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## Aggressor or victim? How the antagonists of the Lebanon War 2006 are constructed in German Newspapers

*Kurzfassung:* Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es, die Strukturen und Muster der Berichterstattung über die Akteure des Libanonkrieges 2006 der deutschen überregionalen Tageszeitungen "Welt", "Süddeutsche Zeitung" und "Tageszeitung" zu identifizieren. Forschungsleitend waren folgende Fragen: Welcher Akteur wird vornehmlich in der Täter-, welcher in der Opferrolle dargestellt und gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Presseorganen? Die Ergebnisse der quantitativen Inhaltsanalyse zeigen, dass Israel nicht nur am häufigsten in der Täter-, sondern auch überwiegend in der Opferrolle dargestellt wird. Am zweithäufigsten werden Akteure der Hizbollah mit der Täterrolle assoziiert. Libanesishe Akteure werden hingegen kaum als Täter kontextualisiert. Sie werden, nach den israelischen Akteuren, am zweithäufigsten in der Opferrolle charakterisiert. Die Analyse konnte Unterschiede zwischen den drei Tageszeitung ausmachen.

*Abstract:* The present study analyzed the patterns of the German newspaper coverage about the antagonists of the Lebanon war 2006. The following research questions were addressed: Firstly, which actor of the Lebanon war 2006 is mainly portrayed as the aggressor and which as the victim – the Israeli, the Lebanese or Hezbollah actors? Secondly, are there any differences between the newspapers – "Süddeutsche Zeitung", "Welt" and "tageszeitung". As findings of the quantitative content analysis indicate, Israeli actors are characterized as both aggressor and victim. The second most description of the aggressor role applied to actors of the Hezbollah. Lebanese actors are rarely portrayed as aggressor. They are, after Israeli actors, the second most group characterized in the victim role. Differences between the analyzed newspapers are found.

### 1 Introduction and objectives

The course of modern wars is not only determined by the quality and quantity of the weapons used but also by the way its main actors are portrayed in terms of which role – aggressor or victim – they are assigned by the national as well as the international media. Given the fact that the news coverage has an impact on the perception of the war and its main actors by the public (see Groebel 1995: 71), the media tenor has an influence on public opinion which in turn affects the political sphere: "When political conflicts become part of the public agenda, political actors are under pressure to 'do something': to react, to mediate, or to come to aid the victims" (Wolfsfeld 1997: 68). When the media focus on the victims "they are issuing a call to stop the bloodshed [...] when journalists uncover government [...] brutality, the underlying message is that 'something should be done' about it" (Wolfsfeld 1997: 65).

Being aware of the importance of the media the main actors of the war try to impart their interpretations of the conflict that are often diametrically opposed to those by the media. In contrast the media "attempt to construct a story that can be understood by their audience" (Wolfsfeld 1997: 31). Hence the news coverage often meets with criticism – especially by the actor who believes to be portrayed as the aggressor.

In 2006 Jewish representatives found fault with the German media coverage about the Lebanon War. Salomon Korn, vice president of the German Central Council of Jews, argued that the news coverage of the German public service broadcasting is biased in favor of the Lebanese people and the Hezbollah: "the Israeli people are often portrayed as the aggressor, while the Lebanese people are always shown as the victim"<sup>1</sup> (Korn, cited in N.A. 2006, Nahost-Konflikt.). Furthermore, the nature of the Hezbollah as a terrorist organization remains concealed, he continues. German newspaper coverage became also a focus of reproaches. Sacha Stawski, representative of the Zionist Movement Frankfurt, criticized the "inverted world" with "Israel being in the pillory as the heedless and inhuman aggressor" (Stawski cited in Arning 2006: Zur Wahrheit verpflichtet...).

The present study was designed to reassess this critique. For this purpose three national German newspapers – "die Süddeutsche Zeitung" (SZ), "die Welt" (Welt) and "die Tageszeitung" (taz) – were analyzed.

The study aims to address the following research questions:

Q1: Which actors of the Lebanon war 2006 are mainly constructed as the aggressor and which as the victim – the Israeli actors, the Lebanese actors or the members of the Hezbollah?

Q2: Are there any differences between the constructions of the three analyzed newspapers?

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1. All translations by author unless otherwise noted

## **2 Theoretical background**

### **2.1 Basic principles of the constructivist perspective**

The present study follows a constructivist perspective<sup>1</sup> that can be interpreted as a "many-voiced discourse, a set of research interest, crucial questions and fundamental theoretical figures of thinking" (Pörksen 2004: 336). Weber (2002: 24) defines constructivism by means of the following formula: "Constructivism can be seen as a theory explaining how an entity / a place / a unity X creates a reality Y or multiple realities Y1-Yn [...]." The possibility of one absolute perceptible reality is rejected in favor of the idea of a multitude of constructed realities. However, the existence of one reality is not challenged. Instead it is argued that it can serve as the starting point for any construction but it cannot be perceived (Burkart 1999: 56): Every statement about this one reality would already be a construction, that has been made by an observer<sup>2</sup> on the basis of his or her particular cognitive structure and specific dispositions (Staiger 2004: 153). According to this view there are as many realities as there are entities that are able to observe and construct. The constructed reality is based on the observer's structure but also on the observation standpoint. Therefore, human beings who live in same environments construct similar realities.

Media and communication research from a constructivist perspective interprets the journalist as an actor who creates realities within the framework of professional standards, routines and schemata. Therefore, the content of the media cannot be equated with absolute reality. Journalists select from a variety of different events to be covered, apply a certain frame and hence construct a media reality. These realities in turn stimulate the recipients to create own constructions of reality (Pörksen 2004: 343). The way the media professionals construct their story depends on internal and external factors such as the characteristics of the journalists themselves, political, organizational and economic necessities (Weischenberg 1998: 67ff.).

Constructivist media researchers examine how journalists construct realities: they "put the specifics of journalistic constructions programs into the centre of interest [...]" (Pörksen 2004: 346). This is the reason why the main focus does not rest upon the comparison of the media reality with external media data but upon the comparison of different media realities. Thus the present study compares the construction of the media reality of the Lebanon War 2006 in three German national newspapers.

### **2.2 War Coverage from a constructivist perspective**

The construction of reality by journalists depends on three decisions (Schanne 1995: 111):

1. the decision about which events should be covered
2. which characteristics of the events should be described and
3. how the descriptions should be reported.

#### **2.2.1 News factors of Wars**

The first decision is mainly influenced by the newsworthiness that can be applied to an event by the journalists: The higher the newsworthiness the more likely the event will be reported. Wars and crisis usually have a high level of newsworthiness because journalists can attribute certain criteria – news factors – that allow these topics to overcome the barrier of news selection (see Schulz 1990: 30)<sup>3</sup>.

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1. However, the significance of the constructivist perspective for communication research has not been undisputed. Resentments have been mentioned within the workshop "Media and Communication" in 1991, during some symposia of the DGPK and in the book "The reality of the media" (see Pörksen 2004: 338; Weischenberg 1992: 168-177)
  2. An observer is defined as "every living cognitive system" (Weber 2003: 185) such as human beings.
  3. According to the approach of Galtung and Ruge (1965: 65 and 68) the following news factors – amongst others – can be applied to wars:
    1. Frequency: Hostilities usually have a certain starting point, different stages, and generally a clear ending.
    2. Negativity: Wars are by definition composed of violence and destruction.
    3. Significance: The more extensive the impact of an event is, the more likely journalists will consider it to be newsworthy. Wars and crisis usually affect many spheres of the society.
    4. Personalization: Events that can be attributed to the actions of persons are usually more often part of the news coverage than abstract and complex incidents.
    5. Clearness: The reason, the course and especially the actors of a war can usually easily be identified and classified.

### 2.2.2 Aggressor-Victim Schema

The second and third decision (which characteristics of an event should be described and how these descriptions should be reported) are influenced by cognitive schemata that have been developed during the professional socialization of the journalist. The term schema can be especially ascribed to the psychologist Jean Piaget, who first articulated this concept in his own discipline. The concept is based on the constructivist assumption that perception and mnemonic processes obviate a one to one image of the world: Human beings can only perceive and process a fraction of all incoming information. In order to easily manage this information, certain selection criteria and rules of processing are needed. Such criteria are developed during socialization shaped by interaction with the environment and are based on the unconscious ability of human beings to render abstract common characteristics of events, persons, places... Brosius defines a schema as a "set of attributes [...] that are shared by the objects of a given category" (Brosius 1991: 286). One differentiates between a top-down and a bottom-up-processing of information: Top-down refers to the way of perceiving, processing and looking for information through established frames, while bottom-up explains the way of processing new information without an interpretive schema but recalling it for further schema-building (Brosius 1991: 287).

The assumptions of the schema concept apply to the framing approach as well (Matthes 2007:49). That, however, puts journalistic actions in the centre of interest. In this context, a frame can be seen as a certain way of interpretation by the media that guides the selection and processing of information. Hence media frames are part of the construction processes of the journalists. They may change over a period of time but they are by and large "stable selection and structuring criteria" (Scheufele 2003: 213). The frames or schemata are mainly influenced by economic, professional, and political conditions and especially in times of wars by the public relations activities of the war antagonists who try "to promote their own world view" (Wolfsfeld 1993: Introduction XXI).

Frames of the modern journalism are often dominated by a tendency towards personalization and dramatization. Apart from these strategies, war coverage has developed special patterns: As shown in many empirical studies (Jaeger 2002; Kempf 1999; Scheufele 2005; Liedtke 1994; Interkom 1993) journalists try to construct an easy to understand story by imparting the idea of a bad versus good war (Marchal 1995: 108). The actors of the war are portrayed in different roles – the aggressor or the victim role. These roles can be identified by the attributes and the actions that are applied to the different actors of the war by the media (Scheufele: 2005: 352-368). Furthermore, they tend to focus on the behavior of the antagonists of the war in the battlefield and their adversarial relationship. The behavior outside the arena is only of little interest (see Jaeger 2002: 195). Gleich describes the logic of the war coverage as "simplistic, by reducing a wide range of complex frictions in the society to one single cleavage and appointing the role of one aggressor and one defender" (Gleich 2003: 146).

Similar to the aggressor-victim schema, the friend-enemy frame also emphasizes on the polarization of the antagonists: one differentiates between the good party that is fighting for the collective good against an evil aggressor. This constructed concept of the enemy can be defined as an image "to reach acceptance of or trigger an attack against another (intention), a stereotyped, simplified and negative image (message) of the characteristics, motives, intentions and behaviour of the other person or group (target) is created in which emotional or pseudo-informational mass media elements (means) apply selection, exaggeration and fake (process), with the consequence that the social distance between the two sides is increased (effect)" (Groebel 1997: 73). It mainly occurs in the media coverage of involved actor's media.

### External influencing factors of the aggressor-victim schema

Both the aggressor-victim schema and the friend-enemy schema can be influenced by different external factors. Of particular importance are on the one hand the public relations of the involved actors and on the other hand the characteristics of the war itself. Being aware of the significance of the media, the protagonists of the war try to influence the media coverage in favor of their own representation. For this purpose the political and the military actors use different strategies such as information management tactics (see Schrader 2002: 50), creating the concept of an evil enemy (see Kunczik 1995: 96; Wilke 2005: 101) or embedding journalism (Wilke 2005, Löffelholz et al. 2007). Whether or not these attempts to influence the media are successful depends on different factors. An absolute determination of journalism by public relations tactics of the politicians and the military can be denied (Kunczik 2002: 355-358). In fact, it is argued that both systems are connected by a relationship of dependence. In general, one can say that public relations strategies are the most successful if they are considered trustworthy and if they are the only source of information (Löffelholz 1995: 175).

The characteristics of the war can also have an impact on the war coverage. In recent years the traditional interstate conflicts have been displaced by transnational and intra-state wars. Central actors of the war are not only states anymore but increasingly so-called warlords (Münkler 2006: 10). Wars are not only being waged by professional soldiers but also by recruited civilians who are taught to handle weapons. This type of modern war is, according to Münkler, characterised by asymmetric parameters: a militarily and organizationally superior actor confronts a seemingly weaker opponent, who tries to compensate for the disadvantage by using creative strategies and tactics. Furthermore, the weak side tries to emphasize

its role as the underdog who needs to defend against the attacks by a superior military. In this case, journalists tend to take side with the assumed weaker actor of the war (Münkler 2006: 58) and consequently portray it as the victim.

### **3 The media reality of the Middle East Conflict in the German press**

In the past decades, a multitude of studies has analyzed the representation of the Israeli actors in German media coverage of the Middle East conflicts. Even though these studies are based on different theoretical and methodical approaches, there are some general trends that can be extracted from the findings: Until the 70s, the image of Israel in the German media had been predominantly positive. Israel had been characterized as a peaceful state that needed support against the hostile Arab environment. (Koschwitz 1984; Hub 1998; Hafez 2002, Broening 2005). The reasons for favorable German media coverage in this period of time can be seen in the special responsibility of the German state for the victims of the Holocaust (Hafez 2002: 159). Furthermore, the embedding of the Middle East Conflict along the cleavage of the Cold War where Israel was an ally of the USA while the Arab states cooperated with the Soviet Union might have fostered a positive image in the German media (Koschwitz 1984). However, since the 70s the assessment of Israeli actions in the media has changed: supportive media coverage in the 60s and 70s has been displaced by a critical tone. Israel has been portrayed as the aggressor who terrorizes the neighboring states and therefore endangers peace and stability in the region especially in the context of the Lebanon invasion in 1982. Even though this overall change can be observed in each of the analyzed media, there are slight differences in terms of the intensity of the position: The conservative press like the "Welt" usually characterizes Israel more positive (Lewan 1970; Hafez 2002) than left-leaning publications like the "Spiegel" (Behrens 2003) and the "taz" (Hafez 2002) which usually take side for Arab actors.

### **4 The Course of the Lebanon War 2006**

The asymmetric combat operations between the Hezbollah militia who operates on Lebanese territory and the Israeli army began July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2006 and lasted 33 days until UN resolution 1701 brought a ceasefire on August 14<sup>th</sup>, 2006. Catalyst of the war in Lebanon 2006 was the operation "kept promise" by the Hezbollah militia, who abducted two Israeli soldiers and bombarded parts of Northern Israel in order to force the release of Lebanese prisoners. Israel reacted with major offensives against hidden Hezbollah bases but also against the Lebanese infrastructure. Along with the Israeli military response, the Hezbollah amplified its missile attacks. On August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2006 a ceasefire was enacted with mediation by Kofi Annan, by the USA and France. Three days later it came into force.

### **5 Method**

This study is based upon a quantitative content analysis of the three German national newspapers "die Sueddeutsche Zeitung" (SZ), "die Welt" (Welt) and "die Tageszeitung" (taz). These newspapers were selected because each of them covers international issues, is known for quality and together they represent a wide spectrum of political views from a conservative (Welt) over a liberal (SZ) to a left (taz) standpoint. The "Welt" was founded by Axel Springer whose pro-Israeli attitude became manifest in the publisher's principles that are the guideline for the professional work of the journalists working for the company: Article 2 advocates the "conciliation between Jews and Germans, which also includes the support for the rights of the Jewish people" (Grundsätze Axel Springer Verlag). Consequently, and as shown in previous studies, one can expect a more favorable characterization of Israel than in the "taz" that is considered to be more pro-Arab due to its left tradition that was sympathetic to the Palestinians especially during the 70s (see Fischer 1994). The "SZ" is expected to hold a middle position.

Since only the coverage during the Lebanon War 2006 is of interest, the beginning and the end of the war mark the time frame of the analysis (13 July 2006 – 17 August 2006).

In view of the specific constellation of three actors involved, the aggressor-victim-scheme implying that one actor of the war is mainly portrayed as the aggressor and the other as the victim needed to be slightly adjusted: One can still expect one actor to be characterized mainly as aggressor and another as victim, but one actor is expected to be contextualized in either ways. Following these theoretical considerations (see also chap.2) and based on the findings of previous research (chap.3) the following three hypotheses were tested:

H1: In the German newspapers the role of the aggressor is mainly attributed to Israeli actors. In comparison, the members of Hezbollah are less frequently portrayed as the aggressor. Lebanese actors are rarely shown as aggressors.

H2: The role of the victim is mainly assigned to Lebanese actors. Israeli actors are portrayed less often as victims. Members of the Hezbollah are least often shown as victims.

H3: The construction of the aggressor role differs among the three newspapers: The "taz" characterizes Israel most frequently as aggressor. The "SZ" portrays Israel less often as aggressor. By comparison the "Welt" shows Israel least often as the aggressor.

The database "LexisNexis" was used for determining all relevant articles in these print media. In order to keep extraneous articles out of the suitable matches, the search parameters made sure that the word Lebanon as well as Israel and / or Hezbollah occurred in the article<sup>1</sup>. Still, a multitude of articles matched with the search term. Therefore a selection criterion needed to be chosen: For the present study every article on the front page and on the op-ed page with reference to the Lebanon War 2006 situated in the title, the lead and / or the first paragraph and with a conflict role (aggressor or victim) was selected for analysis.<sup>2</sup> The first page was chosen because it is argued that due to the prominent position, articles on this side are considered as especially newsworthy by the journalists. The decision for the op-ed page was made because this study argues that articles on this side offer the best insights into the journalists' construction.

The analysis looked for aggressor or victim patterns not on the level of an article as a whole, but on the level of a statement (unit of analysis). For each statement with an object (in this case a Israeli, Lebanese or Hezbollah actor), a conflict role from a source of the statement was coded. Overall, a case was defined by the following variables (see table 1): object, conflict role, form of violence, consequences of violence, legitimization of violence, appropriateness of violence, damage caused by violence, source of the statement. If one of the variables changed, the statement was coded as a new case.

Variable	Parameter value
object	Israeli actor (State/Government, military, civil population, others); Lebanese actor (State/Government, military, civil population, others); member of the Hezbollah (command, party, militia, others)
conflict role	aggressor, victim
form of violence	beatings, abduction, shooting, bombing, suicide attack, tank attack, air strike, missile attack, curfew, occupation, blockade, not mentioned
consequence of violence	flight, destruction, imprisonment, death, injury, humanitarian consequences, environmental consequences, others
legitimation of violence by the source of the statement	yes, no, not mentioned
How is violence being legitimized?	self-defense, ensuring survival, disarming the opponent, fight against terrorism, release of hostages, others
Is violence being characterized as appropriate?	yes, no, not mentioned
damage caused by violence	flight, destruction, death, humanitarian suffering, imprisonment, injury, others
source of statement	journalist, politician, military, expert, civilian, intellectual

Table 1: Variables

Every time an actor was portrayed as someone who uses force – no matter if in defence or as an offence attack – , it was coded as aggressor. If the actor was shown as someone who experienced force it was coded as victim. This coding decision is due to the consideration that every kind of force regardless of the catalyst is perceived as wrongful, whereas every actor who is subject to force evokes empathy – at least in situations when there is no clear culprit as it is in this case. The characterization of an actor within a conflict role can occur judgmentally by the attribution of certain features or by hypothetical expectations and descriptively by the description of actions. Table 2 might illustrate this by means of examples.

According to these rules every object was categorized as aggressor or victim. This classification was used as a filter variable for the further analysis. If an actor was categorized as aggressor, the form of violence used, the consequence of the violent act and the legitimization and the appropriateness of violence were of interest and were, if available, coded.

This study suggests that the conflict role of the aggressor seemed to be even more negative if it was associated with a

1. The used search term was "Libanon and Israel! Or Hizbollah or Hisbollah" (German spelling).
2. In view of the fact that this does not correspond with the criteria of a random sample the identified occurrences of certain statements were not calculated for the whole newspaper coverage of the three media. Therefore, the findings hold only true for the coverage on the first page and on the op-ed page. However, there is no sign that the findings cannot be also conferred to the rest of the newspaper coverage. Of course, this could not be proved by a statistical procedure like a chi-square test.

massive form of violence and / or devastating consequences of the violent act. In contrast, if the violence of the aggressor is legitimized by the source of the statement, the effect of the negative role is minimized.

Conflict role	judgmental		descriptive
	Attribution	Hypothetical expectations	
Aggressor	Missile spitting Hezbollah	Israel is going to attack pretty soon.	Israel is moving the troops forward
	Hezbollah: terror group	Hezbollah will attack Israeli ground groups	Israel has bombarded about 200 Lebanese objectives.
	Zionistic aggression	If the weapons of the Hizbollah remain silent, then only for a little while.	Hezbollah abducted soldiers
Victim	Threatened Israel	Lebanon has to pay the price of the war.	On Saturday 24 Soldiers were killed
	Lebanese people have to bleed		Twelve Israeli soldiers died in missile attack.

Table 2: Examples of characterizations of an actor within a conflict role

If an actor was portrayed in the role of the victim, the damage caused by the experienced violence was coded, when available. Following the same line of argumentation as mentioned above, it is argued that the degree of victimhood is higher if the suffered damage is death or destruction. However, damages like imprisonment and injury are expected to be less significant.

## 6 Findings

Overall, 259 articles met the selection criteria and were analyzed: 76 articles were allotted to the "SZ", 101 to the "Welt" and 82 to the "taz". 1218 statements displaying a conflict role were examined: Most of them (58 percent, figure 1) referred to Israeli actors, one-fifth (22 percent, see figure 1) to the Hezbollah and only 20 percent (figure 1) to Lebanese protagonists.




Figure 1: Frequencies of Statements referring to Israeli, Lebanese or Hezbollah Actors

### 6.1 Role of the Aggressor:

The analyzed newspapers mainly assigned Israeli actors to the role of the aggressor: 63 percent of all descriptions as aggressor were allotted to Israeli actors (see figure 2) –whereof about 60 percent were attributed to the Israeli military and

about 39 percent to the Israeli Government. The Israeli civil population was almost not portrayed as the aggressor (see annex, table 1).




Figure 2: Aggressor role

Furthermore, Israeli violence was attributed to massive and devastating forms like air strikes (38.5 percent) and bombing (34.4 percent; see annex, table 2). In addition the Israeli attacks were contextualized with enormous consequences like death (69.5 percent) and destruction (18.9 percent; see annex, table 3). This even amplifies the perceived level of aggression in Israel's aggressor role. Due to the fact that Israel is – unlike Hezbollah – a state and as such a member of supranational institutions, the Israeli attacks were the focus of international debates: This is reflected in the multitude of statements referring to the legitimization and appropriateness of Israeli violence: 87.8 percent of all legitimating statements were linked to Israeli actors (see annex, table 4). By and large Israeli actions were accepted with reference to the right of self-defense (69.8 percent) and the fight against terrorism (11.6 percent; see annex, table 5). Simultaneously, the intensity of the attacks was criticized as too excessive (see annex, table 6).

About 36 percent of all statements referring to the role of the aggressor were assigned to members of Hezbollah (figure 2). Unlike the Israeli actors that command highly developed weapons and military apparatus, Hezbollah possesses less military inventory. Therefore this group was frequently described in the context of missile attacks (65 percent) and abductions (30 percent; see annex, table 2) then with air strikes and bombing. Hence the consequences of their violence were more limited in scope: They were blamed for imprisonment (50.8 percent), especially of the two Israeli soldiers that sparked the war, and death (42.4 percent, see annex, table 3). Statements referring to the legitimacy (10.2 percent; annex, table 4) and the appropriateness (2.2 percent, Annex, table 6) of their violent actions were rare. Restrictively it must be said that 9 out of 10 statements coded in the legitimacy category for the Hezbollah actors, showed understanding for their actions. However, the overall number of understanding statements remained low. There appeared to be a consensus on the illegitimacy and inadequacy of the violent actions of the Hezbollah that needs no further debate.

Lebanese actors were rarely portrayed as aggressor (1 percent; see figure 2). Hence, an analysis of the forms and consequences of violent acts by Lebanese actors was not performed.

On the basis of these findings, hypothesis 1 can be corroborated.

## 6.2 Role of the victim

As the role of the aggressor was mainly attributed to Israeli actors, so was the role of the victims also mostly associated with Israeli protagonists (52 percent; see figure 3). This is due to the fact that the majority of all descriptions of the aggressor as well as the victim role were allotted to Israeli actors. Israeli victims were mainly contextualized with damages such as the imprisonment of Israeli soldiers (45.6 percent) and death (40.3 percent; see annex, table 7).




Figure 3: Victim role

The second most frequent characterization as victim applied to Lebanese actors (43 percent, see figure 3). This is due to the fact that the Hezbollah militia mainly operated from hiding places within Lebanese civilian territory, so that even though Lebanese people were not the target of Israeli military action, they suffered from them. Unlike Israeli victims, they were mostly associated with dramatic damages like death (51.1 percent), destruction (25 percent) and flight (11.8 percent; see annex, table 7). As a consequence, it can be argued that Lebanese victims arouse more empathy than Israeli victims who suffer from damages like imprisonment.

Hezbollah actors were rarely portrayed as victim (5 percent, see figure 3). Thus a separate analysis has not been undertaken. Hypothesis 2 is not fully supported by these data. It is not Lebanese people who primarily appear in the victim role, but Israeli actors.

### 6.3 The role of the aggressor in the different newspapers

As implied by hypothesis 3, the three analyzed newspapers created different constructions of the antagonists of the Lebanon War 2006. Due to the multitude of available data for comparison, only the parameters with the most significant differences in the description of the aggressor role will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

The results in figure 4 suggest that the left-leaning newspaper the "taz" assigned the part of the aggressor role most often to Israeli actors (69 percent). In addition, this already negative effect of the aggressor role in the "taz" is magnified by the attribution of massive forms of violence like bombing (51.5 percent) and air strikes (18.2 percent, see annex, table 8). In contrast the "Welt" characterized the Israeli side the most infrequently as aggressor (58 percent, figure 4), consistent with the publisher's guidelines of support and conciliation with Israel. Journalists of the "Welt" also attributed less often massive and devastating forms (e.g. bombings in 28.3 percent, see annex, table 8). This indicates that the "Welt" tries to level the negative effect of the aggressor role. Additionally, the "Welt" legitimized the violent actions of the Israelis the most often as acts of self-defense, which can also be interpreted as an attempt to minimize the destructive image of Israeli actions (see annex, table 9 and 10). As expected, the "SZ" holds a middle position (62.3 percent, see figure 4).

Like the "Welt" that constructed the Israeli actor the least often as aggressor, so did the left-leaning and pro-Arab oriented newspaper the "taz" characterize the actors of the Hezbollah the least often as aggressor (28.6 percent, see figure 4). In contrast the "Welt" shows the Hezbollah the most often (41.5 percent, see figure 4). Again, the "SZ" holds a middle position (37.0 percent, see figure 4).






Figure 4: Aggressor Role in the different newspapers

## 7 Conclusions

The present study aimed to analyze the patterns of the German newspaper coverage about the antagonists of the Lebanon war 2006. In order to do so, three newspapers were examined: the "Sueddeutsche Zeitung", the "Welt" and the "tageszeitung". The reassessment of the critique of Jewish representatives who found fault with the representations of the Israeli actors as the aggressor and the belittlement of the Hezbollah provided the impetus for the analysis. Thus the following research questions needed to be addressed: Firstly, which actors of the Lebanon war 2006 were mainly portrayed as the aggressor and which as the victim – the Israeli actors, the Lebanese actors or the members of Hezbollah? Secondly, are there any differences between the three newspapers?

The study followed a constructivist perspective: the media coverage of the Lebanon War 2006 was interpreted as a construction of a reality that is a product of media external and internal factors. Public relations of the political and military actors and the characteristics of the war itself have been identified as essential external factors relevant to the construction of war coverage. News factors as well as an aggressor-victim schema that helps to reduce the complexity of the hostilities and arguments to one conflict line, had an impact as internal professional rules.

The findings of the quantitative content analysis presented in this paper indicate that the role of aggressor is mainly attributed to Israeli actors. Furthermore, they were contextualized with massive and dramatic forms of violence such as bombings and air strikes. Accordingly, their violent acts were often associated with devastating consequences: In the German newspaper coverage they were blamed for death and destruction. Both the massive forms of violence and the devastating consequences of their acts can even magnify the negative effect of the role of the aggressor. However, their violent acts were most often legitimized as necessary acts of self-defense. The role of the aggressor was second frequently associated with members of the Hezbollah militia who primarily used missiles and abductions as forms of violence that, when compared to the forms of violence used by Israeli actors, seem to be less massive. However, only a few statements referred to the legitimization of Hezbollah's violent acts. This is probably due to the fact that their acts of violence as a terrorist group are per se recognized as immoral. Lebanese actors are rarely portrayed as aggressor.

Like the aggressor role, the role of the victim was also most often associated with Israeli actors. This can be explained by the fact that in general the majority of statements with a conflict role referred to Israeli actors encompassing both the aggressor and victim role. Lebanese actors were second most frequently portrayed in the role of the victim. Unlike the Israeli victims that mostly had to suffer from imprisonment and death, Lebanese actors were most often victims of death and destruction. This might cause even more empathy. Members of the Hezbollah are rarely shown in the role of the victim.

As expected, the three analyzed German newspapers differed in the construction of the aggressor role: Consistent with the publisher's guidelines, the "Welt" portrayed Israeli actors the least often as aggressor and with massive and dramatic forms of violence. Journalists of the "Welt" also most often legitimized their forms of violence. As a consequence, the impact of their violent acts seemed to be mitigated. In contrast, the left-leaning newspaper "taz" portrayed the Israeli actors most

often as an aggressor who uses massive forms of violence and causes enormous damage.

As this study suggests, journalists tend to use an aggressor-victim-schema to convey the complexity of a war. In this three-sided case, Israeli actors are shown as both victims and aggressors, but looking at the other two actors one can clearly state a polarization: while the Hezbollah members are mainly portrayed as aggressors, the Lebanese actors are characterized as victims only. Further research might revise if this pattern holds also true for other conflicts and wars especially in the Middle East.

In summary, a misrepresentation of the Israeli actor as claimed by Jewish representatives cannot be completely observed: the Israeli state is both victim and aggressor towards its neighbouring states. The critique can be seen as an expression of their construction of the reality that is due to the different degree of involvement fundamentally opposed to those constructions of the analyzed media: "The media have their own agenda, and they must be considered as political actors in their own right, engaged just like other political actor in a fight to control the construction of social meaning (Walgrave / Manssens 2005: 117)."

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## 9 Annex

			Conflict role		
			aggressor	victim	Total
Israeli Actor	State	Count	4	112	116
		% within Israeli Actor	3,4%	96,6%	100,0%
		% within Conflict role	1,0%	39,3%	16,4%
		% of Total	,6%	15,9%	16,4%
	Government	Count	163	3	166
		% within Israeli Actor	98,2%	1,8%	100,0%
		% within Conflict role	38,7%	1,1%	23,5%
		% of Total	23,1%	,4%	23,5%
	Military	Count	253	115	368
		% within Israeli Actor	68,8%	31,3%	100,0%
		% within Conflict role	60,1%	40,4%	52,1%
		% of Total	35,8%	16,3%	52,1%
	Civil populations	Count	1	55	56
		% within Israeli Actor	1,8%	98,2%	100,0%
		% within Conflict role	,2%	19,3%	7,9%
		% of Total	,1%	7,8%	7,9%
	Total	Count	421	285	706
		% within Israeli Actor	59,6%	40,4%	100,0%
		% within Conflict role	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	59,6%	40,4%	100,0%

Table 1: Conflict Role per Israeli Object

			Form of Violence										Total
			beat-ings	abduc-tion	shoot-ing	bomb-ing	tank attack	air strike	missile attack	block-ade	occu-pation	others	
Object	Israeli actor	Count	1	8	4	49	3	55	3	11	8	1	143
		% within Object	,7%	5,6%	2,8%	34,3%	2,1%	38,5%	2,1%	7,7%	5,6%	,7%	100,0%
		% within Form of Violence	100,0%	20,5%	57,1%	98,0%	100,0%	100,0%	4,3%	91,7%	100,0%	100,0%	58,1%
		% of Total	,4%	3,3%	1,6%	19,9%	1,2%	22,4%	1,2%	4,5%	3,3%	,4%	58,1%
	Lebanese actor	Count	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3
		% within Object	,0%	33,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	66,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
		% within Form of Violence	,0%	2,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	2,9%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,2%
		% of Total	,0%	,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,2%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	0	30	3	1	0	0	65	1	0	0	100
		% within Object	,0%	30,0%	3,0%	1,0%	,0%	,0%	65,0%	1,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
		% within Form of Violence	,0%	76,9%	42,9%	2,0%	,0%	,0%	92,9%	8,3%	,0%	,0%	40,7%
		% of Total	,0%	12,2%	1,2%	,4%	,0%	,0%	26,4%	,4%	,0%	,0%	40,7%
	Total	Count	1	39	7	50	3	55	70	12	8	1	246
		% within Object	,4%	15,9%	2,8%	20,3%	1,2%	22,4%	28,5%	4,9%	3,3%	,4%	100,0%
		% within Form of Violence	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	,4%	15,9%	2,8%	20,3%	1,2%	22,4%	28,5%	4,9%	3,3%	,4%	100,0%

Table 2: Form of Violence used

			Consequence of Violence					
			flight	imprisonment	destruction	injury	death	Total
Object	Israeli actor	Count	3	7	18	1	66	95
		% within Object	3,2%	7,4%	18,9%	1,1%	69,5%	100,0%
		% within Consequence of Violence	75,0%	18,9%	90,0%	33,3%	72,5%	61,3%
		% of Total	1,9%	4,5%	11,6%	,6%	42,6%	61,3%
	Lebanese actor	Count	1	0	0	0	0	1
		% within Object	100,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
		% within Consequence of Violence	25,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,6%
		% of Total	,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,6%
	Actor of the Hez- bollah	Count	0	30	2	2	25	59
		% within Object	,0%	50,8%	3,4%	3,4%	42,4%	100,0%
		% within Consequence of Violence	,0%	81,1%	10,0%	66,7%	27,5%	38,1%
		% of Total	,0%	19,4%	1,3%	1,3%	16,1%	38,1%
	Total	Count	4	37	20	3	91	155
		% within Object	2,6%	23,9%	12,9%	1,9%	58,7%	100,0%
		% within Consequence of Violence	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	2,6%	23,9%	12,9%	1,9%	58,7%	100,0%

Table 3: Consequences of Violence

			Is violence legitimized?		
			yes	no	Total
Object	Israeli actor	Count	58	28	86
		% within Object	67,4%	32,6%	100,0%
		% within Is violence legitimized?	85,3%	93,3%	87,8%
		% of Total	59,2%	28,6%	87,8%
	Lebanese actor	Count	1	1	2
		% within Object	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
		% within Is violence legitimized?	1,5%	3,3%	2,0%
		% of Total	1,0%	1,0%	2,0%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	9	1	10
		% within Object	90,0%	10,0%	100,0%
		% within Is violence legitimized?	13,2%	3,3%	10,2%
		% of Total	9,2%	1,0%	10,2%
	Total	Count	68	30	98
		% within Object	69,4%	30,6%	100,0%
		% within Is violence legitimized?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	69,4%	30,6%	100,0%

Table 4: Is violence legitimized?

			How is violence legitimized?						Total
			self-defense	ensuring survival	disarming the opponent	fight against terrorism	release of hostages	others	
Object	Israeli actor	Count	30	2	4	5	2	0	43
		% within Object	69,8%	4,7%	9,3%	11,6%	4,7%	,0%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	83,3%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	40,0%	,0%	81,1%
		% of Total	56,6%	3,8%	7,5%	9,4%	3,8%	,0%	81,1%
	Lebanese actor	Count	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
		% within Object	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	100,0%	1,9%
		% of Total	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	1,9%	1,9%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	6	0	0	0	3	0	9
		% within Object	66,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	33,3%	,0%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	16,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%	60,0%	,0%	17,0%
		% of Total	11,3%	,0%	,0%	,0%	5,7%	,0%	17,0%
	Total	Count	36	2	4	5	5	1	53
		% within Object	67,9%	3,8%	7,5%	9,4%	9,4%	1,9%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	67,9%	3,8%	7,5%	9,4%	9,4%	1,9%	100,0%

Table 5: How is violence legitimized?

			Is violence seen as appropriate?	
			no	Total
Object	Israeli actor	Count	44	44
		% within Object	100,0%	100,0%
		% within Is violence seen as appropriate?	97,8%	97,8%
		% of Total	97,8%	97,8%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	1	1
		% within Object	100,0%	100,0%
		% within Is violence seen as appropriate?	2,2%	2,2%
		% of Total	2,2%	2,2%
	Total	Count	45	45
		% within Object	100,0%	100,0%
		% within Is violence seen as appropriate?	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	100,0%	100,0%

Table 6: Is violence seen as appropriate?

			Damage caused by violence						
			flight	imprisonment	destruction	injury	death	humanitarian suffering	Total
Object	Israeli actor	Count	1	68	5	15	60	0	149
		% within Object	,7%	45,6%	3,4%	10,1%	40,3%	,0%	100,0%
		% within Damage caused by violence	5,9%	89,5%	12,5%	57,7%	43,8%	,0%	49,5%
		% of Total	,3%	22,6%	1,7%	5,0%	19,9%	,0%	49,5%
	Lebanese actor	Count	16	1	34	10	70	5	136
		% within Object	11,8%	,7%	25,0%	7,4%	51,5%	3,7%	100,0%
		% within Damage caused by violence	94,1%	1,3%	85,0%	38,5%	51,1%	100,0%	45,2%
		% of Total	5,3%	,3%	11,3%	3,3%	23,3%	1,7%	45,2%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	0	7	1	1	7	0	16
		% within Object	,0%	43,8%	6,2%	6,2%	43,8%	,0%	100,0%
		% within Damage caused by violence	,0%	9,2%	2,5%	3,8%	5,1%	,0%	5,3%
		% of Total	,0%	2,3%	,3%	,3%	2,3%	,0%	5,3%
	Total	Count	17	76	40	26	137	5	301
		% within Object	5,6%	25,2%	13,3%	8,6%	45,5%	1,7%	100,0%
		% within Damage caused by violence	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	5,6%	25,2%	13,3%	8,6%	45,5%	1,7%	100,0%

Table 7: Damage caused by violence

Medium				Form of Violence										
				beat-ings	abduc-tion	shoot-ing	bomb-ing	tank attack	air strike	missile attack	block-ade	occu-pation	others	Total
SZ	Ob-ject	Israeli actor	Count		1	2	19	3	29	3	4	2	1	64
			% within Object		1,6%	3,1%	29,7%	4,7%	45,3%	4,7%	6,2%	3,1%	1,6%	100,0%
			% within Form of Violence		9,1%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	8,8%	80,0%	100,0%	100,0%	60,4%
			% of Total		,9%	1,9%	17,9%	2,8%	27,4%	2,8%	3,8%	1,9%	,9%	60,4%
	Actor of the Hezbollah		Count		10	0	0	0	0	31	1	0	0	42
			% within Object		23,8%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	73,8%	2,4%	,0%	,0%	100,0%
			% within Form of Violence		90,9%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	91,2%	20,0%	,0%	,0%	39,6%
			% of Total		9,4%	,0%	,0%	,0%	,0%	29,2%	,9%	,0%	,0%	39,6%
	Total		Count		11	2	19	3	29	34	5	2	1	106
			% within Object		10,4%	1,9%	17,9%	2,8%	27,4%	32,1%	4,7%	1,9%	,9%	100,0%
			% within Form of Violence		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
			% of Total		10,4%	1,9%	17,9%	2,8%	27,4%	32,1%	4,7%	1,9%	,9%	100,0%
Welt	Ob-ject	Israeli actor	Count	1	6	1	13		20	0	4	1		46
			% within Object	2,2%	13,0%	2,2%	28,3%		43,5%	,0%	8,7%	2,2%		100,0%
			% within Form of Violence	100,0%	33,3%	25,0%	100,0%		100,0%	,0%	100,0%	100,0%		52,3%
			% of Total	1,1%	6,8%	1,1%	14,8%		22,7%	,0%	4,5%	1,1%		52,3%
	Actor of the Hezbollah		Count	0	12	3	0		0	27	0	0		42
			% within Object	,0%	28,6%	7,1%	,0%		,0%	64,3%	,0%	,0%		100,0%
			% within Form of Violence	,0%	66,7%	75,0%	,0%		,0%	100,0%	,0%	,0%		47,7%
			% of Total	,0%	13,6%	3,4%	,0%		,0%	30,7%	,0%	,0%		47,7%
	Total		Count	1	18	4	13		20	27	4	1		88
			% within Object	1,1%	20,5%	4,5%	14,8%		22,7%	30,7%	4,5%	1,1%		100,0%
			% within Form of Violence	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%		100,0%
			% of Total	1,1%	20,5%	4,5%	14,8%		22,7%	30,7%	4,5%	1,1%		100,0%
taz	Ob-ject	Israeli actor	Count		1	1	17		6	0	3	5		33
			% within Object		3,0%	3,0%	51,5%		18,2%	,0%	9,1%	15,2%		100,0%
			% within Form of Violence		10,0%	100,0%	94,4%		100,0%	,0%	100,0%	100,0%		63,5%
			% of Total		1,9%	1,9%	32,7%		11,5%	,0%	5,8%	9,6%		63,5%
	Lebanese actor		Count		1	0	0		0	2	0	0		3
			% within Object		33,3%	,0%	,0%		,0%	66,7%	,0%	,0%		100,0%
			% within Form of Violence		10,0%	,0%	,0%		,0%	22,2%	,0%	,0%		5,8%
			% of Total		1,9%	,0%	,0%		,0%	3,8%	,0%	,0%		5,8%
	Actor of the Hezbollah		Count		8	0	1		0	7	0	0		16
			% within Object		50,0%	,0%	6,2%		,0%	43,8%	,0%	,0%		100,0%
			% within Form of Violence		80,0%	,0%	5,6%		,0%	77,8%	,0%	,0%		30,8%
			% of Total		15,4%	,0%	1,9%		,0%	13,5%	,0%	,0%		30,8%
Total		Count		10	1	18		6	9	3	5		52	
		% within Object		19,2%	1,9%	34,6%		11,5%	17,3%	5,8%	9,6%		100,0%	
		% within Form of Violence		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%		100,0%	
		% of Total		19,2%	1,9%	34,6%		11,5%	17,3%	5,8%	9,6%		100,0%	

Table 8: Violence used per Medium



Medium				Is violence legitimized?		
				yes	no	Total
SZ	Object	Israeli actor	Count	14	15	29
			% within Object	48,3%	51,7%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	87,5%	93,8%	90,6%
			% of Total	43,8%	46,9%	90,6%
		Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	2	1	3
			% within Object	66,7%	33,3%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	12,5%	6,2%	9,4%
			% of Total	6,2%	3,1%	9,4%
		Total	Count	16	16	32
			% within Object	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
			% of Total	50,0%	50,0%	100,0%
Welt	Object	Israeli actor	Count	29	6	35
			% within Object	82,9%	17,1%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	93,5%	100,0%	94,6%
			% of Total	78,4%	16,2%	94,6%
		Lebanese actor	Count	1	0	1
			% within Object	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	3,2%	,0%	2,7%
			% of Total	2,7%	,0%	2,7%
		Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	1	0	1
			% within Object	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	3,2%	,0%	2,7%
			% of Total	2,7%	,0%	2,7%
		Total	Count	31	6	37
			% within Object	83,8%	16,2%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
			% of Total	83,8%	16,2%	100,0%
taz	Object	Israeli actor	Count	15	7	22
			% within Object	68,2%	31,8%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	71,4%	87,5%	75,9%
			% of Total	51,7%	24,1%	75,9%
		Lebanese actor	Count	0	1	1
			% within Object	,0%	100,0%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	,0%	12,5%	3,4%
			% of Total	,0%	3,4%	3,4%
		Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	6	0	6
			% within Object	100,0%	,0%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	28,6%	,0%	20,7%
			% of Total	20,7%	,0%	20,7%
		Total	Count	21	8	29
			% within Object	72,4%	27,6%	100,0%
			% within Is violence legitimized?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
			% of Total	72,4%	27,6%	100,0%

Table 9: Is Violence legitimized? per Medium

Medium				How is violence legitimized?						
				self- defense	ensuring survival	disarming the opponent	fight against terrorism	release of hostages	others	Total
SZ	Object Israeli actor	Count	10				1	1		12
		% within Object	83,3%				8,3%	8,3%		100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	83,3%				100,0%	100,0%		85,7%
		% of Total	71,4%				7,1%	7,1%		85,7%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	2				0	0		2
		% within Object	100,0%				,0%	,0%		100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	16,7%				,0%	,0%		14,3%
		% of Total	14,3%				,0%	,0%		14,3%
	Total	Count	12				1	1		14
		% within Object	85,7%				7,1%	7,1%		100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	100,0%				100,0%	100,0%		100,0%
		% of Total	85,7%				7,1%	7,1%		100,0%
Welt	Object Israeli actor	Count	17	2	3			1	0	23
		% within Object	73,9%	8,7%	13,0%			4,3%	,0%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%			50,0%	,0%	92,0%
		% of Total	68,0%	8,0%	12,0%			4,0%	,0%	92,0%
	Lebanese actor	Count	0	0	0			0	1	1
		% within Object	,0%	,0%	,0%			,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	,0%	,0%	,0%			,0%	100,0%	4,0%
		% of Total	,0%	,0%	,0%			,0%	4,0%	4,0%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	0	0	0			1	0	1
		% within Object	,0%	,0%	,0%			100,0%	,0%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	,0%	,0%	,0%			50,0%	,0%	4,0%
		% of Total	,0%	,0%	,0%			4,0%	,0%	4,0%
	Total	Count	17	2	3			2	1	25
		% within Object	68,0%	8,0%	12,0%			8,0%	4,0%	100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%			100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% of Total	68,0%	8,0%	12,0%			8,0%	4,0%	100,0%
taz	Object Israeli actor	Count	3		1	4		0		8
		% within Object	37,5%		12,5%	50,0%		,0%		100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	42,9%		100,0%	100,0%		,0%		57,1%
		% of Total	21,4%		7,1%	28,6%		,0%		57,1%
	Actor of the Hezbollah	Count	4		0	0		2		6
		% within Object	66,7%		,0%	,0%		33,3%		100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	57,1%		,0%	,0%		100,0%		42,9%
		% of Total	28,6%		,0%	,0%		14,3%		42,9%
	Total	Count	7		1	4		2		14
		% within Object	50,0%		7,1%	28,6%		14,3%		100,0%
		% within How is violence legitimized?	100,0%		100,0%	100,0%		100,0%		100,0%
		% of Total	50,0%		7,1%	28,6%		14,3%		100,0%

Table 10: How is violence legitimized? per Medium

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