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Conflict management through media: Contributory and partisan frames in socio-environmental conflict coverage

Kurzfassung: Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert sozio-ökologische Konflikte in Lateinamerika aus Sichtweise der Konflikttransformation und hebt die Rolle der Medien als zweiter und dritter Akteur in Dialogen hervor, die sich mit hartnäckigen Konflikten befassen. Eine Diskussion der von Johan Galtung postulierten und von Lynch & McGoldrick modifizierten Indikatoren des Kriegsjournalismus ergibt, dass sie für die Analyse von Umweltkonflikten einer weiteren Anpassung bedürfen. Auf Grundlage der Framing-Theorie werden Indikatoren für kooperative und parteiische Frames entwickelt. Anhand dieser Indikatoren analysiert der Autor schließlich die regionalen und nationalen Medien sowie die Phasen des Konfliktzyklus in drei sozio-ökologischen Konflikten in Peru.

Abstract: This article analyzes socio-environmental conflicts in Latin America through a conflict transformation lens, highlighting the contributory role of the media as a secondary- and third-party actor in dialogues that address intractable conflicts. This article reviews journalistic coverage of war indicators posited by Johan Galtung, and modified indicators by Lynch and McGoldrick, finding that indicators require further adaptation to analyze socio-environmental conflicts. Using frame theory, this work developed indicators for contributory frames and for the partisan frames. With those indicators the author analyzed the regional and national media and the stages of conflict cycle in three socio-environmental conflicts in Peru.

1.- Introduction

In Latin America, public policies geared toward development and extractive industries have generated continuous emergence of socio-environmental conflicts (Silva, Akchurin & Bebbington, 2018; Bebbington and Humphreys, 2010). Conservative and liberal governments across Latin America have championed extractive industry projects, leading to limitations in human rights and reduction of environmental legislation (Farthing & Fabricant, 2018; Gudynas, 2012). Emerging socio-environmental conflicts are relatively more intense under weak governments, such as the Government of Peru, where extractive neoliberal policies exacerbate conflict. In 2018, the Ombudsman Office of Peru reviewed 194 conflict cases, including 121 environmental conflicts. These numbers show that the persistence of conflicts has become a central problem of governance.

The scholarly literature on socio-environmental conflicts relies on different dimensions of conflict: on the one hand, in the field of psychology, relative deprivation theory argues that individuals behave contentiously when deprived of environmental resources (Gurr, 1970; Rose, Menasco and Curry 1982). Similarly, resource mobilization theory argues that social actors develop contentious actions to preserve environmental resources, using specific repertoires and existing opportunities (Tilly, 2006, Muller and Seligson, 1987; Lichbach, 1989). An alternate explanation is that competition to access and control of natural resources generates contentious dynamics among actors who dispute similar resources (Brock, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Lodgaard, 1992).

Scholars link economics and socio-environmental conflicts, finding that environmental degradation and stressors impede access to resources (Choucri and North, 1983; Galtung, 1982), which generates scarcity; insufficient environmental resources are exacerbated by overpopulation (Meadows, Randers and Meadows, 2006; Tir and Diehl 2001) and unequal redistribution of environmental resources (Kelly and Homer-Dixon, 1995; Percival and Homer-Dixon, 2001).

Across Latin America, socio-environmental conflicts emerge in rural areas with existing social breakdowns, where the entry of extractive industries exacerbates fragile conditions. A conflict analysis of social breakdowns in rural areas can be attributed to divisions among communities (Arellano, 2011), cultural clashes (Gouley, 2005), racism, radical leaderships (Barnechea and Tumi, 2011), political "caudillos" (Aste, De Echave and Glave, 2005), corruption (Tanaka, 2010), and asymmetric power between companies and communities (Alegria, 2011; De Echave et al, 2009). Government entities' weak conflict management strategies (Huamaní, 2012) and low technical capacity, political will, insufficient resources (Huamaní et al, 2011) aggravates existing social cleavages. Additionally, government entities fail to act impartially, often prioritizing income generated by extractive industries above rights of the local population.

Conflict actors, including government officials, private corporations, and social leaders often choose confrontational and polarizing actions (De Echave and Hoetmer, 2009; Alfaro, 2008; Caballero, 2011). This

strategy results in conflict escalation and crises, which affects governance (Acevedo, 2011) and social capital, producing great human and economic loss (Ombudsman Office of Peru, 2012).

The media has become an increasingly important actor in socio-environmental conflicts. The media monitored emerging conflicts (De Echave et al 2009), provided public visibility (Rubenstein et al, 1994) and accelerated or decelerated conflict dynamics (Strohm, 1999). The media provides accessibility for different audiences to understand the conflict through narrative form (Mander, 1999), and help shape and define conflict issues by providing an interpretive framework (Lederach, 1991). An interpretive framework promotes the involvement of other actors (Macassi, 2011) and draws the attention of government officials. Additionally, news coverage promotes global discussion of the conflict, influencing interpersonal exchanges and conversations (Tichenor et al, 1999).

Furthermore, critical theory examines traditions in international war coverage, finding a coverage prioritization of national leaders over the population (Galtung and Holmboe, 1965), official sources (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2000), ethnic differences and identities (Howard, 2002), and confrontational narratives (Beaudoin and Torzón, 2002). More recently, analysis focuses on the political, professional and economic surroundings on the production of the war news (Shinar, 2013; Mitra, 2016).

Similarly, studies criticized use of drama, simplicity in information provided, ethnocentrism, and sensationalist approaches (Wolfsfeld, 2001). Other studies find that during conflict the media functions as a system gatekeeper (Strohm, 1999) and political regulator (Murthy, 2004).

Nevertheless, these critiques of the conflict or Latin American journalism do not vary substantially from critiques of journalism in general, which makes use of quality reporting indicators such as impartiality, contextualization, use of communication resources, balance, etc., (Eto, 2010; Huamán, 2012; Willer, 2010). However, these studies do not include culture of peace or conflict transformation approaches.

Several authors highlight the media's potential conflict resolution capacity, fulfilling roles of mediators (Adam and Thamotheram, 2009), shaping pro-positive narratives (Siebert and Bauman, 1990), establishing bridges among uncommunicative parties (Botes, 1998) or generating non-elite consensus (Gutiérrez, 2002). However, the existing literature on media and conflict does not identify the role of the media in promoting dialogue or promoting early conflict intervention or prevention. In other words, these studies are focused on finding the glass half empty, leaving aside the analysis of the different third-party roles that actors can fulfill during the conflict (Mitchell, 1994).

Socio-environmental conflicts in Latin America need the involvement of other social actors who can play impartial roles, as government entities tend to monopolize conflict management processes. Furthermore, government entities tend to take sides in conflicts, excluding primary actors and deflecting avoid criticism of their public policies, which may be driving the conflict dynamics. Therefore, it is important to consider the role of actors that contribute to conflict transformation, even they do not perform direct and specialized mediation tasks.

The media is crucial in creating conditions for conflict transformation; therefore, development of indicators that highlight the roles of the media as a contributor or party in a conflict, is of great importance.

2.- Indicator for analyzing the media in conflicts

Galtung and Holmboe postulated early multidimensional indicators of conflict coverage different from *war journalism* and *peace journalism* (Galtung and Holmboe, 1965). These indicators of conflict coverage focused on the relationship between people and elites, conflict personification, and negativism.

Later, Galtung developed acute characteristics for these indicators (Galtung, 2005), where characteristics for war journalism and peace journalism are observable in Table 1; these indicators inspired diverse studies and later developments, including Lynch and McGoldrick (2005; 2007) who endeavored to incorporate peace journalism into journalistic practice.

Nonetheless, these proposals were critiqued in four areas, which will be subsequently analyzed:

2.1.- Several authors question the viability of peace journalism assumptions, arguing that journalistic realities may be complex and peace journalism difficult to apply in practice (Loyn, 2007). Other critics argue that basic journalistic principles suffice to resist partisan journalism (Koyen, 2004). On the other hand, Hanitzsch argues that a society's peaceful culture is a precondition for peace journalism to incorporate productive routines, even if peace journalism struggles to be integrated into commercial media (Hanitzsch, 2007).

2.2.- Another objection notes that Galtung's indicators are intended for war and armed conflicts, yet do not adapt to socio-political or socio-environmental conflicts. Furthermore, Galtung's indicators are centered on a phase of

armed aggression. On the other hand, throughout socio-environmental conflicts, the period of open violence is brief, which overlaps with normative forces confronting grassroots organizations.

In socio-environmental conflicts, periods of latency, escalation, de-escalation, and re-latency are longer and deserve greater attention. Presupposing that a difference in coverage exists between each stage, Yang encounters "elite orientation" and partisanship frameworks as predominate news during the crisis (Yang, 2009), which differ from the predominate frameworks of the post-conflict phase, including "agreement orientation" and "causes and consequences approach."

	Violence/war journalism	Conflict/peace journalism
Galtung indicators (2005)	1.- Violence/war-oriented 2.- Propaganda-oriented 3.- Elite-oriented 4.- Victory-oriented	1.- Conflict-oriented 2.- Truth-oriented 3.- People-oriented 4.- Solution-oriented
Lynch y Mc Goldrick Indicators (2005)	1.- Focus on struggle 2.- Closed space and time 3.- Making wars opaque 4.- Us-Them contraposition 5.- Them as a problem 6.- Dehumanization 7.- Reactive to the violence 8.- Focus on effects of violence	1.- Explore conflict formation 2.- Focus on causes and outcomes 3.- Making conflicts transparent 4.- Giving voice to all parties 5.- See war as a problem 6.- Humanization of all sides 7.- Proactivity and prevention 8.- Show invisible effects of violence

Table 1: Indicators of war journalism and peace journalism

Bläsi argues that conditions for news production focused on peace journalism are different according to the stage of the conflict (Bläsi, 2009). As such, it is evident that tools for the analysis of journalistic coverage must be sensitive to different stages of conflict. Media incorporates a preventative focus when reporting on facts to avoid exacerbating a crisis or resurging a conflict.

2.3.- Absence of anchorage in communication theory: peace journalism proposes with precision what must be done and what must be avoided when covering war; however, theoretical premises of political communication are absent, which supports the initial formation of indicators. Relatedly, Nicolas (2011: 76) argues that, "peace journalism could be supported in the framing theory as a starting point," which would facilitate analysis and implementation in the professional field.

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), in response to the critiques associated with peace journalism, and definitions proposed by Entman, as both concepts emerge from the ability to "define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements, [and] suggest remedies" (Entman, 1993:52). If media reduces facts, often intentionally, news translates complexity of frames and informative formats which are codes for making facts more comprehensible for audiences.

War journalism	Peace journalism
1. Elite-oriented Focuses on leaders and elites as actors and sources of information.	1. People-oriented Focuses on common people as actors and sources of information.
2. Differences-oriented Reports on areas of differences that might lead to a worsening of conflict.	2. Reports the areas of agreement Reports on areas that might lead to a solution to the conflict.
3. Focuses on here and now Neither reports on factors contributing to conflicts nor consequences of it. Only reports about what, who, where and when of an event.	3. Reports causes and consequences Reports on factors contributing to conflicts as well as consequences of it.
4. Dichotomizes the good and bad Points finger at other quarters as responsible of the issue	4. Avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys Does not point fingers at other quarters as for issue.
5. Partisan Biased to one side of conflict.	5. Non- partisan Neutral and not taking sides

Table 2: Frames of war and peace journalism (Source: Yang 2009)

Recently, diverse studies have emerged which analyze the coverage of conflict from the perspective of a frame analysis, particularly from political, environmental and ethnic conflicts. Studies, including Ahmed et al (2018) analyze how geopolitical proximity influences framing of social conflicts in news coverage.

Yang (2009), building on Galtung, develops five indicators under the frames of "peace journalism" and "war journalism" and applies an ethnic political conflict analysis. As observed in Table 2, Yang develops several indicators proposed by Galtung, amplifying its definitions to extend beyond war conflicts.

The increasing importance of frames in reflecting on communications and political processes is also expressed in the discussion of conflict management. Conflict frames are an interactive process, where cognitive processes guide expectations over conflict situations (Dewulf et al, 2009). Environmental conflict management approaches require frames that are present in the discourse of parties to the conflict, and proper management of discourse and perceptions that compose frames in the conflict to avoid sharpening and increasing coercive actions (Iannone, 2016; Shmueli et al, 2006; Galli and Wennersten, 2013).

Journalists must manage conflict frames, because the actors express their position in the form of frames, and journalists undergo selection or re-invention of frames to incorporate in their journalistic discourse.

2.4.- The perspective of conflict transformation is not incorporated: other critics of Galtung and Lynch signal that peace journalism must incorporate "Conflict theory, with focus on the structure and dynamics of conflict and on the strategy of how disputes are captured and comprehended their participants and their environment, is the ultimate candidate to anchor PJ to solid ground" (Peleg, 2006:15).

3.- Contributory and partisan frames

Conflict transformation describes social conflicts as processes that involve different dimensions of human relations built on structural and historical causes. These relations are impacted by true or false perceptions and valuations, as well as actions against parties, which shift the access, lack, or deprivation of resources to generate incompatible goals and objectives between parties (Mitchell, 2014).

Under this framework, whether journalists cover facts passively or actively, distantly or proximately, does not affect the role of the media. The role of journalists is defined primarily by their involvement in the dialogued solution of the conflict, where they can perform as specialized mediators according to the original model of de Laue and Cormick (1978) or the advocacy wave of peace journalism (Hanitzsch 2007).

Nonetheless, the contribution of conflict transformation may also be understood from a broader perspective, such as from the perspective proposed by Mitchell (2014), where a grouping of society becomes involved to seek an exit to the conflict. In this sense, third party interveners who transform conflict, according to Kriesberg and Dayton (2012) exist in other institutions—in our case, the media—which may perform contributing roles. In other words, they media may be an actor that does not mediate yet creates conditions for conflict transformation. This actor may provide a contribute perspective by seeking alternative solutions, generating space for communication, sharing ideas, calling for conflict reduction, or supporting dialogue processes, without committing to the results.

The media generates a vision of conflict that influences its dynamics, which is different in socio-environmental conflicts over war-based conflicts, where the media plays a greater political interlocutor role. The selection of facts and actor by the journalist catalyze government and corporate actions, to the degree in which their reputational value and political popularity are at risk.

Political regulation has a significant role in the coverage of socio-environmental conflict, as it influences how governments will intervene and whether the governments will act forcibly or engage in dialogue, which will later influence their legitimacy within public opinion.

On the other side, we observe that part of the literature is focused on how the media plays a primary role in conflict, such as a party or actor with active and conscious agency in achieving combative objectives. Nonetheless, cases where media present hateful discourse and take an active role in escalating a conflict may result in extreme war contexts, such as Rwanda or Serbia (Metzl, 1997; Gowing, 1997) or in Africa, where tribal combats contribute to a loss in autonomy (Gasana, 2002; Panos, 2006).

Nonetheless, socio-environmental conflicts, generally, occur in democratic frames, where media coverage supports or strengthens the primary parties to improve their position within the conflict or weaken the opposition, delegitimizing their demands or personal characteristics. As affirmed by Morris (2018), secondary actors may block initiatives or promote coercive interventions. The way in which the media and journalists perform secondary roles in juxtaposition to the primary parties to the conflict can be labeled as *partisan perspectives*.

Socio-environmental conflict coverage is multidimensional, in which analysis distinguishes war journalism from peace journalism; we presume partisan frames and contributory frames are developed and that both may be present in the same news. Indicators are present throughout the duration of the conflict, not only during the escalation phase.

Lederach (2007) argues that one key element to conflict transformation is the process in which both parties interact in relation to the problems which separate them. In socio-environmental conflicts, these dynamics may intensify, escalating the conflict and rupturing communication.

Peleg (2006) argues that the media may fulfill an important role in the dynamics of conflict escalation and de-escalation, generating critical mass in favor of transformation. According to Wolfsfeld (2001), during conflict, the media may create a favorable climate for peace that involves a dialogue with both parties, secondary supportive actors, and public opinion.

Additionally, the media may exert pressure to develop processes that reduce escalation and diminish what Pruitt, Rubin, and Kim (1994) deem, "structural changes," over conflict dynamics that were considered "intractable" and difficult to change. Actors key to reducing conflict intensifying dynamics, develop and transfer the regulation of delegitimizing discourse, stereotyping, and dehumanization of the media (Burguess, 2003). Similarly, the media may help parties to the conflict informally communicate, seek common ground, or humanize each other.

A critical review of indicators for Peace Journalism implies a need to reform the original indicators developed by Galtung and Lynch and McGoldrick and adapt them to socio-environmental conflicts, based on theoretical frameworks of conflict transformation using frame analysis.

3.- Methodology

The present study focuses on the media's contributory frames in facilitating socio-environmental conflict transformation and partisan frames to increase conflict and hinder dialogue. We will analyze national and regional media coverage of communication between population and extractive industries in three socio-environmental conflicts. The research follows the guidelines raised by the following questions:

- RQ1 Are partisan or contributory frames predominant in journalistic coverage of socio-environmental conflicts?
Are partisan or contributory frames predominant in analyzed journalistic coverage of socio-environmental conflicts?
- RQ2 Are partisan and contributory frames presented differently throughout the conflict stages?
- RQ3 Do partisan and contributory frames vary significantly between local and national coverage over proximity and knowledge of local populations?

Journalistic coverage of different socio-environmental conflicts was qualitatively analyzed to construct indicators (see Table 3) for partisan and contributory frames (Macassi, 2011). In a second instance, frames were developed based on the critical revision of "peace journalism" by Galtung (2005), Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) and on the journalistic conflict-sensitive proposals (Howard, 2002), as well as manuals to develop projects of peace with the use of the media (Adam and Thamotheram, 1996). The indicators that were constructed in both frames can be observed in Table 3.

Contribution frames	Partisan frames
Contextualizes, analyzes the origin or cause of the conflict	Blames, accuses actors and highlights mistakes
Is a bridge for communication between parties	Delegitimizes actions and discourses of individuals and collectives
Demands intervention and authority intervention	Dehumanizes
Appeals, promotes calm, distension, non-violent	Polarizes, has black and white perspective
Supports, evokes action of dialogue and mediation of third parties	Uses stereotypes and stigmatizes
Promotes or entices ideas and solutions	Expresses or incites punitive discourse
Follows, supervises the process of dialogue or agreement	Proves pessimistic and negative toward a solution
Discourse or language in favor of solving the conflict	Threatens, sanctions, and confronts
Preventative discourse or language	Favors or supports one side of the conflict
	Discourse or language that contributes to a larger conflict

Table 3: Indicators of partisan frames and contribution frames

For the partisan frames index, 15 indicators were analyzed, from which 5 were excluded, as they did not report reliability with the other items, leaving us with 10 indicators that contained 0.8 of Cronbach's alpha. For the contributory frames, 15 items were analyzed, 6 of which were excluded, leaving us with 9 indicators obtaining a low 0.53 of Cronbach's alpha. However, these indicators were used because they were theoretically consistent with the studies and revised analyses.

While contributory and partisan frames are not mutually exclusive, coding was conducted separately. Initially, each news coverage was analyzed to determine whether indicators from one frame was present and a second analysis was conducted of the other frame. In a sample of 1080 news reports, we found that 50 (6.6%) contained both contributory and partisan frames. In the small sample of double frame news articles, we did not analyze whether differences existed in the conflict lifecycle or type of media.

The double frames sample contained 11 media entities; five national (El Comercio, La República, Correo, Diario La Primera, and, RPP digital) and six regional (Panorama de Cajamarca, Radio 1 de Tacna, Diario la Voz, Diario Noticias, Correo regional, and, la República Regional de Arequipa). The three cases studied included 167 days of analysis: 57 days for the "Minas Conga," mining project, 50 days for the "Tía María," mining project, and 60 days for the "Toquepala" conflict. A total of 167 examples were analyzed over a temporal observation period of 107 days.

Furthermore, we included an analysis of the national media in comparison with the local media under the assumption that coverage could differ, considering Lee, Maslog & Kim's (2006) documentation. We assumed that geographical proximity of the local media to the communities in conflict could favor development of contributory roles, which in contrast can signify lesser coverage over a larger distance (Ahmed et al, 2018).

For the frame measuring, we followed the methodological principal proposed by Matthes and Kohring (2008:263) in which the frames, "are patterns in a text, being composed of various elements. Instead of directly codifying the entire frame, we suggested dividing the frame into separate elements." Thus, news reports can contain more than one frame, presently allowing there to be more than one indicator in the news, expressing numerically the intensity of its frame or its absence if it is 0.

A total of 1008 news reports were analyzed; 734 of which reports were on the "Minas Conga" mining project, 147 cases of the conflict in "Toquepala," and 199 of the conflict in "Tía María." To analyze the news reports, a quantitative observation protocol was developed that capacitated and trained students in the lecture of the news and in the completion of the file. The files were processed in SPSS V24.

Sample analysis contemplated the stages of conflict for the three cases, under the premise that coverage can differ according to the conflict stage. Conflict stages express the "changing perceptions and attitudes of the parties involved, and of qualitatively different patterns of interactions between the parties." (Glasl, 1982:21). Stages studied were emergence, escalation, crisis, de-escalation and re-latent, based on classifications by Brahm, (2003), Pruitt (2009) and Huamani, (2012b).

In the emergence stage, a conflict is manifested following an initial incubation period, where persuasive, sanctions, and hostile acts surge between parties. Discourse and behavior reflect competing interests between parties. Parties endeavor to publicize the conflict before officials, expressing their positions or delegitimizing the opposing party (Frère and Wilen, 2015). This stage offers opportunities for early interventions (Wohfeld, 2010).

According to Mitchell (2014), the escalation stage occurs when one or both parties develop actions (behavioral factor) to achieve their objectives or persuade the other party to desist. Escalation involves increasingly influential means, particularly though coercive or punitive tactics (Fisher, 2006:184).

Mitchell (2014) finds that this phase occurs when each party's position solidifies, establishing unwillingness to concede or negotiate. This phase is marked by amplification of disputed issues and entry of additional actors with similar interests join, expanding the original geographic limits to the conflict. Pruitt et al. (1994) highlights the increased polarization in this period, which reduces opportunities for dialogue.

The crisis stage is characterized by actions and demonstrations of force or open violence. High stress and tension increase socio-emotive dynamics, leading to potential extremes of hatefulness, dehumanization, and cruelty. In the observed cases, indefinite protests led to seizure of roads, public facilities, and damages to public and private properties, as well as police repression. This situation led to a loss of governance, rule of law, and human lives.

The de-escalation stage occurs after a critical point, after which actions diminish in intensity. Third-party intervention is key to overcome the crisis stage and guide the conflict (Frère and Wilen, 2015). Negotiation processes a) limit the escalation of the conflict and intervene to ensure those limitations (Kriesberg, 1998), or b) diffuse the situation to avoid greater violence. Conditions are created to normalize public life, economics, society, and restore public order.

The re-latent stage follows a de-escalation stage (with or without a crisis), where the conflict has failed to be guided through dialogue, transformed, or ceased to overcome structural violence (Wohfeld, 2010). Psychological dynamics persist, where the parties continue to maintain competing objectives in relation to the substantive conflict issues. Coercive actions are diminished, yet re-escalation conditions are present.

Three socio-environmental conflicts, occurring between February 2011-February 2012, were selected for generating strong social impact in governance and the extractive industry sector. These cases were the "Tía María" mining project in Arequipa, the "Minas Conga" mining project in Cajamarca, and, "La Ampliación de la Concentradora Toquepala" in Tacna.

The "Tía María" conflict case emerged from population opposition to the Southern Peru Copper Corporation project. The open pit copper and gold mine in the "El Tambo" valley in Arequipa had received an investment of \$1,300,000. The *Valle del Tambo Defense Front* was a group of agriculture and mill workers who opposed project development in 2009. This conflict has undergone different phases, the most severe being the 2011-2015 phase. Our analysis begins in February 2011, when the conflict emerges, and ends in April 2011 with the annulment of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure.

The population's opposition towards Southern is based on distrust from their previous operations in southern Peru, as well as their weak community-relations engagement. Diverse institutions, including the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) conducted the EIA, increasing critiques and fears of contamination in the Valle del Tambo, where agroexport are the predominant economic sector.

The analyzed period begins with oppositional stances against the project, followed by a provincial strike that mobilized local populations to seize highways, an effort supported by populations in the regional capital. These activities were responded by intense police repression, which led to the death of 3 people, XXX injuries, burned buses, and economic losses.

The "Conga" conflict case was the opposition to the Yanacocha and Newmont mining project, an open pit copper and gold operation with \$4,800,000 invested. The opposition groups were led by regional governments in Cajamarca and involved urban and agricultural organizations throughout the region. The conflict initiated in 2011 and continued to re-surge until 2019. Our media analysis encompasses November 2011, during which ministries visited, and ends in December 2011, during which the presidential cabinet was replaced, as well as including a period of re-latency in April, 2011.

The conflict emerges over the corporation's use of four lakes, where the project is to take place. According to the EIA, minerals would be extracted from Lakes Mala and Perol, and their water rediverted to three artificial reservoirs; the other two lakes, Azul and Chica, would be used as deposits for extracted material. Opposition to the Conga project is based on the company's weak environmental record and engagement practices. An additional concern was that the mining operations would impact deltas, which fed into rivers that serviced cities and agricultural activity.

The Toquepala conflict emerged over opposition to the expansion of an old mine and new construction in Candarave in Tacna. Toquepala is an open pit copper and lead mine owned by Southern, which expected an investment of \$750,000,000.

The Candarave population opposed construction of the mineral-processing plant to over fears of lead pollution in local agricultural water. Additionally, the population feared that an increase in tailings deposits in the Quebrada Honda would present a threat to the environment.

This conflict began in 2011 and finished with the 2014 EIA approval. The study analyzed a period starting in August, 2011, where demonstrators protested, continuing through September 2011, with violence between police and protestors, and ending in October, 2011, with a regional strike. The analysis also included a conflict re-latency in February, 2012.

4.- Findings and analysis

In contrast to coverage of war conflicts, coverage of socio-environmental conflicts involves many aspects, such as issues, political coverage, administrative processes, mining project characteristics, and environmental components. Due to this, the majority of referenced news on studied socio-environmental conflicts does not present a partisan or contributory frame (see table 4).

Domestic news coverage uses short formats, or minor informative notes; the majority of cases presented describe events with minor elaboration or without a definitive frame, or at least in the frames we have been studying.

In regard to the news reports where the frames that we are analyzing are present, we have found partisan frames to be salient (36.3% see table 4), while the contributory frames are only present 18.9% during coverage of analyzed socio-environmental conflicts (see table 4).

Coverage of studied conflicts tends to mostly generate negative conditions for the solution of conflicts, and rarely chose to facilitate conditions for conflict transformation. Regardless, it is of note that 1 in every 5 news reports includes contributory frames, which minor, but helps construct alternative approaches to conflict management.

	Contribution frames		Partisan frames	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Without frames	876	81,1	688	63,7
With frame	204	18,9	392	36,3
Total	1080	100	1080	100

Table 4: Frequency of the contribution and partisan frames in environmental conflicts (n = 1080)

In regard to the second question of the study, socio-environmental conflicts in contrast with war conflicts, have different lifecycles, where crisis periods tend to be shorter and emergence and re-latent periods longer. In the current study, we observe the quantity of news that has been published over time that lasts and conflict that evolves over the states (see Table 5). The attention that news provides conflicts is heightened during moments of open violence.

Social conflicts, from the perspective of conflict transformation, emerge from parties' competing positions with each other, particularly with access to their environment and use of resources that satisfy their material and symbolic need (Burton, 1990; Rubenstein, 2001). The conflict not only involves the stages of the conflict, but also the analysis of states and relativity to understand the preventative role of news coverage.

The results demonstrate that more news is published with a partisan frame during states of escalation, crisis, and de-escalation (see Table 5), while the emergence stages are published less using this frame.

Under this perspective, we can understand the coverage of socio-environmental conflicts that analyze the lifecycle of conflicts as not simply moments of violence, which usually occurs during studies on war conflict coverage.

Partisan frame	Stages of the socioenvironmental conflict				
	Emergence	Escalation	Crisis	De-Escalation	Re-Latent
Without frame	78,8	59,4	58,3	65,2	71,0
With frame	21,2	40,6	41,7	34,8	29,0
Total %	100	100	100	100	100
n (with frame)	7	86	156	55	88

Table 5: Partisan frame by stages of the socio-environmental conflict (n = 1080, ** = p < 0,01).

Chi Square = 16,7**, Contingency coefficient = 0,12**.

As noted in table 6, we find that the contributory frame of socio-environmental conflicts is proportionally more present during emergence, escalation, and re-latent stages. In contrast, they are found less throughout crisis or de-escalation stages.

These results are explained during latency and escalation stages due to public discussion over legitimacy of demands, conflict causes and roots, and the necessity of dialog to avoid a conflict re-emergence. This process mobilizes opinion, public discussion, and social media, which create alerts to avoid crisis.

Public discussion is most intense in the re-latent stage, where contributory frames are used with similar frequency as partisan frames. They usually publish more reports and analysis over the causes of conflicts and the participation of analysts to discuss relative politics of businesses and government conflict management.

Contributive frame	Stages of the socioenvironmental conflict				
	Emergence	Escalation	Crisis	De-Escalation	Re-Latent
Without frames	78,8	80,7	87,4	82,9	72,9
With frame	21,2	19,3	12,6	17,1	27,1
Total %	100	100	100	100	100
n (with frame)	7	41	47	27	82

Table 6: Contributive frame by stages of the socio-environmental conflict (n = 1080, ** = p < 0,01).

Chi Square = 23,4** Contingency coefficient = 0,14**

To address the third question of the study, we analyze the regional media and the difference between them, as well as the capital media and national media. The principal advantage of the regional media, in comparison with the capital media, is their proximity to the place, participants, and population affected by conflict dynamics. The premise that proximity facilitated development of regional media was that the contributory frames were preferred over the partisan frames.

The results demonstrate that the capital media more frequently uses frames that contribute to the solution of the conflict over the regional media, as shown in Table 7.

The results demonstrate the regional news' weakness, as their publishing market is not dynamic, and consists of a lack of journalist specialization and resources to investigate or publish.

The media based on national news coverage is more specialized and has abundant resources for journalistic investigation. These publications will be exposed to a mass of critics, which will be obligate entities to develop different angles and perspectives, which are contributory frames.

The partisan frames are more present in capital news coverage than in the regional media coverage. The use of these frames is more frequent than the contribution frames, which demonstrates a proportion of media using dialogue to address the conflict.

In summary, the proximity of the regional media to the place of conflict isn't expressed in the number of news centered around the analysis of the cause of the conflict or in the calls for dialogue, but in the regional news involvement of second actors, generally in favor of communities, but that escalate the dynamic or the conflict.

	Contribution frames		Partisan frames	
	National media %	Regional media%	National media %	Regional media %
Without frames	73,0	88,5	60,3	66,8
With frame	27,0	11,5	39,7	33,2
Total %	100	100	100	100
n (With frame)	139	65	204	188
Chi Square	17,01*		42,6**	

Table 7: Frequency of the contribution and partisan frames by national and regional media (n=1080, * = $p < 0,05$, ** = $p < 0,01$).

To measure the intensity of the partisan and contributory frames that cover the socio-environmental conflicts, we are able to differentiate the indicators for each of the frames.

We've found that the contributory frames are more intensely used by the national media than the regional media. Yet there is no evidence that the media significantly uses the partisan frames with more intensity in regard to national media than regional media (See table 8).

	Contribution frames		Partisan frames	
	Mean	D. S.	Mean	D. S.
National Media	0,43	0,84	0,99	1,63
Regional Media	0,18	0,58	0,83	1,49
Mean diferencies	0,25**		0,17	

Table 8: Independent t-test of national and regional media by contribution and partisan frames (n=1080, ** = $p < 0,01$).

Despite recorded data confirming the tendency of the media to concentrate in partisan roles, it is necessary to discuss and highlight contributory roles (see Table 6), as even small contributions demonstrate that it is possible for the media to facilitate to dialogues of socio-environmental conflicts.

5.- Conclusions

The presence of partisan frames is predominant in the coverage of socio-environmental conflicts, but nevertheless, there is a significant presence of contributory frames which are published across both medias. We consider it important in during the preceding years of three analyzed conflicts, where a significant preventative focus was not developed. In locations where journalist trainings for informative conflict coverage were infrequent, state infrastructure for peace was not developed (Huamaní et al, 2012).

On the other hand, analysis of both frames, contrasted with the socio-environmental conflict lifecycles, demonstrated the need to distinguish between journalistic coverage over the conflict stages.

In the case of socio-environmental conflicts, while the period of open violence tends to be brief, prior and posterior debate is held applying contributory and partisan frames. The previous crisis stages are key to generating public opinion over the government conflict management. During de-escalation stage, there tends to be dialogue tables where contributory frames are most important.

If we solely focus on the conflict's crisis stage, we will see that contributory frames are limited, as well as the role of political regulation; the contributory frame is focused on legitimacy and not public demands or gradual use of police force. Analysis of the socio-environmental conflict lifecycle is key to understanding how the media will respond to different dynamics and the role that they play to positively or negatively influence these dynamics (Strohm, 1999).

When we observe the regional media aggravating the conflict, the capital media tends to use frames in a similar measure.

Regardless, the majority of contributory frames in the national media is counterintuitive. This is explained by two reasons: The first is that the regional media is involved in the conflict as secondary actors, which means they participate or assume adversarial roles to delegitimize, confront, or encourage the use of force actors involved in the conflict. Regional media may feel affected by the threat of contamination or perceive the protest as discouraging investment or threatening to destabilize the regional economy.

This can also be explained by institutional weaknesses and the regional media's precarious sustainability, which is less competitive, underdeveloped, and pressured by businesses, advertisers, or by more influential groups. In other words, as mentioned by other authors, journalistic production conditions (Shinar 2013) may complicate forms of confrontation produced in the news (Mitra 2016).

Additionally, we believe that regional media does not fully understand the conflicts, as they address these conflicts as political issues, and they denounce the permanent confrontation between politics and authorities. Local journalism lacks the ability to denounce government management or highlight investigation results to confront the conflict complexity in a constructive manner.

Chronologically, the regional media is the first area where conflict emerges and expands to become widespread among actors and geographic spaces. When the conflict is covered nationally, local polarization has been consolidated, and the regional media are already involved in conflict dynamics, and their publication dynamics push the outlet into a position in favor or against these actors.

The regional media, unlike the national media, lack the necessary distance to approach the conflict with an ideological or economic lens, as they demonstrate false disjunctives between private investment or communities. On the other hand, the national media has the distance to search for a middle ground and develop journalism that supports a dialogue for socio-environmental conflicts.

The indicators of the analyzed frames are a set of strategies for news construction by diverse journalists and active mediators throughout the world, which can be used as intervention tools of third-party mediators in social conflicts. We believe that they create a first comprehensive media approach for engaging coverage with a different perspective, which helps create conditions for conflict transformation and dialogue opportunities.

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