uncritically reproducing these images, media helped, on a global scale, to make the non-existent weapons visible to audiences.

Alternative images have also proved powerful in raising awareness of the consequence of war. When the pictures of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison occurred in the media all over the world, human rights and

the horror of war instantly became issues. Since no weapons of mass destruction were found, the media used alternative angles in which visual elements played an important role. Many news organisations had been sitting on the story of the abuse of prisoners for months, but, since footage and visual elements are essential in television, the story did not reach a global audience before pictures were available. Amnesty International (AI) had already published reports on prisoner abuse by the summer of 2003 (AI: 2004), which did not become a 'case' until they could be visually expressed through television to a global audience.

2.7 Historical background

In the period before the Iraqi invasion we had an interesting situation: there was a split in the Western elite over crucial issues concerning the coming war (Nohrstedt & Ottosen: 2005), issues such as the UN's position in the conflict, and what threat Saddam Hussein's regime actually represented to regional and global safety, which caused serious differences among nations within NATO itself and within the elite in most NATO countries. Because of this split, we also saw a heated debate among elite media that had traditionally shared a common loyalty to the Western-oriented security policy. In Norway, therefore, we saw a split between the country's biggest newspaper, the tabloid *Verdens Gang* which supported the US line in war preparation, and the biggest morning paper, *Aftenposten*, which supported the Norwegian government's resistance against the war in Iraq (for more details see Ottosen: 2005). Even though similar disparities occurred in many countries, the opposition limited itself to matters such as whether the reasons for going to war could be justified according to international law, and there was no real debate as to whether war, as a mean of conflict resolution in itself, ultimately causes more problems than it solves.

3. The case of portrayals of Colin Powell's presentation

3.1 Case study of Powell's presentation to the United Nations

Colin Powell's address to the UN on February 3, 2003 is an interesting example of the use of visual elements in war propaganda. The speech was given one week before the two weapons inspectors, Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei, presented their findings – which were suspected to be negative. As Brigitte Mral has pointed out, the speech should be seen as "an attempt at refuting this expert knowledge in advance, in order to forestall any further protests against war plans" (Mral: 2006:52).

In retrospect, it can useful to see how the visual elements in Powell's presentation played an important role in his attempts to convince a global television audience. In many countries, there has been a lot of critical journalism in the last few years because of the difficult development in Iraq (Edwards and Cromwell: 2006). Most

of the arguments now used by the media were also available before the war, and many of the arguments against the war could have been raised by mainstream media before the war (Solomon: 2004). The big question is: what difference would it have made if the media could have prevented the war through critical peace journalism on a global basis? One such opportunity was missed when mainstream media accepted Powell's presentation, too easily, as facts and evidence. Could the visual presentation have impressed the journalists to such an extent that they lost their critical senses? The multimedia show included satellite photographs, audio records, alleged audio records from informants giving the exact numbers of different substances that could be transported in certain directions, illustrated with graphical constructions of vehicles, and so on. Prestigious papers such as *The Washington Post* and the *The New York Times* were also deceived. In an editorial, *The Washington Post* declared that after Powell's talk "it is hard to imagine how anyone could doubt that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction" (quoted from Zinn: 2006b). At least *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* had the decency, one year later, to apologise to their readers for this poor journalistic performance (Nohrstedt and Ottosen: 2005).

Two years after Colin Powell's powerful presentation to the UN Security Council with 'proof' of the existence of weapons of mass destruction, he himself admitted that such weapons didn't exist at the time, adding that his performance would stick in his mind as a shameful event. What if the media, globally, and also in the countries included in the 'coalition of willing' had, at that time, looked more critically at Powell's performance in the UN Security Council? In what follows I will focus on the need for the concept of peace journalism to strengthen the significance of its visual aspects.

3.2 Colin Powell's presentation in *Verdens Gang (VG)* as a case study

As the point of departure for my empirical case study I will look, in retrospect, at how the visual elements in Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council was used to convince public opinion of the existence of weapons of mass destruction, using the coverage in Norway's biggest newspaper, *Verdens Gang (VG),* as an example. *VG* has a tabloid format and is regarded as one of the biggest commercial successes in the history of the Norwegian press. Through a combination of tabloid stories, presented on the front page, with quality journalism and serious political commentary, it has successfully targetted a stable and loyal mixture of readers. *VG* is owned by the media company Schibsted, one of three companies controlling a majority of Norwegian newspapers. It has been known as one of the most loyal supporters og Norway's membership in NATO, and a strong advocate for the relationship with the US as a cornerstone of Norway's security policy.

3.2.1 *VG*'s coverage on February 6

VG carried a front page article on February 6 entitled 'This is why the US will go to war' (see illustration above). Inserted into the small picture of Powell above it, the title, with a yellow background, proclaimed: 'Look at his evidence' and was accompanied by two small pictures taken from his presentation offering alleged evidence from sites where the weapons were hidden. The so-called evidence was linked directly to the title. These were very powerful propaganda images and the reasons to go to war were explicitly attributed to the alleged weapons of mass destruction, through these visual elements.

An editorial with the title 'The time-glass is about to run out' signalled *VG*'s framing, more supportive of the US than that of other Norwegian media (Ottosen: 2005), and which fitted well into the framing of the front page, pointing a finger at Saddam Hussein as being responsible for the situation by keeping weapons of mass destruction.

The title of the main story, 'Sabotage', referred to Iraq's failure to cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors. The 18 articles on the topic presented a broad spectrum of viewpoints, both from countries which supported the US and from Norwegian supporters like the prime minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik. An interview with him, in which he found Powell's presentation 'convincing', was placed prominently next to the main story. Critics such as Nelson Mandela, and others expressing doubt about Powell's argument, were presented in briefs or small side stories accompanied by small photographs. The three main stories about Powell's presentation used a US-friendly framing, with titles like 'The sabotage', 'Saddam's arsenal' (see illustration below) and 'The terror network'. The framing was conclusive and supportive of Powell's allegations. The three articles were basically a repetition of Powell's arguments – with him as the only source (Ottosen: 2005). The picture of Colin Powell holding up a small piece of 'evidence', introducing the anthrax theme, is in itself a powerful image, for even though the picture was hardly *real* evidence (did Powell actually bring anthrax into the room?) it connoted danger. It takes a careful study of the words Powell used to see that he actually avoided the issue of whether there was anthrax in the tube (Mral: 2006: 55). The combination of the general danger caused by anthrax during the fall of 2001, when the US Senate closed and two postal workers were killed amid a hint that Saddam Hussein might have produced 25,000 litres of the chemical substance, makes a strong statement. Since the existence of this amount could not be proved, the little tube in Powell's hand is compensation – a commanding visual image that people will remember better than the figures he mentioned (ibid.)

The graphical presentation of American satellite equipment accompanied by the small title 'This is how US observes (from outer space) Saddam's war machine' (Slik overvåker USA Saddams krigsmaskin) also connoted 'scientific proof'. The

digital illustrations, which were still pictures from live drawings incorporated in Powell's presentation, were intended to demonstrate how the illegal chemical weapons were moved around in trucks from place to place – strong evidence that can't be disputed, since we 'see' it. Here, I will refer back to some of the theoretical perspectives mentioned in the introduction. Research in this field shows that we react emotionally to images before they reach our consciousness and they are kept in our memory as 'truths' (Barry: 1997:18).

VG's combination – supportive text and visual elements – is essential. The title indicates Iraq's aggressive intention, and the role of the US is simply to keep control of the danger. This fits well into Galtung's model for war journalism, in which he warns about a dichotomy where, of two parties, one side is presented as the holder of 'scientific thruth'. *VG*, through the pictures and graphics presented by Powell, his physical demonstration of the 'proof', provides solid evidence of war journalism. No real arguments and facts are attributed to the 'other side' and its evil intention. The evil is presented through the title, and the reader is invited to think along the lines that a confrontation is the most likely outcome of this scenario, thus breaking with Galtung's suggestion for peace journalism: "Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture making conflict transparent".

It should be noted here that on the following day (November 7), *VG* reduced its propagandistic approach by drawing more attention to the criticism of Powell's presentation through a major article in which Norwegian experts gave it low 'grades' (Gir USA beviser nær stryk). In this article, a Norwegian military expert was quoted as saying that Powell offered no real proof of the existence of WMD and that the total amount of the coverage on that day sent a 'mixed message'. Another article, with the title 'Alarm of poison' (Giftalarm), quoted US sources as saying that Americans all over the world might be subject to attacks by biological and chemical weapons. This could be interpretated as a follow-up to the media strategy of US authorities to create fear after Powell's presentation. In the same article, President Bush was quoted as saying the US had proof that Saddam Hussein had cleared use of chemical weapons and that the UN Security Council must either show strength towards Iraq or risk becoming a laughing stock. One of *VG's* own commentators criticised the Norwegian prime minister for hiding behind the Security Council and not establishing a clear policy of his own. Even if a text tries to reduce the impact of the previous message, the visual part of the message will not be deleted and ironically enough the article that seemingly criticized Powell from the previous day, was also illustrated with images from Powell's own presentation (Bernt and Eide 2006). Social psychologists emphasise that we are more likely to accept a message as true if the text is accompanied by visual elements that support the message in the text (Crick: 1994). Barry argues that human beings have an "inherent bias towards accepting what we see as true" (Barry: 1997).

I will therefore argue that the combination of textual and visual elements in *VG*'s coverage of Powell's performance in the UN had a supportive function for what has retrospectively been shown to be false US propaganda. It was a clear example of what Galtung, in his model, calls war journalism.

A peace journalism approach at this stage should, rather, warn the readers of the power of the visual images, and raise questions about the claim that they prove anything at all, rather than reproduce the images uncritically.

4. A case study of the battle of Fallujah

4.1 The coverage in *VG* of Fallujah

My next case study will be *VG*'s coverage of the attack on Fallujah in November 2004. I will argue that under-reporting about Fallujah, *VG* journalists' reluctance to see the battle of Fallujah within the framework of the whole conflict, including the start of the war, was based on *VG*'s own false evidence as presented by Colin Powell and reported uncritically by itself. I will also argue that the pictures and other visual elements in this case confused the readers more than educating them about the actual events. This lack of visual evidence of the true nature of the attack served the interest of the aggressor, since little attention was drawn to the damage done to the city, the civilian casualties, etc. Using Galtung's model of war journalism, one could argue that this coverage was not 'people oriented', offering no evidence of the destruction of the city and the consequences for the civilian population. This was the pattern followed in most Western media.

4.2 What really happened in Fallujah

All inhabitants were asked to leave the city before the attacks started. Those remaining would be treated as hostile combatants. This was despite the fact that many of the poor people had nowhere else to go, and it was doubtful that everyone received the message about the urgency of leaving the city. Facing this ultimatum, around 250,000 people fled the city, while the remaining 50,000 were trapped and cut off from food or medical care (Phillips: 2005: 43).

Burhana Fasafa, a Lebanese journalist working for the Lebanese TV station, KBC, said in an interview with the *The News Standard* that he witnessed US war crimes in person while reporting from inside Fallujah: "Americans did not have interpreters with them", Fasafa said, "so they entered houses and killed people because they didn't speak English. They entered the house where I was with 26 people, and [they] shot people because [the people] didn't obey …even just because the people couldn't understand a word of English" (quoted from Jamil: 2005:328-329). Many refugees have told similar stories (ibid.).

In an article in the media-critical magazine *FAIR*, Norman Solomon made a point of the fact that the US took control of the local hospital to stop journalists getting photos of casualties:

"At the outset of the new assault, US forces captured Fallujah's general hospital. 'In terms of the information war, the hospital was indeed the most strategic of targets,' international correspondent Pepe Escobar writes. 'During the first siege of Fallujah in April, doctors told independent media the real story about the suffering of civilian victims. So this time the Pentagon took no chances: no gory, disturbing photos of the elderly, women and children ... the civilian victims of the relentless bombing" (quoted from Solomon: 2004).

The true facts of what took place inside Fallujah were scarcely reported in Norwegian media. Solomon referred to the journalist Fadhil Badrani, a resident of the city reporting for the BBC World Service, as saying that "a medical dispensary in the city centre was bombed". He added: "I don't know what has happened to the doctors and patients who were there. It was last place you could get medical attention because the big hospital on the outskirts of Fallujah was captured by the Americans on Monday. A lot of the mosques have also been bombed. For the first time in Fallujah, a city of 1,200 mosques, I did not hear a single call to prayer this morning" (Solomon: 2004).
While the Western media were downplaying the available information about the suffering of Iraqi people in Fallujah, many Arabic-language outlets had a different news agenda. But in these media, too, very few pictures were available. Escobar reported in the November 11 edition of *Asia Times Online*: "The main story playing in the Arab world in the past 24 hours is that of Mohammed Abboud – who saw his nine-year-old son bleed to death of shrapnel wounds when his house in Fallujah was hit because he could not venture out to go to a hospital. Abboud had to bury his son in his own garden" (quoted from Solomon: 2004). Thus the information to implement a peace journalism perspective, and report on human suffering as a consequence of the war, was available for those who wanted to find it.

4.3 The empirical data

I searched for the word 'Fallujah' in *VG*'s database in the electronic archive Retriver and got five hits with content on the attacks on Fallujah in the period November 7 to December 31, 2004. The dates were November 7, 9, 11, 15 and 17. On the basis of these findings I went through these issues on microfilm, since the electronic archive does not include photos. All the stories were news items dealing with the military operation. I will analyse them according to Galtung's model for peace journalism. All were originally published in Norwegian; I will translate the relevant parts into English.

4.3.1 Article 1

The first article was published on the day the attack on Fallujah started, November 7. The dateline was Jerusalem and the title was 'The Americans will clean Fallujah (Amerikanerne vil renske Falluja)'.

One picture accompanied the story, showing stripes of phosphorous grenades along the skyline but having no explanation in the form of a subtext. As an illustration to the story, the picture offered no meaning. We now know that these phosphorous grenades were used by the US forces (see the film 'Fallujah, the hidden massacre' by Sigfrid Ranucci). The irony in this is that while the US falsely accused Saddam Hussein of being a global threat because of his WMD, US forces used weapons that are illegal to employ against civilians, since they cause massive internal burn wounds when they hit a human body. It should be noted here that even though the Pentagon admitted the use of phosphorous grenades it claimed they were used only against military targets, despite the film mentioned above having suggested that civilians were also hit. From a peace journalism point of view this picture could have been used to explain the human costs of the war. By including the word 'clean' in the title of the article, *VG* can be slated for sanitising the warfare. If the actual meaning of the picture had been explained to the reader it might have given a more realistic picture of the real consequences of the war instead of an abstract image.

If we go further into the text we find the following elements which fit into Galtung's model for (traditional) war journalism:

- Focus on conflict arena (closed space, closed time and exists in arena): the town of Fallujah in a limited period of time with one goal – to win. An alternative, peace-oriented angle would, rather, have put the Fallujah case in a historical context, which would include explaining the resistance as a result of the illegal occupation in 2003.
- Two parties: the Iraqi government and the US invasion forces on one side and the rebels (constituting the resistance forces in Fallujah) on the other. An alternative, peace-oriented angle would have focused on conflict formation explaining that the vast majority of the Iraqi population opposed the occupation. Instead of explaining the broad potential for resistance, *VG* is narrowing it further by ending the article with the information that the force of between 1,000 and 1,500 is headed by Omar Hadid and contains radical Muslims from Syria and Jordan. Hadid's group is linked to al-Qaeda's 'top man' in the region, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Here it is implied that the resistance are 'foreigners' with links to international terrorism.
- Who threw the first stone? The time space in the article is narrowed, so that the attack on Fallujah seems the 'natural' answer to two attacks the day before, when 34 people were killed in the neighbouring town of Samarra. Eleven of the

> victims were identified as women and children. In another neighbouring town, Ramadi, 20 US soldiers were wounded. An alternative peace-oriented angle would have presented open space, open time, with alternative outcomes dealing with historical issues from the occupation in 2003, as well as the colonial past.

The one-goal solution from Galtung's model is underlined by quotes from both sides ruling out negotiation and non-violence. The leader of the US soldiers, Lt. Col.Gary Brandl is quoted: "We shall clean Fallujah of rebels". Interestingly enough, *VG* left out Brandl's most extreme hate speech, reported in CNN and other US media, where he claimed: "We're on a mission from God. A mission to liberate the Iraqi people from evil".

VG's use of war journalism is underlined by the quote from one of the rebels claiming that "For us the alternative is fight the Americans or die". In this *reactive* manner, waiting for violence before reporting, the predictable outcome will be more violence. This is underlined by another sentence in the article: "Fundamentalists have mined buildings and are ready to use suicide bombers, car bombs, snipers and booby-traps connected to explosives in the battle against US soldiers."

The fact that all the inhabitants were ordered to leave the town was disguised through the sentence "The Americans hold the opinion that 80 per cent of the inhabitants have fled the town'. This, combined with the expression 'clean' in the title and the description of the event as an 'operation', sanitises the warfare, blaming the rebels rather than the occupation forces for the situation.

According to the model for peace journalism, journalists must expose 'untruths on all sides'. *VG*, on the contrary, covered up the unpalatable facts that could blame the occupation forces as aggressors. The photograph of phosphorous grenades could have pointed in another direction, but it is not commented upon or contextualised. It's just a spectacular image, causing more confusion than clarity.

4.3.2 Article 2

The second article, titled 'Promises a bloodbath – US's biggest street-battle since the Vietnam War is taking place tonight', was published two days later (November 9) and written by the US correspondent of *VG*. Three pictures accompanied the article. Two above the title symbolise the 'two party-element' in Galtung's model. To the left we see pictures of two US soldiers pointing their guns at an unknown target. In the background we see another US soldier on the top of a tank looking through his binoculars. The picture connotes firmness without any focus on potential victims. The subtitle to the picture goes like this: 'Besieged city: US forces were placed in strategic positions around Fallujah before they last night stormed the streets of the city hunting for Iraqi rebels'. I will here remind of the theoretical

point I made earlier – that the left side of the picture is more easily remembered. These images of the US soldier stand for firmness in a defensive manner. As a contrast, the picture to the right 'confronting' the American soldiers, shows rebels and signifies threat and danger. Two of the rebels have their faces hidden, one by a Palestinian scarf and the other by balaclava hood. The two-party layout with two pictures 'confronting' each other on the page fits well into Galtung's win-oriented dichotomy. The civilian population is totally absent.

At this point I will again draw attention to the point made by Rudolph Arnheim in the theoretical overview earlier in the chapter, that we tend better to remember the picture placed on the left side. It can be argued by editing the page in this manner we are shown the war scene through a US perespective (Arnheim: 1988).

The subtitle was: 'Tough street matches: Masked rebels fought yesterday in the streets of Fallujah against the US force, even though some suggested there are as many as 5,000 rebels in the town, they are outnumbered by the Americans'. The picture and the subtitle connotes fanaticism and defeat. They look like bank robbers but are doomed to lose (because they are too few). The third and last picture is a small portrait of the alleged rebel leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The enemy image of al-Zarqawi, as the key al-Qaeda figure in Iraq, is essential here. He personified the enemy image after the arrest of Saddam Hussdein and until he was killed by US forces in May 2006. The Pentagon has admitted retrospectively that a an operation of psychological warfare (PSYOPS) upgraded al-Zaqawi's role in the insurgency to create the image of a strong enemy. This PSYOPS-operation included a false letter supposedly written by al-Zaqawi and claimed by the Pentagon to be found in his computer (*Washington Post*: April 10 2006). With this information at hand it's interesting to see how central al-Zaqawi is in *VG*'s Fallujah coverage.

If we look closer into the text we find that even though the lead of the articles states that 'thousands of American soldiers stormed the streets of Fallujah', the title, including the expression 'bloodbath', refers to the rebels. A statement from the 'feared' Abu Musab al-Zarqawi tells us: "Let us stand up with all our power and use all that is dear to us when we fight them". The rebels also get the blame for potential civilian casualties when the Iraq expert Michael O'Hanlon is quoted fearing that "al-Zarqawi and his men will use many thousand civilians in the city as living shields". The US soldiers are off the hook for the responsibility for any civilian casualties, since they are only targetting the rebels: "Last night the heavens over Fallujah were lit while the overwhelming military power hammered on the rebels".

The operation named 'Dawn' might, according to *VG*, have developed into the most difficult street battle the Americans had fought since the battle over the town of Hue at the time of the Vietnam War. *VG* portrayed the resistance as "a desper-

ate and sometimes invisible enemy that knows the city and every house as well as its own pocket".

American Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was quoted as saying that the purpose of the battle was to "strangle the rebellion in Iraq once and for all. And to clear the ground for the elections in January". His rhetoric includes all the signs of propaganda: "Success in Fallujah will be a setback for the terrorists in the country", he said during his press conference in the Pentagon the day before. At that time 42 rebels had been killed. To balance this, *VG* quoted a doctor in Fallujah who, according to AP, told about 12 civilian casualties and 17 wounded – among them a five year old girl and a ten year old boy. The metaphor 'job' was used by Rumsfeld in his speech to describe the attack and uncritically used by *VG* in the story. The quotations were: "This is a difficult job"; this time, however, Rumsfeld promised "to fulfil the job and not stop in the way the Americans did in April". The war represented by the metaphor 'job' is commonly used in earlier war propaganda (Luostarinen and Ottosen: 2002). A more detailed explanation of the failed operation in April could be a way to help the readers to contextualise the event, since a possible hidden agenda for the massive attack on the town of Fallujah could be revenge for the humiliation to which the US soldiers were exposed at the time. To quote a story from the same journalist on April 1, 2004: "The scenes from Fallujah were so grotesque that US television viewers were protected from the pictures. At least two bodies were dragged through the streets by a car. One body was dragged by its feet. The corpses were hung in telephone-wires." The images of the dead bodies of US soldiers were published in many Western media and were obviously humiliating for the US. Thus, the issue of revenge could be seen as a hidden agenda in the attack six months later. But the issue of revenge was never an issue in Norwegian media coverage.

To return to the November 9 article: an alternative interpretation to *VG*'s suggestion that the public was protected from these images is that the images were censored so as not to trigger the so-called 'Vietnam syndrome'. These scenes could trigger the same kind of feelings that made President Clinton leave Somalia in 1993, after similar scenes took place in Mogadishu.

Dehumanisation of 'them' is an important factor in war/violence journalism. In its elite-orientation it also tend to focus on 'our suffering' through enemy images. One could ask why the readers were not reminded of these scenes when Rumsfeld sent his soldiers to "fulfil the job". In the November 9 article, the Vietnam syndrome is indirectly dealt with at the end. In an interview with CNN, the Iraq expert Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institute claimed that great civilian losses would be "a catastrophe" for the Americans and the fragile Iraqi government. Here, elite-orientation and ethnocentrism are evident. The real victims of the war (the civilian Iraqis) are invisible and not mentioned at all as part of the catastro-

phe. Since they are not presented through pictures and are merely randomly mentioned in the text, it is almost as if they don't exist (Griffin: 2004).

4.3.3 Article 3

The next article was published on November 11, with the title 'Slaughterhouse for hostages found'. This article was also written by the US correspondent of *VG*. The introduction goes like this:

"The Iraqi government soldiers have come across 'the slaughterhouses' in Fallujah where as many as 30 hostages may have been beheaded on camera. The macabre findings were made when soldiers fought their way from street to street through the Iraqi town which for a long period has been the safe haven for the terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his feared men."

The article is illustrated with three small pictures of the hostages, each of them blindfolded, with same subtext on each, 'BEHEADED', followed by the names of the victims. Obviously, the pictures focus on the three Western hostages as the victims of the attack. The portraits of the hostages create sympathy since we identify more easily with people of whom we can get a visual impression (Gilbert: 1991).

If we return to the text, we again see that the inhabitants of Fallujah are invisible. The hunt for terrorists justifies the massive attacks on the city. The findings of the 'slaughterhouse' and the hunt for the named evil-doer follow the pattern of enemy image oriented journalism so typical of war-journalism (Ottosen: 1994). The point is underlined by the mention of another hostage situation, where the family of the head of the interim government, Ayad Alawi, are the worthy victims. Only at the very end of the article is the civilian population of Fallujah mentioned: "Ten thousand, maybe as many as 100,000, civilians are supposed to still remain inside Fallujah and yesterday AP reported that the inhabitants will soon be out of food". This dramatic piece of information is not highlighted through pictures or any other visual effects that will help us to remember it.

4.3.4 Article 4

The fourth article, 'Body of Western woman found', also10,8following lead:

"The body of what probably was a Western woman was found badly treated without arms and legs in Fallujah yesterday. The woman is most likely one of two foreign women reported missing lately.Her arms and legs are missing, she has her throat cut and her stomach cut open. She has been dead for a while… says Benjamin Finnell who has examined the woman at an American field hospital according to the news agency AP."

This story can also be read as propaganda to justify the attacks. The reference to the field hospital is interesting since one of the first things the US and Iraqi gov-

ernment soldiers did was to take control over the hospital on the outskirts of the city, to prevent reporters form showing civilian casualties as was the case in the battle over Fallujah in April.

The November 15 article is clearly 'victory oriented' since the security adviser Qassem Dawoud is quoted by AP, claiming that the battle for Fallujah was over. He claimed that mere pockets of resistance remained. One of the inhabitants of Fallujah was quoted at the end of the story; Abu Mustafa was quoted by Reuters, stating that: "The situation is very difficult. We have neither food nor water. My seven children suffer from diarrhoea. One of my sons was wounded by a grenade explosion last night. He is bleeding, but there is nothing I can do to help him'

In this, the civilian population is given a voice, but the blame is not put on the attacking forces.

4.3.5 Article 5

The last article was published on November 17 and is important since it's the only one during this period with a critical angle towards the US forces and shows there was a certain balance in *VG*'s coverage. The picture accompanying the article shows an American soldier pointing his gun at a body on the ground. The subtext explains the situation: "Shocking: the shocking pictures of a US soldier shooting a wounded Iraqi were yesterday shown on television worldwide". The article was written by the US correspondent of *VG* and was titled: 'Was waiting for help – shocking pictures shake US and the world'. The story is about a man shot at a mosque, caught in the lens of the embedded NBC journalist Kevin Sites. The lead goes like this: '"He pretends to be dead!" the American soldier is yelling. Then he puts the gun against the wounded Iraqi and pulls the trigger. Immediately the wall behind him is covered with blood'.

The reporter explains how the pictures have shocked the American public. It's explained as a possible war crime: the wounded and unarmed Iraqi was placed in the room by another US unit, to wait for medical assistance. The scene is explained by Pentagon sources to have resulted from previous incidents in which rebels have pretended to be dead. One of the friends of the soldier who is now under investigation was allegedly was killed in this way. Lt. Gen. John Sattler is quoted as saying: "We obey the laws for armed conflicts and maintain a high standard of responsibility".

Even though some aspects of the warfare are mentioned critically and the situation for the civilian population is cited a couple of times, the main stories as well as the pictures follow the pattern of a war- and violence-oriented journalism. The focus, with a win-oriented angle (the US and Iraqi forces are gaining control) is on the conflict. The worthy victims (Western hostages) are highlighted while the

unworthy victims (the civilian population in Fallujah) are mentioned briefly without being linked to the behaviour of the attacking forces. It's more that they happened to be in the wrong place than anything else. Indirectly, it's implied that they are responsible for their own situation, since they did not leave the city as requested by the US forces.

4.4 The unworthy victims

The readers of *VG* received little information about the situation facing the civilian population in Fallujah. Of course this must be seen in light of the circumstances in which these five articles were written. The Pentagon's media strategy was to control the access to information. It is not my intention to moralise about the journalist at *VG*, but, still, in retrospect it is intriguing to see what was missing in these articles and, interestingly enough, British newspapers such as *The Guardian* were able to print critical articles about Fallujah with many pictures to underline the massive destruction. So the information was available soon afterwards for those who wanted it. *The Guardian* had a fully illustrated supplement on January 11, 2005 – to my mind an effective piece of peace journalism, since it used photos to document the massive destruction of the city and the consequences for the civilian population. The Iraqi medical doctor and writer, Al Fadhil, entered the city on December 24 and documented the effects of war through diary and photos. He talked to remaining civilians who blamed both the US forces and the resistance fighters who didn't care about their destiny and their ruined city. He entered the city centre on December 24, and wrote: "By 10 a.m. we were inside the city. It was completely devastated, destruction everywhere. It looked like a city of ghosts" (Fadhil: 2005). Using photographs, he documented destroyed mosques and ruined homes, dead bodies, insulting slogans written in English on bathroom mirrors.

After the 'liberation' of Fallujah in December 2004, some civilians were allowed to return on Christmas eve, the same day that Fadhil entered the city. Thus, two days before the tsunami that caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, and massive damage, in several countries, those who wanted to return to the destroyed city of Fallujah were funnelled through five checkpoints, their fingerprints taken along with DNA samples and retina scans. Residents were to be issued with badges showing their home addresses, and it was an offence not to wear them all the time. In an effort to thwart suicide bombers, civilian vehicles were banned from the city (*The Independent*, December 11, 2004).

Before the attacks on Fallujah on November 7, Lt. Gen. John Sattler told his soldiers that the town "is being held by hostages by mugs, thugs, murderers and intimidators" (CNN, November 7 2005).

According to the NGO Iraq Body Count, 800 people were killed in Fallujah. Between 572 and 616 were civilians, of whom more than 300 were women and children. Omar Dhahir, an Iraqi author living in Denmark, offered an alternative explanation: "The more people they kill the more resistance they will meet". General Tommy Franks expressed the US policy of being uninterested in civilian casualties: "We don't do body counts".

The medical journal *The Lancet*, on the other hand, took an interest in the civilian casualties. How many civilians had died in Iraq since the invasion in March 2003? The answer is more than 100,000. Before that, UN organisations estimated that the sanctions against Iraq during Saddam Hussein's time – half of them children under 16 – cost the lives of between 500,000 and 1,000.000. It did not stir up half the attention directed at the tsunami that dominated the global media environment at the same time. Obviously it is a task within the model of peace journalism to give a voice to these voiceless.

In the following I will reflect on the reason for this, and on the potential of the Internet and of digital pictures such as from mobile telephones equipped with cameras.

5. Contrasting *VG*'s Fallujah coverage with the Asian Tsunami

5.1 New technology, sympathy and professionalism – the Tsunami coverage in *VG*

The tsunami struck the shores of many Asian countries on December 26, 2004, just two day after the first Fallujah civilians were able to return to their shattered city. In the above analyses I have documented how little attention Norway's biggest newspaper paid to the thousands of civilians who lost their lives, were wounded or lost their homes through the massive military attack on their city. Since the tsunami occurred with massive force in the news so soon after the attacks on Fallujah, the contrast is striking. In the case of Fallujah, some Arab media like Al Jazeera used new technology to publish some of the damage and civilian suffering. In 1991 during the Gulf War, CNN enjoyed a monopoly on 24-hour coverage seven days a week, and controlled the images on a global scale. Since Al Jazeera was established in 1996, this monopoly has been broken (Figenschou: 2004). In his book *No true glory. A frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah*, Bing West, who sees the war from a US military perspective, puts it like this: "Every battle now has a global audience. The April 2004 siege of Fallujah was lost on the playing fields of digital technology. As Lt. Gen. Conway put it, Al Jazera kicked our butts" (West: 2005: 322). Even though the images of massive destruction of the city were available from Arab media, Western media showed little willingness to use them.

The human tragedy following the tsunami that struck the shores of several countries causing as many as 220,000 deaths, was visualised immediately and media worldwide published many reports that led to a mobilisation that the world had hardly seen before. Money, medicine, relief kits and other resources were collected, expressing sympathy with the victims. Many tourists were killed alongside the local population even though the latter has to pay the long-term costs of the tragedy. In countries like Norway and Sweden, the authorities, and in particular the foreign ministries, have been berated for doing too little too late for the tourists from their own countries. Here, *VG* and other news media did a remarkable job both criticising the government and at the same time giving the public the information the government failed to give (Hansen: 2006). In Norway, the authorities were taken to task for failing to provide an overview of the death tolls. In the first few days after the tsunami struck, government sources claimed that hundreds of Norwegian had died. The accurate number turned out to be 84 of the 3,500 who had spent their holidays in the tourist resorts hit by the waves. Several media picked up this criticism and lived up to their reputations of watchdogs, contributing to the unfavourable reports published in the months following the crisis. For me, the most important issue is why the media fails to be a collective watchdog in a similar manner when the human suffering is caused by man-made wars

5.2 *VG* and the Tsunami

Returning to the biggest Norwegian newspaper, *VG*, I am unable here to undertake a systematic review of the tsunami coverage, but will contrast some aspects of the tsunami coverage with the Fallujah coverage, focusing on the visual representation. A few minutes after the tsunami struck the shores of Thailand, *VG* got the news from one of its readers at the beach. At once, *VG* mobilised readers and asked for reports on the missing as well as documentation through photos sent via mobile phones. At 4.56 a.m., three-quarters of an hour before the Norwegian News Agency (NTB) sent out an alert message about the tsunami, *VG* had received a message from a reader on a roof in Phuket. The first pictures on the ground were not sent through the international agencies but came from one of *VG*'s readers via his mobile phone. Minutes after the tsunami struck, *VG* published the news online. Through contacts on the ground, *VG* was able to get its first interviews with victims. While the government offices were closed during the Christmas holiday the public got little information, and the information they did get was, in most cases, wrong. As a flexible and professional news organisation, *VG* called in more staff and published new information all the time. Its webpage soon became a central point for practical information about where to seek help, flight information, information on hospitals, etc. Viewers were asked to report missing persons and that information was double checked with the information received from government sources. Four days after the tsunami struck, they were able to

conclude that the most likely number of Norwegian deaths was 85, whereas at the same time different government agencies had lists of missing containing 8,000 names, and everything was chaotic (Hansen: 2006).

The media contributed actively to collecting money, and worked as a collective force for humanitarian relief operations. Visual communication was essential, both in documenting the incredible forces of the tsunami and in documenting the human suffering. Global television channels such as CNN and BBC World, as well numerous Internet pages, could give detailed accounts through satellite pictures that were made available (Digital globe-gallery). The human tragedy was instantly documented in living-rooms all over the world. It was a global media event – the world became a single place, as Roland Robertson has characterised the globalisation of media (Robertson: 1992). Why did the media image on a global scale become a force for human sympathy that was totally missing during the massive attack on Fallujah just a few weeks earlier? I will suggest the following as at least a partial explanation:

1. The tsunami caused damage to Western tourists as well as local people. The us-and them-factor was less important for a while, since all were 'in the same boat': *we*, somehow, all were struck (Eide: 2002).
2. The tsunami was caused by nature and no government could be blamed. Thus there were neither media restrictions to prevent the flow of information nor media strategies to draw attention away from the event (Ottosen: 1994)
3. Digital technology, including cell phones with cameras and satellite-telephones, were available immediately. In Fallujah, Pentagon restrictions on media access made a point of keeping cameras away from the battlefield. *VG* and other Western media did little or nothing to raise awareness of the restriction, or to focus on the human suffering in Fallujah. Unlike with the tsunami, responsibility for the events in Fallujah was identifiable: the most powerful military machine in the world.
4. In the aftermath of the tsunami, the local hospitals became information centres for journalists and relatives, while the US took military control over hospitals in Fallujah to avoid visual documentation of the wounded and dead.

6. Conclusion and summary

I have tried to show how the combination of visual representation of digital pictures distributed by mobile telephones, and the possibilities for global distribution and publication on the Internet, have a huge potential to promote sympathy for human suffering which is an important aspect of promoting peace journalism. In the case of the tsunami, the victims were able to reach sympathy and help on a global scale. The challenge for peace journalism is to learn from these experiences

and transfer them to war zones. The Iraqi war is an interesting case for studying the visual aspects of war journalism. The visual component in the propaganda presented by Colin Powell to the UN was intended to mobilise world opinion to support a war.

Reporting from the war zones should include the propaganda environment which, in modern warfare, is a part of the battlefield. Media self-reflexivity and certain themes should be on the checklist for all journalists covering war and conflicts. One important issue here is self-criticism of pitfalls and shortcomings in supplying fair and accurate reports – with respect both to immediate corrections and to comprehensive evaluations retrospectively after major operations or wars (Nohrstedt and Ottosen: 2005). In retrospect, the least one could expect from *VG* when it has obviously has been responsible for distributing the false allegations by Colin Powell to the UN Security Council before the war, was that it should make an apology to its readers as the prestigious papers *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* have done.

Peace journalists should bring alternative perspectives into the news agenda to give the public an alternative way of thinking regarding the dichotomy of only two parties and one potential winner and one loser (Galtung: 2002). By focusing on all parties and seeing the potential for conflict resolution, peace journalism should reveal untruths on all sides and avoid the elite-oriented propaganda trap (Kamalipour and Snow: 2004). The use of visual counter- propaganda by distributing photographs of victims of acts of war sent by mobile phone, and circulating them on the Internet, could be a tool in these efforts.

As pointed out in the comparison of *VG*'s coverage of the tsunami with the attacks on Fallujah, modern technology offers new methods for mobilising sympathy for human suffering through visual documentation. Since the military will try to control access to the battlefield and will restrict the possibilities of disseminating controversial images, human rights groups and peace journalism should use the Internet and digital technology to focus on the 'true face' of war when the media fail to do so. Here we can learn from *VG*'s use of its own readers to mobilise more readers into sending images via the Internet.

7

Two experiments focusing on de-escalation oriented coverage of post-war conflicts[1]

Wilhelm Kempf

1. Introduction

Journalists do not simply report on the world, they also assign meaning to the facts they report and interpret them according to a particular cognitive framework. In the case of conflict, this framework may be either escalation oriented or de-escalation oriented. An escalation oriented framework is guided by the questions: "Who is the aggressor?" and "How can he be stopped?" It tends to take sides and to polarize conflict. A de-escalation oriented framework, on the other hand, is guided by the questions: "What are the issues?" and "How can they be resolved?" It tends to take an impartial stance and tries to depolarize conflict (Kempf, 2003b).

During war and crisis, an escalation oriented framework often becomes so dominant that war reporting and propaganda no longer make any difference (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2001; Kempf & Luostarinen, 2002). Not only do the conflict parties' own media display this trend, the international media also do so. War coverage has a strong bias towards the promotion of conflict escalation and – though less pronounced – this bias often survives in post-war coverage as well (Annabring, 2000; Hamdorf, 2001; Wolfsfeld, 2004). Even in the postwar period only a minority of journalists frame conflict in a firmly de-escalation oriented way.

The concepts of peace journalism, as created by Galtung (1998b, 2002a) and others (Lynch, 2000, 2002; McGoldrick & Lynch, 2000; Bilke, 2002, 2005; Kempf, 2002, 2003b; Kempf, 2003a), are intended to counteract this bias at each stage of conflict: pre-war, war and post-war. Whether these concepts are realistic depends – besides other factors – on audience responses to peace journalism. Does peace journalism have a chance to reach the public? Will it be respected by its audience as more balanced and unbiased? Will it have an impact on the mental

1 The present paper is an outcome of the Toda Institute's Peace Journalism Project and was funded by the German Peace Research Foundation (DSF) and the Research Council of the University of Konstanz (AFF).

models according to which the audience interprets the conflict? Or will the audience hold onto its prejudices and reject news articles inconsistent with the enemy images that emerged during wartime?

There are several constraints that may have an impact on audience responses to peace journalism:

The first of these constraints is *the level of conflict escalation*, which progresses from a self-centered divergence of perspectives via competition to struggle and climaxes in open warfare. Inter-group conflict strengthens in-group solidarity. Group members who stand out in opposing the enemy can thereby increase their social status. Group members identify more strongly with their own group and its positions, and the more escalated the conflict, the more they are likely to do this (Deutsch, 1973).

The second constraint is *the cognitive framework* which corresponds to these levels of conflict escalation and which interprets conflict by means of increasingly radicalized mental models (Kempf, 2002) that can be described along the dimensions of (a) the conceptualization of the conflict as a win-win, win-lose or lose-lose process, (b) the assessment of the parties' rights and aims, (c) the evaluation of their actions and behavior and (d) the emotional consequences of these interpretations, which ultimately transform outrage at war into outrage at the enemy.

A third constraint is the *audience's entanglement in the conflict*, which will be greater, the more reprehensible the atrocities and the closer a society feels itself tied to one of the parties in historical, political and cultural terms. The more it is entangled, the more an audience will tend to identify with one of the parties, and the more it will tend to interpret the conflict according to the same mental model accepted by the party it favors. According to Taylor (2000), however, the media must not deviate too much from the perspective of their audience if they want their reports to continue to be read, to be listened to or to be watched.

It is particularly in long-lasting, intractable conflicts that such mental models solidify into *societal beliefs*. Intractable conflicts are demanding, stressful, painful, exhausting and costly, both in human and in material terms. This requires that societal members develop conditions which will enable them to cope successfully. Societal beliefs fulfill an important role in the creation of these psychological conditions. Since they are both part of society's ethos and a crucial factor for enduring the burdens of war, they will tend to persist after the war is over (Bar-Tal, 1998).

A fifth constraint is the *text genre*. (a) Features or reportages offer more space for the assessment of the conflict context, both in escalation and in de-escalation oriented terms than do short commentaries or news articles with a stronger focus on day-to-day events. (b) Nationwide quality papers have a stronger focus on in-

ternational affairs and more possibilities for journalistic investigation than regional papers that base their articles mainly on the reports of news agencies, etc.

A sixth constraint is *the audience and its interaction with journalism*. (a) Journalists' assumptions about audience preferences (Bläsi, 2006) and traditional news factors like "simplification vs. complexity", "negative vs. positive", "personal vs. structural", "elite vs. non-elite nations" and "elite vs. non-elite persons" (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Östgaard, 1965, Merten, 1985; Eilders, 1997; Allan, 1999) are more compatible with escalation oriented than with de-escalation oriented coverage. Simplification supports the division of the world into "us" and "them" and produces a bias towards interpreting conflict as a win-lose process (Kempf, 2003a), and the preference for negativism, personalization, elite nations and elite persons produces a structural frame which divides the world into "rich" and "poor" and at the same time into "good" and "evil" (Galtung & Vincent, 1992). (b) The typical readership of provincial papers is less interested in and feels less involved in international affairs than the readership of the quality press. Taking the format of the provincial press into account, they can also be expected to be less well informed about international affairs.

2. Hypotheses

A number of hypotheses can be derived from these assumptions.

1. The more escalated a conflict is, the less positive will be audience responses to de-escalation oriented coverage.
1.1. In post-war situations, de-escalation oriented coverage has a better chance to evoke positive responses than during the war.
1.2. The more polarized the frames of conflict interpretation were during the war, however, the less positive will be responses to de-escalation oriented post-war coverage.

2. The more entangled the audience is, the less positive will be its responses to de-escalation oriented coverage.
2.1. De-escalation oriented post-war coverage has a better chance to evoke positive responses in societies which were not directly involved in the conflict.
2.2. De-escalation oriented post-war coverage has a better chance to evoke a positive response in societies which did not side with one of the conflict parties.

3. The more it interprets conflict according to mental models dissonant with the societal beliefs that emerged during wartime, the less positive will be the response to de-escalation oriented coverage.
3.1. De-escalation oriented post-war coverage has a better chance to evoke pos-

itive responses if it is rather moderate and mainly takes the edge off the escalation-oriented frames of interpretation that still prevail,

3.2. while the chance of arousing a positive response is reduced if post-war coverage interprets the situation within a more radically reversed framework.

4. The text genre constrains the intensity of both escalation and de-escalation oriented conflict coverage.

4.1. Responses to escalation and de-escalation oriented post-war coverage will be more differentiated if the coverage exploits the possibilities offered by the format of a feature or a reportage than when it is constrained by the format of a news article or a short commentary.

4.2. Responses to escalation and de-escalation oriented post-war coverage will be more differentiated if the coverage exploits the possibilities offered by the format of the quality press than when it is constrained by the format of a provincial paper.

5. Whether there is a difference in responses to escalation and de-escalation oriented post-war coverage also depends on the audience and its interaction with journalism.

5.1. The typical readership of the quality press will respond to escalation and de-escalation oriented post-war coverage in a more differentiated way than the typical readership of provincial papers.

5.2. Escalation-oriented coverage is better suited to the purpose of arousing audience interest.

3. The original experiment

In order to test these hypotheses, a series of experimental studies was designed which measure responses to escalation- and de-escalation oriented coverage along two dimensions: (1) Audience acceptance of coverage, and (2) the impact of coverage on the audience's mental models of the conflict.

3.1 Goals and conditions

The first of the experiments (Annabring, Ditlmann & Kempf, 2005; Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf & Spohrs, 2005) was designed to test hypotheses 3.1, 3.2 and 5.2 under conditions which were quite optimal for positive responses to de-escalation oriented coverage with respect to hypotheses 1.1, 4.2 and 5.1:

Ad 1.1: The text material used dealt with post-war conflicts in former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milošević;

Ad 4.2: the text format corresponded to that of the nationwide German quality press; and

Ad 5.1: the sample of subjects was representative of its readership.

With respect to hypotheses 4.1 and 2.2, on the other hand, the conditions were much less favorable:

Ad 4.1: The text genre was that of news articles and/or short commentaries; and

Ad 2.2: German diplomacy had supported Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia in their struggles for independence even before the outbreak of war in Slovenia.

Nonetheless, the conditions were relatively moderate with respect to hypotheses 2.1 and 1.2:

Ad 2.1: Although Germany accepted tens of thousands of refugees from the Balkans during the war, and although the German military finally did become involved in the war against Serbia in Kosovo, German society itself was not directly affected by the war and did not suffer its atrocities; and

Ad 1.2: Although public discourse in Germany constructed morally opposed roles for the various parties in the post-Yugoslavian civil wars (with the Serbs receiving the role of chief perpetrators and the Bosnian Muslims and the Albanian minority the victim role), it never completely identified with either side, but to the contrary sympathized with the international community and in the end held Milošević chiefly responsible (Kempf, 1999; Jaeger, 2000; Luostarinen & Kempf, 2000; Annabring & Jaeger, 2005).

3.2 Experimental design

News articles on three events in former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milošević were presented to a total of 128 subjects, representative of the readership of the German quality press:

E1: violent conflicts in Southern Serbia (December 2000),

E2: the extradition of Milošević to The Hague (June 2001) and

E3: the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (March 2003).

Four different types of articles on each of the events were used: a moderately escalation oriented article (o) from a prestigious German newspaper (cf. Table 1) and three variants of these articles, a variant with increased escalation-oriented framing (e) which interpreted the events as a win-lose process and added further information to the text which put the events into a negative context and/or incriminated the Serbian party; a variant with moderate de-escalation oriented framing

(d1) which stayed as close as possible to the original text and only took the edge off its escalation oriented framing; and a variant with a more strongly de-escalation oriented framing of the events (d2) which changed the structure of the text completely and added further information, situating the events in a more constructive context. The average text length was 453 words.[2]

	Event	Title	Source
E1	Conflict in Southern Serbia	Wer kämpft wann gegen wen im Presevo-Tal? (Who is fighting whom in the Presovo Valley?)	*Die Welt*, 12-19-2000
E2	Extradition of Milošević to The Hague	Der Slobo-Faktor (The Slobo-Factor)	*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6-29-2001
E3	Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro	Aus Jugoslawien wird Serbien-Montenegro (Yugoslavia becomes Serbia-Montenegro)	*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3-15-2003

Table 1: The original articles used in the study

The subjects were asked to read one article on each of the three events in chronological order and after each article

1. to narrate the reported events in their own words and
2. to fill out a questionnaire designed to measure their acceptance of the articles as unbiased, well-balanced, interesting, etc.

Combining each text version with each version of the other texts resulted in $4^3 = 64$ combinations of event x variants, each of which was administered to a male and to a female subject. The experiment thus resulted in a sample of n = 64 x 2 x3 = 384 narratives and questionnaires on which the data analysis was based.

3.3 Instruments and methods of data analysis

Acceptance of the articles was assessed by means of a 16-item questionnaire, to which Latent Class Analysis was applied in order to identify typical evaluation-patterns. Four of the items dealt with the entertainment value of the articles, asking the subjects to assess how boring (I1), how interesting (I2), how sensational (I3) and how informative (I4) the articles appeared to them. Next the subjects were asked to indicate how familiar they had previously been with the reported events (I5) and to evaluate whether the events were depicted in a factually correct way

2 For the details of text construction see Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf & Spohrs (2005).

(I6), whether the text included impartial information about all the parties involved (I7) or whether it favored one of the parties (I8), whether the text was understandable (I9) and whether it brought up new aspects (I10), whether they could approve of the article's content (I11), whether it stimulated their interest in further information (I12), whether it was hard to read the text to the end (I13) and whether the reported facts were depicted truthfully or in a distorted way (I14). Finally, the subjects were asked to estimate the journalist's expertise (I15) and his stylistic competence (I16).

The subjects' mental models of the reported events were inferred from their narratives by means of quantitative content analysis. Again, this was a two-step procedure which first coded the narratives according to a number of content analytical variables and then applied Latent Class Analysis in order to identify the mental models upon which the narratives were based.

In order to do so, the depiction of each of the four parties involved in the reported conflicts, Serbia / Yugoslavia, the international community, the Albanian minority in Serbia and Montenegro, was coded by a total of 20 variables.

The first set of variables describes whether the following features are attributed to the parties: confrontational (V1) and/or cooperative behavior (V2), insight into the price to be paid for a confrontational (V3) and/or for a cooperative conflict strategy (V4), insight into the gains from a confrontational (V5) and/or from a cooperative conflict strategy (V6), confrontational logic and readiness for confrontation (V7) and/or cooperative logic and readiness for cooperation (V8), questioning (V9) and/or approval of common goals and needs (V10), pursuit of egoistical goals (V11), demands for flexibility and/or (V12) unyieldingness (V13), questioning or violation (V14) and/or readiness for or support of democracy and human rights (V15).

The second set of variables describes whether the parties' behavior was justified or (at least) evaluated in an unbiased way (V16) and/or whether it was condemned or criticized (V17), whether the narrative referred to victims on the side of the respective party (V18) and whether it dissociated from the party's political elites or society members (V19) and/or whether it identified with them (V20).

3.4 Results

The results of the study show that the de-escalation oriented text versions were accepted to a greater degree and resulted in less polarized mental models of the events than the original articles and the escalation oriented text versions.

3.4.1 Acceptance

Latent Class Analysis of the questionnaire data identified 6 typical evaluation patterns, one of which (K1.5) is characterized by widespread *non-responses to the questions referring to the entertainment value* of the articles. With respect to the other items it is about the same as the average evaluation.[3]

- This evaluation pattern was found in the evaluation of all text-versions (cf. Figure 2) and, irrespectively of the reported event (cf. Figure 1), with about the same frequency of 10% to 14% (total = 12.3%),
- It is characteristic of a small group of readers to whom qualities like "sensational" or "boring" are seemingly irrelevant for the evaluation of news texts.

The other evaluation patterns indicate more differentiated responses both to reports about different events (cf. Figure 1) and to different text versions (cf. Figure 2) and can be grouped according to the interest in further information which the articles aroused:

- Strong interest in further information (K1.3),
- Relatively strong interest in further information (K1.1 and K1.2) and
- Lack of interest in further information (K1.4 and K1.6)



Figure 1: Frequency of the evaluation patterns as a function of the reported events.
χ^2 = 75.74, df=10, p<0.001.
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia; E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro



Figure 2: Frequency of the evaluation patterns as a function of the various text-versions.
χ^2 = 26.87, df=15, p<0.05.
e = escalation oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation oriented;
d2 = more strongly de-escalation oriented

3 For a more detailed description of the evaluation patterns see Bläsi, Jaeger, Kempf & Spohrs (2005).

Strong interest in further information: Evaluation pattern K1.3 assesses the articles as informative and finds that new aspects are brought up in an impartial way. This arouses interest in further information, but at the same time it also creates uncertainty as to whether the reported facts are depicted truthfully and accurately.

- This evaluation pattern refers most frequently to text versions d2 (23.1%) and e (22.4%), which indicates that hypothesis 5.2 can be rejected (cf. Figure 2). Escalation-oriented coverage is not the only type that can arouse audience interest, de-escalation oriented coverage can also do so.
- Another widespread belief about news values and audience preferences also needs to be reconsidered: the dominant news value of personal events (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Merten 1985; Eilders, 1997; Allan, 1999; Galtung 2002a). The high frequency (25.8%) with which this evaluation pattern applies to reports about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3) (cf. Figure 1) indicates that structural themes can also arouse audience interest.

Independent of the text version, *relatively strong interest in further information* (K1.1 + K1.2) was found in 43.8% of the questionnaires (cf. Figure 2). While pattern K1.1 consistently evaluates the articles positively, however, pattern K1.2 doubts their impartiality and truthfulness.

In accordance with hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, the moderately de-escalation oriented text versions (d1) provoked less doubt than the more strongly de-escalation oriented ones (d2),

- while, on the other hand, the de-escalation oriented framing of versions d2 was still moderate enough not to provoke more doubt than the original articles (o) and their escalation-oriented versions (e), which were both more in accordance with societal beliefs that had emerged during the post-Yugoslavian civil wars (cf. Figure 2).
- Nonetheless, and in accordance with hypothesis 3.2, the greatest amount of doubt was aroused by reports about the violent conflicts in Southern Serbia (E1), which did not easily fit into the old enemy image of the "good Albanians" against the "evil Serbs" (cf. Wolfer, 2001) (cf. Figure 1).

Lack of interest in further information is characteristic of evaluation patterns K1.4 and K1.6. While pattern K1.4 evaluates the articles rather positively, K1.6 is rather negative about them.

- Altogether, lack of interest in further information (K1.4 + K1.6) was found most frequently in reaction to the original articles (30.9%) and in only 20.8% of the other text versions (cf. Figure 2).
- When combined with negative evaluations of the articles (K1.6), it decreases steadily the less escalation oriented and the more de-escalation oriented the articles are (cf. Figure 2),

- and, finally, it was least frequently found in the evaluation of articles about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3) (cf. Figure 1).

Again, this indicates that beliefs about news values need to be reconsidered. At least the relatively sophisticated readership of the quality press seems to offer a potential market for a peace journalism which refrains from polarization and personalization, also reports on structural topics and frames conflict in a more constructive way. But can such a peace journalism actually influence audiences and their interpretations of conflict?

3.4.2 Mental models

Computed separately for each of the four conflict parties, Latent Class Analysis of the content-analytical data identified several classes of narratives which reflect the different mental models with which the subjects interpreted the events reported in the articles they read.

Serbia/Yugoslavia

With respect to the perception of Serbia / Yugoslavia, six classes of narrative (K2.1 – K2.6) were identified which demonstrate that the escalation vs. de-escalation oriented framing of the news articles had a definite influence on the mental models with which the subjects interpreted events:[4]

K2.1: Appreciation of democratic change in Serbia,

K2.2: Continuation of the old enemy image,

K2.3: Appreciation of the new start in Serbia,

K2.4: Criticism of the Serbian past,

K2.5: Refusal to acknowledge democratic change in Serbia,

K2.6: Unbiased assessment of (present) Serbian positions.

Two of these classes are typical of the narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1) (cf. Figure 3): Continuation of the old enemy image (K2.2), which inspired 57.6% of these narratives, and an unbiased assessment of (present) Serbian positions (K2.6, 32.5%).

4 For a more detailed description of the mental models see Annabring, Ditlmann & Kempf (2005).



Figure 3: Class size as a function of the reported events.
χ^2 = 571.200, df = 10, p < 0.001
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro



Figure 4: Class size as a function of the various text versions.
χ^2 = 73.800, df = 15, p < 0.001
e = escalation oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation oriented;
d2 = more strongly de-escalation oriented

- A continuation of the old enemy image (K2.2) was found most frequently with subjects who had read an escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was de-escalation oriented, and its frequency decreased steadily the less escalation oriented the article was (cf. Figure 4).
- An unbiased assessment of (present) Serbian positions (K2.6) was found most frequently with subjects who had read a de-escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was escalation oriented, and its frequency increased steadily the more de-escalation oriented the article was (cf. Figure 4).

Two other classes are typical of the narratives about Milošević's extradition (E2) (cf. Figure 3): Appreciation of the new start in Serbia (K2.3), which inspired 45.2% of the narratives, and criticism of the Serbian past (K2.4, 40.2%).

- Appreciation of the new start in Serbia (K2.3) was found most frequently with subjects who had read a de-escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was escalation oriented, and its frequency increased steadily the more de-escalation oriented the article was (cf. Figure 4).
- Criticism of the Serbian past (K2.4) was found most frequently with subjects who had read an escalation oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was de-escalation oriented, and its frequency decreased steadily the less escalation oriented the article was (cf. Figure 4).

The remaining two classes are typical of the narratives about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3) (cf. Figure 3): Appreciation of democratic change in Serbia (K2.1), which inspired 67.9% of these narratives, and refusal to acknowledge democratic change (K2.5, 26.1%).

- Appreciation of democratic change in Serbia (K2.1) was found most frequently with subjects who had read a de-escalation-oriented article; it was least frequent when the article was escalation oriented, and its frequency increased the more de-escalation oriented the article was (cf. Figure 4).
- Refusal to acknowledge democratic change (K2.5) was found most frequently with subjects who had read an escalation-oriented article (cf. Figure 4).

The international community

With respect to the perception of the international community, only three classes of narratives could be identified:

K3.1: Cooperative behavior

K3.2: Confrontational behavior (including some criticism)

K3.3: Identification (including some justification of their behavior)

The behavior of the international community was most frequently interpreted as cooperative (K3.1) in narratives about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3) (82.4%) and least frequently interpreted as cooperative in narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1) (58%) (cf. Figure 5).

- This pattern was found most frequently with subjects who had read a strongly de-escalation oriented article (d2: 80.6%); it was found least frequently if the article was escalation oriented (cf. Figure 6).

The behavior of the international community was most frequently interpreted as confrontational (K3.2) in narratives about Milošević's extradition (E2) (27.8%) and least frequently interpreted as confrontational in narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1) (cf. Figure 5).

- This pattern was found most frequently with subjects who had read an escalation oriented article (29.8%) (cf. Figure 6).

Identification with the international community (K3.3) was almost exclusively found in narratives about the conflict in southern Serbia (E1), where it was characteristic of 33.7% of the narratives (cf. Figure 5) and was the only violent conflict in our sample of events: violence encourages an audience to identify with its own leadership.

- This pattern was found most frequently with subjects who had read the mod-

erately de-escalation oriented text version (d1), which – more than the other texts – discussed the possible risks of sending KFOR troops to Southern Serbia.



Figure 5: Class size as a function of the reported events.
χ^2 = 89.964, df = 4, p < 0.001
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro



Figure 6: Class size as a function of the various text versions.
χ^2 = 28.622, df = 6, p < 0.001
e = escalation oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately
de-escalation oriented; d2 = more strongly de-escalation oriented

Albanian minority in Serbia

With respect to the perception of the Albanian minority in Serbia, only two classes made a difference:

K4.2: Critical distance

K4.3: Uncritical identification

A third class of narratives (K4.1) simply didn't mention the Albanians. As could be expected, this class was found mainly in narratives about Milošević's extradition (E2) and about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3), where the Albanians played no role. Nonetheless, it was also found in 8.7% of the narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1), in which the Albanians received little attention (cf. Figure 7).

- Critical distance from the Albanian minority (K4.2) was maintained most frequently by subjects who had read a de-escalation oriented article; it was maintained least frequently when the article was escalation oriented, and its

frequency increased steadily the more de-escalation oriented the article was (cf. Figure 8).

- Uncritical identification with the Albanian minority (K4.3), on the other hand, was found most frequently with subjects who had read an escalation oriented article; it was found least frequently when the article was de-escalation oriented, and its frequency increased steadily the more escalation oriented the article was (cf. Figure 8).



Figure 7: Class size as a function of the reported events.
χ^2 = 334.760, df = 4, p < 0.001
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro



Figure 8: Class size as a function of the various text versions.
χ^2 = 16.664, df = 6, p < 0.025
e = escalation oriented ; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation oriented;
d2 = more strongly de-escalation oriented

Montenegro

With respect to the perception of Montenegro, again only two classes made a difference.

K5.2: Unbiased acknowledgement of cooperative behavior

K5.3: Escalation oriented partiality

Again, a third class of narratives (K5.1) simply didn't mention the Montenegrin party. As could be expected, this class was mainly found in narratives about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1) and about Milošević's extradition (E2). Nonetheless, it was also found in 12.6% of the narratives about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3), which paid little attention to the Montenegrin side (cf. Figure 9).



Figure 9: Class size as a function of the reported events.
χ^2 = 307.450, df = 4, p < 0.001
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E3 = Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro



Figure 10: Class size as a function of the various text versions.
χ^2 = 26.999, df = 6, p < 0.001
e = escalation oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation oriented;
d2 = more strongly de-escalation oriented

- While the vast majority (74%) of the narratives about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro acknowledge cooperative Montenegrin behavior (K5.2), this pattern was found less frequently with subjects who had read the escalation oriented article.
- Escalation oriented partiality (K5.3) for the Montenegrin party, on the other hand, was found almost exclusively when the article was escalation oriented.

3.5 Conclusions

The present experiment can be qualified as dealing with post-war coverage in the quality press of an outside country which had intervened in the conflict with both diplomatic and military means, whose population was not directly affected by the war, however, and whose media had not completely sided with any of the war parties. Given these limitations, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Escalation vs. de-escalation oriented framing of news articles does have an effect on the mental models with which the audience interprets the reported events and thus may have an impact on their openness for constructive conflict transformation.
2. Beliefs about news values and audience preferences need to be reconsidered: (a) Escalation oriented news coverage is not the only kind capable of arousing

audience interest, de-escalation oriented coverage can also stimulate audience interest. (b) Personalized news is not the only type that audiences like, but rather structural themes can also arouse audience interest.

3. In order not to provoke a boomerang effect, however, peace journalism should be very careful about its strategy: (a) De-escalation oriented coverage has a better chance of achieving a positive response if it is moderate and mainly aims to take the edge off the escalation-oriented frames of interpretation offered by the mainstream press, while it may provoke doubts and thus reduce the chance of positive responses if it interprets the situation within a more radically reversed framework. (b) Danger of victimization is an argument which can potentially influence an audience to identify with its own group and leadership, rather than to be open to constructive conflict transformation.

4. The second experiment

To test whether these results can also be replicated with the text genre and the audience of the provincial press was the aim of a follow-up study by Jennifer Sparr (2004) which measured the acceptance of various text versions with the same instrument used in the original experiment, but did not investigate their effects on the audience's mental models.

4.1 Goals and conditions

The aim of the experiment was to test hypotheses 4.2 and 5.1, according to which the conditions were less favorable than those of the original study:

Ad 4.2: The texts were much shorter, and the text format corresponded to that of an Austrian regional paper; and

Ad 5.1: the sample of subjects was drawn from its readership.

With respect to hypotheses 1.1, 4.1, 2.2 and 1.2, the conditions were much the same as in the prior study:

Ad 1.1: The text material also dealt with post-war conflicts in former Yugoslavia after the fall of Milošević;

Ad 4.1: the text genre was again that of news articles and/or short commentaries;

Ad 2.2: Austrian diplomacy had also supported Slovenia's, Croatia's and Bosnia's struggle for independence even before the war broke out, and

Ad 1.2: Austrian public discourse had been much the same as that in Germany.

With respect to hypothesis 2.1, the conditions were slightly different:

Ad 2.1: the Austrian military was not involved in the Kosovo War.

4.2 Experimental design

	Event	Title	Source
E1	Conflict in Southern Serbia	Presovo-Tal neues Pulverfaß am Balkan (Presovo Valley new powder keg in the Balkans)	*Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, 12-27-2000
E2	Extradition of Milošević to The Hague	Milošević an UNO ausgeliefert (Milošević extradited to the UN)	*Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, 6-29-2001
E4	Kostunica's reaction to Rugova's victory in the elections in Kosovo	Kostunica bietet Rugova Gespräche an (Kostunica offers dialogue to Rugova)	*Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, 11-2-2000

Table 2: The original articles used in the study

The design of the experiment resembled that of the original study, but with some modifications: (1) The original articles (o) were taken from an Austrian regional paper, *Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, which is read by more than 70% of the population in Vorarlberg, a province of Austria bordering on Switzerland. (2) The texts were much shorter (about half the length used in the original study). (3) The treaty between Serbia and Montenegro, for which no suitable article could be found in *Vorarlberger Nachrichten*, was replaced by another event: E4: Kostunica's reaction to Rugova's victory in the Kosovo elections (November, 2000) (cf. Table 2). (4) Since the text format was not suited for a strongly de-escalation oriented framing of the events (d2), this variant was replaced by an escalation-oriented one with reversed partiality: in favor of Serbia (r). (5) The sample of subjects (n = 126) was not representative, but was instead biased towards younger and more highly educated subjects; and (6) the combination of text versions was less systematic than in the original study.

4.3 Instruments

Acceptance of the articles was assessed by means of the same questionnaire used in the original study, to which an additional question was added, asking the subjects whether they would decide to read the article if its title appeared as a headline on the front page of their paper (I17).

4.4 Results

Consistent with hypotheses 4.2 and 5.1, the subjects' responses to the articles were less differentiated than in the original study. Latent Class Analysis of the questionnaire data identified only five evaluation patterns (K6.1 – K6.5), two of

which (K6.4: 13.3% and K6.5: 6.5%) are characterized by missing data, particularly about questions referring to the entertainment value of the articles and also other items. The remaining patterns (K6.1 – K6.3), can again be ordered according to the interest in further information which the articles aroused as:

- some interest in further information (K6.1),
- little interest in further information (K6.2) and
- no interest in further information (K6.3).[5]

They are characterized by a generally lower degree of interest aroused and a generally less positive evaluation of the articles than found by the original study, and there is no significant correlation between the evaluation patterns and the text-versions which the subjects evaluated (cf. Figure 12).



Figure 11: Frequency of the evaluation patterns as a function of the various text versions.
χ^2=56.46, df=8, p<0.001
E1 = Conflict in Southern Serbia;
E2 = Extradition of Milošević;
E4 = Kostunica's offer of dialogue



Figure 12: Frequency of the evaluation patterns as a function of the reported events.
χ^2 = 16.18, df = 12, n.s.
e = escalation oriented; o = original article;
d1 = moderately de-escalation oriented;
r = escalation oriented with reversed partiality

If any tendency can be found in the data at all, then it would seem that the evaluations of the original articles varied most widely (high proportion of K6.1 and K6.3), and the evaluations of the de-escalation oriented text versions varied least of all (high proportion of K6.2).

Some interest in further information: Evaluation pattern K6.1 resembles pattern K1.3 of the original study, though on a lower level. As compared with K1.3, the reported events seem to be more familiar (I5) than in K1.3 and fewer new aspects

5 For a more detailed description of the evaluation patterns see Sparr (2004).

seem to be brought up (I10). The articles seem less interesting (I2), less sensational (I3) and less informative (I4) and provoke more doubts about their factual accuracy (I6) and truthfulness.

Little interest in further information (K6.2) goes hand in hand with an average or undecided evaluation of the article with respect to the other items on the questionnaire.

No interest in further information (K6.3) is combined with a negative evaluation of the articles throughout. They seem difficult to understand (I9) and rather hard to read (I13), as rather boring (I1) and not interesting (I2), and they do not bring up new aspects (I10).

- In accordance with beliefs about the news value of personal and negative issues ("bad news is good news"), evaluation pattern K6.1 (some interest in further information) applies most frequently to reports about Milošević's extradition (E2) and the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1).
  Kostunica's offer of dialogue to Rugova (E4) is less dramatic and arouses less audience interest.
- Vice versa, evaluation pattern K6.3 (no interest in further information) applies most frequently to reports about Kostunica's offer of talks (E4).
  In evaluations of reports about Milošević's extradition (E2) it was almost completely absent (cf. Figure 11).

4.5 Conclusions

The second experiment can be qualified as focusing on post-war coverage in the provincial press of an outside country which had intervened in the conflict with diplomatic, but not with military means, whose population was not directly affected by the war either, and whose media had not completely sided with any of the war parties. Given these limitations, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Although the provincial audience seems to accept everything reported by its media, and even the escalation oriented texts with reversed partiality (r) were accepted no less than the other text versions, peace journalism has less chance to influence the readership of the provincial press.
2. As it seems, the text format of a regional paper is too constrained, and its audience is too little interested or feels too little involved in international affairs, and traditional news factors have too much impact on its reading preferences.

5. Discussion

Summarizing the results of the two experiments, they speak in favor of the peace journalism project.

Hypothesis 5.2 can clearly be rejected. Escalation oriented coverage is *not* more suitable to the purpose of arousing audience interest, but rather de-escalation oriented coverage has the same potential:

- De-escalation oriented articles were never accepted to a lesser degree than the other text versions, neither in the first nor in the second experiment.
- In the first experiment, which focused on the quality press and its audience, lack of interest in further information (K1.4 + K1.6) was found most frequently in reaction to the original articles (o) and could be reduced to the same degree by the other text versions, irrespectively of their escalation or de-escalation oriented framing.
- The more strongly de-escalation oriented test-versions (d2) evoked the same amount of strong interest in further information (K1.3) as the escalation oriented ones (e), and
- lack of interest, in combination with a negative evaluation of the articles (K1.6), decreased steadily the less escalation oriented and the more de-escalation oriented the articles were.

In accordance with hypotheses 4.2 and 5.1, the responses to the various text versions were less pronounced in the second experiment, which was based on the provincial press and its audience.

- Interest in further information was generally lower in the audience of the provincial paper, and
- differences in the various text versions had no effect on the acceptance of the articles. Even the escalation oriented text versions with reversed partiality (r) were as acceptable as the other ones.

Moreover, the first experiment also confirmed hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2, according to which acceptance of de-escalation oriented text versions should be greater if they refrain from interpreting situations within a too radically reversed framework.

- The greatest doubts about the impartiality and accuracy of the articles (K1.3) was aroused by reports about violent conflicts in Southern Serbia (E1) which did not agree with previously accepted enemy images, and
- the moderately de-escalation oriented text versions (d1) aroused less doubt (K1.3) than the more strongly escalation oriented ones (d2).
- Nonetheless, the de-escalation oriented framing of the latter ones (d2) was still moderate enough not to provoke more doubts (K1.3) than the original articles (o) or the escalation oriented ones (e).

Last but not least, the results of the two experiments also support the assumption that traditional news factors like "negative vs. positive" and "personal vs. structural" do have an impact on audience responses to news articles.

- In the first experiment, *lack of interest* in further information (K1.4 + K1.6) was the most frequent response to articles about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3: positive/structural) and the least frequent response to articles about the conflict in Southern Serbia (E1: negative/personal).
- In the second experiment, *lack of interest* in further information (K6.3) was strongest with regard to Kostunica's offer of dialogue (E4: positive/personal) and weakest with regard to the Milošević's extradition (E2: negative/personal), where it was almost completely absent.

The impact of these news factors is not homogenous, however, and depends on the complexity of the articles.

- The articles about the treaty between Serbia and Montenegro (E3: positive/ structural) were not only those that most often met with a *lack of interest* (K1.4+K1.6), they were also those that most frequently aroused *strong interest* in further information (K1.3); and
- strong interest in further information (K1.3) was particularly aroused by the more strongly de-escalation oriented text versions (d2), which gave a more complex depiction of the reported conflicts.

Obviously, simplification has no news value of its own, but on the contrary: more complex reporting can attract audience interest even for issues which are not inherently very interesting.

All in all, these results are consistent with findings by Wolling (2002), according to whom the quality of information is a crucial factor in the evaluation of news programs. The capability of the media to attract attention with quality reports seems to be constrained by the text genre and the media format, however. Moreover, the audience's political knowledge may also have an impact. As Eilders (1997) has found, the more political knowledge readers have, the less they will be influenced by traditional news factors. The better they are informed, the more they will have their own ideas about which aspects of an issue are relevant to them.

Consistent with audience surveys which found that the readership of daily newspapers would like to read political news coverage which gives more background information, is more critical and less influenced by established institutions (Weber, 2003), it is particularly the news factors of "simplicity vs. complexity", "negative vs. positive" and "personal vs. structural" that seem to lose their impact if the text genre and the media format offer enough space for more complexity, more balanced reporting and also the coverage of structural issues.

In the quality press, these preconditions seem to be fulfilled to a sufficient degree, both in order to interest the audience in de-escalation oriented post-war coverage and in order to influence the way it interprets reported events.

As shown by the first experiment, an escalation vs. de-escalation oriented framing of the reported events has a clear impact on the mental models with which an audience interprets conflict.

Escalation oriented coverage promoted mental models which focus on the evil past of the Milošević era (K2.4), perpetuate the anti-Serbian enemy image (K2.2) and refuse to acknowledge democratic change in Serbia (K2.5); which interpret the behavior of the international community as confrontational (K3.2), identify with the Albanian minority in Serbia (K4.3) and side with Montenegro (K5.3) against the Serbs.

De-escalation oriented coverage, on the other hand, promoted mental models which appreciate the new start (K2.3) and democratic change (K2.1) in Serbia and evaluate (present) Serbian behavior and positions in an unbiased way (K2.6), which interpret the behavior of the international community as cooperative (K3.1), maintain a critical distance from the Albanian minority in Serbia (K4.2) and acknowledge Montenegro's cooperative behavior in an unbiased way (K5.2).

Part III
Teaching modules

8

A course in peace journalism

Jake Lynch

1. Introduction

This article sets out an annotated and reasoned account of a self-contained module, or short course, as it can be taught to final-year undergraduate or post-graduate groups in universities. The purpose of the article is to help teachers to shape their own courses.

It is based on MA courses the writer has already led[1], at Sydney University and the University of Queensland, Australia; Cardiff University, Wales; Oslo University College, Norway and Orebro University, Sweden, as well as the on-line TRANSCEND Peace University, to students of disciplines including:

- Conflict and Peace Studies
- Journalism
- Communications
- Media Practice
- International Relations

Some enter such courses wanting to experiment with doing peace journalism for themselves. Others see the coverage of conflicts as an issue of general public concern, and one they wish to address by other means – holding news organisations to account, particularly in broadcasting where codes of conduct may have some statutory or binding status. The article offers brief notes on practical peace journalism, as well as showing how learning outcomes can be formulated to allow the same issues to be tackled in the form of a civil society campaign, or as a peacebuilding intervention in conflict.

The bulk of this article, however, is concerned with

- theoretical issues of conflict, peace and violence
- and media criticism and analysis, based on how these issues are represented in news reports.

1 With Annabel McGoldrick

It suggests how these core concepts may be introduced to a whole group of students, so as to enable them to form their own critical understanding of peace journalism and to see how the issues it raises intersect with others they may meet elsewhere.

It concentrates on a case study from the Philippines, arguing that it, like many conflicts around the world, is now increasingly likely to be framed according to the so-called 'global war on terrorism'.

2. Core concepts

At its core, peace journalism proposes a set of distinctions in the reporting of conflicts, as well as a workable set of methods for editors and reporters to employ, based on an awareness of these distinctions, in mainstream news and current affairs.

Whereas war journalism leads – or leaves – readers and audiences to over-value violence, as a response to conflicts and crises, peace journalism creates opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent, developmental responses.

Briefly, in practical terms, peace journalism tends to:

- Take an analytical approach to conflict, seeking opportunities to identify parties, goals, needs and interests
- Project a multiparty conflict model rather than a Manichean 'tug-of-war'
- Find room for perspectives from beyond the usual 'official sources'
- Seek out peace initiatives as well as 'pegs' (opportunities) to report on them

A course in peace journalism must set out for discussion the reasons why these distinctions can be seen as important. This article suggests how to lead such a discussion with reference to propositions about conflict and its dynamics chiefly attributable to the TRANSCEND method of Johan Galtung.

Such a course must also explore arguments around the production of meaning and media reception and response. The article shows how to help students to consider the likely differential impact, on the behaviour of parties to conflict, of war journalism and peace journalism respectively, as patterns of media response to conflict.

The article also explains how peace journalism can help to bring about the 'conceptual reform' necessary to modernise the study of journalism, as taught to journalism students; a contribution to problematising elements of journalistic practice which pass unexamined in many current courses. That, in turn, entails examining the emergence and ascendancy of conventions known, together, as

'objective journalism', and their historical construction – arguably as a hegemonic project – by economic, political, social and cultural process.

2.1 Media analysis and criticism

Existing courses have generally begun by showing students, at the outset, examples of what war journalism and peace journalism might look like (the opening sequence of Lynch & McGoldrick (2004) has often been used). This is an introduction to analysing representations of conflict in news reporting, and forming a critical understanding calibrated on the distinctions peace journalism proposes as being the important ones.

Experience suggests that many will arrive with the assumption, familiar from everyday conversation, that 'conflict' is synonymous with 'violence'. Most will likely assume that reporting conflict means reporting violent incidents – which, under the conventions of news they will have internalised as readers, listeners and viewers, it often does.

Hence the 'two versions' concept, offering two contrasting treatments of the same violent incident. It will be argued here that there are many aspects of a conflict, besides the violence, which merit reporting – by virtue of their importance in its overall dynamics – but nevertheless remain unreported, or at least under-reported, because of journalistic conventions.

But the assumptions many will bring to the class mean that if the war journalism focuses on violence, and the peace journalism ignores it, the comparison will seem unfair, as between apples and oranges; and unrealistic, since it is difficult to imagine journalists, in practice, ignoring a bombing or riot on their doorstep, even if they wanted to. To be credible, peace journalism needs to be able to say something useful to the editor or reporter who is called on to respond in these circumstances.

The following two examples – published here in transcript form for the first time (to be published as Lynch & McGoldrick, 2007), concern the so-called Valentine's Day bombings in the Philippines, in 2005. They take the form of illustrated transcripts of two news-length treatments, broadly as one could imagine appearing on a television news service for a general audience.

As reports compiled by outsiders they are, inevitably, more easily imaginable in western-owned media like, say, BBC World or perhaps Australia's SBS News, than a local programme; but the differences are of degree rather than of kind. Conceptual frames originating in the West, such as the 'global war on terrorism' are, if anything, even more to the fore in mainstream Philippines media than in Britain or Australia.

Groups are invited to watch them bearing the following questions in mind:

1. How is the violence explained?
2. What is presented as the problem – ie, who or what is to blame for the violence?
3. What does the report lead us to believe the solution is likely to be?

2.2 Version 1 – War journalism

Pictures 1  	Voice 1 Reporter voice-over: A day of love becomes an evening of hate in the Philippines. Commuters in the main financial district of Manila on the way to meet their Valentines when the bomb ripped through a crowded bus station. At least three people were killed, with dozens more injured.
Pictures 2 	Voice 2 Actor's voice reads translation of eyewitness statement: 'It was a loud blast, I saw sparks and then there was smoke. A lot of stuff was flying around, and there was so much confusion I just ran away'.
Pictures 3 	Voice 3 Reporter voice-over: It echoed two earlier blasts in the cities of Davao and General Santos, on the southern island of Mindanao – home to the Abu Sayyaf Group who've claimed responsibility for these attacks. The top US diplomat here says tough action is needed to prevent Mindanao from sliding further into anarchy.
Pictures 4  	Voice 4 Joseph Mussomeli, US Ambassador to the Philippines: 'Certain portions of Mindanao are so lawless, so porous the borders, that you run the risk of it becoming like an Afghanistan situation. Mindanao is almost, forgive the poor religious pun, the new Mecca for terrorism'.

Pictures 5 	Voice 5 Jake Lynch piece-to-camera: Abu Sayyaf say these attacks were a Valentine's Day message for President Gloria Arroyo – revenge for ordering a military crackdown against Islamic separatists in the southern Philippines – a key battleground in the global War on Terrorism. Security officials here say the money and expertise were provided by Jemaah Islamiya, a militant Muslim network seen as the regional offshoot of Al Qaeda.
Pictures 6 	Voice 6 Reporter voice-over: Mrs Arroyo's office said her tough stance would not waver in the wake of these deadly attacks. In all, the death toll has risen to eleven; medical staff in all three cities left to pick up the pieces and care for the victims.
Pictures 7 	Voice 7 Actor's voice reads eyewitness statement: 'I was in another bus, by the third door at the back when all of a sudden, the bus beside the bus I was riding exploded'.
	Second eyewitness: 'What I remember was, there was a loud explosion and a lot of things flew from behind. That's all I remember – and then I lost consciousness'.
Pictures 8 	Voice 8 Reporter voice-over: Whatever progress Philippines troops can make in mopping up pockets of resistance in Mindanao, will be carefully watched – not just here but in Washington too where the fight against Al Qaeda is being coordinated. Jake Lynch, in the Philippines.

2.3 Version 2 – Peace journalism

Pictures 1  	Voice 1 Reporter voice-over: Unhappy Valentine for the Philippines – the bombers hit commuters dashing home to their loved ones in the capital, Manila as well as two southern cities, Davao and General Santos. Medical teams patched up the wounded as the death toll rose to eleven.
Pictures 2 	Voice 2 Actor's voice reads eyewitness statement: 'What I remember was, there was a loud explosion and a lot of things flew from behind. That's all I remember – and then I lost consciousness'.
Pictures 3 	Voice 3 Reporter voice-over: The attacks were claimed by the Abu Sayyaf Group – in revenge, they said, for civilian deaths in a recent so-called 'military crackdown' in the southern Philippines. There's been a chorus of calls from human rights campaigners and opposition groups for troops to pull back and alleged abuses to be properly investigated.
Pictures 4 	Voice 4 Reporter voice-over: Richard Bulane lies in hospital where doctors are struggling to save his right arm; three members of his family lie dead in what he says was a deliberate attack by troops on the southern island of Mindanao.
Pictures 5 	Voice 5 Reporter summarises Bulane's comments after pause for his voice: 'We were shot without provocation', he told me. 'I could see some of their faces and I just kept thinking – I'll see these faces in a court of law'.

Pictures 6	Voice 6
	Reporter voice-over: The soldiers who shot him wouldn't speak on camera but the army statement says the Bulanes were 'communist terrorists' – something they deny.
Pictures 7	Voice 7
	Annabel McGoldrick piece-to-camera: Police are warning of more attacks on soft targets including bus stations and public parks. A spokesman for President Gloria Arroyo said she would not be deflected from the War on Terrorism. But the Philippines people, both here and in Mindanao, are in danger of being trapped in a cycle of violence where each new atrocity succeeds only in raising the level of bitterness on all sides.
Pictures 8	Voice 8
	Reporter voice-over: Mrs Arroyo is about to begin negotiations with Islamic separatists on Mindanao. But some analysts here are warning that crackdowns and tough rhetoric don't make the best backdrop for peace. Annabel McGoldrick, in the Philippines.

2.4 Commentary

How is the violence explained?

In Version 1, war journalism, the bombings are presented as part of a 'terrorist conspiracy' – a form of analysis familiar to readers of Manila's main newspapers, for whom the 'alphabet soup' of JI, ASG, MILF etc is a staple diet.

Furthermore, this appears to be a *Muslim* conspiracy – we are left to infer that the 'Islamic separatists' referred to are somehow connected with those now bent, according to the remarkable interview given by the US Ambassador, on turning Mindanao into the 'new Mecca' for terrorism.

The violence appears to be its own cause – these bombings came in revenge for other violence, a 'military crackdown in the southern Philippines'. We are not shown anything of the context, the conditions in which it becomes possible to mobilise some people for violence. It's a narrative of 'tit-for-tat', begging the question of how the violence started in the first place.

This curtain is pulled back, at least to some extent, in Version 2, peace journalism. The Bulanes' story suggests how the 'global war on terrorism', as a frame applied to this conflict – as it is to many others around the world – may actually be stirring up trouble, as it is being used to justify army violence against civilians.

The behaviour of the Philippines military, passed off in Version 1 with the euphemism 'mopping up pockets of resistance', is here characterised in a frame of human rights abuses.

What is the problem? What is the solution?

In Version 1 the 'terrorists' are the problem. They are to blame. The solution, as presaged in the closing images of the report, is for an intensification of military action to remove, neutralise or punish them.

We are presented with no other form of explanation as to how they arise in the first place, why they attract sympathy and support; so there is, it appears, no other remedy, nothing else to be addressed in order to bring the violence to an end. In war journalism terms, it 'mak[es] wars opaque' (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a, p 6).

In Version 2, by contrast, there is at least an inkling of the conflict as an overarching, shared problem, penetrating relations between people and conditioning their responses. It may be weakly conceptualised at this stage – the 'cycle of violence' in which all sides now risk entrapping themselves – but it is there.

It is suggested that the violence is partly attributable to underlying structural problems such as impunity for the military in human rights abuses. Once that is 'on the map', the conflict becomes more transparent, and it makes sense to report on different ways in which conflict actors are trying to address these problems.

Here, we see people proposing both legal remedies – Mr Bulane himself – and political remedies – the demonstrators calling for a change of policy, and the negotiations with the MILF. Given just a little more context, the viewer can now appreciate how these could form part of the solution:

'The remedy for a problem, in conflict as in medicine, depends on diagnosis' (p 20).

The initial notes above, on these Philippines stories, are similar to the approach used in Lynch and McGoldrick (2005a), written as a set text for a self-contained course, and based, in turn, on the original war journalism/peace journalism table drawn up by Johan Galtung (p 6).

Other important accounts include the escalation/de-escalation schema for constructive conflict coverage, developed in Kempf (2003a), which concentrates on ways to frame conflict in a 'win-win', rather than 'win-lose' mode:

'In any conflict, each side has its own rights and intentions, and there is an opponent whose actions interfere with them and are consequently experienced as threatening. At the same time as the one side's actions interfere with the opponent's rights and intentions, the opponent imagines himself to be threatened as well. Still, there can be common ground, common rights and intentions and common benefits resulting from the relationship between the two parties that may provide reasons for mutual trust. In this sense, any conflict is capable of being conceptualised as either a competitive (win-lose) or as a cooperative (win-win) process' (p 34).

Then, more recently, peace journalism has been applied, or 'operationalised', as a 26-factor framing model – and important differences recorded – in nearly 4,000 examples of conflict coverage in a total of ten newspapers from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and the Philippines (Maslog and Ting Lee 2005).

Any or all of these texts can be used as a basis for setting students to identify distinctions between journalism with potential to contribute, in some way, to more violence, and journalism which may extend the perceived options for non-violent responses, or at least a conceptual and political context in which they can be considered and valued.

3. The rest of the course

The remainder of a course in peace journalism must, at least, cover three main areas arising out of this opening gambit. Two are theoretical – propositions about conflict, and about news, journalism and media respectively. The third is practical, building on the beginnings of media analysis and media criticism introduced in discussions based on the two versions.

Theoretical

1. *Propositions about conflict:* Identify and discuss the propositions about conflict inscribed in these alternative choices of material. Deciding to hear from the US Ambassador, on the one hand, floating the possibility that Mindanao may become the next Afghanistan; or, on the other, from Mr Bulane, to give shape to issues such as impunity and human rights, imply different understandings of what the conflict is *about*.
2. *Propositions about news, journalism and media:* Identify and discuss the propositions about news, journalism and media inscribed in the peace journalism/ war journalism analytical model. Don't journalists just 'report the facts' anyway? Are we 'led to believe' anything substantive about conflict by reading, hearing or viewing news reports, or do we simply apply our preconceptions? Doesn't war journalism simply reflect the interests of those who own the media

and advertise within them? And does the content of news representations 'matter', in any larger sense?

Practical

3. *More practical peace journalism:* Show and discuss other examples of peace journalism. These two treatments illustrate an incipient divergence only. An editorial strategy informed by peace journalism builds on the beginnings of a peace-shaped understanding of conflict, as raised by the coverage of a violent incident, to explore other aspects, unfamiliar from most mainstream news representations. War journalism and peace journalism may be conceptualised as opposite ends of a 'sliding scale' (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a, p 187).

3.1 Propositions about conflict

Some have criticised peace journalism as being unavoidably *normative* (Hanitzsch, 2004a). It enables us to identify, and inspect from the outside, a set of journalistic conventions that tend to foreground acts of violence. But it also suggests there is something wrong with the picture that emerges. The operation of these conventions *distorts* conflicts – 'lead[ing] us, or leav[ing] us, to *over*-value reactive, violent responses and *under*-value developmental, non-violent ones (p 5)' (emphases added).

On what basis, then, are these normative claims made? It is proposed that journalists can anchor themselves in the body of knowledge, observation and interpretation offered by the interdisciplinary field of Peace and Conflict Studies.

This has its own controversies, of course, but it could be argued that its insights provide the foundation for a critique of journalism about conflict before and below the point where these 'kick in'. The following precepts, in particular, are widely shared:

- *Violence is never wholly its own cause* – Conflict is made up of structure, culture and process – the context, without which no explanation for a violent event is complete or, indeed, correct
- *Non-violent responses are always possible* – There is always more than one way of responding to conflict. Many people, in many places, are devising, advocating and applying non-violent responses
- *More than two sides* – There are always more than two parties to any conflict – some, whose involvement or interest is hidden, need putting on the map. Others, presented as a solid aggregate of view, may contain important internal divisions, and they need *dis*-aggregation
- *Every party has a stake* – Parties to conflict should be seen as stakeholders, pursuing their own goals, needs and interests – some openly acknowledged, but almost invariably some hidden as well

'Violence'

To invoke structure and culture as part of the explanation for violence is introduce the signature concept of Johan Galtung, credited as the chief pioneer of Peace and Conflict Studies – namely, structural violence.

As with 'conflict', this is to propose, in turn, a definition of violence quite different from the one most students will know from everyday conversation. One helpful way to open a discussion is to invite them to separate out one aspect of violence – the effect it has – from another: the form it takes.

Galtung's classic definition of violence:

'Human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential' (Galtung, 1969).

This effect can be wrought in different ways: the familiar direct violence – hitting, shooting, bombing and shelling, all involving physical contact, whether person-to-person or by using weapons to convey force to a target – but also by systems, institutionalised customs and practices placing barriers in people's way that they cannot remove by any normal means.

Equipped with this insight, students can be invited to name instances of structural violence such as racism, sexism, Apartheid, corruption-collusion-nepotism – a syndrome known in Indonesia, for example, by its initials as KKN – and many others. What links these phenomena is not the form they take but the *effect* they bring about on individuals and society.

Introducing Galtung's closely related concept of cultural violence may lead the discussion on to consider examples as diverse as initiation rites in traditional societies, to the statues of war heroes, and even colonial administrators, all over central London.

Objections

Any honest presentation of these issues, in the context of a university course, will need to consider at least the well-known objections to structure and culture as aspects of the explanation for acts of direct violence:

"A structure-oriented perspective converts the relation from inter-personal, or inter-state/nation, to a relation between two positions in a deficient structure. If the parties can agree that the structure was/is deficient and that their behaviour was an enactment of structural positions rather than anything more personal, then turning together against the common problem, the structural violence, should be possible. A culture-oriented perspective also converts the relation from interpersonal, or inter-state/nation, to a relation spurred by a deficient culture" (Galtung, 1998c).

It would be wise – and, experience suggests, stimulating to group discussion – to consider this 'exculpatory' model in light of its broader political context. It is, it so happens, at odds with the model inscribed in the prevailing orthodoxy of global political discourse in the early 21st Century, namely the 'global war on terrorism'. In the words of Richard Perle, a highly influential figure on the neo-conservative Right, the priority of this is to:

"decontextualise terror … any attempt to discuss the roots of terrorism is an attempt to justify it. It simply needs to be fought and destroyed" (in Hari, 2004).

This amounts to 'an essentialist explanation' of political violence (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a, p 66), in the sense that 'essentialism involves defining a group of people by a small set of fixed properties, while ignoring the conditions under which such identities emerged. In the process, it discounts any possibility of change or variation within the group'[2].

'Evil' has become, in this debate, a political shorthand for fixed properties attached to enemies of Washington – hence 'the Axis of Evil', comprising Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran and North Korea.

To promote essentialist explanations for observable behaviour in this way can be seen as a symptom of fundamentalism. Just as creationism, another touchstone for the Christian Right of US politics, is a repudiation of science, in the form of evolutionary theory, so essentialism in global politics amounts to a repudiation of social science.

Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-century Arab scholar, is, after all, credited as the world's first social scientist, precisely because he acknowledged that people's apparently 'fixed properties' are actually altered by their interaction with the world around them:

"Conditions within nations and races change with the change of periods and the passage of time" (Khaldun, 1969, p 24).

British Prime Minister Tony Blair attributed the London bombings of July 7 to the workings of 'an evil ideology' (Hencke, 2005). Had he been a student on any self-respecting social science course, he would have been expected to explain the circumstances – historical, social, economic, political – in which such an ideology could attain its power of suasion over young British men at this particular time. However that would have meant acknowledging and tracing politically inconvenient connections with his own policies.

You do not need to be a fundamentalist or a prime minister at war to take issue with Galtung's model, however; there are also dissenting voices from within Peace

2 From *The Free Dictionary*, http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Essentialist

and Conflict Studies itself. It would be wrong to send students away with the impression that all the evidence and interpretation point in the direction of structural causes for violent behaviour in conflicts.

Mary B Anderson, for instance, says that 'proximate causes are more important than root causes' (1999). Violence, she argues, is often perpetrated by those intent on 'manipulation, greed and personal power' (p 9) and takes on a life of its own, detached from 'justice issues' which form the key contradictions of the underlying conflict.

So the structure-culture argument needs careful handling. Both Galtung's and Anderson's formulations can be opened up for discussion. In the former, it could be said that a balance needs to be struck; if the aim is to bring people to accept the need to 'move on' from trauma and resentment, then the approach cannot be so exculpatory as to seem to excuse violence or, experience suggests, it may stick in the craw and prove counter-productive.

The binary opposition proposed by Anderson, on the other hand, appears ripe for deconstruction, indeed it exemplifies Derrida's aphorism that 'there is always already deconstruction, at work *in* works' (1986, p 123) since the less-favoured term, the root causes, can readily be shown, in consideration of real-life examples, to inhere in the more favoured.

It could be argued that individuals and groups can always enrich or aggrandise themselves by violence, but this only runs out of control where there is a lack of consensual law enforcement; and this may, in turn, arise out of root causes that compromise allegiance to the law-enforcing entity. One example is the strife-torn city of Ambon, in the Indonesian province of Maluku:

"A better explanation than that such conflicts are triggered by pure bigotry… is based on the idea that people often identify with a particular religious community for quite worldly reasons. In Ambon at least, joining the Protestant or the Muslim community means being part of a network that not only worships God in a certain way but does practical things for its members – provide access to friends in powerful places for example, or protection when things get tough. These networks extend up the social ladder to influential circles in Jakarta. And they extend downward to street level, where gangs of young men provide the protective muscle that an inefficient police force cannot provide" (van Klinken, 1999).

'Conflict'

peace journalism draws on specific concepts of conflict itself, as well as violence. The definition commonly used in Peace and Conflict Studies is:

"Conflict is a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or think they have, incompatible goals, needs and interests" (Mitchell, 1981, p 2).

Those goals, needs and interests form the Contradictions, which give rise to the conflict – a notion concisely expressed in the famous anti-war placard and bumper sticker:

"How come our oil ended up underneath their sand?" (WNYC, 2003).

Violence is a form of Behaviour in response to conflict – there are many other possible responses. Lastly, both contradictions and behaviour may arise out of, and simultaneously reinforce, Attitudes held by parties to conflict about the others.

This is the famous conflict triangle, which all students of conflict and peace studies, at least, will likely have met by the time they arrive for their peace journalism course:

The ABC conflict triangle:



In considering these ideas in relation to news representations of conflict, it may help to bear in mind the following general observations:

"A key characteristic of war journalism is its *linearity*. Visualise the twin triangles – the ABC of conflict and the three forms of violence. In war journalism, the 'C', the contradictions, or issues dividing the parties, are often missed out in reports concentrating on attitude and behaviour.
Structural violence is also generally absent, with a noticeable bias in favour of direct violence, and some weakly conceptualised cultural violence … Remove one point from each triangle and you are left with the two remaining points, joined by a line …
War journalism offers a blow-by-blow account, a series of tit-for-tat exchanges. It tells us the way it is without any real clues as to how it comes to be that way. Its explanations for conflict and for violence are *linear* ones.
Peace journalism restores the missing points of the triangles to offer us some insights into how things come to be the way they are – essential if we are to form any idea of how to change them. The point is that war journalism is linear in its thinking and peace journalism is *extra-linear*, or multi-dimensional" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a, p 74).

Version 2 of the Philippines story mentions the cycle of violence – another term used casually in news reporting, where its meaning is often collapsed into one of tit-for-tat, another linear conceptualisation. Peace and Conflict Studies offers an extra-linear version, examining how violent behaviour brings about a change in attitudes; attitudes which, in turn, then play a part in constructing further violent acts.

The point is, people affected by conflict experience a number of different stages *between* violent incidents (Elworthy and Rogers, 2002):



It means intervention is possible, during this cycle, to divert it away from a path leading to more violence. At what point, students can usefully be asked? One way to illustrate this concept is by inviting them to imagine trying to get someone who has suffered an atrocity *not* to feel shocked, terrified, grief-stricken or angry.

Bitterness can be thought of as anger + memory, staying in the place of anger, collectively perhaps storing away trauma in a 'trauma bank' (Galtung, 2001) and, eventually, withdrawing it as 'glory' through further violence. Intervention comes at the point between anger and bitterness, and can take many forms.

'**Peace**'

So much for conflict – what of peace? It may be useful to invite students to contemplate two alternative definitions of peace (Galtung quoted in Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a):

- "Peace = victory + ceasefire"
- "Peace = non-violence + creativity"

Active non-violence would be evident in the manifold interventions to interrupt or divert the cycle of violence; and anyone carrying them out, or indeed working to prevent or lessen violence, or transform attitudes and the perception of contradictions, can be seen as a *change agent*, helping to create peace.

Why should this be significant? 'News is supposed to be *about* change. We pick up today's paper to find out what's changed since yesterday. Perhaps the lesson is, to find the sources of change, we need to cast the net a little wider' (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2004).

The US peace researcher, John Paul Lederach:

"I have not experienced any situation of conflict, no matter how protracted or severe, from Central America to the Philippines to the Horn of Africa, where there have not been people who had a vision for peace, emerging often from their own experience of pain. Far too often, however, these same people are overlooked and disempowered either because they do not represent "official" power, whether on the side of government or the various militias, or because they are written off as biased and too personally affected by the conflict" (Lederach, 1997, p 94).

The point is, the part such people play in the development of a conflict often slip through the net of journalistic conventions. War journalism, the dominant form under these conventions, can be said to be inaccurate, therefore, and to present a distorted picture.

peace journalism, it can be suggested, consists precisely in a set of techniques and perspectives to extend the ambit of news to spell out, to readers and audiences, connections between the actions of *change agents*, wherever they may be, and the dynamics and likely development of the conflict concerned:

"If there is one real skill in Peace Journalism it lies in tracing connections between the stories of people like these, and the big issues and eyecatching events of the day – showing how the actions and concerns of individuals bear indirectly on the personal fortunes of every reader, listener or viewer. To do that, journalists need to be able to draw upon a deep understanding of how conflicts develop and how people can respond to them in ways likely to reduce the risk of violence" (British Council, 2002).

3.2 Propositions about news, journalism and media

The case for peace journalism, in the words of Robert Karl Manoff, Professor of Journalism at New York University and Director of its Center for War, Peace and the News Media:

"Mass media technologies, institutions, professionals, norms and practices constitute one of the fundamental forces now shaping the lives of peoples and nations … The media constitute a major human resource, whose potential to help prevent and moderate social violence begs to be discussed, evaluated, and, where appropriate, mobilised" (Conflict and Peace Courses, 1998, p 15).

Questions for discussion with students:

- How does journalism shape the lives of peoples and nations?
- What are journalists responsible for?
- Is the meaning of a news story generated chiefly at the moment of production, or the moment of reception?
- Does the reporter load, as it were, a hypodermic syringe, which is then injected into the consciousness of anyone reading, watching or listening?
- Or do the messages communicated by newspapers and programmes depend on broader cultural conditioning, and its influence on the way they are interpreted?
- When and why would it be appropriate to mobilise the media to help prevent and moderate social violence?
- Should journalists be expected to 'make peace'?

It is beyond the scope of this article – and, indeed, of a single self-contained course – to explore this controversy in any depth. But it is well to alert students as to which side of the line one is standing on, in raising the subject at all. Peace journalism cannot very well avoid proposing that public understanding of key issues depends, at least to some extent, on how they are reported.

Students who wish to follow up on these aspects could be directed to emerging research evidence, of potentially great importance, about measurable differences in audience response to both content and textual characteristics of conflict reporting which could be characterised according to the war journalism/peace journalism schema.

Kempf (2005b) found significant differences between cognitive responses, among the same subjects, to German newspaper articles containing elements of content categorised as 'escalation', and to three re-written versions: '(a) with increased escalation-oriented framing, (b) with moderate de-escalation oriented framing and (c) with more determined de-escalation oriented framing of the events'.

Peleg and Alimi (2005) investigated 'the structuring of comprehension and interpretations to political reality in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, focusing on one particular facet: the possibility of an independent Palestinian state'. The research involved showing subjects the same articles, only with different sets of cross-headings inserted between blocs of text, and experimented with the effects of only minor changes of nomenclature; for the Palestinian leader, for example, as 'Abu Mazen' or 'Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas'.

Then, when it comes to conflict, it is arguable that most readers and audience members have less to go on, in any case, when attempting to decode news reports, than they would be with articles about, say, industrial disputes, crime in their neighbourhood or the price of goods and services.

Shadowy international menaces such as 'global terrorism', the 'Axis of Evil' and 'weapons of mass destruction' lie, by definition, outside most people's direct personal or social experience, so it is more difficult to produce 'negotiated' or 'oppositional' readings (Hall, 1980).

Discussions with students in recent years have tended to be dominated by recollections of their own shifting perceptions about the Iraq war. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005a) track the rapidly changing opinion poll findings in the UK, with a brief period, in the weeks leading up to the invasion, where the plan commanded majority support – soon followed by disillusionment as propaganda was exposed.

One participant on a course taught at the University of Sydney, in 2006 – a Masters student of Peace and Conflict Studies was equally struck by class discussions over Nato's war on Yugoslavia, in 1999:

"From the outset of the course my goal was to gain a greater understanding of the role the media played in conflict. I came into the course with a general understanding that the media, especially privately owned media was always influenced by editorial prejudice, this is evident to anyone who has read or watched a Rupert Murdoch owned media outlet. What I think surprised me however was the extent to which the consumers of media, myself included have been fooled by media into believing that the piece of journalism we have been presented with is unbiased, when in fact it was a text-book case of 'War Journalism'.
The case study about the Balkan war highlighted for me this gross misuse of media power. I have always considered myself to be quite media savvy, always able to determine what is real news and what is propaganda, that is until I encountered the case study of Kosovo … This caused me to rethink the way in which I interpret, and accept any given media report. At the time of the Balkan War I was sharing a flat with a Serbian in Israel, and I especially remember the way in which we interacted with him as a result of way in which the media presented Serbia to us. Speaking for myself, I can admit to having very little knowledge of the Balkans, and when presented with the case for military intervention by the media I was only too willing to jump on the bandwagon. This I believe is indeed the greatest threat that 'War Journalism' presents, its ability to sway an uninformed public on an issue that is multifaceted, and cannot be comprehended through a simple zero sum analysis.
This course has been a wakeup call in that respect for me, as it has highlighted a clear deficiency in the way in which I digest media sources, and has underscored the need to be more analytical, and discerning with regard to what I accept as legitimate news. Through looking at the language used as well as the information being provided by a story, I now feel as though I am empowered with the knowledge, which is required for one to look beyond what is written and to understand the meaning behind it."

Similar comments could now apply to the reporting of conflicts, including local conflicts in local media, around the world, not least because so many are now framed with reference to the obfuscatory 'global war on terrorism' – in contexts as diverse as Nepal, Colombia, Macedonia, Britain/Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Uganda, Sudan, Indonesia – and the Philippines example discussed here. The reporting of conflict has, arguably, become more resistant to decoding in the process, and the dominant ideology more readily capable of being encoded in news reports

(Oberg, 2005). It means that forms of content analysis, such as peace journalism, are now if anything more important in considering the reporting of conflict.

The feedback loop

'I know I waste half the money I spend on advertising – the problem is, I don't know which half' – John Wanamaker, US department store pioneer (Rothenberg, 1999).

Parties to conflict may expend large amounts of money and attention on their dealings with journalists, without knowing whether the news stories that result are effective as an influence on public opinion, and even without knowing, for sure, whether and how changes in public opinion may bear upon their goals and interests in any case.

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005a) argue that it is not the influence of news on public opinion as such, but assumptions by parties to conflict about its likely or possible influence, that condition their behaviour, in a Feedback Loop of cause and effect – another distinctively extra-linear conceptualisation.

This chimes with earlier accounts that emphasise the preparedness of conflict actors to calibrate not only their message but also their actions, to be readily packaged, in the case of those – like governments – who enjoy 'habitual access' to journalists; or to 'promote events', for those – like 'terrorists' – who do not (Molotch and Lester, 1997).

Molotch and Lester's formulation of news management as 'purposive behaviour' may also be a good fit with the issues involved in considering the reporting of conflict, since parties arguably behave more 'purposively' during periods of intensification, when the conflict in question is more likely to be in the news. (As an example, the US embassy in Manila took its own transcript of Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli's remarks about Mindanao and publicised them on its own website, in advance of transmission).

These are just a few threads to grasp – but they point to the kind of considerations likely to crop up in discussions with groups about why peace journalism 'matters' in any larger sense.

The Feedback Loop has unmistakable implications for journalistic *ethics*, a topic many students on media and journalism courses will study separately. In reports of the facts, it means "some facts are created, at least partly, in order to be reported … the facts of tomorrow bear a residue, or imprint, of the reporting of today". It intersects with ethical concepts of *deon* (duty) and *telos* (goal, or outcome):

"A deontological journalistic ethic is, in this sense, merely a teleological one "in-waiting" – waiting for a convincing explanation of the relations of cause and effect" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a, pp 217–8).

Objectivity

It may be surprising to find how many students, from disciplines such as International Relations or even Conflict and Peace Studies, arrive for their peace journalism class still assuming that journalists simply 'report the facts' or that the media merely constitute a neutral 'space'. In this, they may simply be typical of the public at large, in many parts of the world:

"Television journalists: know your place. The overwhelming view of the public is that the job doesn't involve creative decisions, because 'news is news', according to ITC [Independent Television Commission] audience research. 'What do you mean, what should they cover?' a young woman from London asked a researcher. 'They have to cover the news. What has happened, what is going on, there is not a lot of deciding to do about it'" (in Lynch, 2002, p 21).

They may usefully be pointed in the direction of accessible, authoritative accounts, such as Bagdikian (2000) and Hackett and Zhao (1998), of how the set of industry conventions known as journalistic objectivity emerged in the first place.

The standard scientific definition of objectivity is that findings should be observable and reproducible; and these accounts show how journalism came to concentrate on those portions of the facts most easily accepted, at any rate by the targeted affluent consumers, as both. A form of news that was unexceptionable, to readers and audiences of all political views and none, was constructed, therefore, by intelligible historical process.

What does this have to do with conflict? 'Objective' news has three conventions in particular that also predispose it towards war journalism as the dominant form. They are:

- A bias in favour of event over process
- A bias in favour of official sources
- A bias in favour of dualism

How come? Event over process – easy. As with the Philippines bombings, concentrating on the explosion and its immediate physical effects is to confine oneself to things that have, incontestably, happened. Go to unravel it and you immediately confront the question – which thread do we pull? A decision which would draw attention to itself *as a decision*, and therefore one that risks putting off sections of the readership or audience.

Confine reports of conflict to violent events, however, and, as already suggested, it can lead or leave violence to appear, by default, as the only colourable 'solution'.

Official sources – well, clearly important to 'objective' reporting since the words and deeds of a Prime Minister – or even a US Ambassador – can be reported by virtue of holding their office, without that implying approval for what they say. But Lederach's grassroots peacemakers, while always present, and important to the dynamics of a conflict, are just one aspect likely to fall off the edge of the news as a result, leading to a distorted picture. Also missing – anything official sources do not care to discuss, as with the 'our oil/their sand' conundrum in advance of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

What about dualism? This draws in observations from narrative analysis:

"One safe way to insulate oneself against allegations of bias is to 'hear both sides' … It also chimes with the way many other parts of life are organised. Politics? Conveniently divided into Left and Right. Our personality, thoughts and dreams? Try 'conscious' and 'unconscious'. In the end, we will all be sorted into sheep and goats, in the last battle of Good and Evil.
It means any narrative organised around two poles may appear to us as "common sense". A decision to tell a story in that way can slip past, unnoticed, without drawing attention to itself, because of its close resemblance, in shape and structure, to so much of the story-telling we already take for granted. Dualism is, for these reasons, a key part of Objectivity" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a, p 210).

However, dualism is also a key component of war journalism:

- "It's a simple question of geometry. Two points can only be joined in one way – with a line
- It means any movement – any change in the relations between them – can only take place along this single axis
- The conflict is like a tug of war …
- It's a 'zero-sum game', in which each party ultimately faces only two alternatives – victory or defeat

If the parties to a conflict conceive of it, or *frame* it, in this way, it prepares the ground for escalation. Why? Because it becomes impossible for either to propose any change in policy which does not, clearly and unequivocally, move that party further towards victory over the other. Anything else would risk being interpreted – and reported – as 'backing down'. Anything which is not 'winning' must be 'losing'. Defeat being unthinkable, each has a ready-made incentive to step up, or escalate, his efforts for victory" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a, p 8).

The propaganda model

Experience suggests that if students of other disciplines have already met any media theory, through general interest, it likely to be is the propaganda model (Chomsky, 1989).

Certainly the question is likely to be raised in some form – or to hang in the air, if not explored – as to whether all this discussion about war journalism and peace

journalism is not rather beside the point – shouldn't we expect 'corporate media' to be warlike, as the scorpion will sting, because that's their nature?

Chomsky's key proposition:

"Major media – particularly, the elite media that set the agenda that others generally follow – are corporations 'selling' privileged audiences to other businesses. It would hardly come as a surprise if the picture of the world they present were to reflect the perspectives and interests of the sellers, the buyers, and the product" (Chapter One, segment 3/6).

What suggestions can course directors make to open this up? Well, like the Anderson earlier, it may be ripe for deconstruction. War journalism predominated in UK media, for example, in the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq, but, it could be argued, participation was, if anything, against the interests of British business in general, and the media-owning and patronising sections of it in particular.

It brought, or triggered:

- Depressed stock market performance
- Meagre pickings in reconstruction
- Ballooning public deficits, with associated fiscal and monetary effects
- A longer and deeper advertising recession

So 'reflecting the interests of sellers and buyers' cannot explain, at least in a unified, 'present' sense, the predominance of war journalism, leading us (in the UK) to over-value violence as a response to this particular conflict.

The Blair government was committed to war, as later investigative journalism revealed, long before the decision was 'officially' taken, and, it could be said, prudent businesses of whatever stripe do not make life too difficult for the government of the day in carrying out their cherished policies. But that would be to *dissociate* the very notion of 'business interests' – they may be divided and, in some senses, contradictory.

If it is true that Rupert Murdoch, in the comment attributed to him, envisaged '$20 a barrel for oil' as part of the spoils of war (Day, 2003); and if this somehow fed through into the decision by his 175 newspapers around the world to start running bellicose editorials all at about the same time (Greenslade, 2003); then it calls into question the ability of 'business' to identify its own interests, and think through, in advance, the causes and effects necessary to secure them.

Where does this leave us? There are connections, to be sure, between the business interests of those who own and patronise the media, and the prevalence of reporting conventions which predispose the news towards war journalism; however those connections are not linear, as Chomsky implies, but historical and structural; they are, moreover, riven with contradictions, both actual and potential.

Students who wish to pursue this aspect of the course could usefully be directed to Tehranian (2002) on the one hand:

"Structural pluralism may be considered a *sine qua non* of content pluralism";

and Lynch and McGoldrick (2005b) on the other:

"Peace Journalism … does restore a sense of agency and responsibility to discussions about democracy and the media, discussions that can otherwise seem excessively structural-functionalist in tone and content"

to ponder whether and how the statements they make can be reconciled[3].

3.3 More practical peace journalism

In practice, groups and individual students show a great diversity of responses to the opening gambit of showing two versions of a report of a particular violent incident. A group at Sydney University included a sizeable contingent from Mindanao. Some of them, initially at least, saw the reports recounted in this article as more remarkable for their similarities than their differences.

In the same way, *News from the Holy Land* (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2004) – which opens with two reports about a suicide bombing in Jerusalem – elicited very different reactions when screened to an audience mainly comprised of the Israeli Left, in Tel Aviv, then to a mixed audience in Bethlehem. Here, local journalism students tended to be dismissive of the notion that the war journalism treatment should be seen as materially different from the peace journalism. Internationals present, on the other hand – while supportive of the Palestinian cause – were simultaneously well aware that the latter would 'push the envelope' of acceptability in any western newsroom, describing it as 'radical'.

This is fertile ground for group discussions. One begins by asking whether peace journalism can be expected to look and feel the same everywhere. Another involves considering how far peace journalism can be removed, or needs to be removed, from framings of conflict by those who feel threatened.

Discussion can be followed by exercises in media analysis and criticism. What would it take to change the representation of conflicts? Once the basic war journalism/peace journalism model has been introduced, students can be sent away in groups to find examples of reports of conflict, identify their war journalism characteristics and suggest effective tactics to re-conceive, re-source, reconstruct and rewrite them as peace journalism. The Mindanao participants in Sydney began to

3 A suggestion by Professor Robert A Hackett, made during discussions at the 2005 conference of the Toda Institute for Peace and Policy Research, Madrid

appreciate the distinctions and their importance as they experimented with these tactics for themselves. One of them reflected:

"This course is so timely for me because I am at the crossroads: to pursue journalism or to move on to other endeavours. There have been more than a few times when I even told my boss I was planning to resign [my job] but my wife kept on telling me to stay on.
This course has provided a step-by-step guide for journalists on how to do coverage in conflict situations. I realize now that I need not stop reporting on violent events but that I should do so with a wider perspective which would entail a little bit more thinking, a little bit more work, and would require reaching out to alternative sources of information other than the usual 'official' ones."

The next step is to think of ways to follow up on a violent incident, perhaps involving different modes of story-telling, with the aim of interpolating elements of the conflict picture routinely omitted or occluded in news representations compiled under the conventions of 'objectivity'. News from the Holy Land includes five news-length features, which further the incipient divergence of the initial two versions.

Perhaps the most important is a report on two brothers – one a suicide bomber, the other a peace worker in Bethlehem – which was also versioned for BBC radio and television. The surviving brother says: 'Each stage of the struggle has its own different form of resistance. Once it meant retaliation for Israeli attacks on us. But violence just creates more violence. We want a different future, and that's why we're working, that's the reason why I exist, so as to help create a better future for the kids here'.

This is a useful talking point since it shows differential responses to the same set of circumstances – a structure-culture explanation for violence which still finds room for the exercise of individual responsibility.

Then there is the art of 'pegging' a follow-up to an initial report. In reality, in the Philippines, the comments by Ambassador Mussomeli came some time after the Valentine's Day bombings, and were reported in local Philippines newspapers. The story moved further up the news agenda the following day when the Foreign Ministry in Manila called him in for a dressing-down.

A creative strategy for developing this story would have to involve illuminating some of the underlying structural or rights issues, one of which, in the southern Philippines, concerns land use and even – in some cases – food security.

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005a) give an account of a story involving a group of landless peasants on Mindanao. They are trying to invoke the Philippines' Land Reform legislation to open up a tract of land for their own use as subsistence farmers, but the problem is implementation – powerful interests, in this case those of big food companies, are frustrating them.

A possible intro:

"Even as the senior US diplomat in the Philippines was being called on to explain recent remarks, that 'poverty and lawlessness' mean Mindanao risks becoming 'the next Afghanistan', a group of poor farmers on the island were complaining that laws passed to help them are being ignored in favour of deals with multinational companies – many American-owned".

Another connection with the "mainstream" agenda could be offered by reminding readers of the words of one of the judges in the Supreme Court case [involving the same farmers who carried out a hunger strike, some years earlier]: "The resolution of such cases has far-reaching implications for the success of our land reform program. Indeed, their successful resolution can bring peace or rebellion in our countryside".

These developments came shortly after the resurgent Maoist New People's Army (NPA) were branded "the greatest internal security threat to the country" (Morella, 2005) by the Philippines Defense Secretary. It is to oppose the NPA that the majority of troops are deployed in rural areas, particularly Mindanao, where they are accused of persistent human rights abuses'.

Depending on course directors' chosen emphasis, students can be pointed in the direction of other sources and resources – including many online – to compile their own peace journalism follow-ups to reports of violent incidents, shuttling back and forth along a 'sliding scale' between the peg at one end and the preferred conflict analysis at the other.

4. Learning outcomes

It has already been noted that students may come to a course in or including peace journalism from many different backgrounds. Learning outcomes for journalism students, in general terms, consist of both acquiring and applying journalism skills, and knowing why they are doing it. On existing peace journalism courses, they have been asked to produce assignment work giving their own version of a news story about conflict, and also their reasoning.

The question set for students of the Conflict Resolving Media course at the University of Sydney includes the option of a practical exercise, asking them to choose a recent development in a conflict, analyse the reporting and write their own peace journalism version of it – in around 1,000 words suitable for publication in a major broadsheet newspaper. They are asked:

- Using examples, say how this development was reported at the time. Explain what characteristics of the reporting make it war journalism
- What effect might this pattern of reporting have on the actions and motivations of (any) party or parties to the conflict? How might this effect be transmitted?

- How is your own report different from the way the story was reported at the time? What different decisions have you made?
- What effect might your report, and more like it, have on the actions and motivations of (any) party or parties to the conflict? How might this effect be transmitted?
- Why are conflicts reported so often in the war journalism style?
- Was the reporting at the time objective?

Is your report objective?

As this underlines, a course in peace journalism includes considering whether and how patterns of media response to developments in conflict may influence the actions and motivations of parties to conflict. In other words, the nature of media representations may be seen as a matter of general political and social concern. Students of disciplines other than journalism can therefore apply the same core concepts to identify missing elements from news reports of conflict, only then being asked to devise other ways to restore them.

On the Sydney course, those who do not wish to write their own news report can opt instead to write a proposal for a media intervention in conflict, or a plan for a campaign targeting journalists covering a conflict. In each case, they are asked to explain how their proposal, if carried out, could be expected to make a difference, both to the coverage and to the conflict itself. Successful recent examples include a proposal for a peace journalism training programme aimed at international correspondents covering the conflict in Colombia, and a campaign plan to raise awareness among Australian journalists of issues around asylum and refugees.

In this, a course in peace journalism is particularly well suited for insertion into Peace and Conflict Studies – with its unique sense of orientation and purpose – as well as journalism, communications and media. One department, the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, gives, as its mission statement, the following:

"CPACS promotes interdisciplinary research and teaching on the causes of conflict and the conditions that affect conflict resolution and peace. Research projects and other activities focus on the resolution of conflict *with a view to attaining just societies*.
The Centre aims to facilitate dialogue between individuals, groups or communities who are concerned with conditions of positive peace, whether in interpersonal relationships, community relations, within organisations and nations, or with reference to international relations" (emphasis added, CPACS 2006).

9

De-escalating media language of killing: An instructional module

Beverly Ann Deepe Keever

Introduction

This article elaborates on a companion web-based instructional module that examines the role of the media in producing a culture of global violence – and that seeks to curb their extent and effects.

The twinned productions – this article plus the web module – form a small part of the campaign by the Peace Journalism Research Project funded by the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. The companion webcast is to be posted as a resource at http://www.toda.org.

The Peace Journalism Project also aims to explore positive potential for representations of conflict to create space and opportunities to consider and to value non-violent responses.

The 20th century was burdened by a legacy of mass destruction and violence "inflicted on a scale never seen and never possible before in human history", Nelson Mandela writes in *World Report on Violence and Health.* This Report is the first comprehensive summary of violence on a global scale. It was published by the World Health Organization in 2002.

Besides violence made possible by new technologies and what Mandela calls the "ideologies of hate", the *World Report* catalogs and explicates causes of day-to-day violence around the world, in six regions and in more than 100 specific countries along a number of indicators, such as gender and income. It also lists numerous other resources and websites.

The 372-page Report, as well as a summary, abstract and related materials, is available online. It states that "over 1.6 million lives are lost each year and countless more damaged in ways that are not always apparent" because of violence.[1]

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1 http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/index.html, accessed April 2, 2006. Mandela's remarks are in the foreword. The lives' lost quote is by WHO Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland in the preface; neither page carries a number.

In recommending ways for primary prevention, the *World Report* calls for media campaigns to "change attitudes, behaviour (sic) and social norms".[2] One such media intervention that has already begun to enact the Report's recommendation is the BBC's World News Service with its season of programming about "Violence Begins at Home".[3]

However, this instructional module takes on a wider purpose. It is designed as a resource to raise awareness – especially among working journalists, future communicators and citizens worldwide – about the importance of:

- avoiding the inappropriate use of the language of killing and, alternatively,
- avoiding the use of euphemisms to gloss over or cover up examples of violence.

This resource lays out a practical, foundational way to help professional and student journalists as well as citizens using everyday clichés and language to develop what Lynch and McGoldrick call "a critical self-awareness".

Thus, rather than research or concepts designed to develop new theory or to add to existing ones, the author here seeks to harness that vast amount of academic scholarship so as to encourage more critical and creative thinking about curbing the language of killing as a step toward mitigating the so-called culture of global violence.

Because of the increasingly significant role the news media have in determining the framing of killings and conflicts, Lynch and McGoldrick argue, "journalism needs some workable form of *reflexivity*, analyzing and addressing its own role in shaping discussions and creating realities. Without this, it is fated to collude and conceal".[4]

Although this instructional resource is designed for use with college students, it may also be enlightening for citizen activists, community groups and non-governmental organizations. And although this resource talks of written and spoken words, the principles are equally and even perhaps more relevant to still or moving visuals, including photographs, videos, illustrations and cartoons, as evidenced by the worldwide controversy over a Danish newspaper's publication of a cartoon that Muslims worldwide found so offensive it led to violence.

This webcast also includes suggestions for media literacy assignments that may sharpen the awareness of students of all ages in a number of settings. This English-language version may be subtitled by others into other languages and localized by using the *World Report's* statistical data on six regions (Africa, Americas,

2 Ibid., 249.
3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/violence, accessed April 2, 2006.
4 Jake Lynch & Annabel McGoldrick, *Peace Journalism* (Gloucestershire, UK, Hawthorn Press, 2005), xvi.

South-East Asia, European, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Pacific) and on more than 100 countries.

This webcast is based on a presentation made to advanced students in the Global Communication course by Professor Emeritus Glenn Paige. A UH political scientist, he has worked for the past three decades to promoting nonviolence through the writing of his self-published book, *Nonkilling Global Political Science*. It can be printed on demand through amazon.com or is available for free online.[5]

Within three years his book was translated into 25 languages, making it accessible to persons in countries of three billion population. Technology permits the diffusion of this book but the reason for its rapid spread globally is the nonkilling idea, Paige tells students, adding, "The logic of killing is running out of steam".[6]

In his book that students were assigned to read, Paige says, "Language reflects and reinforces lethality, contributing to a sense of naturalness and inescapability". The mass media of communication provide "vicarious learning for lethality and desensitization of the value of human life", Paige states, by elaborating, "No people in history have had so many lethal images imprinted on their brains".

But, he adds, "however harmful to civil society, violent media socialization is useful for a state in need of professional patriotic killers".[7]

De-escalate the everyday, inappropriate language of killing

Paige begins his presentation by examining everyday language and clichés that exemplify unthinkingly or unnecessarily the word *kill*. He then solicited alternative language from the class. A young woman *dressed to kill* thus became a young woman dressed to thrill. A manly *ladykiller* was re-worded to mean *lady charmer*. Referring to the word *ladykiller*, Paige interjects: "Too many males do that, so why use that type of imagery?"

Paige gives as an example the inappropriate use of the word *kill* to describe a successful play in volleyball. To study more deeply Paige's idea, two of University of Hawai`i's volleyball stars, who were enrolled in the course, initiated a research project to find out whether omitting the word *kill* from the volleyball vocabulary in the United States would be possible or even beneficial. UH volleyball stars Kanoe Kamana`o and Kari Gregory explained their findings. They concluded that al-

5 http://www.globalnonviolence.org, accessed April 2, 2006.

6 Paige's 75-minute presentation on Sept. 8, 2005, University of Hawai`i, which was videotaped and audiotaped, made to 40 upperclass students enrolled in the Global Communication course (Communication and Journalism 475). The class included international students from Japan, South Korea, Israel, Australia and Nigeria.

7 Quotes are from pages 13-15 of Paige's book.

though their teammates and coach thought the language change was unnecessary, local radio broadcaster Scott Robbs had years ago voluntarily de-escalated violent language in his play-by-play accounts of the games. Instead of *kill*, he localized a new expression of *to crush the coconut.*

However, even when volleyball as a Western sport was imported into South Korea, the word *kill* did not follow it, as another student, Jae Sun Lee, who was born in South Korea, explained. Her observation suggests that comparative analysis of vocabularies of inappropriately violent words could usefully be studied, especially in sports, which is becoming more global, popular – and often violent.

Others disagree, however. They argue that reducing the amount of violence in the media will not solve the problem of violence in society.[8] Exemplifying this perspective, another student, Bryan Moe, researched a different sport and its language. He found that even without a violent vocabulary, basketball still was often a violent sport in the United States.

Bryan makes a good point that could be extended to consider about suicides. Suicide is rarely covered in the U.S. and other news media because of the fear of copy-cats. Yet globally it outranks both wars and homicides as causes of violence-related deaths. As the BBC reports, "Every 40 seconds one person commits suicide somewhere in the world".[9]

Citing statistics from the *World Report* about causes of violent deaths, Paige says that 50 percent die from suicide; 30 percent from homicide and 20 percent from war. "More people kill themselves than kill another", Paige points out. The need for more research and critical self-awareness is suggested by this paradox of the predominance of suicide despite media silence about it[10] or of the eruption of violence – such as in sports – even when no violent vocabulary is often used.

Sports page writers often use the language of lethality, Paige observed, as he looked at an across-the-top-of-the-page article with its 8-column headline: "Bows Annihilate Aztecs". Conversely, military officials often use sports imagery to obscure their potential destructiveness, he noted, when they refer to their own exercises as *war games.*

8 For an exposition of this perspective, see James W. Potter, *The 11 Myths of Media Violence* (Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications, 2003).

9 From BBC website cited above.

10 In a personal communication with this author received on Dec. 19, 2005, Jake Lynch, referenced in an earlier footnote, observes, that "the most significant lacuna in media coverage may be about the human and psychological cost of inequality, alienating structural and cultural aspects of society", which, for example, all too often is left as the subject of "mere lip service" in the reporting of economic policies.
For a poignant account of suicide attempted by males as young as 8 years old in Micronesia, see Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2005), 216-227.

He advised trying to make violent language more animated and exciting because the language of violence is used to spark emotion, which plays on people's fears and aggressiveness. Conversely, he noted, killing that is really going on is often covered up as *peacemaking*.

Paige advocates the media to operate from the presumption that a nonkilling society is possible and that they contribute to or inhibit that possibility. A nonkilling society is one that avoids the killing of or threats to kill human beings or that abandons weapons used for killing humans or for maintaining or changing conditions of society. The purpose of a nonkilling society is to save lives, Paige explains, adding, "You can't save life by killing".

Paige maintains that the value of his approach is two-fold. First, it is *measurable*; the number of humans killed can be counted. Second, it is *open-ended*; it advocates no set remedy. Instead, he says, his approach invites creative thinking and solutions in all facets of life and at all levels of institutional governance.

Quote accurately and explain violent language

But, he warned, the media also need to quote accurately words of violence when violence erupts or is urged by the public or leaders. The expression to "Kill the Pigs" was hurled at police in Los Angeles during the 1980s Watts riots, Paige explains, and had to be accurately described. Such is also the case of words used by public officials and figures, no matter how violent those words may be. But then one should examine the conditions and reasons for the use of lethal language.

One violent remark that media-circumnavigated and then stunned the world in 2005 was conservative Christian minister-televangelist Pat Robertson's call for the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez because of his nation's policies. But, because of that violent remark given wide circulation in the media, even conservative columnist Cal Thomas called for Robertson to resign, adding with some embarrassment, "I'm sure the non-Christian world is having a fine time ridiculing this latest example of un-Christ-like behavior".[11] Robertson publicly apologized later.

Expose and critique euphemisms

On the flip side, however, the media need to expose and critique euphemisms. Paige gives as an example the term of *collateral damage* often used by U.S. offi-

11 Cal Thomas, "Salvation won't be found on the TV set", *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, August 31, 2005, All.

cials to gloss over or cover up civilian deaths caused by bombing raids or other wartime actions.

He inspected a sheath of newspaper clippings that he has collected over the decades. One shows high-flying U.S. warplanes flying in formation; the Air Force nicknamed them "Blue Angels". "Angels don't kill", he observed. But instead of critiquing the military euphemism, the headline writer for the Page 1 news story localized the planes into the standard lingo of Hawaii, calling the warplanes "Birds of Paradise".

Paige's observations are amplified in a chillingly descriptive article titled "The Banality of Evil". In it, author Edward Herman explains that "Doing terrible things in an organized and systematic way rests on 'normalization'". He elaborates on normalization and the mainstream media's role in it:

"This is the process whereby ugly, degrading, murderous, and unspeakable acts become routine and are accepted as 'the way things are done.' There is usually a division of labor in doing and rationalizing the unthinkable, with the direct brutalizing and killing done by one set of individuals; others keeping the machinery of death (sanitation, food supply) in order; still others producing the implements of killing, or working on improving technology (a better crematory gas, a longer burning and more adhesive napalm, bomb fragments that penetrate flesh in hard-to-trace patterns). It is the function of defense intellectuals and other experts, and the mainstream media, to normalize the unthinkable for the general public."[12]

Four principles of nonkilling journalism

What are the implications for the media of thinking a nonkilling society is possible?, Paige asked. Would they look for different stories? Would they find different information or communicate it differently?

Partially answering his own questions, Paige then recites the four kinds of information that people need to know in order to make decisions about a less violent society. These are:

1. the causes and incidences of killing, with his describing these as "absolutely essential"; how many people have been killed and why;
2. the causes of nonkilling and explanations on why people don't kill;
3. the causes of shifting from killing to nonkilling and vice versa; what causes a

12 Edward S. Herman, "The Banality of Evil", accessed April 1, 2006 at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Herman%20/BanalityEvil_Herman.html. The author is grateful to Jake Lynch for recommending that parts of this insightful article be included here.
For more insights on the significant role of language in framing our everyday reality, please see *Metaphors We Live By* written by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Their example of the "conceptual metaphor" that "Argument is War", evidenced: "He attacked every weak point in my argument" or "His criticisms are right on target" or "He shot down all of my arguments". Their evidence presented on page 4 also echoed many of Paige's examples.

shift or change from one condition to another;
4. the characteristics of a nonkilling society, or, as Paige exclaims, "the most exciting" kind of information. Report and seek out evidence of human creativity to realize conditions of nonkilling in ever aspect of society: politics, security, economics, art, sciences, religions and media.

In addition, for a more complex, reflexive exercise, news media reports should be assessed to determine whether they explain the cause(s) of violence and whether one can deduce an explanation from the way violence is represented in them.[13] This exercise would reveal that all too often, Lynch and McGoldrick assert, war journalism is the dominant discourse that provides no framework for alternative thinking or remedies. These co-authors go beyond this analysis of news products by also advocating study and change of the structural factors that influence, if not determine, the shape, omission or marginalization of news.[14]

Therefore, Paige sets forth, the four principles of nonkilling journalism and other media are:

1. report the killing without euphemisms and inquire into its causes,
2. report the nonkilling – why people don't kill – and report human creativity,
3. report causes of shifting from killing to nonkilling or the reverse,
4. report the characteristics of a nonkilling society.

Critical self-awareness, news analysis exercises

Paige's four principles laid the foundation for this critical-thinking exercise: handing in at least three examples each of 1. violence in the media, 2. non-violence in the media, 3. the shift from an act or process of violence to non-violence or vice versa and 4. recommendations for professional journalists and other communicators.

The students' search produced some fascinating examples. One international student searched the web and found an example of the ultimate euphemism: German Nazi use of "final solution" to mask the massacre of millions of Jews during World War II and to the "de-lousing facilities", or gas chambers, used to implement the Holocaust.

Despite the heavy emphasis given by the U.S. news media to the war in Iraq and the many other easy-to-find journalistic reports of violence, several students found small articles with tiny headlines reporting on successful movements toward

13 The author is appreciative of this insightful recommendation made by an unidentified peer reviewer of an earlier draft of this article.
14 For an excellent elaboration of their proposed future remedies and opportunities, see the epilogue of their *Peace Journalism* book, cited above, 227-232.

peace in Indonesia, Korea and in the beginnings of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Another student's example of a shift from violence to non-violence was the newspaper account of a pregnant woman in Hawaii who was beaten and left for brain-dead; she was kept alive on life support until her child could be born and adopted by her relatives.

Suggestions for creating nonkilling were also made through the students' research and critical self-awareness. Curbing violence in sports entertainment could include not only changing violent vocabularies, one student wrote, but also focusing more on the "spirit of humility and sportsmanship by players, staff and fans". Building sportsmanship and fair play was once emphasized as a fundamental goal of youth athletics.

A beneficial shift in media reporting, especially in visually oriented television and webcasts, might also result if a rule or policy or code of practices was put in place that for every article, story or broadcast that showed violence, a non-violent one must also be shown. "This would create a more rounded media experience, also would allow the public to learn about a focus positively on non-violent people, events and stories", the student wrote. Although controversial, and perhaps unconstitutional under U.S. law, the proposal might voluntarily be adopted by some news leaders – or at least get them to thinking about new approaches in their news output.

Another shift from violence to non-violence reported on by students is already sweeping Hawaii and is spreading to the United States in the form of Korean soap operas distributed with English subtitles on cable television. "Unlike American and other Western soap operas", one student wrote about South Korean productions, "they don't allow plotlines that include violence, as it would contradict their cultural values". As international films, videos, webcasts and television become more readily available globally through rapidly changing technology, viewers will have more options to select productions less violent than are so predominately available in some localities.

Conclusion: "Human violence is a curable disease"

As the speed, reach and impact of the news media increase so dramatically and globally commensurate with the increased levels of worldwide violence, this resource module suggests several concrete, next-step recommendations.

First, intensive, widely available workshops should be organized and disseminated widely to sensitize busy headline writers and news producers about *why* and *how*

they can de-escalate the language of killing in their productions, whether on the sports, business or editorial pages or in their news packages.

Second, more cross-cultural perspectives on violent or conflict-ridden events should be offered as a means to open up alternative constructions of reality for various audiences.

Third, key news leaders, including play-by-play sports broadcasters, should be solicited to drop or urge dropping the violent clichés and other commonly used expressions in their work, much as feminist scholars succeeded in minimizing the use of sexist language.

Fourth, news decision-makers should re-evaluate what might be called their "strategic silence" that routinely omits coverage of suicides, the world's most prevalent kind of killing.[15]

Lastly, to expose some structural factors tilting the news toward violence, media owners should be pressed to disclose their business interests and interlocking directorships with other powerful institutions, especially those related to the military-industrial-intellectual complex that feeds and sustains some violence and that makes profits from the weapons of killing.

These recommendations are offered as part of a much larger campaign to curb global violence. The conclusion of the *World Report* and of his book, Paige states, is that "Human violence is a curable disease". Like polio, Paige argues, violence can be cured with proper research, training, resources and implementation.

More explicitly, the *World Report* explains: "Despite the fact that violence has always been present, the world does not have to accept it as an inevitable part of the human condition. As long as there has been violence, there have also been systems – religious, philosophical, legal and communal – which have grown up to prevent or limit it. None has been completely successful, but all have made their contribution to this defining mark of civilization."

And, the *World Report* offers hope and a roadmap. "Violence can be prevented and its impact reduced, in the same way that public health efforts have prevented and reduced pregnancy-related complications, workplace injuries, infectious diseases, and illness resulting from contaminated food and water in many parts of the world. The factors that contribute to violent responses – whether they are factors of attitude and behaviour or related to larger social, economic, political and cultural conditions – can be changed.

15 The quote is from Richard Lentz, "The Search for Strategic Silence", research paper presented to the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Norman, Oklahoma, August 3-6, 1986.

"Violence can be prevented. This not an article of faith, but a statement based on evidence. Examples of success can be found around the world, from small-scale individual and community efforts to national policy and legislative initiatives."[16]

Both the *World Report* and Paige's book call for accelerated research, programming and implementation. Both exhort media to play a heightened, constructive role. Paige says, "We are going to eliminate human killing on the globe just the way we put a person on the moon".

16 *World Report*, 3.

Part IV
Epilogue

10

Peace journalism: The state of the art[1]

Dov Shinar

1. Introduction

Peace journalism is a normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals, and audiences towards war and peace. Such goals are sought through (a) critical evaluations of the current state of conflict coverage and (b) efforts to conceptualize professional values and practices in both theoretical and operational terms.

Evaluations of current conflict coverage criticize the following media preferences:

1. For violence, sensationalism, personalization, patriotism and exclusion-inclusion biases toward certain countries, groups, and persons (Lynch, 2007; Neiger and Zandberg, 2004; Roeh and Ashley, 1986; Shinar, 2003b, Shinar, forthcoming; Zandberg and Neiger, 2005);
2. For simple descriptions rather than analyses of complex conflict origins, causes, and contexts (Lynch, 2007; Roeh & Ashley, 1986);
3. For fighting parties rather than broader human and other conflict dimensions (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a; Peleg, 2006, 2002);
4. For coverage of conflict only when manifest violence occurs or is about to occur (Hanitzsch, 2004a, b);
5. For "sports-like", "us-versus-them" situations that seek visible events and re-

1 This is a final contribution to a two-year-long collective effort made by the peace journalism group of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, aimed at producing and disseminating meaningful information, ideas and methods on peace journalism to be used by higher education instructors and students for teaching, learning, and reflection. This epilogue offers a series of theoretical and practical issues in peace journalism, as seen by the Toda group members. I am proud to wrap up the project with the feeling that all group members have created valuable products, and with equal confidence that they make significant philosophical, theoretical, and empirical contributions to the scholarly and professional advancement of peace journalism. The efforts of the contributors were conducted in two annual Toda Institute meetings in Budapest and Madrid, in regular correspondence, in stimulating consultation among group members, and in the production of individual articles, accompanied by intimate cooperation with and warm encouragement from Professor Majid Tehranian, the Director of the Toda Institute. Group member Professor Dr. Wilhelm Kempf, the editor of CCO, graciously volunteered to host our contributions in CCO, and was engaged in the difficult task of editing the materials and coordinating a complex peer-evaluation process. On behalf of the group, I wish to express deep gratitude for his efforts. Dov Shinar

sults, damage and victims, winners and losers, rather than longer processes of conflict resolution or transformation (Shinar, 2003b; Wolfsfeld, 2004);
6. For the relatively lower news value of peace-related stories and topics (Shinar, 2003b).

Beyond the pioneering work of Johan Galtung in the area (see Galtung, 2000a), efforts to conceptualize peace journalism appear in the works of the Toda peace journalism group members and others, both in and outside the *conflict & communication online* special issues on peace journalism which are reprinted in the present volume. They focus on:

1. Exploring backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation, and presenting causes and options on every side so as to portray conflict in realistic terms, transparent to the audience;
2. Giving voice to the views of all rival parties;
3. Offering creative ideas for conflict resolution, peacemaking and peacekeeping;
4. Exposing lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides, and revealing excesses committed by, and suffering inflicted on, people of all parties;
5. Paying attention to peace stories and post-war developments more than the regular coverage of conflict;
6. Promoting realistic and cautious attitudes with respect to the success peace journalism might have in overcoming resistance and rejection, as well as criticizing excessive enthusiasm on the part of peace journalism supporters.

2. Four promises of peace journalism

The promises of peace journalism appear in the *conflict & communication online* special issues on the topic, particularly in the works of Jake Lynch (2007), Annabel McGoldrick (2006), Robert Hackett (2006a), Susan Ross (2006), and Wilhelm Kempf (2005a). Although peace journalism does not mean necessarily "good news", it is conceived as a fairer way to cover conflict, relative to the usual coverage, and suggests possibilities to improve professional attitudes and performance; strengthen human, moral and ethical values in the media; widen scholarly and professional media horizons; and provide better public service by the media.

2.1 First promise: Professional improvement

Peace processes are complicated, take time to unfold and develop, are marked by dull, tedious negotiations, lead to reduced tensions, and happen to a large extent behind closed doors (Wolfsfeld, 2004). By contrast, war is more compatible with media norms, discourse, and economic structures (Shinar, 2003b). The supporters of peace journalism principles and techniques suggest that it might lead to

better reporting and interpreting, away from the ratings culture, towards human and social awareness; that it might change the seemingly inherent contradiction between the nature of peace stories and the professional demands of journalists; and that it might increase the news value of peace.

2.2 Second promise: Strengthening human, moral and ethical values in the media

Scholars, activists, and journalists emphasize the value of peace journalism in upholding these professional requirements of journalism, some of which have been eroded by the "ratings culture". Such personalities include Johan Galtung (2000), Majid Tehranian (2002), Edward Herman, Noam Chomsky (Hackett, 2006a), Jean Baudrillard (1981, 2001), Ben Bagdikian, Phil Donahue, Robert McChesney, Nicholas Johnson, Naomi Klein, Ralph Nader, and Gore Vidal (U.S. Newswire).

2.3 Third promise: Contribution to the public sphere

Peace journalism can improve media images, and can increase the contribution of the media to recognized socially important causes, through dealing with inherent dilemmas such as the one between "objective" and other normative frameworks[2]. Schudson (2001, 2003) and Kempf (2006) tackle this issue, the former through a historical analysis of different perceptions of journalistic objectivity in the US and elsewhere, and the latter through a philosophical analysis of media objectivity and the lack thereof. Neiger and Zandberg (2004), and Zandberg and Neiger (2005) offer post-Cold War updated empirical data about modern journalistic reality constructions, which show a preference for nation over profession, and for ethnic rather than civil attitudes.

2.4 Fourth promise: Widening scholarly and professional media horizons

Deviating from traditional leading theories and ideologies, such as various shades of functionalism, hard core Marxism, and technological determinism, more recent writings, including the *conflict & communication online* articles on peace journalism, open new frontiers for research, thought, and knowledge on media and society. They lean on the study of objectivity and conflict research (Kempf, 2003a; McGoldrick, 2006; Peleg, 2006, 2002); relate to post-Marxistpost-Cold War prob-

2 "Objective" and "normative" are not mutually exclusive. The traditional norm of objectivity, typical of Western mainstream journalism, has been increasingly challenged by alternative norms, such as the commitment to social objectives and social justice, including open and critical journalistic attitudes against crime, drugs, environmental pollution, and war. Such challenges often result from the criticism against corporate, capitalist media structures (see McGoldrick, 2006; Hackett, 2006a).

lems of media structure and democratization (Hackett, 2006a, McChesney and Hackett, 2005, Tehranian, 2002); and deal with self- and the "other's" images (Ottosen, 2007), war and peace discourse (Ross, 2006, Keever, 2007, Shinar, 2004, Mandelzis, 2003), and the interdisciplinary linkage of the media with tradition, democracy, peace, and development (Lynch, 2007; Ross, 2006; Hackett and Zhao, 2005; Bratić, 2006a, 2006b).

2.4.1 Four parameters of the promise

In widening scholarly and professional media horizons, the four parameters of this promise focus on the market, on media structure, on leadership, and on the criticism of peace journalism. The relevance of each parameter to peace journalism is briefly presented in the discussion.

2.4.1.1 *Is the market the message?* The first parameter of the promise held by peace journalism is the question whether the neo-liberal laissez-faire market has become the message, and what it means. The fact that media scholars have been exploring this question in a critical vein is hardly surprising (see McChesney and Hackett, 2005; Hackett and Zhao 2005; Hackett, 2006a; McGoldrick, 2006). The position displayed by some of the very representatives and symbols of the market is, however, of particular interest. One of them is George Soros, a real estate wizard and currency-trading tycoon-turned-philanthropist, who became a symbol of contemporary capitalism. He was one of the first to ignite a fierce ongoing debate over the apparent contradictions between the post-Cold War unregulated "market fundamentalism" (particularly, but not only in the former USSR and Eastern Europe), and the Open Society concept that he learned from Karl Popper, his teacher at the London School of Economics. In an extremely provocative article published in the Atlantic Monthly (1997), and later expanded into a full volume (2002), Soros argues that while the communist threat disappeared with the Berlin Wall, a new menace looms in unlimited libertarianism. Calling it the "capitalist threat", he fears that the tolerant, democratic, pluralistic, open societies described by Karl Popper are being threatened by the alleged triumph of free-market economics, often accompanied by the belief that governmental intervention is bad and all market- and price-determined outcomes are good. Instead of the emerging solely price-determined decision-making syndrome that is often accompanied by unlawful violence, intimidation, and urban terrorism, Soros longs for reviving rules of conduct and ethical codes anchored in values independent from the market. In full contradiction with the values he has come to represent, Soros sees nothing less than the state as the only viable mechanism for reinstating the autonomy of values from market pressures, and for struggling against the dehumanizing features of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism. In the media world, this process can be understood by the "assault" of the ratings culture that represents particular, usually

economic interests, on the alleged autonomy enjoyed previously by universal aesthetic and artistic values.
One does not necessarily have to agree with Soros's demand of State intervention in order to ask the crucial question of whether and which kind of regulation might help ease the problem, in general and in the media alike. Moreover, the humanistic stance of peace journalism might strengthen the resistance against the exaggerated adherence of the media to extreme neo-liberal concepts and to overdosed patriotism or war against terrorism (Lynch, 2007).

2.4.1.2 *Is the structure the message?* A second parameter in the promise of peace journalism to widen scholarly and professional media horizons is represented by Tehranian (2002), Hackett (2006a) and others who argue, "The structure is the message". This approach considers the realities of ownership and state/private interests and interaction with media professional standards and ethics, democratic values, socio economic development, and cultural standards. The structural approach departs from the premises that:

- We live in a largely mediated environment ruled by government media monopolies or commercial media oligopolies that construct our images of the world.
- In the present globalized and globalizing world, media ethics and professionalism must be dealt with not only with regard to journalists as individuals but also in the context of media institutional, national, and international regimes.
- Ethics (related to peace, social justice, democracy, and development) and professionalism need commensurate institutional frameworks and sanctions in order to become effective.
- A pluralism of media content, form, and structures at the local, national, and global levels is necessary to reflect the diversity and complexity of the world.

If these arguments are valid indeed, then scholars such as Hanitzsch (2004a, b), Bläsi (2004), Hackett (2006a), and others are right in demanding that peace journalism translate its normative concerns, rooted in the discipline of peace research, into a strategy based on a theoretical and practical analysis of news production logics and constraints. peace journalism supporters, they argue, need to review the lessons of research on the factors affecting news production. Such a review would help identify barriers, blockages and opportunities for the practice of peace journalism, and clarify questions such as: Do media organizations have sufficient autonomy vis-à-vis other institutions, or journalists vis-à-vis media organizations, to put peace journalism into practice? Is structural reform a prerequisite for the successful implementation of peace journalism? If there is to be such a reform, a number of questions should be asked: Does such a reform entail taking over the media economy, as argued by Enzensberger (1970), or should it follow Baudrillard's logic (1981), that taking over would make the reformists similar to the owners they ousted? Are there other options to develop the ethics of peace journalism in accordance with contemporary media realities?

Thus, according to the prevailing critical thinking, since ethics without laws and sanctions are largely pious wishes, the development of ethical codes for peace journalism should be considered necessary but not sufficient.
Also structural pluralism in media ownership and control is an indispensable condition for democratic media checks and balances. In our mediated word, most of the stories are told and most realities construed by media sources. If media sources are dominated by a single structure, public knowledge of vital issues will portray undue homogeneity of opinion and reduce democratic reflexivity and resiliency. Responsible journalism cannot survive in such an environment. Consequently, there is a need to redress the balance in media structures with increased support for public and community media, to be achieved by contributions made by commercial media systems.
In addition to its general effectiveness, this reasoning would make a considerable contribution to the development of peace journalism.

2.4.1.3 *Is the leader the message?* The third parameter in the promise of peace journalism to widen scholarly and professional media horizons appears in cases where national, political or religious leaders occupy center-stage in relation to war and peace. Examples include the critics of George W. Bush (U.S. Newswire, 2003); Peleg's work on the words that killed Yitzhak Rabin (2002, 2003); studies on Yasser Arafat, such as Mandelzis's (2003) and Rubinstein's (1995); and Kurnitzky's work on leadership in North Korea (2006).
Thus, peace journalism might attenuate tendencies to personalize conflict in the media and elsewhere, so as to broaden the scope of journalistic coverage towards human dimensions and prices to be paid for war.

2.4.1.4 *The message of criticism.* The fourth parameter is the contribution made by evaluations and critiques to the conceptual development of peace journalism. Two types of criticism are relevant in this context: the first does not accept the very idea of normative journalism beyond the norms of objectivity and neutrality (Loyn, 2003; Spicer, 2006). This can encourage peace journalism scholars and practitioners to react and to invest in efforts to make their case that additional normative frameworks, such as peace journalism, exist and can be analyzed as legitimate alternative frames of reference for journalistic coverage. The second type of criticism does not reject peace journalism entirely, but claims that journalists should not replace generals and politicians in peacemaking processes, and views professional constraints as killers of the very possibility of putting peace journalism to work. This type of criticism can fuel constructive exchanges on the nature of the concept and on the conditions for its application (Hanitzsch, 2004a, 20004b; Hackett, 2006a).

3. The performance of peace journalism

Although different in principles and arguments, peace journalism belongs to a list of titles that refer to advocacy models of reporting – such as "journalism of attachment" (Bell, 1996), "victim journalism" (Hume, 1997), "justice journalism" (Messman, 2001), and "engaged journalism" (Lynch, 2003b)[3] – and that enjoy low degrees of popularity among professionals and audiences. Two types of reasons can help to explain some of the mixed feelings and the lack of popularity attached to the "peace journalism" construct. The first type includes professional reasons that refer, first, to the principle of media objectivity, and second, to the function of war as a source of media inspiration and exploitation of audience feelings: "War provides visuals and images of action. It is associated with heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational, and satisfies news-value demands: the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization, and results. This preference is magnified in the vivid colors, clear-cut polarities, unexpected features, and primordial sentiments typical of cultural conflict, and in its variety of images and voices exceeds that of plain conventional war …" (Shinar, 2003b, 5-6).

The second type includes historical reasons, such as the political discourse inherited from the Cold War and developed in later armed conflicts, particularly since the 1990s, which have led the media usually to adopt the governmental rhetoric of power and violence as their "official discourse". In the Western world, "peace talk" was tagged Communist in the 1950s and 1960s, and "challenger discourse" until the late 1980s, with low popularity and entry into the general audience media (Shinar, 2003b). The patriotic stance of media celebrities in the Iraq war[4] follows previous demonstrations of loyalty to ruling powers, as shown in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Roeh and Ashley, 1986), the first Gulf War, and the wars in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan (Shinar, forthcoming).

Both types of reasons have helped to criticize peace journalism so as to fuel the debate that goes far beyond the orthodox norm of objectivity and "deviations" thereof. In their studies on the dilemma of universalistic professionalism versus particularistic allegiances, Neiger and Zandberg (2004), and Zandberg and Neiger (2005) develop empirically the argument offered by Baudrillard that structural limitations of style and discourse make capitalist mass media unidirectional, intransitive, "speech without response", rather than "a reciprocal space of speech and response" (1981, 164-184).

3 These concepts differ, sometimes dramatically, from each other. But all of them, including peace journalism, share low levels of popularity in the mainstream media.

4 For example, Dan Rather's statement on CNN (Larry King Live, April 14, 2003): "Look, I'm an American. I never tried to kid anybody that I'm some internationalist or something. And when my country is at war, I want my country to win, whatever the definition of 'win' may be. Now, I can't and don't argue that that is coverage without a prejudice. About that I am prejudiced."

In another strand of criticism of the lack of discrimination between reality and fantasy on the part of media professionals and audiences, Baudrillard criticizes media coverage of the Gulf War using the ironic argument that there is no way to ascertain whether the Gulf War happened on the ground or just in media reality constructions (2001). Peace journalism research offers some comfort, at least in what concerns audience discrimination, as demonstrated by Kempf's (2005a) more optimistic experimental findings about a certain measure of acceptance towards conflict de-escalation discourse on the part of German readers.

Such instances of controversy typify the development of philosophical, conceptual, professional and practical aspects of peace journalism, emphasizing the need for clearer formulations and applications of concepts, expectations, and procedures.

3.1 Epistemology: The need for clearer formulations of philosophical and conceptual premises

The conceptual development of peace journalism offers an interesting insight into this need. A variety of formulations indicate an increasing volume of activity and dispute on its evaluation, conceptualization and critique. According to Galtung (2000), war journalism is "propaganda-orientated", whereas peace journalism is "truth-orientated". This concept is of course problematic, and should be addressed. Thus, in a critique of Galtung's adherence to absolute truth, Keith Spicer (2006) demands no more than responsible journalism. Michael Schudson describes the post-World War I definition of objectivity as a method designed for a world where "even facts could not be trusted" (1978, 122); and recognizes that "at the very moment that journalists claimed 'objectivity' as their ideal, they also recognized its limits" (2001, 164). Even Galtung's loyal disciples Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick (2005) are cautious in dealing with the word "truth". They claim that reports of conflict can be assessed for their accuracy against overlapping evidence in journalism and other fields, as featured by peer review and critical self-analysis techniques. This view too has been challenged. Wilhelm Kempf, for example, is critical of both Galtung's absolutism and his relativist critics. The final conclusion of his elaborated philosophical analysis is, like Roeh's and Ashley's (1986), that "there is no methodological reason why subjective realities – and particularly the one version of reality which is constructed in war reporting – cannot be criticized as misrepresenting reality and/or as biased toward promoting conflict escalation" (Kempf, 2006, 6).

Thus controversy goes on. Criticizing his colleague Jake Lynch's adherence to peace journalism (2003), David Loyn accuses its philosophy of compromising the integrity of journalists and blurring their role as neutral, objective disseminators of facts. The fierce argument posed by Bell (1997) and Glasser (1992) about the

inherent lack of media objectivity leaves the ground wide open for an ongoing and unresolved healthy debate. On another line of criticism, Thomas Hanitzsch (2004a, b**)** struggles with the contradictions between peace journalism and professional norms, such as, first, its alleged failure to take into account the actual dynamics of news production, professional values, and organizational imperatives, and second, the contradiction between the normative premises of peace journalism with some prevailing mass communication theories. The *conflict & communication online* special issues on peace journalism make substantial contributions to the clarification of these issues. Examples include Peleg's conceptual argument on the importance of conflict theory for a better understanding and application of peace journalism (2006); Hackett's (2006a) exploration of the importance of structural reform and media democratization as pre-conditions for the conceptual and practical refinement of peace journalism; and Ross's (2006) analytical bibliographical survey. Together with additional works (Tehranian, 2002; Bläsi, 2004), such works demonstrate the volume of academic and practical concern with these topics. This concern is made very visible in *conflict & communication online*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (October 2007), dedicated to the peace journalism controversy.

3.2 Profession: The need for a clearer formulation of expectations

In addition to its epistemological dimension, the debate on objectivity vis-à-vis other normative requirements of journalism features several professional dimensions. First, one could consider findings on the roles of the media in contemporary international relations beyond their traditional roles of impartial observers-reporters (Shinar, 2003b, 2004) or active participants in general. Unlike these relatively clear, albeit naïve professional expectations, the newer roles of the media as catalysts, mediators and messengers (Shinar, 2003b) have never been clearly translated into specific expectations or norms. Thus there is a need to clarify in better terms questions such as what should be the involvement of the media and media professionals in the mechanics of peacemaking or peacekeeping (Hanitzsch, 2004a, b). Empirical case studies and instructional modules, such as the ones offered by Lynch (2007), Mandelzis (2007), and Ottosen (2007) in the *conflict & communication online* series, might provide good grounds for experimenting with such clearer formulations of expectations.

3.3 Practical shortcomings

A number of practical difficulties can be derived from the discussion on promise and performance:

- *Difficulty in reconciling apparent contradictions of peace journalism with roles, expectations from and definitions of journalism and journalists* as community

and/or industry, and as loyal citizens and/or professionals (Hackett, 2006a; Neiger and Zandberg, 2004; Shinar, 2000, 2003b, 2004; Tehranian, 2002; Wolfsfeld, 1997c, 2003, 2004; Zandberg and Neiger, 2005);

- *Difficulty in producing persuasive evidence of peace journalism importance, news value, and feasibility*. Significant efforts in this area have emerged only in recent years in the form of research efforts and media monitoring projects; courses taught in universities and professional institutions; publication of scholarly books, chapters, articles, teaching manuals, and trade oriented materials; meetings of interested scholars and professionals in prestigious conferences and appearances in journalists' forums; working groups in national and international organizations; and effective workshops. We have yet to wait for these seeds to mature into robust outcomes.
- *Rejection by journalists and the difficulty of peace journalism to achieve popularity*, as demonstrated in the debate between David Loyn and other scholars and professionals (Open Democracy, 2003).
- *Difficulty in avoiding self-manipulation in the relations between field staff and their editors*. Shinar & Stoiciu (1992) showed, on the basis of their findings on the Romanian revolution and the Gulf War, that the absence of well-defined operative policies might increase manipulation, and enhance "self-manipulation" – the priority given by international news editors (more than their field reporters) to incoming war items that fit their own state of mind, psychological pre-dispositions and news-value expectations, rather than to accept evidence from the field. This has been a major constraint on peace journalism.
- *Difficulty in developing a peace discourse in the media*. Even when there is a peace process, the media are constrained by structure and culture, and by the lack of a media peace discourse, as shown by Kempf (2003b), Keever (2007), Mandelzis (2007), and Peleg (2003). Shinar (2000, 2004) found that rather than trying to develop a peace discourse, the media opt for three major alternative strategies. Framing peace in the discourse of war is the most frequent strategy. In the coverage of peace the media resort to a terminology of violence, utilizing symbolic clichés, direct quotations of leaders' military discourse, and signed copy and editorials. Trivialization is a second strategy, which in the absence of a peace discourse that satisfies dominant news-value demands, offers trivial information and upgrades celebrities and media personalities to become news. Finally, ritualization is the production of peacemaking media events, negotiations and ceremonies, whose ritual elements are willingly adopted by the media, as they carry enhanced news value (Katz and Dayan, 1985; Dayan and Katz, 1992).

4. Conclusion: An agenda and four principles of strategy to improve the performance of peace journalism

The following agenda can be condensed from this epilogue:

1. *Beware of pitfalls*, including two types at least: conservative traps, such as excessive loyalty to governments and establishments (Hackett, 2006a), and critical traps, such as "guruism" and excessive loyalty to monopolistic "causes", absolute truths, one-sided concepts of justice, etc. (Spicer, 2006, Kempf, 2006).

2. *Study and disseminate newer research findings*, such as: studies on de-escalation techniques; media detachment, transparency, reflexivity, and self-criticism; structural, economic, professional, and normative constraints in the media; and the development of a media peace discourse.

3. *Use relevant questions and variables*. They might include the dimensions offered by Bläsi (2004) and Hanitzsch (2004a, b).

   The former refer to the interaction of six factors: (1) structural aspects of the media, (2) conflict situation on-site, (3) personal features of the individual journalist, (4) the political climate, (5) lobbies, (6) the audience.

   Hanitzsch's analytical framework refers to three dimensions:

   (1) *Micro-level analyses* deal with journalists as *individuals* with particular reference to the characteristics and professional views of war journalists. How do journalists see their role in modern society and how do they define their communication goals? How do they deal with the structural constraints under which they have to operate? What is the impact of individual characteristics such as gender, age, education, class, ethnic and religious affiliation, etc. on war and peace coverage? To what extent does the situational context, such as territorial circumstances or limitations imposed by military and civilian authorities prevent or even deter reporters from applying peace journalism strategies to their daily work?

   (2) *Meso-level analyses* that refer to journalism as a process of *organized* news production might ask how the structures of editorial work and quality control influence the news. To what extent do textual constraints pre-structure news reporting? How do rhetorical and narrative forms used by the media facilitate certain frames of viewing a set of events? To what extent does the availability of resources (staff, time, budget, etc.) restrict crisis and war journalism?

   (3) *Macro-level analyses* deal with social functions of journalism and its interrelation with the environment. What is the interplay between journalism and other social systems? How do economic imperatives of media companies within

which commercial journalism usually operates interfere with daily news making? How independent are war and peace journalism from various interests within the political system? To what extent do expectations of the audience affect the coverage of war and peace? To what extent are these expectations and their anticipation by journalists compatible with peace journalism?

4. *Encourage the development of a media peace discourse.*
   The invention, development, and marketing of a media peace discourse should form part of the research and development agenda on peace journalism. Together with work conducted on the deconstruction of war discourse and the construction of peace discourse, frameworks and variables can be borrowed from research on other topics and used for additional conceptual leverage of peace journalism (Keever, 2007; Bratić 2006a, 2006b; Kempf, 2006; Shinar, 2004; ASPR, 2003; Peleg, 2003).

5. *Four Principles of Strategy.*
   At least four principles of strategy emerge from the preceding discussion:

   4.5.1 Adapt media values and practices to current realities, in which the newly acquired stronger status of the media in international relations (Shinar, 2003b) can be used to overcome the media's negative peace-related attitudes and peace-coverage techniques inherited from the past;

   4.5.2 Increase the news value of peace coverage in the contest between media frames, rather than conducting missionary attempts to change war-oriented media structures and professional codes of conduct;

   4.5.3 Devise well-defined professional policies, whose proper execution and training might reduce media self-manipulation and external pressures;

   4.5.4 Create and "market" a media peace discourse that satisfies news values, based on the appropriate application of existing findings, and on innovative research.

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Appendix

About the authors

Annabel McGoldrick is a part time lecturer at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney. She is also an experienced professional journalist, latterly as a reporter for World News Australia on SBS Television. Before that, she covered conflicts in the Middle East, South East Europe and South East Asia for broadcasters including the BBC and Sky News. Her publications include Peace Journalism (Hawthorn Press, 2005) as well as numerous book chapters and scholarly articles, and two educational documentaries, News from the Holy Land (Hawthorn Press and Films for the Humanities, 2004) and Peace Journalism in the Philippines (2007). Annabel coordinated and presented Reporting the World, a series of on-the-record seminars for professional journalists in London (2001–2005). She is also a qualified psychotherapist and has consulted on issues around journalism, conflict and trauma to clients including the Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma and the UN Population Fund.

Robert Hackett has taught and researched in Communication at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, since 1984. He has written extensively on journalism studies, mass media and social movements; his publications include *Remaking Media: The Struggle to Democratize Public Communication* (with William Carroll, 2006); *Democratizing Global Media: One World, Many Struggles* (co-edited with Yuezhi Zhao, and co-published by the Toda Institute, 2005); and Sustaining Democracy? *Journalism and the Politics of Objectivity* (with Yuezhi Zhao, 1998). Hackett has co-directed NewsWatch Canada since 1993, and has been involved in community-oriented media reform and education initiatives since 1983.

Beverly Ann Deepe Keever is a professor of journalism at the University of Hawai`i, where she was awarded the Regents Medal for Excellence in Teaching. She served as co-editor of *U.S. News Coverage of Racial Minorities: A Sourcebook 1934-1996* (Greenwood Press, 1997). More recently, she wrote *News Zero: The New York Times and The Bomb* (Common Courage Press, 2004). Before teaching, she worked as journalist, covering the Vietnam War for seven years successively for *Newsweek*, *The New York Herald Tribune*, the *Christian Science Monitor* and other publications. Her coverage of the besieged outpost of Khe Sanh in 1968 was nominated by the *Monitor* for a Pulitzer Prize in international reporting.

Wilhelm Kempf is Professor of Psychological Methodology and Head of the Peace Research Group at the University of Konstanz, Germany. Since 2002 he is the editor of *Conflict & communication online*. His areas of interest include nonviolent conflict solutions and the construction of social reality by the mass media. Recent books: *Konflikt und Gewalt* (Conflict & Violence; ed., Münster: agenda, 2000); *Los Medios y la Cultura de Paz* (The Media and the Culture of Peace; with Sonia Gutiérrez Villalobos, Berlin: regener, 2001); *Journalism and the New World Order. Vol. II. Studying War and the Media* (ed., with Heikki Luostarinen, Göteborg: Nordicom, 2002); *Constructive Conflict Coverage* (edited by the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution: Berlin: regener, 2003).

Jake Lynch is Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney. Before that, he spent nearly 20 years as a professional journalist, working as an international reporter in both television and newspapers, and latterly as a presenter (anchor) on BBC World. His publications include Peace Journalism (Hawthorn Press, 2005) as well as numerous book chapters and scholarly articles, and two educational documentaries, News from the Holy Land (Hawthorn Press and Films for the Humanities, 2004) and Peace Journalism in the Philippines (2007). He has led training workshops for editors and reporters in many countries including the UK, Indonesia, the Philippines, Norway, Nepal, Armenia and Georgia. He was Director of the journalism think-tank, Reporting the World (2001-2005), a series of on-the-record seminars, publications and a website for professional journalists in London.

Lea Mandelzis is Head of Marketing Communications Studies and a senior lecturer at the School of Communications, Sapir Academic College in Israel. Her fields of interest include news discourse in security and peace, conflict discourse in the media, media representations and images, socio-political communications, international communications and public diplomacy. Dr. Mandelzis has presented and published a number of articles on peace and war discourse. She is a former professional journalist in Israel, a peace activist, a council member of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), and a member of the Toda Institute Peace Journalism.

Rune Ottosen is a professor of journalism education in Oslo College, Norway. In 2000-2003 he was professor of journalism at The Sami College in Kautokeino, Norway. Together with Stig A. Nohrstedet he published *U.S. and the Others: Global Media Images on "The War on Terror"* in 2004, and *Global War – Local Views. Media Images of the Iraq War* in 2005. Rune Ottosen is deputy leader of the Norwegian Association of Press-and Media History and was president of The Norwegian Non-fiction Writers and Translators Association 2001–2005. He is a member of TRANSCEND – a Peace and Development Network and is a member of the Peace Journalism group of the Toda Institute.

Samuel Peleg is a Senior Lecturer of Political Communications and Political Violence at Tel Hai College in Israel. He also teaches in the School of Communication at Netanya College. His recent books include: *Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State* (co. ed. With W. Kempf), IOS Press, 2006; *If Words Could Kill: the Failure of the Israeli Political Discourse.* Jerusalem: Academon Books, 2003 (Hebrew); *Zealotry and Vengeance: Quest of a Religious Identity Group*. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, May 2002; and *Spreading the Wrath of God: From Gush Emunim to Rabin Square*. Hakibbutz Hameuhad, Tel Aviv, 1997 (Hebrew). Dr. Peleg writes often in the Israeli Press and is very active in civil society organizations. He is a consultant to several governmental Ministries and is also involved in Peace research with Palestinian scholars and activists. He is the Israeli Chair of One Voice: an Israeli-Palestinian Organization for activism and reconciliation.

Susan Dente Ross is an associate dean at Washington State University, a Fulbright Senior Scholar, and a former journalist and newspaper owner. Her research focuses on the roles of legal and media institutions in creating, perpetuating, or resolving social divisions and conflict. An expert in media and legal practices that undermine full political participation and foment conflict, she has focused on how these institutions support intercultural conflict and the circumstances under which they encourage peace and democratic participation. Her work contributes to several multi-national projects to reform media practices and develop a university peace journalism curriculum.

Dov Shinar is Professor of Communication, and Head of FAIR MEDIA: Center for the Study of Conflict, War and Peace Coverage at Netanya Academic College, Israel; and Principal Investigator, Peace Journalism Group of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research; Professor Emeritus, Concordia University, Montreal, and Ben Gurion University, Israel. His fields of theoretical and applied interest, research, and scholarly publications include: international communications; media in war and peace; media and development; and public diplomacy. His books, chapters and scholarly articles were published in and translated into English, Hebrew, French, Portuguese and Spanish. He is a member of the editorial boards of the International Communication Gazette, Conflict and Communication Online and Intercom, and a member of the steering committee of Keshev, The Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel. A member of the task force that established Israel Television, he has been engaged in professional work for the printed press, radio and television.

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verlag irena regener berlin Wir setzen Qualitätsstandards jenseits des Mainstreams

Wilhelm Kempf y Sonia Gutiérrez Villalobos

Los Medios y la Cultura de Paz

(Friedens- und Demokratiepsychologie, Bd. 1). 2001, 141 S., brosch., mit 25 Abb. & 1 Tab., € 19,80. ISBN 978-3-936014-00-6.

La cultura de la guerra está dominada por elpensamiento dualista y las polaridades que este genera. El fortalecer la paz implica socavar esas polaridades en los tres momentos: antes de que el conflicto haya escalado a su etapa violenta, durante la etape violenta, y después del cese al fuego o la firma del tratado de paz. Los periodistas y los medios masivos podrían hacer una contribución significativa a estos procesos. La pregunta es cómo hacerlo. Sin esfuerzos sistemáticos por construir la paz, los conflictos pueden durar mucho. Además, siempre está la amenaza de que resurja la violencia. Basado en estudios sobre los reportajes de la guerra del Golfo, los reportajes del conflicto bosnio y del proceso de paz palestino-israelí, enfoca este libro el papel de los periodista y de los medios en los tiempos de transición entre la guerra y la paz, e investiga sobre una posible contribución de los periodistas en el proceso de formación de paz.

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Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ed.)

Constructive Conflict Coverage

A Social Psychological Approach

(Hochschullehrbücher, Bd. 1). 2003, 192 S., brosch., mit zahlreichen Abb. & Tab. sowie buchbegleitender CD-ROM, € 29,90. ISBN 978-3-936014-02-0.

"There is an urgent need to work toward a process of greater social openness in order to be able to learn something about the reality before it is set in concrete, in order to recognize facts before they are interpreted" (Ignacio Martin-Baró, 1991). The contribution which journalists can make to such a process of greater social openness is central to the present training book, which puts three mutually-supportive topical complexes at the center of journalistic training: the transmission of theoretical knowledge of the social-psychological mechanisms involved in an escalation-oriented construction of reality, the application of this knowledge to sensitize journalists and the audience to the escalation-oriented perceptual distortions typical of conventional conflict reportage and the development of writing techniques which will enable journalists to report the facts without interpreting them in advance in an escalation-oriented manner.

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

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Peace journalism is a relatively new research area in psychology which emerged in the last decade of the Twentieth Century. Building on findings from social psychology (group processes, social influence, conflict research, attitude change), propaganda and enemy concept research, as well as on models of conflict management and the constructive transformation of conflict, it is increasing our awareness of the role news coverage plays in the escalation and de-escalation of conflict.
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